

# THE QUEST

A Quarterly Review.

Edited by G. R. S. Mead.

Vol. XII.

OCTOBER, 1920.

No. 1.

Reason and Dogma	- - -	Edwyn Bevan, M.A.	1
Shakti: The World as Power	- - -	Sir John Woodroffe	24
George Tyrrell's Letters	- - -	H. C. Corrance, B.A.	40
Boehme's Standpoint	- - -	C. J. Barker	52
M. Schure's Forecast	- - -	Col. B. R. Ward, C.M.G.	66
Plotinus and Plato	- - -	K. S. Guthrie, Ph.D.	75
Some Problems of the Subconscious	- - -	L. M. Corry	82
Astrology as a World Concept	- - -	S. E. Hall	99
The Gentile Surround of Early Christendom	- - -	The Editor	116
Reviews and Notices	- - -	- - -	133

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# THE QUEST

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## REASON AND DOGMA.

EDWYN BEVAN, M.A.

THERE is, I suppose, no statement which has been commoner in theology than that the truths of religion are not amenable to human 'reason.' "The thing is certain just because it is impossible"—the defiant outburst of Tertullian 1700 years ago. "A fool is he who hopes that our reason can run along the infinite road pursued by One Substance in Three Persons"—words which Dante puts into the mouth of his Virgil. And it is not only within the Christian Church that such things have been said. Tertullian after all was only echoing the arguments of the pre-Christian pagan scepticism which had defended the practice of the old religion, with all its apparent absurdities, by throwing doubt on the validity of reason. And in our own day we know of anti-intellectualist forms of philosophy which discredit reason as against feeling and instinct, and so offer a tempting alliance to the Christian apologist—an alliance of which some Christians have not been slow to avail themselves—whether wisely or



not, is the question. I have heard of modern Indians defending their traditional religious practices and beliefs against Christian criticism on similar lines.

It appears to me that both those who attack religious doctrines in the name of 'reason,' and those who defend them by discrediting 'reason,' habitually use this term without any clear conception of what they mean by it. "Reason," they say, "teaches one thing; dogma affirms the contrary." Reason, I submit, on the other hand, teaches us nothing at all—or rather it teaches us only one thing which cannot by itself conflict with any religious or anti-religious dogma.

Perhaps we ought first to notice that the alleged conflict between reason and religious dogmas is of two kinds. There are first the cases in which the propositions maintained by the Church are said to involve in themselves or between each other a logical absurdity or self-contradiction. The doctrine of the Trinity, as stated in the Athanasian creed, is the typical example. There are, secondly, cases in which the religious dogma affirms that a particular event took place, whereas reason, it is said, teaches that such an event did not take place. These cases are comprised under the term 'miracles.' They must be carefully distinguished from cases of the first kind. The proposition here does not involve any conception which is in itself unintelligible or self-contradictory. There is no *logical* absurdity in the proposition, A Virgin bore a son, or A Man walked on the water. These propositions have a perfectly clear meaning and present to our apprehension a consistent picture. Only, as a matter of fact, reason teaches—so we are told—that these events did not take place.

What I want to speak more particularly about is the supposed conflict between reason and dogma in the sphere of earthly events, the question of miracles.

What is 'reason'? If we use the term in the proper sense, it is the consistency between the different factors of experience or the mental activity by which we apprehend that consistency. The one and only thing that reason teaches is: "There is a consistency between the factors of experience, whatever they may be." But it says nothing at all as to what the factors of experience, as a matter of fact, are. Because we are reasonable beings, we are sure, to start with, that there is a consistency between all the factors of our experience, if only we can find it. And so, since our experience, as it comes to us, often seems chaotic, our reason never rests till we have discovered the scheme which makes our experience a consistent whole. The problem is always being renewed, because new bits of experience are always coming to us, and very often the new bit won't at all fit into the scheme we have ready. Then the scheme has to be modified and re-made to take in the new *datum*. Our convictions about the universe at any moment are the result of our piecemeal experience as worked up and co-ordinated by our reason. We express these convictions in definite statements. Of course in one way the convictions and the statements expressing them go beyond our experience. They give, not only experience we have actually had, but the logical scheme we have devised to hold together the different bits of our experience. That scheme is a framework, part of which is filled with actual experience, part of which is hypothetical construction, bridging over the gaps, an empty framework, into which we believe that experience would have fitted, if

we had had an opportunity of putting things to proof by direct perception at that point, or that fresh experience will fit when it comes. Sometimes, when it comes, it does fit straight away into the framework. Then our rational scheme is, so far, verified. Sometimes it refuses to fit. Then it shows that our scheme has been in part constructed of false hypothesis.

It is no doubt in this sense that some people describe a particular religious doctrine as contrary to 'reason.' They imply that they know well enough all the *data* of experience out of which the belief was made, and hence are able to affirm confidently that the belief was wrongly made, not according to the laws of sound logic. But what if the difference of the belief in question from their own belief is not due to the logical machine having worked differently upon the same *data*, but to its having worked upon different *data*, upon another mass of experience? If there is any possibility of this, of *data* having come in which lie outside the range of their experience, or of *data* which, though they are within their experience, they have failed to attend to or appreciate, then we might expect them to show some diffidence in affirming that the belief is unreasonable. And when we are dealing with religious belief, with belief as to the inner reality of the universe, it seems somewhat bold to assume that there can be no *data* before anyone else except those included in the range of one's own individual experience.

All around the little experience of each one of us, the little number of things we remember having seen and heard and felt, is a vast world of things existing and happening. We are immensely concerned to know



something of this environment, because it is obvious that the significance of our own small lives and the right conduct of our own lives depend upon the context of our lives in the world as a whole. If we could never have any knowledge of anything except what we individually have experienced, we should be like people in a closed motor-car at night, lit up inside but rushing on without any light to pierce the surrounding darkness; a wreck would come very soon. As a matter of fact, the greatest number of things which fill our consciousness, which make up our world, are things we have never directly experienced; we are conscious, for instance, of London with its millions of lives all round us, and England round London, and the world with its problems, impoverished Europe, Bolshevik Russia, India, China, outside England. It is important to us to know thousands of things we can never directly experience. How do we get from the limited *data* of our experience to a knowledge of what lies outside of it? It is here reason comes in. Although reason by itself tells us nothing, if you give reason the *data* of our experience to operate with, it takes us beyond them by applying to them its one doctrine: "The universe, or experience as a whole, is consistent." Our experience is part of a world-wide pattern, and we can therefore infer from the part we have seen what the rest is which we have not seen.

Wherever there is uniform recurrence, as in a row of columns, there is a pattern. In our own personal experience we discover from babyhood onwards numberless uniformities—the effect of burning when we put anything into the fire, the sinking of the stone and the floating of the stick in water. Whenever we have registered a uniformity we take this to be one of the

characteristics of the world-pattern and assume that it holds good all over the rest of the world which we have not seen.

And now note that we are continually from babyhood correcting our theory of the pattern according to fresh experience. We find it to be a much less simple pattern than we took it at first to be. The baby, let us say, starts with the theory that the combination of a certain colour of complexion with the human form is part of the world-pattern; he supposes, on the basis of experience, that all men are white. Then he is shown by his nurse a picture of black men. This conflicts with his reason in the same sense in which the statement that a man rose from the dead conflicts with our reason; that is to say, it conflicts with his experience. Two alternatives are before the child. Either (1) there is not a pattern at all, the universe is irrational, or (2) the theory he had formed of the pattern must be corrected. Having reason deep in his mental constitution, the child instinctively chooses the latter. And he can amend his theory of the pattern in two ways. The trouble, remember, is that two uniformities he had observed in his experience conflict if they are both extended as universal laws of the pattern beyond his experience. One uniformity is that what his nurse has hitherto told him has turned out to be true, the other is that men are white. Either therefore the simple law, My nanny speaks the truth, must be replaced by the more complicated law, My nanny speaks the truth only in certain circumstances, or the simple law, All men are white, must be replaced by the more complicated law, Men are white or black according to circumstances. The child holds as firmly as ever to the essential faith of reason: "There is a pattern";

but he has discovered that the pattern is not as simple a one as he had supposed.

Just in this way we can only affirm certainly what events could or could not take place outside the limits of our experience, if we have a complete theory of the pattern of the universe. If it were true to say, The belief that a man rose from the dead is against reason, that could only mean, Any one who asserts that a man rose from the dead, implies thereby that there is no pattern at all; he denies that the universe is rational. But it is nonsense to say that all those who believe that a man rose from the dead, believe that the universe has no pattern at all. They only hold that the pattern of the universe is more complex than it is held to be by the men who think that the uniformities observed within a certain range of experience are sufficient to give a theory of the whole.

Now it is so obvious that none of us can ever claim to have a complete and final theory of the world-pattern, that all attacks upon the belief in miracles on the ground that they are 'against reason' are foolish. Stories of miracles do not conflict with reason; what they conflict with is a large mass of human experience. This does not prove them to be untrue, because the mass of experience upon which modern natural science is based, although very large, is infinitely smaller than the universe. But it does prevent people accepting the stories of miracles as true, if we can account for these stories existing without being obliged to modify in any particular the theory of the world-pattern which we have hitherto formed on the basis of ordinary common-sense experience. You will remember that when the baby was first told about black men, he had the alternatives of adjusting his theory of the universe



to the new fact, either by supposing that black men really existed or by supposing that his nurse was not speaking the truth. Similarly here we have the fact : certain human witnesses declare that such and such miraculous events took place. We can deal with this fact either by supposing that the witnesses do not give a true account, or by supposing that the pattern of the universe is really such as to include events of that kind. Now it seems to a large number of people to-day that the first way of dealing with these stories is much simpler than the second.

The real attack upon miraculous stories to-day is not made by metaphysics or by physical science, whose theories are so plainly imperfect and provisional that they cannot possibly claim to give a final and complete theory of the world-pattern. The real attack is made by psychology and anthropology. For these sciences claim to show how naturally the stories would arise under certain individual and social conditions of mind, even if the events they allege never took place. They do not attempt to prove that the events *could not* have taken place ; all they purport to do is to take the value out of the testimony that they did take place.

This state of the case is ignored both by those people who go on talking against the belief in miracles on the ground that they are 'against reason,' and by Christian apologists who take great pains to prove that there is no valid metaphysical or scientific reason why such events should not take place. This is to defend a position at a point where the repulse of an attack is easy, after the real attack has shifted to another quarter. The question is: Are these stories more easily accounted for by the hypothesis that they are true or by the hypothesis that they were due to decep-

tion or mistake? It is possible to conceive testimony so strong that it would be reasonable to accept it, even if it involved our adopting a theory of the world-pattern which we should never have formed on the basis of our personal experience alone and the personal experience of all living people known to us. Is the testimony supporting any miraculous story of this strength? In spite of the explanations offered by modern psychology and anthropology, there are still people who answer this question, in the case of some miraculous stories, by Yes. But there are two different accounts given of this strength of the testimony, and we must carefully distinguish them. According to one account the testimony is strong because, if we take it just as a human testimony and apply the common-sense rules of evidence to it, it is convincing in spite of the exceptional character of the event alleged. That is to say, to suppose the testimony false would involve a worse disturbance of our present theory of the world-pattern, because it would imply such a departure from all our present ideas of human psychology, than the disturbance involved in the supposition that the event alleged really took place. To take, for instance, the narrative of Christ's rising from the dead. It is easier, this argument says, to suppose that His dead body really was re-animated than to suppose that the account in our documents rests upon illusion or fraud. It was on this ground presumably that Seeley, in *Ecce Homo*, referred to the Resurrection of Christ as an event for which there was convincing historical evidence. Seeley spoke as a historian, not as a Christian, for his own theory of the universe seems to have differed materially from the Christian one. The other account given of the strength of the testimony

is that it is strong because it is divinely inspired. Whether it is strong or not, as judged by the ordinary rules of human evidence, you must accept it because it is given on the authority of God Himself, speaking through the Bible or through the Church ; you must accept it by faith.

Well, with regard to the first argument, is it true that the testimony to such miracles as the resurrection of the body of Christ or His walking upon the water or His multiplication of the loaves is so strong, just as human testimony, that to accept them as having really happened is the easiest hypothesis? Personally I cannot see that it is. If you took, for example, the narratives of Christ's Resurrection just as the Society for Psychical Research takes documents submitted to it, I cannot think that they would appear first-class documents. In the first place there are the obvious discrepancies between the different accounts ; in the second place, there is the impossibility of putting further questions to the witnesses. Both these things would be serious detractions from the value of the testimony from the point of view of the Society for Psychical Research. And even if you ultimately inclined upon the basis of the documents to accept the fact alleged as true, all you would have got would be a balance of probabilities ; you could never verify your conclusion. But you can hardly take as a basic fact in your religion something which you regard as on the whole rather more likely to have happened than not.

Yet while we admit that the truth of these events can never be satisfactorily established on a simple balance of probabilities, we must recognize, I think, that there is no such clear balance of probability *against*



them as rationalists would make out. For remember the rationalist contention is : Because in the limited field of experience which we can verify, we never find events of this kind, therefore the probability against such events ever having occurred is overwhelming. But the theory of those who believe in them, is not that they are ordinary events ; they are not events which, on this theory, *would* occur in normal human experience. The fact therefore that they are not found in ordinary experience can hardly be urged against the theory ; there is no reason why they should be found. Take the story of Christ's walking on the water. Supposing it is true that some spiritual or psychic power exists which under certain rare and peculiar conditions counteracts the force of gravitation, the *data* before us to-day are just the *data* we should on that supposition expect to find. We should expect, that is, to find occasional testimony to such events having taken place in the case of some extraordinary personalities, and we should expect such testimony to be rare and very difficult to verify. We have, remember, the alleged phenomenon of 'levitation,' which seems to have a certain body of testimony in favour of its having occurred at various times and in various parts of the world. It is difficult to say that probability is either against or for these stories, because the conditions under which they are stated to have occurred, are not conditions we can reconstruct at will, and the negative result of ordinary experience cannot therefore be urged against them.

The only way, it seems to me, in which the stories of miraculous events in the past can receive decisive confirmation, is by manifestation of the same, or a similar, power in immediate experience ; apart from

that, no argument as to probabilities takes us much farther. Supposing you could have in our own day some thoroughly verified case of levitation, the story of Christ's walking on the water would receive an immense accession of probability. There are Christians who believe that the same spiritual power which operated in an extraordinary way upon the material world in the case of Christ and some of the saints in former times, ought to be permanently resident in the Church, if the Church was as it should be. We have in these stories instances of a spiritual power which men of faith ought to exert to-day. If that is so, the historical truth of these stories is important. If on the other hand we believe that the power of working what are called 'miracles' has long ago ceased, then I do not see that it is of any practical consequence whether the old stories are true or not. Supposing the stories of Christ's stilling the storm and feeding the multitude *were* true, they could in that case be of edification to us to-day simply as figures of what we may expect Christ to do here and now—that is, still our inward spiritual conflicts and feed us with spiritual food. But, as figures, the stories would serve their purpose equally well whether they were literally true or not.

Those who say that the truth of the miracles in question must be accepted by faith, hold so far a stronger position than those who base belief in them on a calculation of probabilities. A very large amount of our beliefs about the world we hold by trust in the testimony of particular persons. If we have reason to believe that the authority in a certain case is trustworthy, unquestionably to accept it is the most rational thing to do. The critical question here is: What

justification is there for the initial act of faith? What is its relation to reason?

I think we must recognize that at the basis of all religion there is an act of faith. So, in a sense, there is at the basis of all rationalist theory with regard to things we have not directly experienced. In both cases we make a leap from our immediate experience, from the fragment of the world-pattern we have seen, to a belief in what is there beyond the field of our vision. In rationalist inference we make the leap in the trust that laws or uniformities we have discovered in the little bit of the pattern we have seen, hold good over all the rest. You can never prove that the universe is rational, because all such argument would be a begging of the question to start with. Our belief that the universe is rational, the pre-supposition of all rationalism, is itself an act of faith.

At the basis of religion is another act of faith: the belief that the universe is rational in another sense—in the sense in which we describe an action as rational when it has a reasonable end, when it is worth doing. The faith of religion is that the good we discover or know in the human spirit, is that for which the universe exists. If, for instance, spirit, and all the good and beauty it recognizes, came in the process of time to an utter end with the extinction of life on the planet, the world would be without meaning. If the world is to have a meaning, the spirit tells us that certain things *ought* to be; the faith of religion is that they *are*. The belief in the coincidence of what *ought* to be with what *is* is the religious act of faith: you cannot prove it; neither can you disprove it.

Why should we make any leap at all, why not confine ourselves to the little bit of reality we have

seen? The answer is that we are not only spectators of reality, we are also makers of reality. When we *act*, we create a new bit of reality. If we were merely spectators—minds suspended in space looking on inactive at the world-process—we might, so far as I can see, be purely agnostic. We might abstain from making any guess as to the part of the pattern, if pattern there is, not yet disclosed to us, and simply wait and see what happened. But we are under the necessity of doing something in the world, of making our own new contribution to reality. Even if we resolved to sit absolutely still till we died, if we did die (for if we are purely agnostic we must not affirm that death will necessarily be the consequence of abstinence from food), that would be a sort of conduct chosen by an act of will. The movement of time compels us, whether we want to or not, to act. But for action we need to form some hypothesis as to the universe in which we act, as to what lies beyond the range of previous experience. It is before the compulsion to act that all pure agnosticism breaks down.

The religious man bases his action on the hypothesis that the universe is such as to realize in the long run the good which is revealed to him in the human spirit, that spirit, and not matter, is the really dominant thing in the universe. His faith is an act of trust in the universe, and, if he is convinced, as most religious men are, that without God the good he recognizes could not be realized, that life could not have a meaning, then his act of trust in the universe may be also called an act of trust in God. He chooses this hypothesis, not because it is the only one which is logically possible on the *data* before him, but because



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[P.T.O.]

it appears to him, as a spiritual being, the worthiest of all possible hypotheses to live by. Our faith is not what we are prepared to demonstrate by argument, but what we are prepared to live by and die for: the typical assertor of Christianity is the martyr. And if the Christian belief is true that ultimately God will ask an account of each individual's faith, He will not ask how much we were able to prove, but what we determined to make the real principle of our action.

If we adopted a hypothesis as to the universe logically irreconcilable with the little bit we see, our choice would, I think, be justly described as irrational. But the religious hypothesis is neither proved nor disproved by our limited experience. We are compelled, as we have seen, to make a leap of some sort beyond our experience, and we choose to leap in that direction rather than in another. There is a number of hypotheses all equally compatible in pure logic with the bit of the world-pattern we have seen. The bit of the universe, consider, shown us by our experience consists in great part of the uniformities of the material world, the movements of material mass, which seem to have no spiritual or moral purpose, but it also includes the human spirit in all his various manifestations, culminating in Him, the Son of Man. Now it seems to me we can, without being illogical, choose either element in our experience to interpret the whole by. We may choose to take the brute material mass with its uniformities as the key to reality, and explain the phenomena of the human spirit simply as a chance and ephemeral outcome of material laws. Or we may take the human spirit as the key, and regard the material world as ultimately there to subserve a spiritual end. I do not see why

even such an hypothesis as that the ultimate Reality behind the universe was a malignant and not a good power should not be possible in pure logic. All the appearances of good and of human value in the world we might explain as contributing to produce in the end a greater volume of evil and misery than could be produced without them. The religious man chooses to take the good and the beauty revealed in the human spirit at its highest and best as giving the real purport and meaning of the Whole.

No doubt this trust in the religious man does not appear to him an hypothesis arbitrarily chosen, but a conviction held with deep personal certitude. Often, as life goes on, its events serve to make this certitude deeper and greater. An analogy, I think, is the certain trust which a man feels in his friend. He believes in his friend's goodwill, although that goodwill is not manifested in every part of his friend's behaviour. There are large tracts of his friend's behaviour which are neutral in character, numberless actions he does mechanically by simple habit, walking, eating, sleeping. Other parts of his conduct may even bear the appearance of disloyalty or ill-will. But there have been moments of intense self-revelation, moments when his eyes have looked into the eyes of his friend and the two human souls have touched and known each other, and for ever after those are the moments which he takes as the key to all his friend's conduct; there the spirit was disclosed which gives it all its purport and meaning. Behind the mechanical actions which by themselves tell nothing of the friend's personality, he knows that the personality is still there. Even when there is the appearance of ill-will, he trusts still; he is sure that ultimately his friend's conduct in this

particular will be explained and be found consistent with faithful love.

So Christians believe that the inner Reality of the universe has looked into human eyes through the eyes of Jesus Christ, and behind all the appearances of indifference and heartlessness in the material tracts of the world, for them He is always there. The universe in its totality will ultimately be found to be the best possible embodiment and manifestation of the Divine Will and Wisdom and Love.

Now you might point out to the man who trusted his friend in the way described, that his hypothesis as to his friend's personality was an arbitrary one. He was not logically compelled to take those particular moments in his intercourse with his friend as the key to the whole; he might equally have chosen the times when his friend seemed indifferent as showing him as he really was, and he might have construed the occasional appearance of love by the indifferent moments and not the seemingly indifferent moments by the occasional appearance of love. There is an element of deliberate will in his choosing the hypothesis he does. But he feels that he could do no otherwise without violating what in himself is best. I do not mean that in all cases it is wise to place this trust, in spite of appearances, in another man. Sometimes people trust foolishly. It depends on the quality of those moments of mutual communication how far it is right to build this trust upon them. But there are cases when I may feel rightly that the evidence a man has given me of trustworthiness at certain moments, warrants me in trusting the man—one might almost say absolutely. We may always be deceived. So may those who determine to trust the

universe because of those manifestations in humanity be deceived. We ought frankly to admit this; we take the risks of trusting. Yet in the case of a man's trust in his friend, this admission of the theoretical possibility of his being deceived does not affect his inner feeling of certainty, his 'moral certainty,' as we say. It is not the same sort of certainty as the certainty induced by logical compulsion, but in its intensity and force as a psychological factor it is just as great as logical certainty. And if the hypothesis that the inner reality of the universe is revealed in good men and especially in Christ, cannot be logically proved, neither can any of the other hypotheses about the universe—that it has no moral quality, that it is indifferent to good and evil, that it is essentially unknowable—be proved. In its character of a leap beyond experience the hypothesis of the Christian believer is no worse off than any of those other hypotheses; all are leaps beyond experience. A leap of some kind we are compelled to make by the necessity of action. The Christian believer chooses this hypothesis, because he chooses to accept the scale of spiritual values given him in his moral and mental constitution as veridical.

So far we have shown how the hypothesis of the Christian believer is faith, but we have not yet shown how it can be the acceptance of any authority embodied in other human beings. This however is what we have to do, if miracles are to be accepted in any sense as facts on the authority of the Church or the writers of the Bible. To go then a step further, we may, I think, see that the spiritual values which a man now recognizes by his own inner light, he did not originally discover all by himself. We do not know how much of them would have ever entered his con-

sciousness, if he had grown up in isolation in a desert island. He discovered them because they were already expressed in the tradition of some society or community with which he came into contact after his entrance into the world. He did not accept them blindly, without any confirmation in his own spirit; he has come, he says, to see for himself that the ideals embodied in this society are higher than any other he can conceive. (It is very analogous to the training of the artist; his ideals are formed under the influence of art-traditions existing before him, but when they have been formed they are his own personal conviction.) Just as it is reasonable for a man to say, I see in Christ the most perfect manifestation I can conceive of Spirit, and therefore take Christ as the most perfect manifestation of the inner reality of the universe, so if a man finds that the tradition of a particular society or community or church gives him a view of the universe which satisfies better than any other the exigencies of his spiritual and moral nature, and that it also produces in the life of its members the spiritual fruits which seem to him the highest in value, it seems reasonable that he should take this view as his working hypothesis as to the constitution of the universe. But here we come upon a difficulty. The theory we have just stated seems all right as long as what we have to do with are either values, *e.g.* the doctrine that the best thing in the world is love, or suppositions about the universe which are essential if reality is to correspond to value, *e.g.* the doctrine God is love; for in both these cases the tradition can be confirmed by the man's own personal spirit. He can see for himself that the tradition of a community speaks the truth when it affirms that love is the best



thing in the world and that, if reality is to correspond to value, the inner reality of the universe, God, must be love. In neither of these cases therefore does the man accept the traditional teaching blindly, without the confirmation of his own inner sense. But it is quite different where it is a question of concrete events in history, of particular miracles. Can any inner spiritual sense give information to a man as to whether Christ really did walk on the water or feed five thousand with five loaves?

I do not think we could attach much value to such an argument as: Because this community speaks the truth on questions of spiritual value, therefore I ought to accept its authority on matters of fact. Authority is essentially relative to particular fields. A man who speaks with authority on art, does not necessarily speak with authority on strategical problems. The Catholic theory itself limits the authority of the Church to questions *de fide et moribus*, questions concerned with faith and morals. Only it includes under the term 'faith' belief as to a large number of alleged historical events. A man must believe that events of which he can get no verification in experience, took place because the Church says they did. Now in the field of spiritual values it seems to me that a man may reasonably respect the authority of a community on a particular point, even where his own judgment does not confirm it, so long as his judgment does confirm on a large number of other points the view of that community. For instance, a man who found that the Christian view of life as a whole satisfied him and that Christianity showed a power of producing in practice the richest virtues, might reasonably say: "I do not see for myself that

suicide or polygamy is wrong, but since the Christian tradition emphatically condemns these things, I think it is probable that my own moral judgment is here defective and that suicide or polygamy is really wrong." Just as a judge of art might say: "I do not see for myself that this work is good, but, since it is universally admired by the people whose judgment I have learned to respect, I think that probably my own artistic sense is here defective." And he might reasonably act on this hypothesis, if he were commissioned, let us say, to buy pictures for a public gallery. It is reasonable in certain cases for a man to subordinate his own judgment to authority. But these are cases where the field in which he trusts the authority, unconfirmed by his own judgment, is the *same* field in which the teaching of the authority has been as a whole confirmed by his judgment. If on the other hand you say: "I trust the Church as to matters of historical fact, because my own judgment confirms the Church's teaching as to spiritual values," you are passing to a wholly different field, and the procedure does not appear to me reasonable.

The only matters of fact, it seems to me, as to which the Church can claim respect for its authority, are those which are essential, if reality is to correspond to value—if the *is* coincides ultimately with the *ought to be*. For instance, to a Christian it seems plain that, if the universe is really such as to satisfy the demands of the spirit, God must be, and must be of the character attributed to Him in the Christian faith. Here therefore the Christian Church teaches with authority when it makes an affirmation as to what is. But are the miraculous events in the Gospels in the same way facts essential to the Christian view of the universe,

things which must actually have occurred, if reality corresponds to the Christian scheme of values?

In regard to such alleged miracles as the walking upon the water, the feeding of the five thousand, the changing of water into wine, I do not see that we can answer this question by Yes. I do not see that it makes any difference to the Christian faith as to the character of God and the Person of Jesus Christ whether these particular narratives are historical fact or mythology. With regard to them, I think the only considerations which apply are those which estimate the probability or improbability of the stories in the light of experience. When we come to the two great miracles associated with the Person of Christ, the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, the case is much more problematic. No doubt the Christian doctrine of the Person of Christ does profoundly affect the Christian view of God. If it can be shown that the Christian doctrine of the Person of Christ essentially requires that Christ should have been born of a virgin, that Christ could not be God in the sense required by Christian theology if He had a human father as well as a human mother, then the belief in the Virgin Birth would no doubt be part of the Christian belief about God, and the Virgin Birth would be one of those things which must be presupposed, if the universe is to correspond with the Christian scheme of values. Personally, I do not see that this has ever been shown. I do not see that the Christian belief as to the Person of Christ depends at all upon the truth of this story; and if it does not, the story becomes simply one which there is neither any good ground for affirming, because the evidence for it is very doubtful, nor good ground for denying, because the case is so obviously unique that probability and

improbability cannot here be estimated by our ordinary experience.

The other great miracle associated with the Person of Christ is the Resurrection. Here I think we must distinguish between the Resurrection in the sense of the continued activity of Christ after His death, in the full reality and power of His personal life, and the reanimation of His dead body. The Resurrection in the first sense is essential to the Christian faith. The experience of the disciples after the Crucifixion, those appearances which convinced them that Jesus was alive, can have been no subjective illusion; they must have been a real manifestation of Himself by the living Christ. But the truth of this does not seem to me to depend on whether the body taken down from the Cross was reanimated or not. The story of the empty tomb would, on such a view, be another of the stories which the evidence, combined with our experience, gives us no warrant either to affirm or to deny.

In discussing dogma and its relation to reason I have considered specifically Christian dogma; but the general principles I have maintained could, I think, be fairly applied to the traditional teaching of any other religious community by those who take that teaching to afford the best interpretation of the universe. And even their application to Christian dogma may be of interest to non-Christians, since Christianity is on any theory a big fact of human history, and the question therefore how far its teachings do really, as is alleged, involve a conflict with reason, is a question which all those interested in human history may find it worth while to consider.

EDWYN BEVAN.

# SHAKTI: THE WORLD AS POWER.

SIR JOHN WOODROFFE (ARTHUR AVALON).

## II.

IN the preceding portion of this paper<sup>1</sup> it was pointed out that the Power whereby the One gives effect to Its Will to be Many is Māyā Shakti.

What are called the 36 Tattvas (accepted by both Shāktas and Shaivas) are the stages of involution of the One into the Many as mind and matter.

Again with what warrant is this affirmed? The secondary proof is the Word of Shiva and Shakti, revealers of the Tantra-shāstra, as such Word is expounded in the teachings of the Masters (Āchārya) in the Āgama.

Corroboration of their teaching may be had by observation of psychological states in normal life and reasoning thereon. These psychological states again are the individual re-presentation of the collective cosmic processes. "As here, so elsewhere." Primary evidence is actual experience of the surrounding and supreme states. Man does not leap at one bound from ordinary finite sense-experience to the Full Experience. By stages he advances thereto, and by stages he re-traces his steps to the world, unless the fullness of experience has been such as to burn up in the fire of self-knowledge the seed of desire which is the germ of

<sup>1</sup> See the July number.—Ed.

the world. Man's consciousness has no fixed boundary. On the contrary, it is at root the Infinite Consciousness, which appears in the form of a contraction (*Sangkocha*), due to limitation as Shakti in the form of mind and matter. This contraction may be greater or less. As it is gradually loosened, consciousness expands by degrees until, all bonds being gone, it becomes one with the Full Consciousness or *Pūrṇa*. Thus there are, according to common teaching, seven ascending light planes of experience, called *Lokas*, that is 'what are seen' (*lokyante*) or experienced; and seven dark descending planes, or *Talas*, that is 'places.' It will be observed that one name is given from the subjective and the other from the objective standpoint. The centre of these planes is the 'Earth-plane' (*Bhur-loka*). This is not the same as experience on earth, for every experience, including the highest and lowest, can be had here. The planes are not like geological strata, though necessity may picture them thus. The Earth-plane is the normal experience. The ascending planes are states of super-normal, and the descending planes of sub-normal experience. The highest of the planes is the Truth-plane (*Satya-loka*). Beyond this is the Supreme Experience, which is above all planes, which is Light itself, and the Love of Shiva and Shakti, the 'Heart of the Supreme Lord.' The lowest *Tala* on the dark side is described in the *Purāṇas* with wonderful symbolic imagery as a Place of Darkness where monster serpents, crowned with dim light, live in perpetual anger. Below this is the Shakti of the Lord called *Tamomayī Shakti*—that is, the Veiling Power of Being in all its infinite intensity.

What then is the Reality-Whole or *Pūrṇa*? It is certainly not a bare abstraction of intellect, for the

intellect is only a fractional Power or Shakti in it. Such an abstraction has no worth for us. In the Supreme Reality, which is the Whole, there is more than everything which is of worth to men, and which proceeds from it. In fact, as a Kashmir scripture says : "The without appears without only *because* it is within." Unworth also proceeds from it, not in the sense that it is there *as* unworth, but because the experience of duality, to which evil is attached, arises in the Blissful Whole. The Full is not merely the collectivity (Samashti) of all which exists, for it is both immanent in and transcends the universe. It is a commonplace that it is unknowable except to Itself. Shiva, in the *Yoginīhṛidaya Tantra*, says : "Who knows the heart of a woman ? Only Shiva knows the Heart of Yoginī (the Supreme Shakti)." For this reason the Buddhist Tāntrik schools call it Shūnya or the Void. This is not nothing, but nothing known to mind and senses. Both Shāktas and some Vaiṣṇavas use the term Shūnya, and no one suspects them of being 'Nihilists.'

Relatively, however, the One is said to be Being (Sat), Bliss (Ānanda) and Chit—an untranslatable term which has been most accurately defined as the Changeless Principle of all changing experience, a Principle of which sensation, perception, conception, self-consciousness, feeling, memory, will and all other psychic states are limited *modes*. It is not therefore Consciousness or Feeling as we understand these words, for these are directed and limited. It is the infinite root of which they are the finite flower. But Consciousness and possibly (according to the more ancient views) Feeling approach the most nearly to a definition, provided that we do not understand thereby Consciousness and Feeling in



our sense. We may thus (to distinguish it) call Chit Pure Consciousness or Pure Feeling as Bliss (Ānanda) • knowing and enjoying its own full Reality. This, as such Pure Consciousness or Feeling, endures even when finite centres of Consciousness or Feeling arise in It. If (as this system assumes) there is a real causal nexus between the two, then Being, as Shiva, is also a Power, or Shakti, which is the source of all Becoming. The fully Real, therefore, has two aspects: one called Shiva, the static aspect of Consciousness, and the other called Shakti, the kinetic aspect of the same. For this reason Kālī Shakti, dark as a thunder-cloud, is represented standing and moving on the white body of Shiva lying inert as a corpse (Shava). He is white as Illumination (Prakāsha). He is inert, for Pure Consciousness is without action and at rest. It is She, His Power, who moves. Dark is She here because, as Kālī, She dissolves all in darkness, that is vacuity of existence, which is the Light of Being Itself. Again She is Creatrix. Five corpse-like Shivas form the support of Her throne, set in the wish-granting groves of the Isle of Gems (Manidvīpa), the truly golden sands of which are laved by the still waters of the Ocean of Nectar (Amṛita), which is Immortality. In both cases we have a pictorial presentment in theological form of the scientific doctrine that to every form of activity there is a static background.

But until there is in fact Change, Shakti is merely the Potency of Becoming in Being and, as such, is wholly one with it. The Power (Shakti) and the possessor of Power (Shaktimān) are one. As therefore He is Being-Bliss-Consciousness, so is She. She also is the Full (Pūrṇa), which is no mere abstraction from its evolved manifestations. On the contrary, of

Her the *Mahākālī Stotra* says : “ Though without feet, Thou movest more quickly than air. Though without ears, Thou dost hear. Though without nostrils, Thou dost smell. Though without eyes, Thou dost see. Though without tongue, Thou dost taste all tastes.” Those who talk of the ‘bloodless abstractions’ of Vedānta, have not understood it. The ground of Man’s Being is the Supreme ‘I’ (Pūrṇāham) which, though in Itself beyond finite Personality, is yet ever finitely personalizing as the beings of the universe. “Sā’ham,” —“She I am.”

This is the Supreme Shakti, the ultimate object of the Shāktas’ adoration, though worshipped in several forms, some gentle, some formidable.

But Potency is actualized as the universe, and this also is Shakti, for the effect is the cause modified. Monistic Vedānta teaches that God is the material cause of the world. The statement that the Supreme Shakti also exists as the Forms evolved from It, may seem to conflict with the doctrine that Power is ultimately one with Shiva who is changeless Being. Shankara answers that the existence of a causal exus is Māyā, and that there is (from the transcendental standpoint) only a seeming cause and seeming modification or effect. The Shākta, who from his world-standpoint posits the reality of God as the cause of the universe, replies that, while it is true that the effect (as effect) is the cause modified, the cause (as cause) remains what it was and is and will be. Creative evolution of the universe thus differs from the evolution in it. In the latter case the material cause when producing an effect ceases to be what it was. Thus milk turned into curd ceases to be milk. But the simile given of the other evolutionary process is

that of 'Light from Light.' There is a similarity between the 'conventional' standpoint of Shangkara and the explanation of the Shākta; the difference being that, whilst to the former the effect is (from the transcendental standpoint) 'unreal,' it is (from the Shākta's immanent standpoint) 'real.'

It will have been observed that cosmic evolution is in the nature of a polarisation in Being into static and kinetic aspects. This is symbolized in the Shākta Tantras by their comparison of Shiva-Shakti to a grain of gram (Chanaka). This has two seeds which are so close together as to seem one, and which are surrounded by a single sheath. The seeds are Shiva and Shakti and the sheath is Māyā. When the sheath is unpeeled, that is when Māyā-Shakti operates, the two seeds come apart. The sheath unrolls when the seeds are ready to germinate, that is when in the dreamless slumber (Sushupti) of the World-Consciousness the remembrance of past enjoyment in Form gives rise to that divine creative 'thinking' or 'imagining' (Sṛiṣhti-kalpanā) which is 'creation.' As the universe in dissolution sinks into a Memory which is lost, so it is born again from the germ of recalled Memory or Shakti. Why? Such a question may be answered when we are dealing with facts in the whole; but the latter itself is uncaused, and what is caused is not the whole. Manifestation is of the nature of Being-Power, just as it is Its nature to return to Itself after the actualization of Power. To the devotee who speaks in theological language: "It is His Will." As the *Yoginīhṛidaya* says: "He painted the World-picture with the Brush which is His Will and was pleased therewith."

Again the World is called a Prapañcha, that is an

*extension* of the five forms of sensible matter (Bhūta). Where does it go at dissolution? It collapses into a Point (Bīṇḍu). We may regard it as a metaphysical point which is the complete 'subjectification' of the divine or full 'I' (Pūrṇāham), or objectively as a mathematical point without magnitude. Round that Point is coiled a mathematical Line which, being in touch with every part of the surface of the Point, makes one Point with it. What then is meant by these symbols of the Point and Line? It is said that the Supreme Shiva sees Himself in and as His own Power or Shakti. He is the 'White Point' or 'Moon' (Chandra), which is Illumination and (in the completed process) the 'I' (Aham) side of experience. She is the 'Red Point.' Both colours are seen in the micro-cosmic generation of the child. Red too is the colour of Desire. She is 'Fire' which is the object of experience or 'This' (Idam), the objective side of experience. The 'This' here is nothing but a mass of Shiva's own illuminating rays. These are reflected in Himself as Shakti, who 'in the *Kāmakalāvīlāsa*' is called the 'Pure Mirror' of Shiva. The Self sees the Self, the rays being thrown back on their source. The 'This' is the germ of what we call 'Otherness,' but here the 'Other' is and is known as the Self. The relation and fusion of these two Points, White and Red, is called the Mixed Point or 'Sun.' These are the three Supreme Lights. A=Shiva, Ha=Shakti, which united spell 'Aham' or 'I.' This 'Sun' is thus the state of full 'I-ness' (Pūrṇāham-bhāva). This is the Point into which the World at dissolution lapses, and from which in due time it comes forth again. In the latter case it is the Lord-Consciousness as the Supreme 'I' and Power about to create. For

this reason *Binḍu* is called a condensed or massive form of *Shakti*. It is the tense state of Power immediately prior to its first actualization. That form of *Shakti*, again, by which the actualization takes place is *Māyā*; and this is the Line round the Point. As coiled round the Point it is the Supreme Serpent-Power (*Mahā Kuṇḍalinī*) encircling the *Shiva-Liṅga*. From out this Power comes the whisper to enjoy, in worlds of form, as the memory of past universes arises therein. *Shakti* then 'sees.' *Shakti* opens Her eyes as She reawakes from the Cosmic Sleep (*Nimesha*), which is dissolution. The Line is at first coiled and one with the Point, for Power is then at rest. Creation is movement, an uncoiling of *Māyā-Shakti*. Hence is the world called *Jagat*, which means 'what moves.' The nature of this Power is circular or spiraline; hence the roundness and 'curvature' of things of which we now hear. Nothing moves in a really straight line. Hence again the universe is also called a spheroid (*Brahmāṇḍa*). The gross worlds are circular universal movements in space, which, as *Ether* (*Ākāsha*), is of the form of the rest of things. Consciousness, as the Full (*Pūrṇa*), is never dichotomized, but the finite centres which arise in it, are so. The Point, or *Binḍu*, as effect then divides into three, in various ways, the chief of which is *Knower*, *Knowing* and *Known*, which constitute the duality of the world-experience by *Mind* of *Matter*.

Unsurpassed for its profound analysis is the account of the thirty-six *Tattvas* or stages of cosmic evolution (accepted by both *Shaivas* and *Shāktas*) given by the Northern *Shaiva* School of the *Āgama*, which flourished after the date which Western Orientalists assign to *Shangkarāchārya*, and which was therefore in a position to criticize him. According

to this account (which I greatly condense) Subject and Object in Pure Being are in undistinguishable union as the Supreme Shiva-Shakti. We have then to see how this unity is broken up into Subject and Object. This does not take place all at once. There is an intermediate stage of transition, in which there is a Subject *and* Object, but both are part of the Self, which knows its Object to be itself. In man's experience they are wholly separate, the Object then being perceived as outside the Self, the plurality of Selves being mutually exclusive centres. The process and the result are the work of Shakti, whose special function is to negate, that is to negate Her own fullness, so that it becomes the finite centre contracted as a limited Subject perceiving a limited Object, both being aspects of the Divine Self.

The first stage after the Supreme is that in which Shakti withdraws Herself and leaves as it were standing by itself the 'I' side (Aham) of what, when completed, is the 'I-this' (Aham-Idam) experience. But simultaneously (for the 'I' must have its content) She presents Herself as a 'This' (Idam), at first faintly and then clearly; the emphasis being at first laid on the 'I' and then on the 'This.' This last is the stage of Īshvara Tattva or Bīṇḍu, as the Mantra Shāstra, dealing with the causal state of 'Sound' (Shabda), calls it. In the second and third stage, as also in the fourth which follows, though there is an 'I' *and* a 'This' and therefore not the undistinguishable 'I-This' of the Supreme Experience, yet both the 'I' and the 'This' are experienced as aspects of and in the Self. Then as a preliminary to the division which follows, the emphasis is laid equally on the 'I' and the 'This.' At this point Māyā Shakti intervenes

and completely separates the two. For that Power is the sense of difference (Bheda-Buddhi). We have now the finite centres mutually exclusive one of the other, each seeing, to the extent of its power, finite centres as objects outside of and different from the Self. Consciousness thus becomes *contracted*. In lieu of being All-knowing, it is a 'Little Knower,' and in lieu of being Almighty Power, it is a 'Little Doer.'

Māyā is not rightly rendered 'Illusion.' In the first place it is conceived as a real power of Being and as such is one with the Full Reality. The Full, free of all illusion, experiences the engendering of the finite centres and the centres themselves in and as Its own changeless partless Self. It is these individual centres produced from out of Power as Māyā Shakti which are 'Ignorance' or Avidyā Shakti. They are so called because they are not a full experience but an experience of parts in the Whole. In another sense this 'Ignorance' is a knowing, namely that which a finite centre alone has. Even God cannot have man's mode of knowledge and enjoyment without becoming man. He by and as His Power does become man and yet remains Himself. Man is Power in limited form as Avidyā. The Lord is unlimited Power as Māyā. In whom then is the 'Illusion'? Not (all will admit) in the Lord. Nor is it in fact (whatever be the talk of it) in man whose nature it is to regard his limitations as real. For these limitations are he. His experience as man provides no standard whereby it may be adjudged 'Illusion.' The latter is non-conformity with normal experience, and here it is the normal experience which is said to be Illusion. If there were no Avidyā Shakti, there would be no man. In short the knowing of Full Experience is one thing and the



knowing of the limited experience is another. The latter is Avidyā and the Power to produce it is Māyā. Both are eternal aspects of Reality, though the forms which are Avidyā Shakti come and go. If we seek to relate the one to the other, where and by whom is the comparison made? Not in and by the Full Experience beyond all relations, where no questions are asked or answers given, but on the standing ground of present finite experience where all subjectivity and objectivity are real and where therefore, *ipso facto*, Illusion is negated. The two aspects are never present at one and the same time for comparison. The universe is real as a limited thing to the limited experiencer who is himself a part of it. But the experience of the Supreme Person (Parāhantā) is necessarily different, otherwise it would not be the Supreme Experience at all. A God who experiences just as man does is no God but man. There is therefore no experiencer to whom the World is Illusion. He who sees the world in the normal waking state, loses it in that form in ecstasy (Samādhi). It may however (with the Shākta) be said that the Supreme Experience is entire and unchanging and thus the fully Real; and that, though the limited experience is also real in its own way, it is yet an experience of change in its twin aspects of Time and Space. Māyā therefore is the Power which engenders in Itself finite centres in Time and Space, and Avidyā is such experience in fact of the finite experiencer in Time and Space. So much is this so that the Time-theorists (Kālavādins) give the name 'Supreme Time' (Parakāla) to the Creator, who is also called by the Shākta 'Great Time' (Mahākāla). So in the *Bhairavayāmala* it is said that Mahādeva (Shiva) distributes His Rays of Power in the form of the Year.

That is, Timeless Experience appears in the finite centres as broken up into periods of time. This is the 'Lesser Time' which comes in with the Sun, Moon, Six Seasons and so forth, which are all Shaktis of the Lord, the existence and movements of which give rise in the limited observer to the notion of Time and Space.

That observer is essentially the Self or 'Spirit' vehicled by Its own Shakti in the form of Mind and Matter. These two are Its Body, the first subtle, the second gross. Both have a common origin, namely the Supreme Power. Each is a real mode of It. One therefore does not produce the other. Both are produced by, and exist as modes of, the same Cause. There is a necessary parallelism between the Perceived and the Perceiver and, because Mind and Matter are at base one as modes of the same Power, one can act on the other. Mind is the subjective and Matter the objective aspect of the one polarized Consciousness.

With the unimportant exception of the Lokāyatas, the Hindus have never shared what Sir William Jones called 'the vulgar notions of matter,' according to which it is regarded as some gross, lasting and independently existing outside thing.

Modern Western Science now also dematerializes the ponderable matter of the universe into Energy. This and the forms in which it is displayed is the Power of the Self to appear as the object of a limited centre of knowing. Mind again is the Self as 'Consciousness,' limited by Its Power into such a centre. By such contraction there is in lieu of an 'All-knower' a 'Little Knower,' and in lieu of an 'All-doer' a 'Little Doer.' Those, however, to whom this way of looking at things is naturally difficult, may regard the

Supreme Shakti from the objective aspect as holding within Itself the germ of all Matter which develops in It.

Both Mind and Matter exist in every particle of the universe though not explicitly displayed in the same way in all. There is no corner of the universe which contains anything either potential or actual, which is not to be found elsewhere. Some aspect of Matter or Mind however may be more or less explicit or implicit. So in the Mantra Scripture it is said that each letter of the alphabet contains all sound. The sound of a particular letter is explicit and the other sounds are implicit. The sound of a particular letter is a particular physical audible mode of the Shabda-brahman (Brahman as the cause of Shabda or 'Sound'), in Whom is all sound, actual and potential. Pure Consciousness is fully involved in the densest forms of gross or organic matter, which is not 'inert' but full of movement (Spanda), for there is naught but the Supreme Consciousness which does not move. Immanent in Mind and Matter is Consciousness (Chit Shakti). Inorganic matter is thus Consciousness in full subjection to the Power of Ignorance. It is thus Consciousness identifying Itself with such inorganic matter. Matter in all its five forms of density is present in everything. Mind too is there, though owing to its imprisonment in Matter undeveloped. "The Brahman sleeps in the stone." Life too which displays itself with the organization of matter is potentially contained in Being, of which such inorganic matter is to some a 'lifeless' form. From this deeply involved state Shakti enters into higher and higher organized forms. Prāṇa or vitality is a Shakti—the mantra-form of which is 'Hangsa.' With the mantra

‘Hang’ the breath goes forth, with ‘Sa’ it is indrawn, a fact which anyone can verify for themselves if they will attempt to inspire after putting the mouth in the way it is placed in order to pronounce the letter ‘H.’ The Rhythm of Creative Power as of breathing (a microcosmic form of it) is two-fold—an outgoing (Pravṛitti) or involution as universe, and an evolution or return (Nivṛitti) of Supreme Power to Itself. Shakti as the Great Heart of the universe pulses forth and back in cosmic systole and diastole. So much for the nature of the Power as an Evolutionary process. It is displayed in the Forms evolved as an increasing exhibition of Consciousness from apparently, though not truly, unconscious matter, through the slight consciousness of the plant and the greater consciousness of the animal, to the more highly developed consciousness of man, who in the completeness of his own individual evolution becomes freed of Mind and Matter which constitute the Form, and thus is one with the Supreme Consciousness Itself. There are no gaps in the process. In existence there are no rigid partitions. The vital phenomena, to which we give the name of ‘Life,’ appear it is true with organized Matter. But Life is not then something entirely new which had no sort of being before. For such Life is only a limited mode of Being, which itself is no dead thing but the Infinite Life of all lives. To the Hindu the difference between plant and animal, and between the latter and man, has always been one rather of degree than of kind. There is one Consciousness and one Mind and Matter throughout, though the Matter is organized and the Mind exhibited in various ways. The one Shakti is the Self as the ‘String’ (Sūtrātmā) on which all the Beads of Form are strung, and these

Beads again are limited modes of Herself as the 'String.' Evolution is thus the loosening of the bonds in which Consciousness (itself unchanging) is held, such loosening being increased and Consciousness more fully exhibited as the process is carried forward. At length is gained that human state which the Scripture calls so 'hard to get.' For it has been won by much striving and through suffering. Therefore the Scripture warns man not to neglect the opportunities of a stage which is the necessary preliminary to the attainment of the Full Experience. Man by his striving must seek to become fully humane, and then to pass yet further into the Divine Fullness which is beyond all Forms with their good and evil. This is the work of Sādhana (a word which comes from the root 'sādh,' 'to exert'), which is discipline, ritual worship and yoga. It is that by which any result (Siddhi) is attained. The Tāntric Shāstra is a Sādhana Scripture. As Powers are many, so may be Sādhana, which is of various kinds and degrees. Man may seek to realize the Mother-Power in Her limited forms as health, strength, long life, wealth, magic powers and so forth. The so-called 'New Thought' and kindred literature which bids men to think power and thus to become power, is very ancient, going back at least to the Upanishad which says: "What a man thinks, that he becomes."

Those who have need for the Infinite Mother as She is not in any Form but in Herself, seek directly the Adorable One in whom is the essence of all which is of finite worth. The gist of a high form of Kūla-sādhana is given in the following verse from the Hymn of Mahākālarūdra Himself to Mahākālī:

*"I torture not my body with penances."* (Is not

his body Hers? If man be God in human guise why torment him?) "*I lame not my feet in pilgrimage to Holy Places.*" (The body is the Devālaya or Temple of Divinity. Therein are all the spiritual Tīrthas or Holy Places. Why then trouble to go elsewhere?) "*I spend not my time in reading the Vedas.*" (The Vedas, which he has already studied, are the record of the standard spiritual experience of others. He seeks now to have that experience himself directly. What is the use of merely reading about it? The *Kulārṇava Tantra* enjoins the mastering of the essence of all Scriptures which should then be put aside, just as he who has threshed out the grain throws away the husks and straw.) "*But I strive to attain Thy two sacred Feet.*"

ARTHUR AVALON.

(Read before the Quest Society, May 27, 1920.—ED.)

## GEORGE TYRRELL'S LETTERS.

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TYRRELL held, with Kant, that the only valid proofs of the existence of the Christian God are moral (pp. 13, 26, 27, 108), and this was, for him, the only real basis of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical authority.

In his published works he gives this theory only a general application, except that he makes the Incarnation the symbol of the idealized conscience of mankind, as he does in these Letters (p. 230). He was opposed on principle to working it out in detail, being no believer in hard-and-fast systems and, unlike Liberal Protestants, taking the dogmas of the Church from the Catholic standpoint as one whole, without distinguishing between their theological values (pp. 57, 70).

But the Letters, edited by Miss Petre, contain passages wherein he gives some indications of the way in which he conceives his re-valuation of dogma would affect particular doctrines. Thus he writes (p. 63) :

“Mysteries and symbols are justifiable just so far as truth does not admit of plain statement. But have we a right to cover up in myths and fables these simple truths of Christianity? . . . If we tell them that Christ's body rose into the clouds, they will only laugh their whole religion to scorn. If we tell them that His self-sacrifice raised Him above His fellows to the level of God, they will understand and believe

and love and imitate. The spiritual truth of the Eucharistic presence is within a child's comprehension; the carnal miracle of Transubstantiation is now a scandal to the meanest intelligence."

It will be observed that here, while a clear idea is substituted for the story of the Ascension, this is not so in the case of Transubstantiation. Yet, after having so candidly stated his negative position, some positive declaration would have been welcome. And indeed could any case be imagined where a 'plain statement' was more required, when it is considered that this dogma has been one of the greatest causes of misunderstanding between Catholics and Protestants of all grades? The same may be said of his further remarks on the same important subject on another page (59): "So too, in affirming the philosophical concept of Transubstantiation, or of the hypostatic union, she [the R. C. Church] but protects the simple truths of Revelation on which her affirmation formally falls." It seems to the writer that it is just 'those simple truths' which are by no means clear or, if clear, then very much misrepresented by the dogmas in view of the critical work done on the old documents of recent years, and especially of Loisy's commentary on the Gospels, wherein he shows that, shorn of all verbal accretions, the institution of the Eucharist was no more than a farewell meal.

Tyrrell is much more explicit on the doctrine of the Virgin Birth in the same Letter (p. 58), but hardly more satisfactory. His explanations of this and other questions, here and elsewhere, are very ingenious, but he writes as if he believed that these stories were intended by their authors to represent moral truths.

"It [the Ascension] was a gross materialisation



and obscuring of that truth which we are now only learning to de-materialise and restore."

As a matter of fact, it is not a restoration but a new interpretation which is really in question. There is certainly no evidence of design on the part of the writers, as in the case of Æsop's fables or of Eastern parables generally, to impart moral instruction through these stories, and there is another and more obvious explanation of their origin. He writes again (p. 90):

"The truth of a single dogma is relative, not merely in the sense that it is capable of better expression, but also because, like a word in the context of a sentence, it has signification only as part of the organic body of truth, and not absolutely, or apart from its context, in the total 'Word of God.' The present doctrine of authority and infallibility is infallibly true *in some sense* (like that of the three persons in one God); no better expression of that sense was possible in 1870; but the crude literal sense is already discredited."

Perhaps no other passage gives so clearly the contrast between the lucid and unassailable character of his general *schema* and the impossibility of applying it successfully in detail. Elsewhere he gives repeated evidence of his irreconcilable antagonism to the decree of Infallibility and all it represented (pp. 54, 70, 106, 248). At all events he did not fall into the error of some who, in attempting to make 'Infallibility' reasonable and credible, have simply explained it away. Elsewhere he writes:

"At present I can only think that the Pope is infallible just when and in so far as he does give voice to the consentient Church whose mouthpiece he is." And he adds: "As a Rationalist, I should regret that

Christ did not confer on his vicar the prerogative of impeccability rather than that of Infallibility. It would have been a far greater stay to the Church and refutation of her enemies, than the present unverifiable claims." He deals more fully with this on page 37, which has a further interest in that it shows where his idea of development differed from that of Newman and Loisy. In the course of it he remarks that :

"The Divinity of a dogma or institution is just its aptitude to secure those divine ends for which the Church exists." And again : "The leadership of Rome must be, as primitively, one of example, not of coercive right. I could not stay in the Roman Communion if I had to accept the new Vaticanism as part of the system. I can endure it as a heresy or disease."

Yet once more, in referring to a certain author, he writes (p. 105) :

"He would retain for the Church and Bishop of Rome a spiritual primacy or leadership, such as Paul allows (*Rom.* i. 8) and such as Christ exercised by His life and example. But what does history say to such an idea of Rome and her bishops, whose example has been the scandal of the world?"—thus admitting the impossibility of bringing ecclesiastical authority into the net of his *schema*, in which the authority of conscience is supreme.

But Tyrrell was too conscientious and open-minded to be deceived or to wish to deceive others as to the true state of the case. He knew quite well that the mainspring of the development of dogma was not moral, but was actuated by the subtle metaphysics of the Eastern mind in conjunction with political exigencies, and that so the resultant was not well fitted as a medium to symbolize the higher aspects of spirituality

and moral idealism, though its Catholicism made it the only available one. The main element, the Logos-idea, in its origin purely metaphysical and theological, was moralized only by its union with the life and character of Jesus. Hence, while Tyrrell's notion of the Incarnation was not that of its originators, it lends itself as a symbol of the idealized conscience without any great violence. But when any further attempt is made to apply the moral interpretation in detail, the theory inevitably collapses. It becomes far less than an hypothesis; it will not even fulfil the easy, pragmatic test of 'working.' That Tyrrell was not blind to this is clear from the following passages:

"At the worst I have stretched true principles unduly in my desperation to find a *modus vivendi* for the stifled; and the medicine prepared for a few has been judged as though it were bread for all (p. 183)." And: "I plead guilty to taking refuge in a fog towards the end of my last letter. It is the modern fashion of ethical, as well as of religious, apologists in their flight from the spears and darts of critical assault. Hence a general tendency to defend and glorify fogginess marks the decadence of every *Weltanschauung* as surely as does the tendency to resolve mythical absurdities into mystical symbols. It means that theology is raising a smoke to cover its own retreat" (p. 219). Again: "To some extent symbolism is a sop to Cerberus. It will do for the present, to keep the old and new believers in our Church. But eventually men will ask, Why express symbolically what can be said plainly? And we shall have to criticise and define the just limits of symbolism. . . . Again, a good deal of our symbolic interpretation is apologetic afterthought and not quite

honest. Incense was a disinfectant; now it is prayer. . . . If we can express it more clearly why adhere to the symbol? . . . Altogether it seems to me a very complex problem. It cannot be denied that the desire of Modernists to hold to the Church at all costs (in which they are right) acts as a bias on their perfect candour and makes them far too ingenious. . . . Courage is, I learn daily, the rarest of virtues; and have ceased to look for it even in myself" (p. 61). And: "Personally I hardly believe that Modernism, however defensible in the abstract, will be able to save the Roman Church. It was right to try the experiment, were it only to prove its futility." And again: "Have you ever read John Morley's book on *Compromise*? It is a stronger plea for honesty than I yet feel equal to. But I think his hard sayings apply only to those whose convictions are fixed and subjectively certain, and so I may go on shuffling a little longer" (pp. 108-9).

On the other hand he had, somewhat unwillingly, to admit, or rather (as he puts it) to "wonder whether 1870 was not the perfectly logical and historically inevitable issue of the 'Catholicising' process, which began perhaps with St. Paul, and is traceable in St. Matthew's Gospel—a process arrested in the Greek Churches, repudiated theoretically (not really) by the Protestant sects, and accepted alongside of its contrary by the Anglican compromise."

This is of course fundamentally true. It is not only Rome which is *à priori* in this sense, but also every Protestant Communion which has built up a theological system on the text of the Bible. Even the most liberal Protestants are not free from it, and Harnack, as Loisy pointed out, takes a doubtful text of

St. Matthew as his absolute starting-point in his *Essence of Christianity*. If this is done, some such development as that of Rome becomes logical and inevitable. The chief differences are that, while Rome's development can be traced historically, without any violent breach, from its source, that of Protestantism is inconsistent and unhistorical in its deliberate breach with that past, combined with the effort to seek some absolute starting-point in a distant age, the interpretation of which can be no more than provisional and arbitrary. The other main difference is that the Roman development has alone been thorough and uncompromising. In other Churches the external seat of authority is evasive. The Bible is appealed to, but cannot stand alone without the Church which fixed its canon and interprets it. In Rome this principle is realized in a place and a person, though there inevitably remains the illogical appeal to Scripture as supporting those very claims, on the strength of which the text is interpreted in the sense of ecclesiastical authority. The argument is a vicious circle, and Rome has at least done a good work for freedom of thought by the *reductio ad absurdum* of this idea, whose fallacy is not salient in Protestantism only owing to the confusion in which it is held.

Tyrrell, being of a deeply religious nature, and having strong Catholic instincts, did his best to escape from the dilemma, while retaining his position and as much as possible of his faith. He loved to the last the external side of religion as symbolizing the spiritual. But it became evident to him with increasing clearness that everything he valued in the Church, not excepting the beauty of its devotional system, was inextricably bound up with a scholasticism which he could not but

reject. Rome could never now provide a religion of pure sentiment and moral ideals. He writes (p. 110):

"But the whole system is so close-knit and coherent, and the root-fibres of wheat and tares so intertangled, that it is difficult to see what could be changed without changing all." And (p. 113): "The antinomy I wrestle with is that institutionalism, or externalism, is at once essential and fatal to religion."

Surely there can be no greater contrast between the immovable attitude of Rome and that of this modern thinker, who yet desired to maintain his allegiance to her 'at all costs.'

'*Pascendi's*' '*tu quoque*,' charging Modernism with *à priori* assumptions, was only true in so far as this element must enter into all intellectual processes. But the difference between scholasticism and the modern philosophical outlook is, that the former depends entirely upon its first principles, must stand or fall with them, and therefore cannot afford to allow them to be criticized; whereas the latter is ready to criticize any of its intellectual assumptions and to use them only so far as they explain the facts furnished by life and history. "Philosophy," as Tyrrell says (p. 20), "must wait upon science and induction."

This is the strength and pride of Modernism, but also its weakness, in that it affords no sure foothold for a metaphysical basis of religion.

"The truth of Being is Becoming," say the modern Heraclitans. And, as regards phenomena, they are right; but the principle carries further than some of them would desire. Here is where the apparent strength of Rome enters in. If there is no fixed standing-point in phenomena, she can at least offer the semblance of it. If the flux cannot really be

stayed, she can at least decree its stability. And she will find many willing to share that illusion. In fact, it is just by opposing this current that she will continue to gather into her net a certain number, not only of those whose minds are obstinately closed to modern ideas, but even of those who may be described as semi-Modernists. As a constant and necessary element of the human mind, this instinct of Permanence has its place and is essential to every philosophy worthy of the name. And it is just this element that Rome exploits in her own interests, and by which she catches, not only obscurantists, but those timid souls who fear the accelerating pace of the stream may lead them to the rapids. Her position is indeed a strange mixture of strength and weakness, so strictly reasonable and logical if her premisses be granted, and yet so utterly opposed to all modern movement of thought and knowledge which conflicts with that position. Yet she provides the *locus standi* which is the *desideratum* of so many. There is method in that madness whereby she seems engaged in a hopeless crusade against all progress. She has not entirely lost her traditional astuteness. Tyrrell's view, so often expressed in these Letters, and which formed the chief bulwark of that optimism which helped to buoy him up through all his troubles, that 'the lay-mind' (p. 110) was destined to work wonders in the reform of the Church, has no foundation whatever in fact.

But Tyrrell recognized the necessity of a standing-point, and that a God of change only was impossible. This he found in the moral and spiritual consciousness of mankind, especially as expressed in the writings of the New Testament. Thus he made no clear-out distinction between 'Revelation' as objective fact and

as an inward experience, and it was on the objective side that the theory showed its weakness. The Bible, for him, contained the germs of that 'Revelation,' but through criticism they were constantly subject to change. But the inward experience is itself divided; for (p. 63) it "shows us in ourselves and everything a power that makes for good and a power that makes for evil. What they are, how they are related, how unified we cannot know. We symbolise the first as an idealised good man—the second as an idealised bad man. We dramatise their relations as a conflict between God and Satan. The victory of the former symbolises our incurable hope. The best of us can do no better—for self is our ultimate and inevitable category."

And the conflict goes deeper than this; for there are two main elements in the idea of God, those of Goodness and Power, which philosophers have tried in vain to synthesize, while some have shirked the problem by seeking to solve it in a one-sided manner. In the Christian religion there has been a tendency to exalt Goodness at the expense of Power, resulting in a certain moral flabbiness: "Christianity, owing to the circumstances of its birth, laid so much stress on sweetness, that strength, physical, mental and, in some sense, moral, has been at a discount ever since" (p. 202).

Their roots are seen respectively in the magic and propitiation of savage rites and early mysteries, and in the gradual rise of the moral ideal. And, as Tyrrell rightly says (pp. 13, 14), the Christian religion has, more than any other, attempted to give its due to either element in its general conception of Deity, though, as Mill pointed out, the union of the attri-



butes of infinite Goodness and infinite Power is irreconcilable with the facts of Nature.

Tyrrell's mind was not one which could ignore this dualism or attempt to explain it away in the traditional fashion of Augustine, which, inadequate in his age, has become more glaringly so with the increase of knowledge. He was well aware of, and did not seek to minimize, the antagonism between Moral Idealism and the indifference and cruelty of Nature. That he could write with such admiration of Schopenhauer (p. 25) is evidence of this. Though he plays with the question under the title of the 'Cat-philosophy' in some of these Letters, he regards its solution as impossible for the intellect and purely a question for faith (p. 151).

The tendency of Liberal religious thought and philosophy, on the whole, has been to lose sight, to some extent, of the more primitive element. Yet it is impossible to explain the rise of dogma, or to make plausible any dogmatic symbolism, without it. The idea of Christ, as manifested in the early Christian writings, is not exclusively moral. The power-notion is shown in the effort to depict Him as triumphing over the mechanism of Nature, an attempt which reaches its culminating point in the Fourth Gospel. To take then such stories as those of the Ascension and Resurrection purely as moral symbols, does not represent an original 'Revelation' in any sense of the word. Modernists are doubtless right in their critical attitude towards Gospel-miracles, but the stories themselves represent an element which their synthesis has ignored, and one that has effected more in the building up of dogma than the moral element itself. The idea of the Incarnation, and the sacramenta

system which has been founded on it, is essentially that of the marriage of Goodness and Power (albeit a Power, like Nature's 'secret force,' hidden and latent) and their action in and through matter. How far such stories have any actual basis criticism may now be unable to determine; but the possibility must always be considered that some foundation existed other than edification, especially in view of the strange but carefully observed and attested experiments of men of such unquestioned scientific trustworthiness as Sir William Crookes. If his deliberate and weighed testimony to an often-repeated 'materialisation' and final disappearance is accepted, the *à priori* objection of improbability to the resurrection and ascension of Jesus is removed. The strength of Catholicism lies in the past; its ideas are the inheritance of an earlier age; and it has apparently ceased to have the power to fulfil the law of life by adapting itself to the present. In spite, therefore, of its superficially consistent logic, it is doomed as the vehicle of an intellectual basis of belief. The strength of Modernism, in the widest sense, lies in the future, and therefore, in some shape or other, it must prevail, though not in that world which it first set out to conquer.

Possibly, if Tyrrell had lived, though never losing his faith in God, as man represents Him under his moral ideals, he would have come to the conclusion of the process which cost him so many internal struggles, by realizing the impossibility of reconciling inward liberty with any form of ecclesiasticism.

H. C. CORRANCE.

## BOEHME'S STANDPOINT.

C. J. BARKER.

WHEN a man proposes to himself to enter upon a new line of study, and finds himself inclining towards an avenue of knowledge hitherto unexplored by him, the most natural, certainly the wisest, course to pursue is to make a preliminary survey of the new ground upon which he is about to enter, to take a bird's eye view, so to speak, of the region that appears to hold out attractive or alluring inducements to his attention and regard. The further this new region may be from the beaten track of every-day life the greater the necessity for a careful and deliberate investigation of the main outlines of the land. Though the remote places may not be any more likely to prove a barren wilderness than the more highly cultivated regions, the fact that they have not won for themselves a numerous and appreciative population throws upon the explorer more work of a preliminary kind than would otherwise be called for. Moreover the nature of the abilities needed for the task and the specific equipment he must take with him have also to be determined.

In the realm of Mysticism the foregoing remarks apply with special force, and Böhme was very fully conscious of this. Over and over again he has taken pains to direct the reader's attention to the qualifications necessary in anyone who aspires to benefit by his writings. With almost pathetic solicitude not

only has he clearly and unmistakably pointed out the one and only way in which the message he sought to deliver could be received, but also has frequently warned the reader of pitfalls on the path. In his *Way to Divine Knowledge* William Law declares :

“ There is not any possible error that you can fall into in the use of Behmen's books but what he gives you notice of beforehand, and warns you against it in the most solemn manner; and tells you, that the blame must be yours, if you fall into it. Neither is there any question that you can put, nor advice or direction that you can ask, but what he has over and over spoke to; telling you in the plainest manner, what the Mystery is which his books contain; how, and by whom, and for what end, they are to be read ” (1752 ed., p. 109).

This work was published by Law “ as preparatory to a new edition of the works of Jacob Behmen; and the right use of them ”—an undertaking that the author, unfortunately, never lived to accomplish. But to this day Law's *Way to Divine Knowledge* stands unrivalled as a first introduction to Böhme, despite the exasperating form of dialogue in which it is cast.

We venture to make the above statement in view of the fact that Mr. Earle (who we trust has set himself to do at least part of the work that Law was not privileged even to begin) modestly refrains from introducing his new translation of certain important tractates with a single word of preface or explanation.<sup>1</sup> This is to be regretted; for, while we thoroughly realize that Jacob Böhme must for ever be his own

<sup>1</sup> *Six Theosophic Points, and Other Writings*, by Jacob Böhme. Newly translated into English by John Rolleston Earle, M.A. London (Constable); pp. 208; 10s. 6d. net.

best interpreter, we could have wished that Mr. Earle had placed us under a further debt of gratitude by giving us a word of help and encouragement in our efforts to appreciate this old-world author.

Böhme began writing in 1612. A period of seven years followed, during which he meekly remained silent, in obedience to the mandate of the irate Primate, Gregory Richter, who deprived him of the unfinished MS. of the *Aurora* and forbade him to write anything more! Thereafter he was constrained by an irresistible impulse to fulfil the great task laid upon him and so continued to the end of his life. But he never at any time wrote for publication. With the exception of two small pieces, which were published by his friends a few months before he died in 1624, under the title *Der Weg zu Christo*, none of his works saw the light during his lifetime. A few ardent admirers gathered round him, and to them we owe the preservation of his life-work. As his MSS. were completed they were invariably carried off and laboriously copied for private study. His collected works were subsequently divided into thirty-one sections and arranged chronologically. The individual treatises vary very considerably in size, but their quality is alike throughout.

Mr. Earle has made a present to the English student of a most excellent translation of four of the smaller ones: *The Six Theosophic Points*; *The Six Mystical Points*; *On the Earthly and Heavenly Mystery*; and *On the Divine Intuition*. We say 'made a present' advisedly; for we fear that work on Böhme, as ever in the past, must still be done for love of the work itself, the subject not lending itself to the exploitation of the commercial spirit. Mr. Earle's volume should be brought to the notice of every lover

of Böhme. Without doubt it will meet with a very hearty reception and be welcomed with open arms; all the more so as the pieces themselves are amongst the most difficult to obtain in an English dress. There are others awaiting the same good service; we sincerely trust that Mr. Earle will take them in hand.

In 1661 'L. Lloyd, at the Castle in Corn-hill,' published a small quarto, entitled *Several Treatises of Jacob Behme* (translated by John Sparrow). It contains the only other version into English of the above pieces that has ever been printed; and it is now well-nigh impossible to obtain a copy of this exceedingly rare volume. The 18th century reprint of Böhme's works in large quarto (usually catalogued as 'Law's Edition') came to an end with the death of Mrs. Hutcheson (who financed the undertaking as a Memorial to her deceased friend William Law), and the fifth volume, which should have contained Ellistone's translation of the *Epistles*, and Sparrow's translation of *Several Treatises*, and *The Remainder of the Books*, was never produced.

Mr. Earle has been placed in a much more favourable position for making his translation than was Sparrow in his day; for the extremely meticulous and critical work of Gichtel and his friends that produced *Des Gottseligen Hoherleuchteten Iacob Böhmen, Teutonici Philosophi, Alle Theosophische Schrifften*, 1682, was not available for Sparrow—to say nothing of the reprints of that work in 1715 and 1730, under the devoted editorship of Joh. Wilh. Überfeld. The 1730 edition is usually considered the standard edition. Quite recently, however, we have received notification that an entirely new edition of the complete works is announced in Germany. The last was Schiebler's,

1841-47. It is claimed that this new edition will be the most complete ever published, giving the various works in their proper chronological order, also the Franckenberg biography, and others, a very full index, and a comprehensive bibliography of the old and the new literature on Böhme. It is in six volumes (the 1730 ed. is in ten) and is edited by Dr. Hans Kayser. It is "to form the basis for a wider scientific study of this profound German thinker," though we have grave doubts as to whether either Gichtel or Überfeld would have countenanced Böhme as a 'thinker,' or ever have suggested that his works should be studied 'scientifically.' Jacob Böhme was unique; whatever his method may have been, emphatically it was not scientific. Not one of his statements concerning the mystery of being was the result of deliberate observation and experiment; in fact innumerable passages could be quoted pointing in the very opposite direction:

"I acknowledge myself to be altogether unworthy. . . . I cannot at all say that it is the work of my understanding or reason. . . . I never in all my life studied these Mysteries, and likewise know nothing of them; for I am a layman. And yet I must bring such things forth to light which all the high schools and universities have not been able to do, to whom, notwithstanding, in comparison I am but a child, and have none of their arts and wisdom. . . . I cannot say that I have learned or comprehended it, but as long as the Hand of God stayeth upon me I understand it; but if it hides itself, then I know not my own labour, and I am a stranger to the work of my own hands. . . . It is not my work. . . . I am only a simple mean instrument: God worketh and maketh what he pleaseth" (*Epistles*, Ger. ed. x, Eng. iii).

The beginner would be well advised to take the trouble to read through the *Epistles* before setting to work seriously on Mr. Earle's volume. They not only clearly exhibit the nature of the ground where Böhme stood when the vision of the inner realms of being opened itself in his creaturely mind, but they will also no less clearly indicate the procedure (certainly not 'scientific') to be followed by his readers if they are to come into direct touch with his writings. They also frequently refer to the writings themselves. In *Epistle xii* (Eng. ii.) will be found the following:

"*The Sixth Book*, or part, of our writings, treats of the Six Theosophic Points, of the utmost depth. [Namely] how the Three Principles arise in one another in harmony, so that in eternity there is no conflict; and whence come conflict and division. Also what is the origin of good and evil, even out of the Abyss [*Ungrund*], out of Nothing into Something, and how introduced into the ground of nature. This *Sixth Book* is [i.e. contains] such a mystery—though expressed with childlike simplicity—that no understanding [*Vernunft*] will fathom it without the light of God. . . . It [the book] is a key to Alpha and Omega (to all.)"

To students who may not have access to *Several Treatises* the following extracts from Sparrow's preface may, perhaps, prove interesting:

"The *Six Theosophic Points* is an exposition containing the knowledge of the greatest mysteries in eternity; and how they may be apprehended in the things of this outward visible world, more deeply and yet more particularly than in his other writings. . . . In which consideration we may see how this whole world is a looking-glass of the two eternal beginningless worlds, both the light and the dark world in one



another as one. . . . In the *Six Mystical Points* are matters of highest depth and of the greatest concernment to mankind to be known fundamentally, as he hath written of them."

Sparrow here summarizes these 'matters of greatest concernment' under six heads. The whole context is too long for quotation, but the final paragraph may be given :

"It says in brief, what the *Mysterium Magnum*, or great mystery, is, *viz.*, that which is resembled to us in this visible world (wherein all things belonging to darkness and light are hidden and manifested in the eternal substantial wisdom), in which also all things, both evil and good, are eternally resident, as in one world together ; though they must for ever be invisible, incomprehensible and incommunicable the one to the other ; as day and night, heaven and hell are so, the one being the love and light, the other the wrath and fire of the one only spirit, the wonderful and incomprehensible God. . . . The *Third Book* hinteth how the Heavenly and Earthly Mystery may be seen distinctly manifested together in this outward world, which is a looking-glass of the eternal great mystery, wherein both the heavenly divine, and the hellish wrathful mysteries, are represented in the visible things of this world, which hath had a beginning, and we may thereby be furnished with skill to go out of the earthly corruptible and [also out of] the hellish mystery with our souls, into the heavenly blessed mystery. . . . *Divine Intuition* is concerning the true sight or discerning of divine things, thereby to distinguish what is divine, and what is natural, in all things. . . . Creation is flowed forth from God, and endued or qualified with the same harmony . . . by his law and ordinance

as is always in himself; and this is a creaturely manifestation of what is in him from eternity to eternity. And in this book man's outward reason is answered to many objections about God's dispensations in this world, wherein man may discern what is divine and good, and the cause why reason seeth little or nothing of God either in the things or in the actings among men in the world."

One may charitably allow a considerable degree of latitude in the use of language to any writer who ostensibly sets himself to expound ideas such as are set out in the above passages. How skilfully soever his words may be chosen, he will find himself faced with well-nigh insuperable difficulties, for he will need to use words for a purpose entirely foreign to the one for which they were originally coined. On p. 18 of Mr. Earle's volume we have an excellent illustration of this very difficulty:

"The first will (which is called Father, and is itself freedom) desires Nature, and Nature with great longing desires freedom, that it may be released from the torment of anguish. And it receives freedom in its sharp fierceness in the imagination, at which it is terrified as a flash; for it is a terror [*ein Schrack*] of joy that it is released from the torment of anguish. And in the terror arise two beings [*Wesen*]. . . . The terror of its nature is a kindler of fire. For when the dark anguish, as the very fervent, stern being, receives freedom in itself, it is transformed in the terror, in freedom, into a flash, and the flash embraces freedom or gentleness. . . . The fire takes the love-quality into its essence, and that is now its food, so that it burns, and gives from the consumption, from the terror, the joyous spirit."

If we can take up the position of that deep student of Böhme William Law, and allow that such passages as these may, after all, not be absolutely unmitigated nonsense (though they may, certainly, be held to appear so, from one point of view), we may perhaps be prepared to hesitate before finally throwing them away as entirely useless.

The nature and genesis of fire and light figure largely in Böhme's writings, and fire is one of his prime symbols for the divine process. In his *Seven Principles* it stands fourth, on the 'cross,' or at the point of separation of the eternal Seven. 'Terror,' as ordinarily used, falls short of the full meaning of *Schrack* as employed by Böhme, though great fright must be there as one of the main elements in the concept. But to this must be added the sudden liberation of a pent-up terrific force, accompanied by a terrifying, ripping sound. In translating this paragraph Sparrow endeavours to convey the fuller meaning by 'skreek'=scream, to utter a shrill, harsh cry, to screech or scream.

"And it conceiveth or receiveth the liberty in its sharp fierce wrath in the imagination, whence it skreeketh as a flash, for it is a skreek of joy, that it is released from the anguish-source. And in the skreek exist two substances. . . . The skreek of its nature is a kindling of fire."

And Ellistone, in his translation of the *Signatura Rerum* (and also in the *Mysterium Magnum*), renders *Schrack* by *Flagrat*, from the Latin *flagro*.

"Although by it I mean not a burning, but even the powerful opening of the life or death in the enkindling of the fire; for the fire is the dividing bound-mark wherein the life of both Principles is

opened and severed; the life of the first is the dying death in the darkness, and the life of the second is the living life in the light. . . . In brief it is the pregnant echo of the sound of eternity, everywhere speaking, working, and opening itself in love or anger, in each thing according to its will and desire. In some it is the horrible Flagrat to death, and in others it is the pleasant, triumphant Flagrat to life."

Probably the greatest obstacle to the modern mind in its efforts to understand a writer like Böhme is its unwillingness to investigate truth by means of similitudes. St. Paul's statement, in his *Epistle to the Romans*, that "the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead," does not commend itself to exact thinking; and yet this principle lies at the very heart of all mystical interpretations of the universe.

"There is not the least thing done in the world, but doth, by way of similitude, signify and teach to us somewhat of the most transcendent and richest mysteries of eternity. . . . The thing representing is but a shadow in respect of the inward substance that is resembled by it." If man can find access to these divine scriptures he will learn that "the present bondage of creation is referable to spiritual causes older than man, and holds in subjection spiritual powers in material forms," and that the physical universe is "only a parenthesis—a mere parenthesis" in the divine record.

Such being the case, we are to look to the context, to what preceded our physical universe, and to what is to follow it, or come out of it. If we are to understand God's Word—the Word that was there 'in the

beginning'—we must reach through the 'vanity of time into the riches of eternity.' Such is the contention of the mystic. And he further holds that our only hope of doing this is first, thoroughly to realize that the achievement is beyond the power of self-will to accomplish, and secondly, that the revelation will certainly be given to us by the Holy Spirit, by God Himself, if we are willing to receive it, as alone it can be given and received. All valid mystical interpretations of the whence, the why and the whither of things, are given, not acquired by natural right, and the realization of this root-principle of divine knowledge is the *sine qua non* of the mystical process. If a man misses his way at the first step, the exactitude and precision of all subsequent stages of the journey will never bring him to the goal. Hence the necessity of a 'conversion'—not merely 'an interchanging of the *terms* of our proposition,' but the necessity of adopting, or rather accepting, an entirely contrary *method* of investigation itself.

"The whole kingdom of nature and the whole kingdom of grace were opened in Jacob Behmen, and the whole kingdom of nature and the whole kingdom of grace lie hid in myself." Thus wrote William Law. The principle underlying Mysticism, we are given to understand, is a becoming something, not simply a knowing about something that has already become.

Böhme's problem was himself. The particular mode of the being of all beings (*des Wesen aller Wesen*), the essence of all essences, the substance of all substances, that manifested itself 300 years ago in the man Böhme, has been embodied in his writings also. The writings we have, but the spirit evades us. This is our difficulty. Critical analysis of the exterior is

manifestly useless. Is there no other way? What of art? Is it possible for an artist to embody his *life*, himself, in the work of his hands? If anything of the sort is possible, then we would suggest that Böhme was an artist, and one would no more dream of seeking the divine essence in his writings by a critical analysis of the words in which he has encased it, than one would dream of attempting to find the same essence by any such method in an oratorio, in a picture, or in a poem. We suggest that only by approaching Böhme in childlike simplicity, in the same spirit, that is, in which he himself lived and died, and which breathes through every line he wrote, can we ever hope to approach the sphere of the divine essence which made him to be what he was. Not by the most careful study of the man's words shall we find their meaning; for the meaning of the words lies deeper, a 'principle' deeper than language. But by long and familiar intercourse, by dwelling with him, patiently and with tender sympathy associating our life with his life, our spirit with his spirit, we may, peradventure, contact in some measure the divine essence of which he has so much to say, and to which he unhesitatingly affirms he owed all and everything that made him what he became—when he "put his life in utmost hazard," when the terrifying *Schrack* of the dark fire at the heart of human nature burst its erstwhile bonds, and became the light of grace, illuminating and irradiating the very thing that it itself is.

"But whence cometh the light? My dear Reader, if you be able to break open all, and look into the pith, yet you will not find it. Though you seek in the deep, in the stars, in the elements, in all living creatures, also in heaven and earth, you will not find

it. Now you will say, Where then shall I find it? Dear Reader, I cannot so much as lend you the key to it. But I will direct you where you will find it: It lieth in the third chapter of the Evangelist, *St. John*, in these words: You must be born anew, by water, and by the Holy Ghost. This spirit is the key" (*The Three Principles*, 4.30).

And again, in like measure, from Mr. Earle's exquisite rendering of what constitutes perhaps the most precious piece Böhme ever penned, *Divine Intuition*:

"But seeing the great love of God in Christ is thus come to the aid of human life in earthly form, and has made for us poor men in the life of the humanity of Christ an open gate of grace to the divine entrance; therefore the matter now lies in this, that the life's will taken captive in its image-like existence should abandon again the earthly, *viz.*, egoism and self-will, and immerse itself wholly and solely in this embodied grace (which pressed from one, as from the first man, upon all, *Rom.* v. 18); and take to itself this grace, and in virtue of such acceptance and divine union sink with its resigned life's will into the super-sensible, super-fathomable, eternal One, as into the first ground of life's beginning, and give itself up again to the ground from which life sprang forth; then it is again in its eternal place, in the temperament, in the true rest."

A pellucid depth! What is to be done with it? Surely William Law was right. If any man misses his way in Böhme he will have no one but himself to blame.

The writer of this note has been intimately acquainted with Jacob Böhme for many years, and he

is grateful for the opportunity to place on record that in reading this new translation he is distinctly conscious of something he has never experienced before in Böhme-fields. It is difficult to say what this is: something in the nature of space, perhaps, of freedom, of movement, of flow. The old familiar atmosphere, so to speak, is there; and the light of olden days was ever sufficient. It seems to be, not so much a matter of light, as of life—as if one were walking with Böhme in the Western Highlands rather than being cooped up with him in the Reading Room of the British Museum.

C. J. BARKER.



## M. SCHURÉ'S FORECAST.

Colonel B. R. WARD, C.M.G., Late R.E.

*Les grands Initiés* (1889); *Sanctuaires d'Orient* (1898);  
*Les Prophètes de la Renaissance* (1919).

IN these three books Edouard Schuré, after sketching what he claims to be the secret history of all religions, makes an attempt to find a formula which shall indicate for us the future development of the world's religious evolution and enable us to work intelligently for the future synthesis of Religion, Science and Society.

In the first of these volumes M. Schuré undertakes to show that an 'esoteric tradition' has been in existence and has been continuous throughout the ages, that this tradition—this truth as he boldly calls it—manifests itself in divers degrees in the 'Messiahs' who have founded the great religions. This truth, he maintains, has never at any time been recognized by more than a small number of persons. By the mass of men it has never been even suspected. In its essence it does not reside in the knowledge of material facts, although it alone can illumine, order and explain them. It has its source in the depths of the soul, in the intellectual contemplation of archetypal ideas (*idées mères*) and in the energy of the will applied to the spiritual life. This essential, central and superior truth, according to him, is the living soul of all the great religions, the synthesis of their successive

revelations, the origin and the end of all science. As it flows at once from a changing source—the soul—and from an immutable source—universal spirit—it is always varied in form and yet always fundamentally identical.

This 'esoteric tradition,' whether written or oral, exists uninterruptedly through the centuries. But this continuous renewal is not automatic; it is due solely and entirely to the continuous effort and personal inspiration of those who form the chain. Every new development of humanity requires an appropriate adaptation of the doctrine and—as it were—a wider application.

It was under the influence of these ideas that *Les grands Initiés* was written. It was a first synthesis of the history of religions from India to Christ, and through him to present and future times. The book was meant as a challenge to orthodox science as well as to orthodox religion. It was in opposition to the established doctrines both of the University and of the Church. It was however, we are told, the occasion of an outburst of generous enthusiasm on the part of many of the thinking young men of the day. Other older voices joined in the chorus of congratulations, and testified to having suffered and having struggled in the same manner as the author had done. In this way many unknown friends, we read, assured M. Schuré that his book had given them back the power of hope, the courage to act and that certainty of faith which makes trials fruitful and survives defeats.

The second book of the series—*Les Sanctuaires d'Orient*—is the record of a visit to Thebes, Eleusis and Jerusalem, carried out as the result of an imperious longing to see with his own eyes those

sacred places of Egypt, Greece and Palestine, where he had lived so long in thought.

The journey lasted for six months and far surpassed the author's expectations.

Summing up the past and foreshadowing the future, the trinity of Thebes, Eleusis and Jerusalem was conceived as a splendid revelation of the organic unity of Science, Art and Religion in a re-integrated Life.

In the great symbols of Egypt—the Pyramid, the Sphinx and the 'Phoenix' (*sic*, meaning the winged-globe symbol)—M. Schuré recognized Egypt as the home of universal principles.

The Pyramid gives the idea of the Unchangeable and the Eternal. It is not the symbol of the Living God, but the geometrical figure of Law, the pentahedron (? semi-octahedron), or five-sided solid representing 'the Absolute.'

The triangle superimposed on the square and ending in a point is said to be the symbol of the trinity of life superimposed on the quaternary of the universe and its four elements. By means of the four faces of the pyramid, the triangle resolves itself into the divine unity from which it emanated. It is a symbol of 'the Absolute,' an idea which, according to the author, can be represented only geometrically.

The Sphinx, with its human head on the body of a lion, M. Schuré contends, typifies the nature of evolution culminating in humanity.

The Phoenix—or winged disk of the sun—is, he believes, the symbol of Horus, the manifested God, the Egyptian Apollo. Two serpents, entwined together, and coiled round the disk, raise their heads on each side, and represent the two movements of the eternal

Spirit—its out-breathing and its in-breathing. The symbol thus is said to represent the living Spirit of God in its journey through man and nature. The two serpents, whose heads protrude from the circle of infinity, and who re-appear in the caduceus of the Greek Hermes, have two functions. One is to breathe life into all material forms. The function of the other is to drink in the souls which are returning to the divine light.

These three symbols, it is said, hold the key to the religion and science of ancient Egypt. The two streams of Religion and Science have now separated, and are generally looked upon as hopelessly antagonistic. By going back in thought to Egypt, when Religion and Science at their source flowed together as one stream, we may get some glimpse of the religious and scientific synthesis after which humanity is now groping.

The Pyramid is the symbol of the unfathomable Deity manifested by the quaternary law of matter under the category of the four elements, and evolving by the ternary law of Past, Present and Future back to the Divine.

The Sphinx is his Living Word, with lion's claws and human face.

The Winged-disk is a symbol of the immortal soul, which flies through all the worlds with her solar wings.

All three symbols may be concentrated in thought into one axiom—that the Deity is manifested in the Individual, who comes from God (Involution) and returns to him (Evolution) along the ternary road of Life as manifested in Time (Past, Present and Future), polarized between animalism and spirituality, and

exhibiting all the degrees of the spiritual hierarchy during his winged journey through the worlds.

In the last book—*Les Prophètes de la Renaissance*—published in 1919, M. Schuré continues his previous studies in the light of the Great War of 1914 to 1918.

In it he recognizes an immense wave of spiritual life, presaging a transformation in human society as radical and universal as that effected by Christianity.

In the time of Christ the impulse of the wave was given by a sublime Prophet, the greatest of the Sons of God. His aim was to implant amongst men the idea of fraternity, with a feeling of the Divine at once deeper and more immediate than had been the case before. To-day, says M. Schuré, the new spiritual wave has taken, as centres of expansion, the national souls of peoples, in order to bring them to a more intimate understanding of their relations to one another, and in order to create new social organs.

In studying the five great Prophets of the Renaissance M. Schuré is seeking for the formula which will help in the solution of the social problem as it presents itself to-day. For to-day, as he says, another Renaissance is unfolding itself before our eyes, a Renaissance which he thinks will prove to be a veritable Resurrection. "It is in vain," he writes, "that the jailers of the human soul, atheists of all kinds cleverly camouflaged and masked, who make a pride of their short-sightedness and display their doubts as a badge of superiority, have organized up to the present day a conspiracy of silence regarding those general principles, at once spiritual and synthetic, now again being re-born in the world."

The great Prophets of the Renaissance saw

these general principles, and blazoned them forth in their poems, their statues and their pictures.

Dante, as the Genius of Faith, without diverging a hair's breadth from the strictest Catholic Orthodoxy, enlarges and vivifies it in introducing, as M. Schuré holds, the ideas of Thrice-greatest Hermes, Orpheus and Pythagoras. These great teachers had identified the cosmic forces with the spheres of the seven planets, the active virtues residing in Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars and Jupiter, while the contemplative virtues received in Saturn the crown of their perfection.

A century later Paracelsus made a discovery which was destined to open out dazzling vistas over the infinite universe by means of a glimpse into one of the most hidden mysteries of Nature. By means of his studies in natural history, his experiments in chemistry, physiology and medicine, he was led to understand that man is, by his corporal and spiritual construction, a true mirror of the world; that not only are all the chemical constituents of Nature found in him, but that by means of his *physical* body, his *etheric* or *vital* body and his *astral* body (his radiant 'aura') he reflects the three worlds natural, psychic and spiritual. Thus every man carries in himself the three worlds. In the three divisions of his being he possesses an earth, an atmosphere and a firmament. By means of them, whether he knows it or not, he is in perpetual communication with the corresponding portions of the cosmos. That is why man, whom Paracelsus calls a *microcosm*, is an extract, an abstract and a quintessence of the universe which he calls the *macrocosm*.

Dante, after the long and painful pilgrimage described in *The Divine Comedy*, reaches the summit of

the conical Mount of Purgatory under the guidance of Virgil. Here in the Earthly Paradise, where Leah and Rachel, typifying the active and the contemplative virtues, are plucking flowers and making them up into garlands, Virgil says to his *protégé* :

“You have seen the eternal fire (Hell) and the ephemeral fire (Purgatory), now you have come to a place where I can no longer guide you. You are free, upright, whole, master of yourself, and sin has no more power over you. You are lord of yourself, by virtue of the crown which I place upon your head.”

Then follows the mystic vision of Beatrice, in whose eyes he sees reflected by turns the human and divine nature of Christ. Thus the perfect fusion of the human and divine, the mystery and aim of creation and evolution, appears to the initiate through the prism of Love in the eyes of the Woman. This spectacle is impressed on the soul of the Seer ‘like a seal in soft wax,’ and his initiation is complete. Now for an instant he looks back, and then again forward, and at last, armed with new sight, he understands the reason for and the meaning of the three worlds which he is traversing. He also now understands the essence of his own being, which reproduces and reflects the three worlds as in a limpid crystal. Hell, with its darkness, its struggles and its horrors, corresponds to the *material world*. Purgatory, with its soft light, its repentances and its trials, corresponds to the *etheric world of the soul*. Paradise, with its splendours, its joys and its ecstasies, corresponds to the *astral or divine world of pure spirit*. On the intercession of Beatrice and the prayer of Saint Bernard, Dante is finally permitted to have a glimpse into the mystery of the Trinity, which appears to him under the form of three

concentric circles, at the centre of which he fancies he can distinguish a human face.

"And, as by a thunder-clap, my spirit was traversed by a splendour which made my desire and my will move in accordance with the Love which moves the Sun and the other stars."

"Thus," writes M. Schuré, "the initiation of the pilgrim of the three worlds is closed by a conscious and voluntary identification of his soul with the thought and the will of God."

In the sequel, the author shows us Leonardo as the Genius of Science, seeking to solve the mystery of Evil. The polarity of Matter and Spirit is represented by him under the forms of the head of Medusa and the head of Christ in the great fresco of the Last Supper. Raphael, as the Genius of Beauty, combines the beauty of form in Hellenism with the spiritual beauty of Christianity, and in his last great picture (the Transfiguration) he shows us the hierarchy of the three worlds as a ladder, ascending from the material world at the base, through the etheric world, occupied by the half-sleeping apostles, up to the spiritual world, which radiates its light through the two lower worlds. It is the same pilgrimage, or path to the Divine, which Dante shows us in his upward journey from Hell, through Purgatory, to Heaven. This picture also shows at a glance the simultaneous existence of human souls in the three worlds, and therefore the degree or rank attained by them. As a corollary to this may be inferred the law of metamorphosis, of re-births and of reincarnations, which M. Schuré looks upon as the great law of evolution, regarded from its spiritual side.

Michael Angelo, as the Genius of Force, and Corregio, as the Genius of Love, illustrate in their



different ways—the one with a fierce despair, the other with gentleness and joy—the hierarchy of the three worlds and the polarity of the Eternal Masculine and the Eternal Feminine.

As a summing-up of the whole matter, M. Schuré, in the following words, gives us his opinion that the old science of the Egyptian and Orphic mysteries must be resuscitated and adapted to our own times, if we are to see the visions of the Prophets of the Renaissance realized in the social life of humanity.

“There are three magic instruments which can penetrate into the very depths of Life: *The Torch of Love*, which creates enthusiasm; the *Lyre of Harmony*, whose rhythm ordains Beauty; and the *Caduceus of Hermes*, with two serpents entwined and facing one another, who directs souls when they descend into the flesh and carries them back to the Gods after death. The charms of the Torch and of the Lyre have power over the inferior worlds. Alone the Winged Sceptre of Hermes leads to the Divine world and allows its possessor to have command over the other two.

*“Up to the present day the Torch and the Lyre have sufficed to the artist and the poet for their incantations. But now the powers of evil are so strong, and the darkness produced by them has become so dense, that the Caduceus of Hermes, the sceptre of integral science, can alone penetrate and conquer them.”*

“Therefore dismiss the doubt which gnaws at your heart and paralyses your aim. The Torch and the Lyre are the gift of the Gods. The Sceptre of Hermes is the reward of will. It belongs only to those who know how to conquer it, and no one may seize it but he who possesses Faith.”

B. R. WARD.

# PLOTINUS AND PLATO: A COMPARISON.

KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, A.M., Ph.D., M.D.

COMPARISONS are odious, it is said. And yet there is no better means of learning, it is also said, than to compare spiritual things with spiritual. Indeed it may be maintained that at bottom it is the only method of learning; it has even been said that he who knows one language only, does not know any as yet. This is all the truer in biography where there is no absolute mathematical scale of values. It is the biographies of the great saints of the world-cults which have been the inspiration of the faithful; and it has been a comparison of the founders of the different cults which has generally decided the comparative values of their religions. Indeed the world has grown accustomed to measure things by the one supreme biography which has given tone to centuries and millennia. Under such circumstances we cannot help but profit by a comparison and contrast between those two great leaders and inspirers, Plato and Plotinus.

## I. SIMILARITIES.

1. They both lived in times so discordant that the genuineness of their education resulted in an epoch-making summation which became a mirror of their age.

We are so accustomed to the urbane, universal personality of Plato that we should find it difficult to

imagine what his age would have been without him. Here we have Socrates with a really valuable teaching about the concept of knowledge; here Parmenides and Heraclitus, the Megarians and the Cynics who had made a genuine distinction between knowledge and opinion. Heraclitus, Zeno and the Sophists had satisfactorily demonstrated the subjectivity of sense-perception. The Eleatic principle of Being, the Heraclitan of Becoming, were both true, in their way. Anaxagoras had proclaimed the reality of Spirit, the Megarians and Socrates had heralded the idea of the Good. It was a very Babel, and every man's hand was, with good reason, against every other man's. Apparently there was no hope of agreement, for each partisan paid no attention to his neighbour, and each had a really valuable contribution to the spirit of the times. It was an *impasse*—a situation impossible to any but the gods who sent as saviour Plato, with sufficient education to be willing to learn the good of each, and with sufficient genius to combine it all into his doctrine of Ideas, his dream of the Republic, and his idealized biography of Socrates.

Plotinus lived at a time quite as impossible, from the human standpoint. Here we have the Platonic and Stoic schools, who had for four centuries conducted almost a feud to the death, whose last act, strange to say, was staged in the Syrian town of Apamea, between the Platonist Numenius and the Stoic Posidonius. Both systems had received a check-mate. Aristotelianism had created a new science and scorned the other two. Gnosticism had instilled its secret venom among the superstitious. Among the common people had risen a strange Syrian sect that gloried in persecution and recked of no philosophy whatever.

Once more Providence sent a man whose very infirmities compelled him to assimilate the best remaining treasures of the Greek world and retranslate the ancient treasures for the then modern world.

2. They both depended on a hidden source. But eclecticism alone is not sufficient to explain the genius of these two. For that matter any of their contemporaries might have done their work, if that was all. There was a hidden spring, all the more powerful for not being acknowledged. It was like the secret strength of the Christian. It was as if some great unselfish prophet of the past was hovering over them, performing the miracles for them, speaking through them. Plato mentioned Pythagoras as little as Plotinus acknowledged Numenius. But in the last analysis it was their inspiration that moved them.

Plato made every effort to obtain the works of Ocellus Lucanus and got some through Archytas. His *Timæus* was probably due to the work of the Locrian follower of Pythagoras of that name; Burgess, the editor who suggests that the Locrian's work may have been a summary of Plato's, acknowledges that it is inexplicable how the former's mathematics could be so infinitely more developed, if only an abstract. It is acknowledged that Plato took the Pythagorean idealized numbers, matter and the indefinite duality.

It was not otherwise with Plotinus. His first secretary, Amelius, was Numenius's legatee, and knew all of Numenius's works by heart. Moreover I have elsewhere pointed out in Plotinus's first period many citations of the fragments of Numenius which remain; judge then how much we should find if we had all of Numenius's work before us.

3. Both employed a method of questions rather

than assertions. It has often been noted how one of the charms and sources of thought-arousal in Plato's dialogues is the uncertainty as to what was Plato's own view, and what only that of the man of straw made to be destroyed. It is not otherwise with Plotinus, who prefers to ask questions which his readers have to answer for themselves, and betrays his own opinion only tentatively and at intervals. Both therefore were Socratic midwives of thought rather than dogmatists; and therefore they have an immortal place in the education of thinkers, irrespective of the agreement of these with them personally. Their works are schools of thought rather than cast-iron formulations, such as those of St. Thomas Aquinas.

4. Both employed myths. Whole books have been written on the myths of Plato; these he seems to have used as an objectification of his argument at the climax of the dialogue, as the keystone of his arch. As the supreme Galilean teacher spoke only in parables, so Plato's myths of the Cave, of the Soul-charioteer, and others, remain among the most cherished treasures of the race. Plotinus does not indeed use myths with the same consummate art, nor does he use them so regularly; but he has created some myths that will be inscribed on the walls of the Hall of Fame: the Head with the Three Faces, that ultimately formed the foundation of the chief doctrine of the world's foremost religion; the Man whose feet are in the Bath-tub; Eros and Psyche; the Orchestra of the Universe; the Over-weighted Birds; the Ray and Light; Spring and Stream; and many others. These beautiful illustrations will never fade.

5. Both lived untroubled lives. In one sense this might be said of many other philosophers. Yet

this would not invalidate the undeniable similarity of Plato in his peaceful Academy and Plotinus in his Roman School, serenely writing out an immense body of thought, and founding traditions that lasted centuries. Fortunately for us their labours are preserved for us, for the greater part.

## II. CONTRASTS.

In some respects it must be granted that Plato was more fortunate or more successful than Plotinus.

In the first place, Plato wrote finished dialogues, whereas Plotinus allowed his secretaries to write out treatises as systematic as circumstances permitted. Plato's biographic method was far superior. He idealized Socrates and in the latter's death found an apt opportunity for tragic interest. He called up the great and good before him and impersonated them on his romantic stage. Like Rousseau, he was wise enough to clothe his thought in living garb. He was a Shakespeare; Plotinus a Robert Browning.

Again, Plato in his earlier *Republic* and later *Laws* touched the political interests of men, of which Plotinus only dreamed. Plotinus's attempted 'Platonopolis' was a failure; but that was to be blamed on the Emperor, not on him. Plato never even tried as much. But Plotinus's scattered references to political establishment are not comparable in volume or power with Plato's.

On the other hand, Plotinus has the strength of his weaknesses. If he is less concerned with political interests, he is far more so with the soul's salvation. Plato's ideal sage will be persecuted, nay, shamefully killed; and beyond a theoretical purification by virtues he does not, like Plotinus, aspire to personal vision of

the divinity. Plato's ideal is a statesman, Plotinus's is a saint. The latter's ecstasy is personal knowledge of the divinity and immortal life; that is a goal of universal interest.

Again, just because Plato was a stronger man, his career is less typically human, and therefore less useful for the admonition and instruction of the philosophical student. Plato's career was not so much a development as a disappointment, a reactionary degeneration, ending in gloom. His best period is that of his early *Republic*. When he is disappointed and soured, he loses faith in human nature, in the *Laws*, and finds things so wrong that he comes to believe in an evil world-soul. The end of his life is uncertain. On the other hand, Plotinus, in full sincerity and humility, because of his poor sight, lack of self-analysis and bodily weakness, goes through the whole mental process that any thinking student must traverse; from a naïve common-sense dualism through the Berkeleian dialectic to monism, and beyond to a certainty of higher co-ordinate faculties of intuition by which he comes in contact with the spiritual realms. Plato is a comet: Plotinus is a planet.

Then Plato is still a static philosopher; but Plotinus, from Aristotelian incitation, is a genetic prophet. Plato's intelligible world is a final vision; Plotinus's is an eternal generation, an endless development, a universal progress. Plato is an ideal for a youth; Plotinus gives the working principles for the whole life. Plato may be the summation of his past; but Plotinus is a prophecy of the future. And so it has proved. His Aristotelian-Stoic translation of Plato has served as theology for a millenary religion. His trinity, his eternal generation, his ecstasy ultimat-

ing in a vision of a Father begetting a Son of wondrous beauty, his teaching of repentance, conversion, sanctification and witness of the Spirit have, under different auspices, been re-echoing down the corridors of time. And the day of his recognition has dawned, with the re-ordering of his works and a concordance for ready reference. The future will hear much more of Plotinus than has the past.

#### CONCLUSION.

As we said at the beginning, comparisons are odious, although highly illuminative. Plotinus, as Neoplatonist, is unthinkable without Plato, and must of necessity agree with him in idealism; yet Plato's idealism is static, while Plotinus's is dynamic. Plotinus is therefore a step beyond Plato, although the immortal radiance of the Academician will never be dimmed. But Plato has become a memory, while Plotinus remains a power; for his is the gospel of progress, not of the reaction of the *Laws*. Were Plotinus alive to-day, we can imagine him making a yet more macrocosmic summation of past wisdom, not for his own glory—for he was so modest he would not even be reproduced in painting—but for the progress of truth. Who will do this for our age and for the future?

KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE.



## SOME PROBLEMS OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS.

L. M. CORRY.

THIS, I confess at once, is a most misleading title. I am not in any way qualified to speak about that vast, unplumbed abyss — the subconscious mind; I am simply going to relate some experiences with a planchette and to try to get others to decide what part in the manifestations is due to subconscious mind, and what part, if any, is due to the action of discarnate human beings.

As this paper is trivial and may sound flippant, I want to say at the outset that I am desperately anxious to believe in survival, and that I agree with the Editor in thinking that the establishment of that fact on an incontrovertible scientific basis would do more to advance the science of psychology and secure the basis of a reasonable religion than anything else. I suppose I ought also to say that I have not the most rudimentary psychic gifts, and that what follows is simply the record of a spectator, not even of a systematic investigator.

The two people who 'manipulated' the planchettes with which I shall chiefly deal, were related to one another and much in sympathy, but with very varied temperaments and gifts. They had discovered that they could get sentences spelt out by placing their hands on an inverted tumbler and letting it move

freely within a circle of letters on a polished table. Our first experiments were with the tumbler. We blindfolded the manipulators, whom I shall call A and B, and constantly changed the position of the letters, which were on separate wooden blocks, so that by no possibility could their normal sense control the messages. The tumbler clearly showed the emotions of anger, impatience, pleasure, obstinacy, etc.; it always knew when a letter had fallen on the floor, and hovered on the edge of the table till we picked it up, though we were quite unaware that a letter was missing. Sometimes, in a rage, it swept all the letters on to the floor, and if it had spelt out 'stop,' nothing would induce it to move again. My sister and I possessed a planchette, with which we had made vain attempts to write; so we suggested to A and B that they should come to try it. Their success was instantaneous; it dashed off coherent messages at once. The writing was very large and, I regret to say, it remained so, using up reams of kitchen-paper, in spite of repeated hints as to paper-shortage!

Automatic writing is now almost a rule where there is interest in psychic matters; but there are just a few features of our experiments which I think are unusual and worth recording.

In the first place our planchettes have distinct personalities; they tell us their names, and are very hurt if we do not use them. They have a variety of gifts; one, for instance, can do arithmetic, another can write poetry.

The second point, which I think is unusual, is that we get a great many messages from animals.

The third point of note is that, while we have had many interesting conversations with living people, we

never get any communications from the deceased. We thus get some of the phenomena of Spiritualism, but no spirits.

With regard to the first point—the individuality of the planchettes—one of them explained to me at an early sitting that ‘planchette’ was a general term, and that she resented being addressed as ‘planchette,’ just as I might resent being called ‘woman’! One of them went so far as to demand the lid of the box in which he was kept, and to have his name written on it. They give themselves only Christian names and take the surnames of their owners. We were startled once when a recently acquired planchette referred to our old original one as ‘Charlie Corry.’ They seem to have different characters. Brenda Adelaide has, as one might expect, a vein of sentimentality. Tommy is young, mischievous, good at sums. Cyrilla writes charming poetry. They never, however, say that they have had a previous existence nor pretend to be anything but toys; in fact Tommy begged me to buy his ‘twin sister Betty’ at Hamley’s, asserting that she had a gift for telling cards. Months later, requiring another planchette, I did go to the shop. But I evidently failed to get Betty; for when I sat down at the table, having entirely forgotten the episode, Tommy greeted me with the remark: “You fool! you went too late!”

The planchettes have not only individuality, but a variety of gifts. We suggested to Tommy that perhaps he could do sums. At first he did some easy additions and subtractions, and finally did sixth root sums, giving the answers instantaneously to problems that took us some time to work out. His arithmetic was beyond the scope of A or B; but I think that when the sixth root sums were done a mathematician was

present. The planchette cancelled fractions in the neatest way, and did some elementary euclid and algebra, the answers being invariably correct. One or two of the planchettes have written bars of music, which they insist on hearing played on the piano, and show great appreciation of their own productions! The planchette who calls herself Cyrilla, has a decided gift for poetry. Sometimes the verses are said to be original; sometimes they are attributed to modern poets. The curious fact is that they are *never* in the conscious memory of any one present.

The greatest feat from a super-normal point of view a planchette has ever accomplished, was to write out the names of nineteen cards in the order in which they occurred in a pack, which had been shuffled and put away in a drawer. In this case *no one* had seen the cards. Planchette first wrote down a list such as ace of clubs, nine of diamonds, etc. The pack was then fetched, and I turned the cards up. They were then one by one compared with planchette's list and found to be correct. On that occasion, only members of my family were with A and B; but on several other occasions the planchettes have told a lesser number of cards, though for some reason they disliked doing it and required a lot of persuasion. Of course from an evidential point of view this test was valueless; for it was not a *new* unopened pack of cards that was read, but one lying in the drawer of a card-table where A or B might have looked at it. I am perfectly convinced they did not look at it, for they were as surprised as we were at the exhibition of supernormal power. Neither of them is the least clairvoyante in the ordinary way; but I suppose one or both may be sub-consciously clairvoyante. The

Society for Psychical Research, when told about the cards, suggested that A or B might have looked at them in their sleep; but as neither is addicted to somnambulism this seems improbable. This reminds me that, on one occasion, Cyrilla was taken to the S.P.R. headquarters. The visit, however, was not a success. She began inauspiciously by calling the Secretary by her Christian name and saying: "I don't like . . . I won't be tested!" But I think she was finally persuaded to give some proofs of thought-reading.

Another curious *trait* of our planchettes, which I hope is not a reflection on the circle, is their ability to forge signatures. We discovered this by accident. My name was written and someone said: "It is in your own handwriting!"—on which planchette began to do other signatures. On one occasion, when on a visit in the country in Scotland, it did a lot of signatures of people unknown to A or B, but whose names they might have seen on turning over the leaves of the visitors' book. On another occasion, when staying for a week-end in a country house in Surrey, it wrote signatures which were in a visitors' book they had not seen, for it had been put away. It insisted on the book being fetched and compared with the signatures. On this occasion only the hostess can have been familiar with the handwriting; but how was her subconscious mental picture transferred to the brains controlling planchette? It is not easy to forge a signature, even if you have it in front of you to copy; but for two people manipulating a clumsy wooden instrument to write a signature they had never seen seems well-nigh an impossible feat. A curious point is that, when we asked A and B with a planchette to

do signatures of people from whom they actually received letters, they were much less successful, though they wrote accurately familiar signatures like Lillie Langtry's and Queen Alexandra's.

I must touch now on the second peculiarity of our planchette-experiences—the conversations with animals; and I should like to hear from others who have had similar experience. The animals began to communicate when there was present a relative of A and B's who had an estate in the North, and who was much interested in the animals on the farm. The most frequent communicator was a dog, called Pongo, who came and conversed in rather ponderous Johnsonian English. His style was always consistent, and he attributed his grand manner and his learning to the fact that he was a spaniel! Human beings he characterized as 'well-meaning, but of weak intellect.' Another dog, who was a frequent visitor, was a dreary pessimist. Several of the farm-animals came and made remarks. The donkey once complained bitterly of the tactless treatment of the new stable-boy; the cows asked for prettier milkmaids. A Shetland pony complained of the weight of his mistress in a pony-cart; a hen actually came and talked about her daughter Olga! When we asked why she was called Olga, the hen wrote: 'After my husband's sainted aunt!' On several occasions we got messages from dogs who had died, and who were in the 'land of happy beasts.' The living animals too all spoke of the 'land of happy beasts,' which they shortened to the 'L. H. B.,' as their ultimate goal. When questioned as to their occupation in the happy land, a dog said they hunted rabbits. We had hardly formulated the thought that this was scarcely paradise

for the rabbits, when planchette hastily wrote : 'Imit-bunnies !'—imitation rabbits. It reminded one of that delightful story of Andrew Lang's—'In the Wrong Paradise'—when a Scotch Missionary gets by mistake into the paradise of the Ojibaway Indians, where he is constantly being hunted and scalped. It is explained to him that *he* is the chief ingredient in *their* heaven !

This brings me to my third point. We conversed with all kinds of people and things and got every variety of good advice ; but our conversations were always with living people, never with the dead. Men and women we knew and those we did not know came and discussed their private affairs. Actors and actresses were frequent visitors. On one of the last occasions when we interviewed a planchette, an actor taking the leading part in a well-known play monopolized most of the evening, criticizing other people in the caste with great freedom and telling us about his training. Once we had a long message giving elaborate advice about dressmakers, milliners, hair-dressing and the use of cosmetics. When we asked : Who is saying all this ? the reply was : 'The Spirit of Frivolity !' When we asked the planchette that was forging signatures, Who was writing ? she replied—'The Spirit of Graphology !' I have seen our planchettes write sentences in Latin, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Roumanian ; but I think the language written was always known to someone present.

We have of course received a good many prophecies giving specific dates, which were generally quite wrong ; so we have never treated the planchettes' forecasts with the slightest respect. Their remarks on the War were

usually quite wide of the mark; but it is of interest to note that in October, 1914, when all our friends and relatives were hurrying to the various Fronts, we asked the planchette Brenda, who was in a literary vein, to write us something on the War, and she immediately produced the following apposite lines :

“Sirs, on no common quarrel are we up,  
But are embattled for dear Liberty,  
Dear Liberty to Righteousness affianced.  
For this the noble hath disdained his ease,  
For this the gentleman foresworn his hearth;  
For this the yeoman left his glebe unploughed;  
For this we have preferred, rather than reap,  
Or sow the tilth, to trample the sown fields  
And springing pasture to incarnadine.”

I wonder if any reader recognizes these lines? We immediately thought they were Elizabethan; but when we asked planchette *she* said: ‘By Stephen Phillips.’ We were familiar with Stephen Phillips’ verse, but the above did not seem to us the least in his style. We showed the lines to many people; but no one knew them. In the end we discovered that planchette was right; they are in a play by Phillips, called ‘The Sin of David.’ Now A and B had both seen this play acted, but had never read it; so it is evident that the simple hearing of a passage, which had left no normal recoverable impress on their memory, had so stamped itself on their subconscious that it was reproduced on a singularly fitting occasion.

It is in poetry that the planchettes, particularly Cyrilla, have made their most sustained efforts, and we have thought it worth while to keep copies of all



the verses written. On several occasions we have had short poems by living poets, such as Henry de Vere Stackpoole and Walter De La Mare, and under pressure their authorship has been acknowledged. In no case have they been poems which any member of the group has known by heart; though generally someone present might have read them. In a good many cases no author's name has been given, and the planchettes have taken the credit for producing their verses; but in two or three cases further research has traced them to modern writers, and I am inclined to think that none of them is really original. They are not doggerel verse; on the contrary there are subtleties of rhyme and rhythm which prove them to be the work of no novice. I shall give one short sample.

#### SUNSET GATES.

“O clouds that mount on high!  
What do you see there?  
O clouds that gild the sky!  
O clouds that flame and fly!  
Fain would we flee there.

“O bars of rose and gold!  
Show, we beseech you,  
All that your depths enfold,  
All that you have and hold,  
For we would reach you.

“Whence is your coming?  
Whither your going?  
Out of the gloaming  
Into the glowing?

What in your roaming  
 Keep you from showing?  
 Where is your homing,  
 From the winds blowing?

"Clouds of the sunset gates!  
 Marvellous faces  
 Shine when your gold abates,  
 Smile through your spaces.  
 There El Dorado waits,  
 There are our places.

"Shatter your misty shrouds  
 Veiling our view,  
 Scatter your filmy crowds  
 Barring the blue,  
 Open your gates, O clouds,  
 Let us come through!"

The poem that has puzzled us most is a French piece of three eight-lined stanzas, called '*Résignons Nous.*' It begins:

*"C'est la saison des avalanches,  
 Le bois est noir, le ciel est gris."*

A and B have a fair knowledge of French, but are quite incapable of producing verses in it. This poem has been submitted to several literary French people, who do not recognize it, but say it is certainly and essentially French. It seemed to me to be rather in the style and sentiment of Victor Hugo, but less distinguished authors have been suggested. It was written one evening when A and B and two other members of my own family were present; we all have particularly good memories for

poetry, and could not possibly have learnt the verses and forgotten them absolutely,—so it remains a mystery. Short German and Italian poems have also been written. The German lines suggested the words of a Schubert song, but have not so far been identified.

This briefly summarizes our planchette-experiences. The strange thing about them is that we have had some of the phenomena of Spiritualism, but no spirits. When A and B began to write, their attitude was open-minded, they had never attended *séances*, and did not for a moment think of themselves as mediums; but we had read a good deal on the subject, and perhaps expected supernormal phenomena to occur. We were not out for what is called 'development'; we met always in bright daylight or by electric light, and were never told by the planchettes to write in the dark. I think it quite possible that, if we had got into communication with discarnate beings at the start, the sittings would have been stopped; and I am almost certain that, had we been convinced Spiritualists, the messages we received would have purported to come from discarnate human beings. We sometimes got messages for strangers who were present, which, had we been Spiritualists, might have been said to come from their discarnate relatives. I remember, when once an American friend was dining with us, planchette referred to what she had been doing in the afternoon, gave her advice about her health, and then remarked: "I don't like Mrs. D; she knows too much!" Now Mrs. D's affairs were quite unknown either to A and B or to us, and she *did* know a good deal, having had many psychic experiences herself.

A planchette is fatally suggestible; once give it a hint and its inventive powers run on. One felt that

with very little encouragement the wooden planchettes would pose as romantic personages. The dog Pongo, who came so often, had a perfectly coherent personality; he talked like a rather pompous elderly gentleman of the old school. Surely he was *not* an elderly man of the 18th century posing as a dog? Could he be the subconscious mind of a dog in Scotland, attracted to the circle because his owner sometimes attends it? or is he a subconscious creation of the mind of A or B? I am quite convinced that he is not a deliberate creation of their ordinary minds; for while writing they are often carrying on a conversation about other things and have no idea what they are inscribing. I have seen messages written up-side down and in 'looking-glass' writing; moreover we were sometimes considerably bored by Pongo's long-winded sentences and longed for him to go away!

I was staying in the country not very long ago, and after dinner we amused ourselves with a planchette. The lady manipulating it had never used one before, but she knew she had psychic gifts and had had some experience of table-turning; so, unlike A and B, she immediately got messages from a discarnate Italian priest, who had come to her on previous occasions. Someone suggested that the 'control' or communicator should tell us about our 'last incarnations.' This hint was responded to with alacrity. We numbered ourselves to save time, and planchette immediately wrote: "No. 1, Sœur Mathilde, Angoulême, 1560; No. 2, Madonna Silva, Firenze, 1628." Her husband was sitting next her, so planchette very tactfully added: "No. 3,—he loved her." No. 4 had been a Scotch boy in the Stuart period, who had died at the age of 15. No. 5 had been born in Weimar and had been the

friend of Sebastian Bach. There was just a hint of fitness in these suggested 'past incarnations,' though they were certainly not ideas from the ordinary mind of the lady manipulating the planchette. The doctrine of reincarnation illustrates particularly well the part played by the subconscious mind of the sitters. If the investigating group is familiar with this idea, the 'spirit controls' take it as a matter of course; if the group is unfamiliar with it, or for any reason dislikes the notion, the 'spirits' strenuously deny it. In a recent American book of revelations purporting to come from the 'twentieth plane'(!), reincarnation is said to happen *occasionally*: "Men or women of genius are always reincarnations; people only come back when they have risen to the 'tenth plane.'" The investigator says to the 'control': "Then the hundreds of people who think they are reincarnations of Cleopatra must nearly all be mistaken." To this the 'control,' who says he is Hartley Coleridge, replies with some asperity: "Cleopatra is not on the market for reincarnation; she is in the valley of the tenth plane. Her sins were as scarlet." In a later chapter Spinoza, who is controlling, mentions that he was last reincarnated in Benjamin Disraeli, in order that he "might gain the experience which actual contact with the people gives a great statesman"!

I have just read hurriedly three books of psychic records: *I Heard a Voice*, *Rupert Lives* and *Rachael Comforted*, and they all seem to bear out my contention that the subconscious mind of the group has a very direct bearing on the phenomena. In *I Heard a Voice* two young girls, aged 14 and 16, manipulate the planchette; their father, a K.C., seems to take as inspired almost everything they write. They get some

interesting evidential matter; but the spirits who come seem chiefly anxious to insist on certain High Church or Roman Catholic doctrines, and especially on the supreme importance of the right attitude towards 'Our Lady, the Mother of God.' The writer of the book *Rupert Lives* also has some interesting evidence of his son's survival, particularly a sort of cross-correspondence with the late W. T. Stead; but from this book one would gather that the 'astral plane' is mainly interested in the affairs of the Baptist Church. *Rachael Comforted* is a touching story of a mother's communication, through planchette-writing, with her boy, Sunny, who died at the age of 13. What interests me about this book is that, although it has only recently been published, it tells of things which occurred 19 years ago. The naturalness of the after-life as described and the close connection with *this* life which it reveals, are corroborated by *Raymond* and other recent books. 'Sunny's' mother has conventional ideas, and seems genuinely surprised and not a little relieved to hear that her son is not an 'angel'; he is constantly correcting her impressions by telling her that "*There is Here.*"

Now just because the heaven of the Spiritualists is so unlike the conventional heaven—

"All glass and gold, with God for its Sun"—it strikes most unreflecting people who hear about it as a new revelation; but have we ever really believed in the heavens of Dante and Fra Angelico? Have we not, at the back of our minds, *i.e.* subconsciously, repudiated them, and really craved for a paradise somewhat more like earth?

The subconscious mind has a dramatic instinct; it not only retains our lost memories but it seems to

have the power of re-shaping events and presenting them in another form. An interesting example of this dramatizing power was reported in a paper read by Sir G. Lowes Dickenson to the S.P.R. some years ago. The case was that of a young girl, the daughter of a country parson, who under hypnotism represented herself as being a woman of the reign of Richard II., and gave most amazing details of the daily life—clothes, food, etc.—of the period. It occurred to the lecturer that the kind of information she gave, though it could not have been acquired from an ordinary history-book, might have been found in an historical novel. The girl in her normal state was closely questioned. No, she had only read one historical novel; that was about the Stuart period. Later however, when she was writing with a planchette, she mentioned the name of an authoress. The books of this authoress were examined, and it was found that she had written an historical novel of Richard II.'s reign called, I think, *The Countess Maude*. The girl had not the faintest recollection of having ever heard of the book; but on enquiry it was discovered that an aunt had read the book aloud to her when she was a child of 8 or 9. Here is an instance of what, on the face of it, appeared to be either the memory of a past incarnation or a case of spirit-control, but which turned out to be simply an instance of subconscious memory. Now, if we can so weave the fabric of a tale told in childhood into the meshes of our mind as to imagine ourselves characters in it, if we can by suggestion create an animal with a distinctive personality, may not all 'controls' be the result of conscious and subconscious suggestion?

One last indictment of the spirit-hypothesis. At

least two people who took a keen interest in A and B's planchette-writing and were sometimes present, passed over during the War. Knowing the writers and the private nature of our circle, would they not naturally have used this means of coming back? We are told that the souls who have passed over are still, like the dead in Virgil's *Æneid*, praying to cross the flood and "stretching their hands with fond desire to gain the farther bank." If this is so, surely they would have used this simple and natural means of communicating with us.

Let me close with a short passage from the book *Rachael Comforted*. The mother, through planchette-writing, is having her daily talk with her boy. She says: "The visitors who come to watch me writing, have such a lot of theories about the subconscious self, they upset me almost as much as Father Maturin." (Father Maturin was a relative, a Roman Catholic priest, who considered all planchette-writing likely to be the work of devils.) The boy then writes: "Are *you* a doubting Thomas, Mother?"—and she continues: "You see, Sunny, the subconscious self can apparently do everything a spirit can do and more; so that I begin to think that people who hold this view can never arrive at the truth." Sunny then writes: "It is nonsense, Mother, don't you think? *Do* tell me you do. I feel like saying: 'Bother these people!'—for you see, Mother, they are so funny. They are all like this—fighting in the dark, and when they come to a bit of light they paint it all over black, and then they are in the dark again."

Who knows? Am I, by insisting on the activity of the subconscious mind, to use Sunny's childish simile, 'painting out the light'? I would much rather believe



that the veil which divides us from the other world is getting thinner, and that Tennyson was a true prophet when he wrote in one of his later poems :

“ The ghost in man, the ghost that once was man,  
But cannot wholly free itself from man,  
Are calling one another through a dawn  
Stranger than earth has ever seen.  
The veil is lifting and the voices of the day  
Are heard across the voices of the dark.  
No sudden heaven nor sudden hell for man,  
But thro’ the Will of One who knows and rules,  
And utter knowledge is but utter love—  
Æonian Evolution, swift or slow,  
Thro’ all the spheres—an ever opening height,  
An ever lessening earth.”

L. M. CORRY.

(Read at a Members’ Meeting of the Quest Society, June 3, 1920.)

## ASTROLOGY AS A WORLD-CONCEPT.

S. ELIZABETH HALL.

ASTROLOGY has been called a science; it has been called a superstition. To its chief modern critic the combination of learning and faith that he discerns in it seems a 'monstrous alliance.' "The gods of heaven," he complains, "are subjected to the laws of mathematics." This, in his view, learned superstition Cumont proceeds to demolish with the formidable weapon of a discriminating judgment, which recognizes its world-wide influence on religious belief, its harmony with philosophic thought and its ethical value, while continuing to regard it as a mental disease, and calling on experts in lunacy to deal with its manifestation.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the difference in intellectual outlook between the Western world in the 20th century and the Orient nearly 3,000 years ago; but before one describes as lunatics those who regard with sympathy some of the prevailing beliefs of the ancient world, it would be well to try to imbibe the mental atmosphere of those far-distant times, to realize in what deep-seated instinct those beliefs may have arisen, and to study with impartiality the relations they bear to modern thought. In a short paper it is possible only to touch on these questions; but what I do hope to make clear is the point of contact that exists between the thought of our own day and the ideas underlying the doctrines of astrology.

Three great world-religions owe their origin to conceptions of the Divine Nature formed by the Semitic race before the dawn of history. Such dim outlines of those conceptions as are still discernible show that the clear distinction we are accustomed to draw between the Divine Nature, the Nature of Man and the External World, did not exist for those early thinkers. To them men on the one hand were akin, physically akin, to the gods; they were of the same stock; the tribe literally derived its origin from the god it worshipped; and on the other hand the gods were conceived as a part of the natural universe. The power working through Nature was, to the Semite, God in action. He worshipped the sun, moon and stars, not identifying them with the gods, but conceiving the sacred object to be a living being, on account of the unseen life inhabiting it. In the ageless mountains, symbolizing a life sublime and eternal, he recognized the Divine Activity. 'Great Mountain' was a name which the Assyrians bestowed on the Deity. "As the mountains stand round about Jerusalem," said the Hebrew poet, "so Yahweh is round about his people." The loftiness of the everlasting hills carried men's thoughts to the world above; the volcano with its bursting fires seemed aflame with God. The broad river that swept past like a living thing, making fertile the surrounding country and supplying nourishment to the dwellers on its banks, and which anon, turned into a torrent, threatened them with destruction, was a vast entity, instinct with power and seeming to speak with a voice. The winds, the clouds, were divine agents; their motions were revealers of the Deity.

The worship of the visible universe, moreover, was not the only form of nature-worship existing in

antiquity. The mysterious unfolding of life in the vegetable, animal and human world, not as yet rendered commonplace by the habits of a mechanistic generation that has bartered the priceless faculty of wonder for a superficial smattering of scientific knowledge, was a spectacle that inspired them with awe and reverence. The divine and awful power of procreation was to them an object of worship, and Ishtar, the great goddess of fertility, was co-equal with the highest of the celestial divinities, the Sun and the Moon. Scholarship is perhaps too apt to sum up in *isms* the religious experiences of the past, and it is easily said that what we have here is neither more nor less than a pantheistic view of the universe, sprung from the ideas of primitive animism.

‘Animism’ in the history of man’s beliefs takes somewhat the same position that the ‘Subconscious’ does in regard to present-day problems of psychology. A large number of quite diverse phenomena are easily disposed of by being relegated to this convenient limbo. The animistic theory is specially useful because it presents the picture of a primitive and uninstructed mind, whose operation can be readily explained so as to support a pre-conceived opinion. Solomon Reinach classes savages, children and animals together as ‘animists,’ indicating the low level of intelligence, hardly to be distinguished from instinct, to which in his view what is called animism belongs. Cumont speaks of traces to be found among the Semitic peoples of a primitive animism, which regarded the forces of Nature, as well as animals, plants and stones, as divinities who had mysterious relations with mankind; and from this belief he traces the development of divination among the Chaldæans. From the higher

level of present-day intelligence he proceeds to analyse the mentality of the ancient seers, showing how they perceived in natural phenomena manifestations of the will of those numerous spirits with which their imagination peopled the universe; how, studying night by night the brilliant Assyrian skies and observing the moon and stars moving unceasingly across the dome of heaven, they were inspired with 'superstitious fear'; how the eclipses of the Moon and the Sun filled them with wonder; mentioning their naïve belief that these celestial luminaries were devoured or concealed by a huge black dragon. The scientific achievements of the Babylonian astrologers should surely make one hesitate before accepting such an explanation. Objects, says Cumont, as well as beings are conceived as living, and animism establishes everywhere unexpected relations between them. He appears to assume that the statement of this belief is sufficient to demonstrate its futility. Has any philosophy, through all the centuries of philosophic enquiry, yet arrived at a proof of what life is, or where in the realm of Nature it ends?

Robertson Smith in his great book, *The Religion of the Semites*, deals more reverently with the primitive beliefs of men. He speaks of a view of the universe according to which a series of relations connected both man and the god he worshipped with physical nature and material objects; in consequence of which acts of worship had to be performed at certain times, at certain places, with the aid of certain material appliances and according to certain mechanical forms.

"This view," he says, "dates from a time when men had not learned to draw sharp distinctions between the nature of one thing and another." And he points

out that savages do not distinguish between phenomenal and noumenal existence, or even between the organic and inorganic, or between plants and animals. To him the question is one of a certain habit of mind acquired in the process of evolution. At that stage men's minds worked differently. They were not analytical. The processes, in which science delights, of division and sub-division had scarcely been entered upon. Separateness was not then so marked a feature of human life. The universe had hardly attained that pluralistic character which vexes philosophic thought to-day. Truly those early thinkers were well worthy of our contempt.

The gulf placed by the human mind between itself and its environment has grown wider with the ages. The individual stands ever more and more mentally isolated from the world around him and from his fellows. A certain stage in the progress of humanity may have rendered necessary this intense straining towards individualism. But is it to be so always? May not the race in its gradual evolution be reaching a point at which it becomes desirable to emphasize rather the unity of life; to return by another path—for direct return is never possible—to reach again not only the intellectual belief that all Nature is animated by the same life, but the *realisation* that the Sun, Moon and stars, Mother Earth, the animals and plants are indeed other selves; and instead of resigning ourselves to the fate of window-less monads, to accept the happiness of sharing a group-life with all around us.

“Well,” it will perhaps be said, “we have already agreed that animism, when it is finished, brings forth pantheism. Let us give this thing a name and we

have done with it." But what do we mean, when we speak of pantheism? If we turn our thoughts to the picture presented by the civilized world in the Alexandrian age and study the ideas then prevailing in regard to religion and philosophy, it may perhaps surprise some of us to find the position held by the pantheistic doctrine in the intellectual world, and still more the essential connection existing between this system of philosophy and the astrological conception of the universe. The pantheism of the Stoics, like sidereal religion, regarded the world as an organic whole, maintained as such by the interplay of natural forces. The vital principle of this great organism was the ethereal fire, manifested in its purest form by the celestial bodies. The fire that kindled the Sun and the stars was endowed with reason, was an intelligent light (*φῶς νοερόν*), in essence the same as the reason that enlightened the minds of men. The ceaseless motion of the heavenly bodies and the unalterable laws that regulated that motion, alike showed them to be in a special sense a manifestation of the divine power that informed the universe. The stars were regarded as *revealing* the will of the gods.

Though Stoic pantheism showed in this the degree to which the ideas of sidereal religion had penetrated Hellenic thought, the conception of the divinity of the stars was no new thing in Greek philosophy. To both Pythagoras and Plato the stars were divine. The naturalist philosophers were accused by Plato of atheism in asserting that the Sun was merely an incandescent mass. Aristotle held that the heavenly bodies consisted, not of ordinary fire, but of something akin to it, of nobler origin and higher power, of the same essence as that vital

heat which is the substratum of soul, "the fire in which soul is embodied." The celestial element was ungenerable and indestructible. In the stars he saw eternal substances, principles of movement and therefore divine. He expressly says of them that they partook of action and life (*πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς*). But to the mass of the people, who still worshipped the gods of Olympus, made in the likeness of men, the conception of the divine power as something non-anthropomorphic, as eternal and as identified with the highest power of mind, was undoubtedly an advance to a more spiritual form of religion. Readily adopted, especially in its aspect as revealer of Fate, by the crowd, sidereal religion was also eagerly welcomed by the aristocracy both of blood and of intellect. Its scientific character, its veneration of reason and its loftier religious conceptions appealed alike to the intellect and the emotions. Its supremacy was rapidly extended, till it embraced practically the whole civilized world. It had already permeated and to some extent modified the ancient religion of Egypt, was the established belief of all the peoples of the Semitic race, and had travelled eastward to India and China. Kings and princes followed the guidance of the stars in the founding of cities and the undertaking of important enterprises. To Alexander, to Antigonus and to many other rulers the predictions made were, we are told, fulfilled to the very letter. On his sepulchral monument, erected on a spur of Mount Taurus, Antiochus, King of Commagene, had the scheme of his nativity inscribed on a large *bas-relief*, because all the predictions of the horoscope had been fulfilled in his life. The historian adds that, not only to great men such as these, but also to any ordinary individual, astrologers foretold the



future with success. Astrology even obtained the special recognition of the state. The coins of the cities of Syria were often stamped with those signs of the zodiac that presided over their destinies; and among the welter of conflicting beliefs struggling for survival at the beginning of our era, astral religion was singled out for official protection by the Roman Emperors. The position held in Roman philosophic thought by the theory of the divinity of the stars is shown by a passage in Cicero's treatise *On the Nature of the Gods*. After giving a detailed account of the movements of the planets he says:

“Such immutability, such regularly recurrent periods in diverse paths maintained through all eternity, can only be explained by the attribution to them of intelligence, reason and design. And since we perceive that these are possessed by the stars, for this if for no other reason we are compelled to include them in the number of the gods, nor do those stars which are called fixed fail to show the same intelligence and the same wisdom, whose revolution is daily repeated, is regular and constant. . . . Their perennial and unceasing motions, accomplished with a marvellous, nay an incredible regularity, proclaim the presence within them of a power and intelligence that are divine; and the man who fails to perceive that these bodies are endowed with the power of the gods, shows that he will never be capable of perceiving anything at all. In the heavens then there is neither chance, nor rashness, nor error, nor variation; but on the other hand all order, truth, reason, constancy, regularity. . . . He then who thinks that the celestial order, marvellous and incredible as it is, on which the maintenance and security of the whole universe

wholly depends, is without intelligence, must be regarded as devoid of intelligence himself."

Astral religion maintained its position through the early centuries of our era, and only lost it when the new impulses of the Renaissance oriented differently the thoughts of men. It is in the face of these facts, mostly given or admitted by Cumont himself, that he describes astrological belief as a hallucination only deserving to be studied as a mental ailment. He appears to condemn in the same breath both star-worship and divination by means of the stars. The latter of course has its roots in the former; if separated from all belief in the divine nature of the stars, astrology becomes at once the superstition he asserts it to be. But though condemning both he assigns a separate position to each. He regards a faith in stellar divinities as the starting-point of astrology, which afterwards became a science and forgot the source from which it had sprung.

The important conception of a form pre-existing in heaven of things actualized on earth—a conception which on its metaphysical side is an essential element in the world-view of Plotinus—he apparently casts aside as unworthy of attention. It is easier to explain the indefatigable labours of the Chaldæan seers and the passionate belief of the people by primitive movements of the untaught human mind. Men having observed the regularity of the stellar motions, and believing that relations existed between things in heaven and things on earth, took note of events that occurred under certain conjunctions of the heavenly bodies, and invented a scheme by which the future lay mapped out before their eyes in a series of intricate mathematical calculations.

The phenomenon of nature-worship itself is treated with the same lack of psychological instinct. The belief that the stars were divine is accounted for by a process purely intellectual in its nature. The primitive human being is supposed to have reasoned that the stars were living, from the fact that here on earth things that were alive moved. Cumont is doubtless true to his own principles in ignoring the psychic side of things. He speaks with contempt of the vague sense of a presence, which some persons suppose themselves to feel in the solitudes of Nature. Even one who is not sensitive himself might, one would think, recognize in these days that such a sense—and no vague one—exists, when at times it suddenly overwhelms the very unbeliever with a force that he can as little resist as explain. The conflict that results from such an experience between the psychic sense and the critical intellect is shown in a few lines from Francis Thompson's 'Ode to the Setting Sun.'

"Yet in this field where the Cross planted reigns,  
I know not what strange passion bows my head  
To thee, whose great command upon my veins  
Proves thee a god for me not dead, not dead !

"For worship it is too incredulous,  
For doubt—oh, too believing-passionate !  
What wild divinity makes my heart thus  
A fount of most baptismal tears ? . . ."

It will be admitted by most, I think, that our critic is over-weighted on the intellectual side, when he states that the whole structure of astrology collapsed on the discovery that the hypothesis of the geocentric system of the universe was false. He assumes that,

because the earth was found to be revolving in space, the established theory of planetary influences would no longer hold. It is not easy to see how he is led to this conclusion, unless he regards astrological combinations as depending more exclusively on the actual position of the heavenly bodies than statements made by himself show it to have been. For instance, in the principle of substitution of one star for another, examples of which are not infrequently met with (as when Saturn acted for the Sun while the latter was not visible), do we not see a proof that stellar divination did not follow as a captive in chains the slowly progressing chariot of astronomical knowledge?

The chariot of science moves on unceasingly, but not always in a straightforward direction, and many are the doublings and turnings and self-contradictions that astral divination would have been compelled to submit to had it given up its soul entirely to such keeping. Surely it is not too much to suppose that there may be a more direct way of getting at the truths underlying human life than through mathematical calculations. Suppose, for instance, that the polarization of the signs of Cancer and Capricorn has been found in numerous cases to indicate a certain tendency both in the external life and in the character, and it is afterwards mathematically demonstrated that these constellations were not actually in the positions relative to each other in which they were taken to be, is the Cancer-Capricorn experience thereby invalidated? No sane person wishes to decry the marvellous achievements of science, but as long as there is no finality in its own conclusions it is claiming too much when it claims for itself the whole domain of truth.

Doubtless the discovery that the Earth, instead of

being the fixed centre of the universe, was itself in motion, might have occasioned a revision of the whole complicated system of astrological combinations, might have given astrology a wider field for its operations and a more subtly woven material, which would perhaps have corresponded still more closely with the complexities of human life.<sup>1</sup> But though the results were more intricately elaborated, the essentials would have remained untouched; and the fact is that after the discovery had been made, though astrology suffered eclipse (to use a related metaphor) for a time, it still remained as one of what may be called the subconscious beliefs of human nature and still held on its way unmoved by the pronouncement of science. Its planets may travel in the wrong direction; its 'Sun in Pisces' may have to find its path among the stars of Aquarius, but the place of sidereal influence as an essential element in human life is becoming more and more recognized. The human mind feels instinctively that the interplay of planetary forces does not depend on the relative positions of the heavenly bodies *in terms of space*. To assert that these influences can operate only under certain spatial conditions is to regard astrology as a branch of mathematics, instead of the expression of a living force pulsating through the universe, as the life-blood pulsates in the human body. Science may have abolished the dwelling-place of the gods on high, and given us in its stead the concept of infinite space, but none the less is the spirit of man elevated as he looks upward to the starry heights, none the less as he contemplates the heavenly regions does he feel drawn nearer to his eternal home.

<sup>1</sup> A heliocentric system of astrology has of course been worked out.

By some strange law of human nature, we must suppose, the inability to understand the mental outlook of another is often accompanied by a condescension more or less ill-placed. After setting out the process by which the Chaldæans, starting from a belief in stellar divinities, arrived at the conclusion that the course of human affairs was as certain and as predictable as the movements of the stars, Cumont goes on to say that the belief grew into a science, and that, the principles of this science being justified by physical and moral reasons, "it was pretended that they rested on experimental data amassed by a long series of observations." Surely to anyone who approaches the subject without *parti pris*, it must appear that these accusations of ignorance, prejudice and bad faith are somewhat recklessly launched against the learned men of Chaldæa, to whose persistent study, untiring patience and scrupulous care in recording their observations the birth of astronomical science was due. Why assume that those who starting with the blank sheet of knowledge inscribed thereon the length of the year, the path of the Sun, the heliacal rising of the constellations corresponding with the various months, who traced the backward and forward movements of the planets, determined the duration of the lunar period and often accurately predicted eclipses, were less intellectually honest than ourselves or less capable of examining the foundations of their belief? Why assume that the so-called 'desperate error' of astrology arose simply from the insatiable desire of men to foresee their destiny? Is it not at least equally probable that the belief had its origin in the deep human instinct which ever causes man to seek something stable amidst the ceaseless change of

all around him, to search for law in the bewildering maze of apparently inexplicable phenomena? Urged by this irrepressible longing, can one not imagine the Chaldæan sage, absorbed in the study of the radiant skies of Mesopotamia and observing with religious awe the resplendent progress of that nightly pageant, conceiving in his mind the first seed of the mighty thought of Divine Law, and the awful joy with which in this conception he felt himself drawn near to the very throne of the godhead? It was a conception that was to live as long as human thought endured—to become indeed the rock on which the structure of religion was to stand. The thought was developed and further established in the Western philosophy that held the widest sway over the human mind during the centuries following the birth of astrology, and in the Fate (*Heimarménē*) of the Stoics reached its highest philosophical expression.

There is one side of astrology which needs perhaps to be specially touched on, because it is apt to be obscured by the more striking metaphysical and religious aspects of the subject. The doctrine that the fire of which the Sun and stars consisted was of the same essence as the human reason led in the Roman period to a development of the highest ethical importance. The realisation of the essential truth of mysticism, the union of the Soul with God, was the goal of him who lived in continual relation with that Divine Nature which was manifested in the stars, and which dwelt also in his own soul. To obtain true knowledge of the will of Heaven thus revealed, it was deemed necessary to lead a life of high moral purity, if not of austerity. The virtues of sobriety, chastity, integrity and self-renunciation must be diligently

practised. Science was the reward of virtue. As in all other forms of religion, the true religious life was not lived by all its devotees. But if the piety of some astrologers was only on the surface, their failure does not affect the high moral standard set by sidereal religion in its mystical development. The doctrine, though born of pantheism, here shows a distinctly dualistic tendency. The heavy, earthy part of man's nature is associated with the body, the fiery element with the spirit. In order to rise to the ethereal abode of the stars, it was necessary to conquer the lusts of the flesh, which drag the soul downward with the downward moving elements of earth and impede the natural upward flight of the spirit of fire. Thus the ethics of sidereal religion harmonized with the Stoic doctrine that knowledge is virtue, that wisdom realized in action is the sole good ; nor can one fail to remember in the same connection the words of the founder of Christianity: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine."

Both to the Stoic philosopher and to the devotee of astral religion Nature was an embodiment of Divine Law and Wisdom, to attain to a knowledge of which moral purity was essential. This knowledge it is which leads one man to follow willingly the eternal law, while another, being without knowledge, and acting on his own impulses, pulls against the supreme law, which nevertheless compels him against his will. The philosopher said that the actions of men were due to universal causes, co-operating with causes dependent on the character of the agent. The astrologer taught that a knowledge of the divine law was the reward of virtue and that only the pure in heart could rise to the starry heights. The Chaldæan doctrine of necessity



was thus entirely in harmony with the determinism of the Stoics. The astrologer held that the attitude of man to destiny was the key to his moral life. He must follow Fate rather than leave it to Fate to force him into the appointed path. He must bring the motions of his will into harmony with the supreme will. He is part of a whole, and the whole should labour together. The resemblance of this doctrine to the Christian teaching inculcating entire surrender to the Divine will, cannot fail to strike one. The renunciation of Demetrius, expressing the purest ideal of Stoicism, recalls in a singular manner the utterances of more than one Christian saint.

"I have but one complaint to address to you, immortal gods, that you did not make me sooner know your will. I would myself have anticipated what, at your call, I offer to submit to now. Would you take my children? It is for you that I have reared them? . . . Do you desire my life? Why should I hesitate to restore to you that which you gave me? . . . I am not constrained to ought, I suffer nought against my will, I am not obedient to God, I am in accord with him, and the more so because I know that everything takes place in virtue of an immutable law proclaimed from all eternity."

The harmony of the human will with the Divine is the goal alike of the philosopher, of the Christian mystic and of him who studied the heavenly wisdom as interpreted by the stars. It is at the time of the development of astrology as an element in Stoic philosophy that the importance of astral divination in relation to character becomes emphasized. Regarded at first as a revealer of the fate of nations and of kings and princes, it became by degrees the means of fore-

casting the destinies of private persons of all kinds, especially in relation to birth. From the prediction of good or evil fortune for the new-born child, it passed on to the delineation of character, which was now regarded as an equally important part of the revelation of the stars. The Stoics recognized a formal connection between the position of the heavenly bodies and the individuals born under them, and Diogenes of Seleucia admitted that from these positions it might be known "what nature each would have and for what occupation he would be best adapted." In the characters thus delineated it was not, of course, vice or virtue that was to be discerned, but rather the function of each being in that whole of which he formed a part. The great importance of this particular department of divination, which, one may point out, has been specially developed in modern astrology, is evident. In regard to education and moral discipline, and to problems of psychology in general, it is capable of rendering valuable assistance; while on its mystical side it points to the conception of man's greater body, the heavenly sphere, with which as yet he is unable to co-operate, and holds out the hope that by perfect submission to the Divine Law he may one day attain to the fruition of both knowledge and virtue, moving in complete harmony with the movement of the whole.

S. E. HALL.

(Read before a Members' Meeting of the Quest Society,  
Feb. 19, 1920.)

## THE GENTILE SURROUND OF EARLY CHRISTENDOM.

### ROUND THE CRADLE OF CHRISTENDOM, II.<sup>1</sup>

THE EDITOR.

As this paper is being written away from my books, I must content myself, if not the reader, with general statements, some of which would require qualification or modification in certain respects, were a more detailed survey being attempted. The terms 'Gentile' and 'Pagan' should be taken simply for 'non-Jewish' and 'non-Christian' without any pre-judgment as to value; for their question-begging nature as commonly used by apologists is one of the greatest scandals of the religious history of the West.

#### THE DIASPORA.

The former paper, after some introductory matter, attempted to deal with the Palestinian Jewish Enclosure round the cradle of the dominant faith of our present Western world. In Palestine itself Jewry had been for long and was still in close contact with non-Jewish elements of many very various kinds, but it largely outnumbered them. Far otherwise was it with the Dispersion of Israel, or the Diaspora—to give it its Greek name. The Hebrews of the Dispersion, whether in large colonies, small groups, or as scattered individuals, were distributed far and wide among the

<sup>1</sup> For No. I. see the July issue.

nations, from the Euphrates and beyond in the East to the Pillars of Hercules on the West. Though even in Palestine itself many of the Jews were by no means insensitive to foreign religious and philosophical tendencies, in the Dispersion they were far more open to such innovating and liberalizing influences than their more conservative Palestinian compatriots. The vast majority of Jewdom was scattered throughout the nations; indeed there were more Hebrews in Babylonia and Egypt respectively than in Palestine itself. If then in Palestine, at the time of the birth of Christianity, there was in some quarters a not inconsiderable measure of adaptation of foreign ideas within the ancestral framework of Jewish religion, much more was it the case elsewhere in the Diaspora. For ever were the Jews curious as to religion in spite of their dogged conservation of certain essentials of their racial faith. And here we must never forget that precisely during these critical years the high-water mark was reached of a feverish Jewish propaganda, which was generally very willing to relax the stringency of the Law and the stubbornness of dogma to gain proselytes, and hence was tolerant of accommodations, blendings and inter-mixtures. It was an altogether different state of affairs from the subsequent rigid rules (the counter-reformation of Talmudic Rabbinism, which were precisely formulated and reduced to writing only about 200 A.D.) against the very serious danger with which Rabbinic Jewish orthodoxy was threatened by the ever more vigorous and powerful Christian movement, which had been brought to birth out of the loins of Israel. In the early years of our present era Rabbinism in general had not yet "set a hedge round the Law," and protected the camp of the

Torah with the wire-entanglements and machine-guns of an absolutely intransigent orthodoxy.

Thus it was that then, as now, a race with a remarkable genius for religion of a certain order, and in other respects exceedingly capable in adapting and accommodating itself to its environment and material interests, even when conditions were apparently most unfavourable, and of winning profit to itself through its natural gifts for trade and industry, was distributed far and wide through the Græco-Roman world, and was therefore in the most favourable position of all competitors for distributing its wares, whether material or spiritual.

Jewish synagogues or meeting-houses were to be found in well-nigh all the great cities and trading marts; and wherever there was a synagogue there were controversy and propaganda. Such circles and groups of Jews and proselytes were naturally acquainted with, if not well versed in, many very varied Gentile religious beliefs and practices. It was this dispersed organism of Jewry that constituted the main carrier of developing early Christianity.

It has until recent years been the habit for the most part to regard the history of the Jews, as of a religious folk dispersed among the nations, through the spectacles of the later Rabbinic editing of traditions enshrined in the Talmūds; but this does not give us so much the actual history of which we are in search, as an account of what the Rabbis desired that history should have been, according to their own views of orthodoxy. The *haggādic*, semi-historical and legendary, material of the two Talmūds has invariably to be submitted to searching analysis and criticism before any reliable facts can emerge.

No other scribes, if we except the Brahmanical, have had such a genius for writing up, over-writing and metamorphosizing traditions and records as those of Jewry. And this estimate does not apply solely to later Rabbinical literature; it is notoriously the case with the earlier apocryphal and apocalyptic documents, and of course, as all biblical critics are aware, with the canonical Old Covenant library itself. Through all this very extensive range of literature students of the history and comparative science of religion can detect in varying measure the presence of many various extraneous religions and cultural influences. Modern instructed apologetics no longer denies such influences; it endeavours to maintain simply that whatever ideas the Jews, as the Chosen Folk of Yahweh, borrowed or adapted from such sources, they sublimated or ethicized. This may be as it may be; opinions will here vary considerably. In any case the Jews were first and foremost human like all the rest of the nations. They by no manner of means differed *toto cælo* from their fellow men, even on the ground of religion; indeed here too as elsewhere they were, as all other men, human and not infrequently all too human.

Of the Hebrews of the Exile it is most highly probable that many, if not most, did not maintain or retain their customs or even their religion, and so became gradually amalgamated with the surrounding peoples. It should not be forgotten that only some 4,000, the most religiously zealous of the race, returned. It is highly probable that there were similar leakages also elsewhere in the Diaspora during the following centuries; in any case there was demonstrably much interchange and modification of thought. For instance,

in Alexandria, the cultural, religio-philosophic and trading metropolis of the Hellenistic Græco-Roman world, where the Jews occupied entirely two of the five quarters or wards of the city, Greek philosophic influence permeated so deeply and early into the Hebrew mind and heart as to give birth to the magnificent sapiential books even of the canon itself. How much more then was this the case with extra-canonical and infra-canonical writings, that huge mass of apocryphal and apocalyptic and allied literature? The very violence of the prophetic denunciations at the one end, and of the rabbinical at the other end, of the chronological frame-work of this scribal industry, against 'fornication' and 'going a-whoring after strange gods,' and allied graphic and picturesque oriental religious metaphorical expressions, bears most eloquent testimony to what was persistently going forward on all sides from century to century.

In the years of which we are specially treating, most Gentile sympathizers with Jewish ideas of God and religion, in this or that respect, doubtless preferred to remain outside the strict pale of Israel, without full rupture with their own ancestral forms of faith or syncretic cult. Many, however, underwent the ritual bath of purification and paid the tax (in lieu of the offering of the sacrificial victim), which constituted them 'proselytes of the gate'; while the most zealous submitted to the painful and dangerous rite of circumcision, which made them fully Jews or Jew-made 'strangers.' The women proselytes, who had not to submit to any analogous physical rite, naturally largely outnumbered the male converts. If on the one hand there was this considerable influx

into Jewry, and thus the entrance of very numerous carriers of prior religious thought and practice of non-specifically Jewish origin into Israel, equally so was there a corresponding outflow from Israel into other forms of cult, especially those of a saving nature, mystical and initiatory. We are beginning to recognize more clearly this historic state of affairs; but much is still conjectural owing to the now imperfect nature of the indications. Nevertheless the old bad way of blank denial of inconvenient facts to suit later dogmatic prejudice and religious pride no longer serves, at any rate among the instructed.

We pass on now briefly to consider some very general features of

#### THE GENTILE SURROUND OF EARLY CHRISTENDOM.

It goes without saying that what an encyclopædia could not exhaust can hardly be even head-lined in the few pages of a short article. I propose therefore simply to jot down some passing reflections on the most general aspects of this vast theme, and those too only which envisage the more intimate side of the question rather than the more popular phenomena of the history of the non-Jewish and non-Christian religion and philosophy of those days.

The old ingrained mischievous habit of painting the portrait of faiths and doctrines other than one's own in the most lurid colours, and with the art of caricature which thrives on the trick of exaggerating or minimizing details, is fortunately to-day out of fashion among instructed and humanistic thinkers. To assert that all which was religiously Jewish or Christian (according to the present prevailing standards



of the apologetic traditionalists of either faith) was white and all which was Gentile and Pagan in religious thought black, is manifestly sheer Manichæism of the baser sort. In philosophy, for instance, all thinkers in those days had for long insisted on the unity of God over against polytheistic and pluralistic views. Moreover philosophical culture was ever a method of seeking the best mode of life. In none of the great schools was philosophy an intellectual discipline solely; it was ever a mode of life, always a search how best to live, always ethical. Nor if it rejected the popular forms of cult, was it divorced from religion. Even the Epicuræans did not set aside religion, as is popularly supposed; indeed they did not even deny the existence of the gods, as ignorance has asserted for so many centuries. There was a wide movement in the direction of correcting, moralizing and sublimating popular and traditional notions, and the general ideas of the thinkers indirectly permeated popular thought in some measure in many directions. The problems of philosophy then were the same as they are to-day; the only difference is that they are in our own day more clearly and subtly defined. Then as now the deeper thinkers were well aware that the discursive intellect could not answer all their questions, that rationalism *pur sang* could not supply the key with which to unlock the profounder mysteries of the human mind and human heart. There were, of course, as there ever have been in periods of intellectual culture, whole-hoggers and radicals of the extreme left who flourished on denial and uncritical scepticism, but they were a small minority.

We cannot in any case legitimately divorce philosophy from religion, for all true philosophy is

religious and all true religion is philosophical; it is, however, the religious aspect that interests us specially in our present enquiry. And here we come into contact with a welter of the most confused and apparently contradictory forms of faith and practice of every kind and degree; for it is essentially a very human state of affairs we are considering, and man is man at all periods of his existence, and especially in the flowering of a great epoch. And here we should reflect that, though Orthodox Christianity proved to be the fairest blossom of the tree in the judgment of the majority, there were other blossoming trees in the spiritual orchard, other flowers in the psychical garden; that the fruit of this particular blossoming has not yet come to ripeness even now after 1900 years of maturing, and that it has not infrequently proved bitter to the taste.

The religious thought, practice and experience with which Early Christianity and especially Pauline propaganda came into contact, were chiefly not only Hellenized forms of faith, that is to say national propagandist mystery-cults overworked with the thought and ideals of Greek culture, but also Oriental cults that had been little if at all touched by the latter influence,—Babylonian, Assyrian, Iranian, Egyptian, Phœnician, Hither Asian and even to some extent Further Asian syncretism of all kinds, saving cults high and low, mysteries and initiatory rites, mystical, theurgical and magical, thaumaturgic and therapeutic, strictly ascetic or grossly licentious. There was also a rage for revelation, a widespread consciousness of guilt and of a corresponding need of purification, ceremonial and ethical, many withdrawn communities with strict disciplines and contemplative

exercises, prophecy, seership and vision, magic, psychism and superstition, elaborate ritual and the simplest of observances.

One of the burning questions of present-day New Testament research is to determine how far Paul in particular was influenced by non-Jewish ideas in formulating his theology and christology. It is admitted on all sides, for this is now simply a question of comparative philology and the history of language, that the Apostle to the Goyim uses phraseology which is largely common to the general Hellenistic theological language of the time. In proportion as this is placed beyond the shadow of doubt, such scholars as are determined at all cost to assert the novelty for the Gentiles of all the characteristic Pauline doctrines, seek to maintain the Apostle's complete dependence on Jewish tradition and the language of the Greek LXX. version of the books of the Old Covenant canonical collection ; or, where this is clearly impossible, to find in his language without exception a new significance which would distinguish the meaning of every technical term from that which it currently and commonly bore. They have to admit that the Hellenistic mystery-religions already possessed the terms, but contend that Paul used them only the better to convert his hearers to faith in his gospel, by giving them an entirely new interpretation. They do not seem to be conscious that, even if this could be satisfactorily made out in their own sense, which is so far by no means the case, the question is still being begged that Paul's views must necessarily be of a higher value for general religious theory than those of the adherents of such saving cults, the vast majority of whom he failed to convert. It may be that it might

have been so in some cases, it does not follow that it must perforce have been so in all. And here we should remember that within Christendom itself there has been from the first and repeatedly the very strongest exception taken to many of the Pauline dogmas. As to the bad habit of lumping all the mystery-institutions together and from one, concerning which we have even less information than of some others, judging all,—much stress is laid by apologists on the nature of the Eleusinia and highly coloured contrasts painted to their disparagement. But the Eleusinia were largely what may be called a ‘political’ mystery-institution, and the only legitimate parallel that can be instituted or contrast that can be drawn is with the more distinctively Oriental religious mystery-cults and gospels of salvation on the one hand, and with the philosophical mysteries and communities on the other.

There is a regrettable tendency in most treatments of this subject to focus all the attention on the popularly organized propagandist mystery-cults and to reduce to a minimum the less externally organized, more withdrawn but very widespread tendencies to gnosis of every kind. We must never forget that here we are dealing with matters that were largely kept secret. It is a fundamental error in method to put the worst construction on secrecy because the modern scientific spirit does not like it, and especially because it annoys and baffles us in our researches. It is an elementary fact of historical study that the vast volume of the religious activity of the time is entirely unknown to us. I am frequently amazed, when studying the results of the minute and meticulous analysis which scholarly industry bestows

on the rumours and fragments that remain of those many now physically forgotten faiths, to see how the ingenious interpreters and contrast-hunters seem to assume that they are dealing fully with the real problem. Such work is excellent, if the problems are envisaged from the point of view of a reasonable perspective; but it becomes pernicious, when isolated and often superficial phenomena are erected into a test of the whole down to its very depths, as it was when being lived through in its concrete reality.

We should be very much on our guard when using such a general term as 'gnosis,' and remember that the epithet 'gnostic' was first used by the heresiological Church Father Irenæus to designate but one single school of what was an ancient and exceedingly widespread general tendency. Recent research has proved that the idea of gnosis—not as intellectual knowledge, which is so frequently but quite erroneously asserted to be its meaning, but as knowledge of salvation, spiritual knowledge, knowledge in which the whole man was concerned, knowledge of God—was everywhere in the air among those who were devoted to the deeper mysteries of the religious life. Gnosis is indubitably pre-Christian by centuries even in the Hellenic West, not to speak of Hellenistic days, when Greece contacted the Orient, and its roots go back to a remote period. Are we to believe that Paul was in contact solely with these adherents of the Hellenistic mystery-religions in the narrow sense of the term, and not also, and perchance more intimately, with those of this widespread Oriental gnosis? This is not only incredible from general historic considerations, but is clearly demonstrable from the language he uses. Much could be adduced under this head,

but one striking instance will suffice for the present, and may prove of special interest to the reader, in that, though the present writer has drawn attention to it for upwards of a score of years, it seems to have made no impression even now on the exegetes. It is, however, a very crucial point. In referring to the theophanies of the risen Lord of the Christian Faith, Paul asserts, as the Authorized Version will have it: "And last of all he appeared to me also as unto one born out of due time." Where is a convincing explanation of this utterance to be found in the endless commentaries that have been written? For my part I have been unable to find one. Turn now to the original Greek and translate: "And last of all he appeared to me also"—not "as unto *one* born out of due time," but "as unto *the* born out of due time." There stands upright, strong and sturdy the definite article, refusing to be brow-beaten and sent about its business as an entity of no importance. The reading has never been called into question; even if it were, the primary rule of textual criticism, that the more difficult reading is to be preferred, forbids so cavalier a treatment of the sentence. "One born out of due time" again is a prudish phrasing. The original is strong, elemental even. It stands out impressively and conspicuously: "as unto *the abortion*"—as unto that 'abortion' of which you have heard, which is so striking and familiar a figure of your tradition, and so understandable to you in all its significance. That is clearly what Paul had in his mind when penning or dictating the phrase. The Abortion is a technical term of the Gnosis, or rather of one of the most clearly defined traditions of the Gnosis deriving ultimately from Babylonian sources. In its sublimated Hellenized

form it is an integral element in the grandiose Sophia-mythus, a variant of which Valentinus hands on to us by the rough hands of his bitter Patristic critics. In barest outline it runs as follows :

Wisdom, the least of the Divine attributes, powers or realities who constitute the fulness or perfection of the Godhead, and the law of whose being is that they bring forth as paired dualities in unity,—Wisdom aspires to the transcendent unity of the Divinity beyond all, and desires to imitate the Supreme Mystery, and so bring forth or create of herself without the aid of her lawful syzygy or co-partner. Her desire, which is not really self-will, but love of union with the Father of all fatherhood, becomes act and she brings forth. But instead of giving birth to a perfection or perfect æon or reality, she produces as it were an unworked prime universal substance, pure but in need of all other perfections. Thereon her fellow æons lament that imperfection has thus arisen in the Divine concord and harmony of the fulness, or all-sufficiency, through the aspiration and longing of Wisdom for utter union with the Father above all. They pray to the Father to restore peace unto them. Thereon by command of the Supreme the imperfect fruit of Wisdom's longing is externed from the Divine perfection and excluded from it by the Last Limit, against which none shall prevail until the Day 'Come unto us.' The whole burden of the subsequent world-drama is a setting forth of how the prime substance of the world of becoming, this 'formlessness' of Wisdom, is first gradually developed by the enformation according to substance and then completed by the enformation according to gnosis into a perfect æon, the final consummation being the

sacred marriage of the 'Sophia Without' with the Common Fruit of the Plērōma, or Divine Fulness, which the æons offered of themselves severally and in union, as the Christ, in thankfulness to the Father for the restoration of their harmony.

The imperfect fruit of Wisdom Above is called the Abortion, a term reminiscent of the far-off primitive adumbration in the form of a crude and barbarous myth of this grandiose mystic vision. What is first set forth as a cosmic happening is subsequently applied to the life of the individual soul. Paul's enigmatic phrase now becomes sun-clear. Just as, he says in substance, the Christ appeared to the suffering and sorrowing Sophia Without, and wrought her imperfect substance into a perfect æon, so too was it with me. He appeared and thereafter my unwrought spiritual nature began gradually to grow towards the full stature of the Spiritual Perfect Man.

The general phraseology of Paul is drenched, not only with traditional terms of the Hellenistic mystery-religions, but also with those of the pre-Christian gnosis, terms which are explicable only on the ground of the subsequently christianized stream of gnostic endeavour. The one set of terms is largely Hellenistic rather than Oriental and the other Oriental rather than Hellenistic; they should not be indiscriminately confused, much less should one class be neglected in favour of the other. This does not mean to say that Paul had no originality; he had, for he was a seer and illuminate. But the theological and christological construct he gradually built up is not necessarily and essentially to be accepted as unquestionably superior always in all respects; and the revolt of so many deeply religious minds of our



own day, as in the past, against a number of his dogmas bears eloquent testimony that he is far from having said the last word on the subject.

The most primitive Christian doctrine, if not the religion of Jesus himself, is almost entirely confined to the circle of notions prevalent in the Jewish enclosure, of which we attempted to give a brief outline in the last paper. The gentilization and hellenization of the faith were initiated chiefly by Paul, and it is of the utmost importance to ascertain, if possible, the nature of the religious *milieux* in which he carried on his widespread propaganda. I have never been able to believe that he always started his churches *de novo* with an utterly brand-new gospel; he found frequently similarities already existing, and that too not in the synagogues only and among sympathizers with them.

What seems clear from a critical study of the N.T. documents is that a small and peculiar Messianistic Jewish sect of no great importance was gradually transformed into a highly developed form of spiritual Hellenistic mystery-religion as set forth most conspicuously in the fourth gospel at the end of the first century. I have just had the pleasure of listening to an illuminating lecture by Professor Bacon of Yale, given at the Summer School of Theology at Oxford; therein it was shown convincingly how the course of this striking development, with its strongly contrasted and very varied elements and features, can be followed most conveniently and clearly in the Ephesian tradition. The very disparate 'Johannine' gospel and epistles and the 'John' apocalypse are both referred traditionally to Ephesus. There it was that Apollōs, who came from Alexandria,

was preaching before Paul a gospel bound up with the proclamation and baptism of John the Baptist; and the relevant documents show strong signs not only of endeavouring to correct certain Gnostic ideas, but also of minimizing Baptist influences, the Christian 'Johannine' activity carrying on and developing Pauline ideas. This is of very great importance. The picture of John the Baptist in the Synoptics depicts the rough figure of a solitary ascetic with a very simple doctrine, the proclamation of the near approach of the Divine Sovereignty and the pressing need of repentance. There is little that would lead us to suppose that this John did not stand alone, but came forth from a school or community of Baptists with a highly developed body of doctrine of a mystical nature. This is however fully brought out by the later polemical writings of the Church Fathers, who connect Simon the Magician and his contemporary or forerunner Dosithaeus (Dosthai) with John Baptist, and also by a critical analysis of the oldest deposits of the still living tradition of the Mandæans or Gnostics of the lower Euphrates, who proudly derive their origin from the Baptist, and whose scriptures at times set forth most beautifully the doctrine of the Gnosis of Life, the ever-living and life-giving Water of the Spirit of God.

In whatever direction we push back our researches by the comparative method, the better to acquaint ourselves with the environment of Early Christendom, we find ourselves in contact with mystical, gnostic and contemplative communities, groups or individuals devoted to the holy life, and seeking after a knowledge of the human soul and its relation to God. Subsequently-orthodox Christianity had many rivals; it

finally conquered, and neglected, suppressed or misrepresented the many it had previously hated or feared. There is no sign of charity or willingness to understand on the part of its stalwart champions, no chivalry to its opponents, no hand-shake when the popular victory was won. And even to-day, though this spirit of bitter exclusiveness is camouflaged, it still remains active, for it is the most powerful ingredient in the sub-conscious of the belligerent faith. Gentile, Pagan, Heathen, Heretic, are terms of detestation for the Orthodox apologist; for him, no really good thing can possibly come from any of such sources. If a man, no matter how excellent in other respects, does not believe that Jeschu ha-Notzri was and is absolutely and in all respects very God of very God, and does not worship him as God, *ipso facto* that man must be still in Cimmerian darkness with regard to the greatest fact and reality in the whole universe.

In the following paper we shall venture to say a word or two on the burning question of 'The Religion of Jesus and the Religion about Jesus'; for there can be no commonly agreed religion of humanity as long as the man-made dogmas of the latter type of faith are proclaimed to be the sole infallible revelation of the Supreme Mystery of the universe.

G. R. S. MEAD.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### DAS JOHANNESBUCH DER MANDÄER.

Von Mark Lidzbarski. Giessen (Töpelman); Trans. etc. pp. 256, Text pp. 291; M.82 (M.184.40, *plus Valuta*, etc., = about 16s.).

THE Syriac Mandæan (*mandā=gnōsis*) Gnosis is a still living tradition, going back according to its own claim to the days of John the Dowser. Its present-day representatives, who are apparently little able to explain their own documents of very various dates, some of which contain indubitably very ancient elements, are to be found in the marsh-lands of the lower Euphrates. Readers of THE QUEST from the beginning should be fairly well informed concerning somewhat of the extant Mandæan literature, which is of first importance for the study of part of the background of the Religion of Māni, of the Coptic versions of the Pistis Sophia, the Books of Yew and the untitled Apocalypse of the Codex Brucianus, and indeed also of the so-called Ophite and Naassene streams of the Gnosis (taken in conjunction with the tradition of Simon the Magian), which constitute the earliest forms of the Christianizing of the Gnosis. The back numbers of THE QUEST, which are now impossible to procure save in the secondhand market, contain many very valuable contributions, and among them, as bearing especially on the Gnosis of John the Baptizer, the following by Miss A. L. Beatrice Hardcastle, M.R.A.S.: 'Fragments from the Mandæan Tradition of John the Baptist' (Ap. 1910); 'Fragments of a Mandæan Mystery-Ritual: The Book of Souls' (July, 1912); 'The Mandæan Chrism' (Jan. 1914). In connection with these should be read the three learned, arresting and suggestive papers by Dr. Robert Eisler, entitled: 'The Baptism of John the Forerunner' (Oct. 1911); 'John-Jonah-Oannēs' (Ap. 1912); 'John the Baptist in the Light of a New Samaritan Document: The Second Noē' (July, 1912). The prior greatest authority on the Mandæan religion was W. Brandt—*Die mandäische Religion* (1889) and *Mandäische Schriften* (1898); see

also his excellent art., 'Mandæans,' in *E.R.E.* (1915)—whose labours have been made to yield most fruitful and valuable results for the study of the general Gnosis by Bousset in his *Haupt-probleme der Gnosis* (1907). The most venerated collections still possessed by the Mandæans are: *The Book of John* (*Sidra di Yahyā*); *The Treasure* (*Ginzā*), or *The Book of Adam*, or *The Great Book* (*Sidra Rabba*); a collection of 'Baptism' and 'Departure of the Soul' Hymns and Prayers (*Qolasta*); and a mainly cosmological treatise, entitled simply *The Book* (*Diwān*). But the initial difficulty is philological. The idiom in which the literature is composed is a form of Aramaic which developed in lower Babylonia, and its nearest congener is the special dialect of the Babylonian Talmūd,—that is to say, the Aramaic of upper Babylonia.

But as this Mandæan literature has continued right up to the present day, it contains forms of the language extending over many centuries. Hitherto no one has been sufficiently equipped linguistically to render the documents correctly; much has been left to conjecture. And even now, when we have at last (1915, but only now procurable in this country) got the long expected translation by Lidzbarski of one of the documents, the translator himself, who is by far the best equipped for the task, is puzzled over the meaning of a number of terms, in spite of every endeavour to obtain the help of the best scholars in cognate and allied idioms. Nevertheless a long step has been made, as may be seen by comparing L.'s version of the *John-Book* with the attempts which have previously been made to translate portions of it by Stäudlin and Miss Hardcastle. A careful perusal of this excellent piece of work reveals, more clearly than we ever before ventured to expect or hope, the enormous importance of the Mandæan tradition, not only for the study of the Gnosis, but also for a most important background of the Origins of Christianity. This we shall not be able to make secure until Lidzbarski has done the same good service for the rest of the literature, which will then have to be most carefully analyzed, so as to discover the earliest deposits of doctrine. But it is good that the laying of a truly scientific foundation of a critical text and a scrupulously faithful version has been begun. We are eager and anxious to have the rest of the work completed in proportion as we have found the beginning of it so very good. The purpose of the present notice is simply to announce to our readers the existence of this most important work, which has so far, to our knowledge, not yet been noticed in this country. Later on, when we have completed the three

papers which are now appearing dealing with the Origins, we hope to devote a special article to the amazing and arresting contents of the *Mandæan Book of John*.

#### THE EROTIC MOTIVE IN LITERATURE.

By Albert Mordell, Author of 'The Shifting Literary Values,' &c.  
New York City (Boni & Liveright); pp. 250; \$1.75.

THE writer of this essay is a convinced Freudian, and with characteristic 'frightfulness' pitches the whole bomb-armoury of their un-'joy'-ful sex-interpretation indiscriminately into the midst of the men, women and children of the unfortified town of imaginative and poetical literature. We admit that there is value in some of the researches of analytic psychology and that more is to be won out of the quarrying, if pursued with less obsessed methods; but we straitly refuse to go the whole sex-hog with the radical left wing of the movement. The main recipe we are offered in the present incursion for tracing the genesis of poetic inspiration is *cherchez la femme*. If we desire, for instance, to gain a true insight into the works of Keats, Shelley, Edgar Allan Poë or Lafcadio Hearn, then we must acquaint ourselves with all the most intimate details of their *affaires de cœur* and sexual aberrations. Now there is some ground in all this in which to discover the *occasions* of some of the masterpieces of the poets, but it does not explain their inspiration. Moreover, when this mode of approach is pushed to extremes, as it is by the Freudians, we are presented with treatises on phallism and pornography rather than with a sober and balanced scientific and philosophical treatment of the subject. What we find is an utter absence of the spiritual sense in all such effusions; it is difficult to see, in spite of the warm repudiation of the charge by the absolute Libidinists, that their view is any better than a pseudo-scientifically camouflaged form of materialism. Where indeed will they draw the line? Already in Germany we have had a 'Life of Jesus' sketched from the standpoint of pathological psychiatry. Will the Freudians now supply us with a similar one on the lines of their favourite Œdipus- and Atreus-complexes? We regret to see that in the hands of the extremists psychoanalysis is rapidly degenerating into a system of cast-iron dogmas. When the facts are found not to fit the dogmas, and it is pointed out that the Libidinist is trying to torture long-suffering human nature on a Procrustean bed, *le parfait Freudiste* retorts that his critic is manifestly suffering

from very pernicious complexes and requires to be psycho-analyzed by a true Freudian adept for the good of his soul. The *tu quoque* is only too obvious. We doubt not that before long some stalwart of the new faith will proceed to dissect the mentality of the scientists and philosophers on the same lines. Such psychoanalytic theories in general are but a half truth, and must continue to be so as long as they fix all their attention on the lower *strata* of human nature. This half-truth must in the nature of things remain in the region of the Lie until it is complemented with its better and higher half; and this is being attempted, we are glad to see, by the more enlightened wing of the movement; but Mr. Mordell is not rowing in their boat. It is surprising that a writer who professes to be a critic, and a most thorough-going critic, of high literature, should be so fond of that new and vulgar journalese vocable 'to voice.'

#### SPACE, TIME AND GRAVITATION.

An Outline of the General Relativity Theory. By A. S. Eddington, M.A., M.Sc., F.R.S., Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy, Cambridge. Cambridge (The University Press); pp. 218; 15s. net.

THE main principles of the general theory of relativity, which is apparently destined to supersede for mathematical philosophers the old absolute physics whose laws were determined by what appear from the new standpoint to be the quite arbitrarily chosen limitations of that Euclidean or natural geometry which has tyrannized over our minds for so many centuries, are not easy for a non-mathematical layman to grasp. Nevertheless many whose mathematics falls short, or who are even sublimely ignorant of the higher discipline of that most brilliant construct of the human intellect, are keenly interested in the rumours of the new departure, and would fain know some little of what is agitating the theoretical dove-cotes of our men of exact science. The difficulty is to find a book that is in any measure comprehensible to the averagely instructed reader who is ignorant of the mysteries of the mathematical hierophants. We are ourselves here of the profane; or rather we were once many years ago 'mathematical,' but the memory of the meaning of the higher formulæ is now too deeply buried in our subconscious to be

recoverable. As Mulvaney said: "I was a corp'ral wanst, but they redoooced me." Nevertheless, in spite of our technical incompetence, we have read through a number of books on the fascinating theory of relativity in the hope of catching a glimpse here and there of the new-found promised land. Of all of these Professor Eddington's volume is the most illuminating for the myopic, or at least our own bleary eyes. For a scientific work dealing with an abstruse subject, it is brilliantly and humanly and even in parts humorously written; you feel you are in contact with the thoughts of a live man. It is not for our ignorance to review such a book, for we sit on the farthest back benches of the Professor's class-room; but we can and do say: Go and hear him; read his book!—and this especially to those who have been babbling about a 'fourth dimension' of space for so many years, and using the blessed word as a universal solvent for every psychical puzzle in heaven or on the earth. For such it will be a liberal education to hear what simple physics and pure intellect can teach about the tyranny of sense, and what it has to say of the fictionism of mesh-plotting as a means of capturing the reality of space-time events. It is perhaps a somewhat misleading term, but the 'fourth dimension' or co-ordinate of concrete living reality is time and not an imaginary further dimension of Euclidean space. You cannot abstract space or time from this continuum without destroying both. Every event is a concrete duality in unity of space-time. The long-worshipped physical *deus ex machina* of a fixed observer in absolute space is a fiction; no such entity can be discovered by any possible experiment. All is relative. If the sun does not go round a fixed earth, equally the earth does not go round a fixed sun; nor again does our solar system circle round a fixed centre in the starry heavens. All are in motion; all flow. We can calculate only when we have determined our system of reference, and no system of reference is absolute; they are all relative. As Professor Eddington says: "The absolute may be defined as a relative which is always the same no matter what it is relative to." But even this relative physical absolute we cannot discover experimentally; much less then can we conceive the absolute physical itself, if there be such an entity. But we must refrain from crudely repeating even a single point in what the Plumian Professor at Cambridge has set forth so clearly and convincingly in his arresting volume.



## EMERSON AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

By J. Arthur Hill, Author of 'Psychical Investigations,' etc.  
London (Rider); pp. 116; 8s. 6d. net.

THIS exposition of the teaching of Emerson by a writer so well known in connection with Psychical Research makes us at once suspect that we are about to be offered an explanation of psychic phenomena in the direction of the 'Oversoul' doctrine of the American philosopher; and accordingly we are not surprised to find it definitely stated that the data of Spiritism support Emerson's mystical psychology. One would like to know what that great thinker, were he to revisit the earth, would say to this assertion. The relation of his teaching to the theory of the subliminal consciousness is more obvious. Doubtless many of Emerson's sayings imply something corresponding to the experience of psychics, but from his starting-point of self-reliance, and his dictum that "everything real is self-existent," up to his interesting modification of the theory of evolution, that an effort from within must be admitted, a kind of *élan vital* contributory to the result, his view is far too comprehensive to bear any relation to characteristic psychism, or even to ordinary subjectivity. Indeed his 'Universal Soul,' in which individual souls are merged, traces its descent from Greek philosophy: and though now somewhat losing ground between Nietzsche's Superman on the one hand and the 'subconscious' of psycho-analysis on the other, will always survive as the natural refuge of a certain kind of temperament, and moreover as a doctrine that marked the beginning of a new epoch and "broke the monotony of a decorous age." The sketch given of Emerson's personality is interesting reading, and the book supplies us in handy form with a useful account of the great man's life and work.

S. E. H.

## LES ÉCRITURES MANICHÉENNES.

I. Vue générale. II. Étude analytique. Par Prosper Alfarié,  
Docteur-ès-lettres. Publication encouragée par la Société  
Asiatique. Paris (Nourry); pp. 154 + 240.

WE should like to call the attention of those of our readers who are interested in the history of the once far-spread religion of Māni, which was so bitterly persecuted by Mazdaism, Christianity and Islām alike, to this very important publication. It is in-

dubitably the most informative work on the subject which has yet appeared. It analyzes and summarizes, not only the older 'authorities,' who depended exclusively on the polemical and refutatorial works of the bitter opponents of this now forgotten faith, but also all the recent work which has so far been done on the 800 remains and fragments of writings, in direct transmission through translation by the faithful themselves, which have been unearthed in Tūrfān, Chinese Tūrkeṣtān, by the Russian, German, Japanese and English missions. Dr. Alfarić, a friend of Loisy's and an excellent scholar, has apparently been led to this general study, which for long will be the most indispensable 'Introduction' for all students of Manichæism, by his remarkable work *L'Évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin*, in 3 volumes, the first of which treats of the period in the life-history of the Father of Western theology entitled '*Du Manichéisme au Néo-Platonisme.*' The information which is now accessible enables us to orient ourselves with some hope of general accuracy as to the antecedents, foundations and super-structures of the most ascetic form of religion to which the humanity of this planet has ever given birth, and at the same time helps to fill in part of the background and some portion of the foreground, of a certain type of Gnosticism. Our present purpose is simply to call attention to Dr. Alfarić's most recent labours; later on, if opportunity should serve, we should like to attempt a more detailed consideration of this subject, so important for the history of comparative religion.

#### EVIDENCES OF SPIRITUALISM.

Practical Views on Psychic Phenomena. By G. E. Wright. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 136; 2s. 6d. net.

Fourteen Letters from the Beyond. By the Hand of Mary Hamilton Coats. Preface by G. E. Wright. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 100; 2s. 6d. net.

A Soldier Gone West. By H. M. G. and M. M. H. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 65; 2s. 6d. net.

THE excellent little book by Mr. Wright is a closely reasoned, logical criticism of existing records of supranormal phenomena and an exposition of the methods which should be followed in their investigation. Believers in the proven reality of such phenomena should read it, as well as unbelievers and those who are trying to get at the truth, for it is a good example of how the

case for Spiritualism can be presented without dogmatism or prejudice. Mr. Wright points out the difference between "a fact and the evidence for a fact." In the study of inorganic nature, as in physics or chemistry, the test of truth is *repetition*; in the study of organic nature, biology for example, the test is the *average results* of experiment and observation. But in dealing with supranormal phenomena the test of truth is a different one: it is *cumulative*. Mr. Wright adopts Gurney's analogy of the faggot composed of individual sticks of evidence which taken separately are weak, but which in the aggregate constitute a stiff and unyielding body of evidence. Having dealt with this important point of the nature and value of evidence, the author goes on to the question of the best methods to be followed by the investigator. He advises much reading of the existing records, so that some knowledge may be gained of the complexity of the subject and the manifold possibilities of error. He then gives separate chapters to Telepathy, Physical Phenomena, Materialization and Spirit-Photography, and lastly Communication with the Disembodied—Methods and Evidences. He adds short summaries of the most recent hypotheses and experiments, as well as of those of an earlier period, which are less reliable owing to unscientific and inexact methods of investigation, and shows all through the book a balanced judgment which should commend his work to the critical and impartial reader.

The integrity and sober judgment of the writer of *Fourteen Letters from the Beyond* are vouched for by the same writer in a Preface. The letters were obtained by automatic writing. Some purport to be a description of the life after death of a grandfather in the spirit communicating with a grandson in the flesh. Others are from various 'discarnate' souls who passed over during the War. The moral attitude of the writers is unimpeachable and their account of the Hither Beyond is interesting, though it is not of any 'evidential value.' But, as Mr. Wright says in his Preface, there is now such a mass of communications received by autoscopic means, *i.e.* through the planchette, ouija-board, table, or direct writing by the hand, that it is illogical to ignore their possible significance, and they should be studied, in order to differentiate between what may be merely subliminal impressions "finally translated through the ordinary mechanism of hand and brain into writing," and cases in which it does not seem possible for the automatist to have exercised control on the script; for instance, when the writing has been 'upside down,' as though someone had

written it sitting *opposite* the automatist, or when it is 'looking-glass writing,' which can be read only in a mirror.

*A Soldier Gone West* is another set of Letters, purporting to be from an American doctor who died in the War, and written to two women friends. They give an account of his activities on the other side, which were mainly concerned with helping those still on the battlefields. There are many points of interest in the communications. 'The Doctor' repeats the now constant refrain that many who have passed over are homesick at first, and feel the grief of bereavement, and this condition is accentuated when they 'come back' and find their friends and relatives too sad to give them any comfort and insensible to their presence.

One intriguing subject is alluded to only once or twice quite casually—that of re-incarnation. On p. 42 'the Doctor,' speaking of the advance achieved by many through having made the supreme sacrifice of their lives in the War, adds: "And I am told by many Masters that many a soul had progressed more through that one achievement by way of spiritual (*sic*) than through several incarnations." And again on p. 47, alluding to those who were aviators in this life as knowing 'much intuitively,' he says: "Most of them are fellows who did not wait long before incarnating, I am told."

O. S.

#### IN QUEST OF AN IDEAL.

An Autobiography. By Edmond Holmes. London (Cobden-Sanderson); pp. 151; 6s. net.

ALL readers of *THE QUEST* will be interested in perusing this frank utterance on the spiritual development of one of its most distinguished contributors. *The Quest of an Ideal* is not an autobiography of incident; there is indeed little striking incident in the book. It is the life-story of a development of thought and a deepening of feeling. The first great step in his spiritual understanding, Mr. Holmes tells us, was the learning of the lesson "that the communal self is the link between the individual and the divine or ideal self, an essential link, without which that transformation of individuality which is of the essence of self-realisation cannot be effected."

The Quest is for an Infinite Ideal, and the beginning of its finding is the realization of the idea of Wholeness, to which our colleague devotes practically the last chapter of his exposition. What is the nature of this illuminating insight into the first essential of truly spiritual consciousness is already familiar to

our readers, for this chapter appeared originally in our own pages (Jan. No.) under the title 'The Philosophy of My Old Age.' It is somewhat remarkable that Mr. Holmes always quotes from his verse and not from his prose writings in illustration of his points. In this medium, which presented itself for his use unsolicited at recurrent periods, with long gaps between, he believed he could express more fully what he felt and meant. Here again THE QUEST had the good fortune of first publishing perhaps the finest of his poems, 'The Creed of My Heart.' He tells us that he regards his last small volume of *Sonnets to the Universe* as his 'swan song'; but we hope he is a false prophet, and that we shall have from his pen another period of what he modestly terms 'rhyming.'

#### VISIONS OF THE CHRIST.

And other Experiences of a Quaker-Mystic. London (Watkins): pp. 128; 8s. 6d. net.

THIS book (edited by a clergyman of the Church of England) contains some pages from the Journal of a Quaker written between the years 1911 and 1915. The author claims to have been initiated into the mysteries of the interior life by a spirit-friend called Beatrice. She is the medium through which he has received many spiritual messages and undergone many spiritual experiences. It is possible to criticize the validity of such messages and experiences. The only remark which we feel disposed to make is that the author's mystical experience would appear to be the result of a keen perception of the spirit-world, which is in no way akin to the workings of the intellectual imagination.

H. L. H.

#### THE ROMANCE OF THE SOUL.

By the Author of 'The Golden Fountain.' London (Watkins): pp. 125; 8s. 6d. net.

IN this little book the writer sets out to answer the question: "By what means shall the ordinary man and woman, living the usual everyday life, whether of work or of leisure, find God?" The answer to the question is to be found, at any rate in part, in the pages which record a personal experience. The old pathway of renunciation, purgation and illumination must be trodden before oneness with God is attained. The writer is a little more practical in this book than she was in *The Golden Fountain*, though none the less this treatise is informed by the same warm spirit of

devotional experience that marked so conspicuously its predecessor. Under different headings much excellent counsel is given, as for example when the reader is warned that Contemplation, so far from being a "laziness of the will," is rather a "great energy of will because of, and for, love." The criticism of a personal experience is an impossibility: criticism is only legitimate when it is directed against the conclusions which are drawn from the experience. The writer has disarmed the critical reviewer by confining herself to the record of a personal experience. Hence it is only possible for the reviewer to appreciate or depreciate the purpose of the book; it is appreciation that we are impelled to give to this record of a real contemporary mystical experience.

H. L. H.

#### IS SPIRITUALISM OF THE DEVIL?

By the Rev. F. Fielding-Ould, M.A., Vicar of Christchurch, Albany Street, N.W. Introduction by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. London (Rider); pp. 52; 1s. 6d. net.

THE answer which Mr. Fielding-Ould gives is well written in a simple style that makes the complex subject of which it treats easy to follow. The writer deals with Spiritualism, in which he is a firm believer, from the point of view of an orthodox, though broad-minded Christian. He maintains that, though there are lying and deceptive spirits against whom we should of course be on our guard, the general run of the rumours received from the spirit-world are of a high moral order. The nature of the communications depends to a great extent on the degree of religious and moral fervour of the enquirer. Mr. Fielding-Ould naturally does not think that Spiritualism is a new religion, which is to supersede Christianity; it is rather a confirmation and further development of the original Christian doctrines. His essay may be useful to many Christians who are troubled as to the sources of Spiritistic phenomena.

O. S.

#### TUTORS UNTO CHRIST.

By A. E. Garvie, M.A., D.D. London (Humphrey Milford); pp. viii. + 242; 4s. 6d. net.

THE author of this book has had a long experience in lecturing to students preparing for the mission-field, and within the present cover he has put together some thoughts on the study of com-

parative religion. He has not written primarily for scholars, though such will welcome this book: he has had in mind a wider circle of readers. Probably the most valuable chapter from this point of view is the one in which the author writes of 'Christianity and other Faiths,' though his treatment of the historical development of, and the psychical factors in, religion is exceedingly good. The book ends with an admirable chapter dealing with the philosophy of religion. As an introduction to the study of comparative religion the book is excellent. It should have the effect of introducing the reader to one of the most stimulating and important of subjects, and ought to inspire him to study more thoroughly the science of comparative religion.

H. L. H.

### NOTICE.

IN spite of the ever-growing increase of the cost of production the price of THE QUEST has not been so far raised. We have in consequence been steadily piling up a deficit. It is with much regret that we now find ourselves unable to contend any longer against the present penalizing conditions of publication, and are compelled to advance the price. From this number onwards the price will be: single copies 8s. net, 8s. 8d. post free; annual subscription 12s. net, 13s. post free. Current subscriptions at the old rate will hold good till exhausted.

Owing to lack of space 'Discussion' on 'Round the Cradle of Christendom' has been held over till the January issue, when contributions by Dr. K. C. Anderson, on 'The Non-historicity School,' and by Dr. Robert Eisler, on 'Jesus and the Jewish Blood-Sacrifices,' will appear. For the same reason many reviews have had to be held over.—ED.



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A Quarterly Review.

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Vol. XII.

JANUARY, 1921.

No. 2.

The Orphic Mysteries and Early Syrian Christianity - - -	Vacher Burch	145
Some Consequences of the New Psychology - - -	E. M. Caillard	165
The Meaning of Consciousness -	F. C. Constable	178
Psychoanalysis and Reconstruction -	Dora E. Hecht	192
The Self-suggestion of the Saints -	V. C. MacMunn	205
Idifferent Arms - - -	Herehaught	223
Jesus and the Blood-sacrifices -	Robert Eisler	230
The Educational Value of Comparative Religion - - -	Percival Gough	244
The Illumination of the Shadow -	E. P. Larken	252
The Widow - - -	V. H. Friedlaender	259
Reviews and Notices - - -	- - -	265

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21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C. 2.

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# THE QUEST.

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# THE QUEST

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## THE ORPHIC MYSTERIES AND EARLY SYRIAN CHRISTIANITY.

VACHER BURCH, M.A.

THE springtime of literature in Syria was not a long one. It extended, with some sterile stretches, from about the end of the first century to the time of Aphrahat. After this first Father of the Syrian Church, the literature has no time when the first rains fall again and the Spring returns. Certain names attain celebrity. This the early anonymous and Patristic writings were never given, and because they are not like those writers who say the expected things in the expected manner. That, however, is a way in Letters we share with old Syria. Even thought in them becomes more slender in its flow. The celebrated, like Ephraim and Theodore, cultivate extensive vocabularies. Here too the ages make harmony. It seems to be a human error to make nothing that is rhetorical alien to fame. Aphrahat and his predecessors drew from the first pellucid sources of Christian thought. The energies from those sources worked in them so

that they could not help seeing great things and saying great things. They said these in their own simple way. Thus the Vision could live. It is to be expected that the earliest of these writings shew a naïveté in their gatherings of literary factors equal to the simplicity of their literary style. In them matters which are very much older than the first century mingle with the earliest Christian views. The seeds of thought and practice from immemorial cults were borne into Syrian soil from the uncharted mind of the Hittites and from the mountainous ways of Asia Minor. The same seed had been carried into ancient Crete and Dodona. Now this mingling of factors was a natural deed. Those early writers were obeying ancestral monitions, and were not attempting new designs in mosaic. Theirs were not efforts of ordered thought; but Folk-intuition was at work to find its way, it scarce knows how or why, towards the larger idea and the truer language. It is fortunate that a writing has come down to us in which we can watch that intuition at work. The *Ascension of Isaiah* is its name; and it is a fascinating little work.

Like other books of about its own age its nominal theme is of the going up to and coming down from the highest of the heavens of a prophetic figure. The writer of this *Ascension* is, however, the striving Folk-intuition, of which mention has been made, with the power of penmanship. Therefore the nominal theme will be only an incident in the writing; and its significant things may be found in what is gathered about the prophet who seeks the beatific vision. This is so in the *Ascension of Isaiah*. It has been shewn, but a short while ago, that a primary base of this writing is in the most ancient Phœnician religion—

that is to say, in what Phœnicia helped to make of the primal Mother-goddess cult. It is more than interesting to note the influence of ancestral monitions. Without waiting to point out other qualities in the *Ascension*, it will be well to disclose what in it has relations with the subject of this paper. It will be known to all readers of this first-century apocryphon that when Isaiah came to the seventh heaven, he saw the beginning of the Lord's descent to and ascent from the place of the dead and through the seven heavens. An injunction is laid upon Him that, as He passes through each heaven and goes lower, He shall make Himself like the angels who guard the circles of the cosmic scheme and so hide His identity. A short citation will make the method plain: "And I saw anew that when He came down into the third heaven, He transformed Himself according to the form of the angels who were in the third heaven. And they who kept the gate of the heaven demanded the *charaktēr* and the Lord gave it" (x. 23ff.). These same facts apply to the descent into the other heavens. It should be noticed that the word which has been rendered in Greek by *charaktēr*, *i.e.* symbol, finds its support in the Latin and Slavonic versions of the *Ascension*; the Ethiopic translator gives the word less certainly. The importance of this word will soon appear. For the present, we should register the judgment that, in this descent and ascent of the Lord through the seven heavens, we have new beauty given to old beauty of religion. Our problem then is, whether we can retrace the former work of man's aspiration. It is a delicate laboratory-exercise in the anatomy of beliefs. Its delicacy is realized when we know that each discovery of these exquisite articulations means



the revision of the opinions of others, and that this, as in all departments of life, can mean explosive experiences.

There is some evidence that the *Ascension* was used by the Ophites. That is a line to be followed up, if we warn ourselves against doing what others have done who have talked of those folk. They have made the observation; and then have made our apocryphon to be of later date than it ought to be and also have related it with Egypt. Egypt has been the 'old lady who lived in a shoe' to whom the foundlings of the science of the History of Religions are given. There are fashions in literary maternity; so Babylonia has had her turn for a short period. The practisers of any religious form can be found in other lands than that of the religion's birth; but a principal document of that religion will keep the tang of the homeland. It is most difficult to denationalize a document. Thus the matter for examination is not the migratory Ophites, but an Ophitic document which is always true to the hills of home.

Celsus kept, and after him that most industrious scholar Origen, a document which is of capital importance for our investigation.<sup>1</sup> It describes an initiate's way into the purified life with the Lord of Life and Light. He stands at the approach to seven ascending circles. Over each circle presides a guardian angel. Each circle has its gate which can be passed only by presenting the right *charaktēr*. The concord of these principal features between the *Ascension* and the Celsus document is most significant. The septuple cosmic and ritual scheme, we know, is as necessary to Ophitism as it is to our apocryphal writing. The

<sup>1</sup> Origen, *Contra Celsum*, vi. 81f.

fragments of a Coptic work,<sup>1</sup> which is attributed to James the brother of the Lord, is to be taken as the authentic voice of Egyptian Ophitism; and its main feature also is the seven heavens. It is a pity that we have not the whole work, for the voice now stammers. Other qualities in those fragments shew that they and the Celsus document are independent of one another. We can proceed to find the authentic notes of Syrian Ophitism. Let us take three 'heavens' or 'circles' to illustrate the nature of the Celsus document.

At the sixth gate stands Jao. He presides over the secret mysteries of the Son and the Father. He is named also the second divine appearance, the unveiler of the Night, the first prince of Death and the portion of the freed. The initiate passes in and out of his realm with quick steps because of new powers which have come to him through Jao and the Living Logos. The symbol the initiate presents to the guardian of the gate is his beard.

Sabaoth is the guardian of the realm into which the ascending initiate has passed. He is said to be the author of the primal law of being which manifests itself in grace. The powers of the number 5 are his; and in the power of that number, the aspirant realizes bodily deliverance. The gate of this realm is passed by means of the symbol of Sabaoth's artistry.

Over the third realm rules Astaphaios. He is the overseer of the primary principle Water. To pass his gate the initiate shews the 'substance of the cosmos.'

These three different stages of the ascending

<sup>1</sup> Edited by Winstedt, *J.T.S.* viii. 242 and 246. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, vi. 80, records an Egyptianized version of a septuple cosmic scheme.

cosmic scheme disclose the mingling qualities of the whole. Most ancient cult-qualities jostle the new Christian ideas. The discrimination of these factors will, perhaps, be made more easily if the names of the 'angels' are first examined. Take, for instance, Jao or Sabaoth or Adoneus or Eloaios—these strike the ear as being familiar Semitic divine or angelic names. We incline to refer for them to such a source as the Old Testament. If we so do, we shall have found one use of these names, but we shall not have found their origin. Then to dispossess the Old Testament, that is the conventional source, we shall first remind ourselves that such names as we have grouped together are angelic as well as divine. Pradel<sup>1</sup> has gathered a number of Greek prayers in which we find Sabaoth, Adoneus and Eloaios are named and invoked with other 'angel-knights.' A profusion of illustrations to this end could be adduced. Therefore the names are angelic as well as divine. Now there seems a quite natural reason that a god's names should pass to beings who do him service. And if our judgment stays there we shall desire no other source for the angels' names in our cosmic scheme than the Old Testament. That confidence must be shaken again, when we remember that to those names which sound familiarly were added, for example, Astaphaios and Horaïos. They are not of the Old Testament. Still the persistent Hebraist may say that the foreign names have been added to the original Hebrew deposit. The theory of accretions, like that of interpolations, should be classed as 'Veronese,'—if a term can be borrowed from Mr. St. John Lucas's delightful M. Duroy: that is to say, it must not be suffered unless

<sup>1</sup> *Griechische und süditalienische Gebete*, 1907, 9; 20 and 26.

the document says it "can't be done on (my) kind of instrument." So very much, indeed, would be either accretive or interpolative in the Celsus document, if the theory were once allowed. Even the names which seem to be biblical have to yield us older values than the Hebrew writings and the cult matters they record. Varro informs us,<sup>1</sup> as Joannes Lydus reports him, that Jao and Sabaoth are Phœnician names for Dionysos, who is set in authority over the seven circles. This Dionysos is not the divine figure of late imagination, but a primal Dionysiac figure such as Orpheus conceived—a god who could come down the Near Asian uplands and assume the Phœnician purple. The relation of Phœnician names for the Orphic god with the seven circles is a first realisation to be made if the Celsus document is to be understood. We shall find also that these names can be taken back to an older stratum of belief.

What other signs, we must now ask, of Orphic relationship does our document show? When the aspirant for life stands at the foot of his way he prays to "him who blinds the being," who "gives forgetfulness beyond recall." These are primal conditions of being for the attainment of the highest. Long ago Plutarch<sup>2</sup> sought to know what it meant to have the being blinded; and on the authority of Castor the Pythagorean he found that the worshipper was veiled so as to affirm that the soul within him was shrouded and hidden by the body. There may have been the ritual act of binding the eyes. In the Pythagorean forms this would appear to be so. But the prayer in the Celsus document seems to be allied more nearly to the

<sup>1</sup> Joannes Lydus, *de Mensibus*, ed. Wünsch, 1898, iv. 53.

<sup>2</sup> *Ætia Romana*, 10E.

higher thought of Orphism, such as it finds expression on the tablets of gold which have been found in the graves of dead Orphists. On those lovely relics of their faith the veil has been taken from the being, because 'forgetfulness beyond recall' of the conditions when the soul was blinded has been reached. The *Petalia Tablet*<sup>1</sup> bears its charming witness to these things, where it says to the still aspiring Orphist:

"Thou shalt find to the left of the House of Hades a  
Well-spring,  
And by the side thereof standing a white Cypress.  
To this Well-spring approach not near.  
But thou shalt find another by the Lake of Memory,  
Cold water flowing forth, and there are Guardians  
before it.  
Say: 'I am a child of Earth and starry Heaven.  
But my race is of Heaven (alone). This ye know  
yourselves.  
And lo, I am parched with thirst and I perish. Give  
me quickly  
The cold water flowing forth from the Lake of  
Memory.'  
And of themselves they will give thee to drink from  
the holy Well-spring  
And thereafter among the other Heroes thou shalt  
have lordship."

It is clear from this poem that the well on the left of the white Cypress tree has water which if drunk will bring back the powers and knowledge of the life where the being or soul is veiled. But to drink of the water 'on the right of the Cypress tree' will awaken the being or soul to the powers and knowledge of its true self

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Murray in Miss Harrison's *Prolegomena*, 660ff.

and home. A little Doric poem, attributed to Prodicus of Samos<sup>1</sup> who was an Orphic poet, delicately dramatizes the situation. In it, as it were, the Seeker and the Well-spring act their parts. We may arrange the few lines of the poem in this manner:

*The Seeker*: "I am parched with thirst and about to die."

*The Well-spring*: "But drink of my water; I flow perennially on the right of the Cypress tree."

*The Seeker* (drinks, and cries with astonishment as he comes into possession again of his unveiled being): "Who art thou? Whence art thou? I am the son of the Earth and the starry Sky."

There can be no doubt that in these Orphic authorities is the explanation of the prayer which prefaces the Celsus document. It is impossible not to stay for a moment to remark that there are elements also in the *Petalia Tablet* which can serve to illumine or to be illumined by that other most pleasant product of early Syrian genius, *The Hymn of the Soul*—but these things I have not yet worked out. To return to our document, and to our effort to shew its essential Orphism, we may find affirmation of the conclusions just stated in another remark of Plutarch's<sup>2</sup> where he says that punishment for an Orphist in the life to come will be to be given over to total blankness of spiritual being—that is to say, for him to remain in the veiled condition.

It will be necessary to seek if the different symbols, which are so potent at the gates, have the same close Orphic connections. For three of the circles the symbols can only be conjectured. Therefore, omitting those circles for which we have not definite evidence,

<sup>1</sup> Joubin, *B.C.H.*, 1898, 122.

<sup>2</sup> *de Laten. Vivendo*, 7E.

we find that to pass Jao the Beard<sup>1</sup> was the symbol, to pass Astaphaios Water, to pass Eloaios an Ear of Corn, and to pass Horaaios the Tree. Now the first of these, the Beard, relates the initiate, or ascender, with the Kouretes. He is the true 'shaveling' or *koros* or *kouré*. This represents a layer of thought which lies deep in Orphism. It is a most ancient survival. For in it we touch pre-historic Folk-rites; then the Kouretes as the necessary attendants of the primal Mother-goddess; then the Orphist's ascetic refinements on that great cult's usages; and lastly, in our document, where the Orphic connotations are joined with views of Jesus Christ as the Logos. It has become the new form of circumcision, as the Celsus document says. The second symbol, Water, has almost as long a history as the first. Theology waits on cosmology in Orphism. Zeus comes from the breast of the Primal Waters. In oldest Syria Water is the primal cosmic substance.<sup>2</sup> Clement of Alexandria<sup>3</sup> has kept three lines from the pen of Orpheus where, according to his mystic way, he shews how Water is mother to the soul or the freed being of man. It is this Orphic value which has been conserved by the Celsus document. The third symbol is the Ear of Corn. This too is a symbol of the primal Mother-cult. There are some scholars who have thought that thence the Mother had her name, for an old Cretan word for the cereal is not unlike the Mother's oldest name. It seems better to believe that the Mother was before this symbol of hers; since her oldest name has a significance which would scarcely

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the same deed in the Stratonikean Mystery, Deschamps & Cousin. *B.C.H.*, 1887, 383, 1888, 479ff; also Miss Harrison on Kouretes and Zeus Kouroi, *B.S.A.*, 1908-9, 328f.

<sup>2</sup> Flach, *Scholien zur hesiodischen Theogonie*, 1876, 220.

<sup>3</sup> *Stromata*, vi. 265.

permit of origin through this symbol. For its meaning in our document we may turn to Hippolytus.<sup>1</sup> He tells us that among the Ophites<sup>2</sup> an ear of corn is regarded as the residence of the god, and the bearing of this symbol into the presence of the Mother "is the act of generation, spiritual, heavenly, from above; and most strong is he who is thus begotten." There is beauty in this usage. It is so beautiful that it has made Hippolytus lucid. We know that the Sacred Marriage is the most intimate ceremony in Orphism. We also know—do we not?—that the ear of corn is an ineffably ancient symbol of the Mother-goddess. The cult-history for this symbol is the same as we have found before. That is notable. There is, however, a more notable matter in the ritual restraint and gathering of ideas in the exquisite symbol; and that is, we have, in the facts of the Celsus document and the comment of Hippolytus, material for the reconstruction of the Orphic ceremony. The last symbol we are to examine, is the Tree. This is shewn to Horaïos. This name takes us at once into the Mysteries. There is, for example, a fragment of Aristophanes<sup>3</sup> in which the radical of the name of Horaïos is related with the god Sabazios. Also it is well known that the Horai performed their part in Orphic ritual. Then the guardian of this 'circle' has an Orphic name. Now it is pleasing to see how the things of that religion were made Christian. The symbol to be shewn to this guardian is the Tree of Life "made in the image and likeness of the guiltless." The reference is to the

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophumena*, v. 8.

<sup>2</sup> That the name 'Ophite' had its rise in Orphic ideas would seem clear; compare Maass, *Commentorium in Aratum Reliquiæ*, 1891, 353f., 452, for Scholia where the name Ophios occurs.

<sup>3</sup> Meineke, *Fragmenta Poet. Comæd.*, 1840, ii. 2, 1178.



Cross of Calvary. Origen records that concerning this symbol Celsus remarked that the practisers of these religious forms used it because their leader was a hewer of wood. It is quite true that Jesus Christ came into the family of a village carpenter. But that fact cannot make Celsus into an enlightened commentator. The stark economy of his comment shews that his knowledge is poor. In literature, as in many other modes of expression, it is striking how often what is thought to be laconic strength is only poverty of thought or spirit. The symbol of the Tree, in such a context as it is found, should take our minds back first to the Great Mother cult. On a superb series of coins struck in Gortyna, which is a Cretan town, she is to be found seated in the branches of the willow tree.<sup>1</sup> We need not multiply evidence of this sort. Let us then find this tree's relations with Orpheus. There was a famous fresco of the Underworld at Delphi which Polygnostos had painted, and in it Orpheus leans against the willow tree with an hypostasis of the Great Mother. There the tree is really a 'tree of life' to them.<sup>2</sup> That we have found the proper context for this symbol, is to be seen from another feature in the Celsus document where it speaks of the doings of the initiate in the 'circle' of its use. He is said "to have crossed fearlessly the barrier of fire." Behind that sentence can be caught glances and gleams of dateless fires and ritual. In the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, the Mother-goddess is found making a child to be without death and age by putting him through and taking him out of fire. Professor Murray considers this deed may be based on such a primæval matter as

<sup>1</sup> Svoronos, *Numismatique de la Crète Ancienne*, 1890, s.n. Gortyna.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 587.

the sacrifice of a child.<sup>1</sup> That crude deed may have been done. It was not the Orphic manner; nor, indeed, was it the way the Kouretes of the Mother had. According to a fragment of Euripides' play called *The Cretans*,<sup>2</sup> it would appear that the Kouretes made about the Mother a girdle of dancing torch-light—a veritable 'barrier of fire' to be crossed by any who would be guiltless in life and devoted to her worship. There is scarcely needed any process of refining to make these matters wholly Orphic, and so to be material which could find its way into Syrian Ophitism. It may be that the references to 'fire' and 'the wheel of genesis,' which occur in the New Testament *Letter of James* (iii. 6), are evidences of the influence of this union of Orphism and Christianity in the second half of the first century. The provenance of the *Letter*, it will be recalled, is considered to be Syrian. So far then as the present examination of the Celsus document has gone, it seems plain that this early form of Syrian Christianity shews the influences of Orphism in such a manner as to be a valuable source for the reconstruction of Orphic thought and ritual. If we return in thought to the golden Orphic Tablets, we can find in the *Timpone Grande Tablet* (b) evidence that the septuple process, which is the chief feature of the Syrian Ophite initiation, is also integral to Orphism. This knowledge raises the question of the nature of the seven 'heavens' or 'circles'—were they ritual properties, or were they realms in idea? First then what were the 'circles' in Orphism? In Professor Murray's render-

<sup>1</sup> Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, 1907, 276ff., where he discusses an Orphic papyrus of the second century B.C.

<sup>2</sup> Porphyry, *de Abstinencia*, iv. 19.

ing of the *Compagno Tablets*, it will be recalled, there are the memorable lines :

“ I have flown out of the sorrowful weary Wheel ;  
I have passed with eager feet to the Circle desired ” :

and again :

“ I have passed with eager feet from the Circle desired  
. . . to the seats of the Hallowed.”

Miss Harrison, whose fascinating books on Greek religion have awakened even dull minds to the wonders of that line of study, wavers between what she calls “ a real wheel,” perhaps borrowed from Egyptian rites,<sup>1</sup> or “ a circle drawn round the neophyte out of which he escaped.” Celsus has left us a catalogue of ideas and properties belonging to the Syrian Ophites which is a joy to the investigator of early Near Asian religion. It reads thus: “ They heap one upon the other words of the prophets, and circles upon circles, and water-floods of the church (or congregation) on the earth, and circumcision, and a certain outflowing energy from the Virgin Prunike, and the living soul, and heaven suffering death to live, and earth slain by the sword,<sup>2</sup> and many dyings that they may live, and death ceasing in the cosmos when cosmic sin is dead, and another descent by narrow ways and gates opening automatically, and everywhere the Tree of Life and rising from the flesh by the Tree.” For the scholar, that paragraph is more than Masfield’s enchanted ‘ Malvern Hill ’ :

<sup>1</sup> Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, v. 242 ; Miss Harrison, *Prolegomena*, 591. There is clear synonymy between the terms ‘ wheel,’ ‘ heaven,’ and ‘ circle.’

<sup>2</sup> For this phrase cp. *Fargard* ii. 10, 14, where Yima pierces the earth with his poignard. There is an Iranian strain in early Syrian and Palestinian thought.

“There—in the twilight . . .  
Quiet are clan and chief, and quiet  
Centurion and signifer.”

We have already dipped our archæological spades into this rich earth. If some of the factors of this paragraph are drawn closer together, we shall make other finds. For instance, let us put side by side the phrases: “circles upon circles . . . descent by narrow ways and gates opening automatically”; then our only conclusion from these items can be that there was used a series of ascending circle-wise ‘kingdoms’ or ‘heavens’ with their necessary automatic gates. Such ritual properties, in which the ascender is laden with the burden of finding life through death unto the fleshly, merit the descriptions in the Orphic Tablets of the ‘sorrowful weary Wheel’ and of the ‘eager feet’ of the aspirant for life as he climbs upwards to the ‘Circle desired.’ The Ophite ‘circles’ are only a step on in the idealization of Orphism. Mountain and woodland and circling torch-light were the first natural plans of the Orphic ritual cosmos. It but required the fire of imagination, which is the fine possession of that religion, to shape the ‘circles’ which the later Orphists knew. The Celsus document thus makes a considerable contribution to our knowledge of Orphic ritual properties.

We may now turn to the side of ideas in the remarkable paragraph. The items sound strange to those who are unused to the study of the naïve modes of early Christian thought: Water-floods of the church (or congregation) on earth; outflowing energy from a Virgin, and the ceasing of cosmic death—they are just the kind of things to entice us to search for their origin in the all-providing Egypt. Another first

century witness to Syrian Christianity, the *Odes of Solomon*, turns our attention to the true fatherland of these ideas. *Ode vi.* is the true commentator on this idea of the water-flood of the church on earth. There the Odist wrote: "For there went forth a flood<sup>1</sup> and became a river great and broad; for it flooded and broke up everything, and it turned to the Temple, and the restrainers of the children of men 'were not able to restrain it, nor the arts of those whose business it is to restrain waters; for it spread over the face of the whole earth, and filled everything. . . . Blessed then are the ministers of that draught who are entrusted with that water of life." Without entering into the details of a delicate piece of analysis with its accompaniments of detailed evidence, it may be allowed to summarize the interpretation of this passage from *Ode vi.* as follows: The Odist is celebrating the overthrow of the ancient Hebrew forms of religion by the new revelation of Life in Jesus Christ. This revelation is the 'flood' that breaks forth from the primitive Christian congregation unto whom it is entrusted. The Celsus document then is not dealing here with properties, but with primitive Christian ideas with their evangelical anti-Judaism. The second enquiry concerns the Virgin from whom is outflowing energy. In *Ode xxxiii.* we read: "But there stood a perfect Virgin who was proclaiming and calling and saying, O ye sons of men, return ye, and ye daughters of men, come ye: and forsake the ways of corruption and draw near unto me, and I will enter into you . . . and they who have put me on shall not be injured: but they shall possess the new world that is incorrupt."

<sup>1</sup> This term (*aporroia*) should be kept free from later mystical meanings which were brought to it.

This Virgin is the Sophia who was with God from the beginning of things, and who, as the Sapiential books say, was His female executive in the creation of the world and of men who could be neighbours with the Divine. The christology of the *Odes* is early enough for us to see a little of the labour of the first-century folk to spell out the meanings of the person and work of Jesus Christ through analogies from the Sapiential literature. It will be remembered that the citation from *Ode* xxxiii. closed with speech about a new and incorrupt world, and also that the third problem in ideas from the Celsus document concerns the dying out of cosmic sin. The hint of this deed as an accomplished one in *Ode* xxxiii. is explained in *Ode* xxii., where the Odist writes: "Thou didst bring the world to corruption (he is addressing the Lord of Life): that everything might be dissolved, and then renewed, and that the foundation of everything might be thy Rock." The statement may be naïve, but the thought moves swiftly and deeply. The audacious and simple writer is contemplating the end of the work of the Lord of Life through the potency of His revelation of Life. His view of universal redemption is the profoundest in the history of Christian thought. Thus, in rapid sketch, we have been able to shew that the Celsus document is early Syrian in its Christian ideas; for, of course, there can be little or no doubt that the *Odes of Solomon* is a first-century Syrian Christian work.

The ground we have covered should have enabled us to see that in the instance of the Celsus document there is a coalescence of early Syrian Christianity and Orphism; and that in the instance of the *Ascension of Isaiah* there is the skeleton in the text of the Orphic ritual and cosmic scheme. To this last conclusion can

be added this, that its christology, which up to the present has been a puzzle, finds its interpretation in the same source as the Celsus document—namely, the *Odes of Solomon*. The writers of these early anonymous books are thinking in the same world of Christian ideas with their filiations in the same elder world of religious ideas and practices. The North Palestinian Folk-mind is taking its own fascinating way to Jesus Christ. The question arises, at this point, did Orphism contribute anything to early Syrian Christianity? A case has been made out concerning the septuple cosmic scheme. Let us interrogate the *Odes* once again. *Ode* xlii. tells us, as others of the *Odes* do, that in the first century prayer was made in vivid ways—as, for example, in cross-wise fashion: “My expansion is the outspread tree which was set up on the way of the Righteous One.” The bulk of this *Ode* is given up to the celebration of the Descent into Hades. Now, there seems little reason to question that a primary factor in the creation of this symbol was first-century *Anti-Judaica*. The suggestion arises, however, that there was a twin factor, and that was in Orphism. The relation of the Descent into Hades with the refining of the immemorial Tree sign makes this suggestion possible. It should be noted that the *Ascension of Isaiah* has the same juxtaposed material (ix. 14, 15). The Descent of the Lord into Hades is not only in early Syrian books, it is also in the New Testament—and thence has passed into the beliefs of certain of the larger institutional Churches of the West. Is it not here that Orphism has left its mark?—for Plato<sup>1</sup> records how Orpheus

<sup>1</sup> *Symp.* 179c ; Vergil, *Georgics*, iv. 454ff., who romanticizes Orpheus, and turns the ‘circles’ into spaces of time. I have not yet seen Dr. C. Schmidt’s *Gespräche Jesu mit seinen Jüngern nach der Auferstehung* (1919), in which he has a long study on the ‘Descensus’ in the early Church.

went down alive into Hades. We are used to finding the literary source for the Descent, as it appears in the New Testament, in the *Books of Enoch*, and we may not find it elsewhere. The essential *Enoch*, wherein is the best expression of the Semitic Folk-material which has found its way into the text of the New Testament, is a North Palestinian book. This book might well have felt the same influences on the cult side as other first-century North Palestinian books. For it seems to be beyond question that in the *Ascension of Isaiah* and the Celsus document the going down into Hades was a natural concomitant of the cosmic scheme which climbed so high that the climber became 'God instead of Mortal.' What is a unity in some first-century North Palestinian works would not be a disunity in other works from the same part of Palestine. It has been customary to trace the ultimate literary source of the Descent references in *Enoch* and the New Testament to certain Old Testament phrases. That these were a source it might be difficult, and even wrong, to deny; but the ultimate literary source they would not appear to be, since one of the most needed pieces of work on the Old Testament is to discover the influence of the Great Mother cult, with its historic mutations, on the Hebrew writings. There seems then a deep Folk-reason why, for example, on the tombs in the earliest catacombs, the figure of Jesus Christ should have been given some of the regalia of Orpheus. We think slowly; and it is most compelling to come upon signs of the cherishing care the mind of man gives to those hours in which thought has been beautiful. The Folk-mind is always a kind of contemporary mental context for us. This consideration has its perils. For under



the rigid application of what is called the view of progressive development in the History of Religions—it is, in reality, the myth of the steam-roller that wandered into the land of ideas, if our analysis is refined enough—what is Folk and what is Revelation are often confounded, and hence Christianity has suffered. We cannot be careful for Orpheus and careless towards Jesus Christ. The study of the beginnings of Christianity can make vast gain only as we become more sensitive in our discrimination between what came by Jesus Christ and what belongs to the Palestinian Folk-mind. It is one of the surprises of this work of careful appraisement to find that it is the picturesque Folk-mind which has contributed more to the body of official and dogmatic Christian thought—and especially to its views of Man and the World and the juridical consequences in idea for God and Redemption—than the actual revelation of Jesus Christ. In the early Syria into which we have been delving, we are in a simpler world. Ordinary men and women have raised their heads to listen to the new Voice. They have talked the wonder over in their homely style. It was the epic manner. Then the things which were told by the hearth or as the sheep followed to the fold, found expression in the mind of one who could think and write the vernacular in a striking way. These people are almost unconscious that new ideas are being spoken by that Voice. And later students can distinguish them only as they are analytically exquisite enough to trace the informing gold in the grey iridescence of intuitions and story and dreams and half-ideas which they weave whose books, for the great part, are in the winged things their fathers have said and done.

VACHER BURCH.

## SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD.

ONE characteristic of the New Psychology is that it does not regard the human mind as an isolated phenomenon to be studied apart from animal mentality. Trotter, in his *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, observes that the need of an objective standard in psychology was long ignored, with the result that "any given mental phenomenon might be as much a product of the observing mind as the mind observed." In fact for a considerable time the observing mind and the mind observed were one and the same, and introspection was regarded as practically the only method that could be pursued. Introspection alone was bound to be untrustworthy. Individual differences and predilections were certain to obtain undue prominence, and there was little hope of gaining any true insight into the fundamental characteristics of human mentality. A great change has come about in this respect. Comparative psychology and the study of mental diseases, "in which mental processes and mechanisms which had eluded observation in the normal appear in an exaggerated form, rendering recognition less difficult," have placed the study of the human mind on a far surer footing, and have already resulted in great practical utility. The fact that mental disease, regarded from a psychological standpoint, is lack of proportion,

one mental factor being enormously exaggerated to the neglect, perhaps exclusion, of all others in the consideration of the subject, is of itself a very important and far-reaching discovery. To recognize that sane and insane persons are not so different that their minds work on different methods, but that these are identical save for the over-emphasis laid by the insane on some few, or possibly one, of the *data* on which they found their reasoning, is exceedingly instructive, and from the psychological point of view hopeful. If it leads to the conclusion that we all have in us the seeds of insanity, that we are all a little mad, it equally points to the mad being all a little sane. Much may be evolved from that little by judicious and sympathetic treatment.

In what indeed according to our present psychological knowledge does sanity, that is healthfulness of mind, really consist? Trotter warns us against identifying this with normality as generally understood. In commenting on the Freudian system, he observes (p. 90) that, though individually curative, it does not give promise of being of much value to the *race*; for this must be judged in relation to the value of the normal to which the patient has been restored, and that by no means involves attainment of the full measure of capacity which might be possible to the mind in question. It is simply the *statistically*, or *averagely*, normal which is meant, and this Trotter regards as being far from psychologically healthy, because below the standard of foresight and progress potentially attainable by the human mind. But the statistically normal have "exclusive command of Directing Power in the world and [are consequently] a danger to civilization" (p. 91), being unable to

accept and profit by *the new in experience*. Trotter suggests calling this type the 'resistive,' because the mental stability acquired by it is "in certain important directions a loss, and the nature of the loss resides in a certain limitation of outlook, a relative intolerance of the new in thought, and a consequent narrowing of the range of facts over which satisfactory intellectual activity is possible" (p. 55).

In this connexion it is interesting to remember that all those men who have most largely benefited their race have not been 'normal,' but have during their life-time almost without exception been regarded as cranks and crazy enthusiasts. Even Christ was not exempt from this supposition.

But the anti-normal, those to whom the new in thought and experience is welcome, who are willing to put it to a practical test, have difficulties and drawbacks of their own. They form the great type of the 'unstable,' and just as "the resistive gain in motive what they lose in adaptability, [so] in a sense the unstable gain in adaptability what they lose in motive. Thus we see society cleft by the instinctive qualities of its members into two large classes, each to a great extent possessing what the other lacks, and each falling below the possibilities of human personality" (p. 55). This Trotter regards, and surely with truth, as evidence that "civilisation has not yet provided a medium in which the average human mind can grow undeformed to its full stature" (pp. 52, 60). There is at once a lack of balance, of what, in many of the semi-religious, semi-philosophical books current and popular in our time, is called *poise*, and a lack of initiative; and the cause of these two opposite defects is said to be the fact that mankind is provided by its

members with a herd-tradition which is constantly at war with (individual) feeling and experience, this in either case tending "to exaggerate that isolation of the individual shown by the intellect to be unnatural and by the heart to be cruel."

Isolation is 'unnatural' to the human individual because man is a *gregarious* animal, and the full import of this fact is only now beginning to be recognized. Gregariousness is a very powerful instinct: it is also one which endows the species possessing it with the great advantage of acting *collectively*, the general welfare being inevitably made the chief motive power and taking precedence of any other aim. The bee, the ant and all those mammals which congregate in herds and packs, demonstrate the remarkable facilities for defence and offence, for safeguarding the young, for procuring adequate nutrition, attained by means of the gregarious instinct. At the same time they also show that the unquestionable advantages to the *species* involve, where the instinct is allowed undisputed sway, the sacrifice of the *individual*. The worker-bee is so possessed by the hive-spirit that she can hardly be said to have an individual life at all. The two or three short months between her birth and the day when, actually worked to death, she expires in the service of the hive are spent in that service wholly. She feels no other call, her sex is forgone, altruistic cares are her sole occupation, and, though doubtless she takes pleasure in them, the pleasure of satisfying an instinctive impulse, she is nevertheless considered as an individual incomplete; and the cause is the absolute subservience of all her activities to the common life of the hive.

This aborted individual development of the worker-

bee is a phenomenon of very special and direct interest to man; for the form of gregariousness characteristic of the bee is characteristic also of him. In both cases the community is not banded together for defence only as is the flock or herd, or for offence only as is the pack, but for the whole of the common life, and the result is an absolutely harmonious division of labour of which the advantage to each hive and to the species at large is obvious. But the bee has a very narrow intellectual capacity, and the thwarting of the individual egotistic instincts may consequently not be a very serious matter. In a creature of such highly developed intelligence as man, capable of many diversified interests, whose instinctive impulses may seek response through various channels, one moreover who is perpetually impelled to put the question why such and such is the course of things, it can hardly be to his highest advantage collectively, nor within the range of credible possibility, that his individual cravings should be so completely subjugated to the common welfare as to be denied satisfaction and eventually destroyed. Their very variety and strength raises the hope that they are destined on the contrary to minister to such a development as shall bring forth a gregarious life infinitely higher than that of which the bee is an example, one which, so far from stultifying, involves the attainment of the highest individual capacity as a *condition* of the fullest and most perfect life of the community.

One very great, perhaps the chief, *desideratum* for the attainment of such an end is perfected inter-communication. Not that external inter-communication only or chiefly, which consists in facility and rapidity of locomotion, of exchange of views and

interests by post, telegraph, wireless, etc., but the intimate ever deepening and extending sympathy of mind with mind, which is greatly promoted by these outward facilities, but which is something far more, and more essential than they are, leading to a mutual understanding and fellowship, which results in an almost indefinite enlargement of the individual personalities participating in it. It seems obvious that the greater the intellectual capacity of the species, the greater, if it be gregarious, will be the need to the individual of this sympathetic mental interchange. In the case of man, who alone among the denizens of earth has attained in language to some adequacy of expression, the need has become imperative, the more so that he is able to recognize it; for he is not, like the 'dumb animals,' able only dimly to realize what he craves for in this direction, he *knows* that it is sympathy and understanding. His trouble is that he wants these to be complete, and he never in any individual case attains his desire. If, as in some very perfect instances of friendship or married love, he appears to do so, there is always the possibility of a catastrophic end to the soul-satisfying experience through some unforeseen development in events. But the craving for perfect reciprocal understanding does not itself die. Its satisfaction is sought in the direction of religion; and the author already quoted in the earlier part of this paper regards religious feeling as a direct consequence of this instinctive desire for perfect sympathy, itself due (from a biological point of view) to the gregarious instinct in a being of such high intellectual development as man. "Religious feeling is a character inherent in the very structure of the human mind, the expression of a need which must be

recognized by the biologist as neither superficial nor transitory, that need being a sense of incompleteness due to the impossibility of bringing the individual into soul-satisfying harmony with his fellows" (p. 113).

It does not seem to occur to this very able writer that, even if inter-communication between mind and mind in the human race were to reach perfection, there might still be failure to attain 'soul-satisfying harmony.' Man does not seek to enter into sympathetic understanding with his fellows only; he craves it with all nature, and that not intellectually simply. It is not solely because natural anomalies and paradoxes puzzle and defy his intellect that he resents and is grieved by them. It is because they often offend him morally and æsthetically also, as in the case of the apparent cruelty and hardship resulting from the struggle to survive in the organic kingdom which bears so hardly on the weak. It does not seem probable that any completeness of understanding between individual man and his fellows, however greatly it might contribute to the higher evolution of the race, would suffice to reconcile him to a universe in which such things are. He would want to get into 'soul-harmony' with them also. Religion in its highest form offers him this possibility, and Christianity, considered as a life-principle rather than as a dogmatic system, points to the way of attainment.

We are here passing beyond the bounds of orthodox science. For the way of attainment consists, firstly, in experiencing the inward vision which sees through and beyond the phenomenal dealt with by science to the real of which it is the expression, otherwise named the spiritual; and, secondly, in subordinating the phenomenal to the real, or in alternative words the



material to the spiritual.<sup>1</sup> Now orthodox science, fully occupied with investigating that region which it claims as its own, has decided that, even if the spiritual exists, it is no proper subject for scientific consideration, because it transcends the phenomenal. But orthodoxy is no less a fetter to the enquiring human intellect when it poses as scientific than when it is dressed in ecclesiastical garb. And a fetter is what the human intellect cannot but away with ; it will deliver itself at all costs. Its deliverance at the present time seems to be coming from two directions : the remarkable advance in psychology, and the great expansion in religious thought, already preparing in 1914, but which the terrible crisis of the succeeding years has wonderfully advanced and emphasized. Christianity, as a life-principle, has more than gained all it has seemed to lose as a dogmatic creed. To this fact witness is borne by non-believers in it as a Divine revelation as well as by believers. Quotations may be given illustrating both these statements. The analytical psychologist Jung, in his work *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, regards Christianity as having given a quite exceptional impulse to the subduing of the animal instincts in man. Though he indeed supposes that " the Christian religion seems to have fulfilled its great biological purpose so far as we are able to judge," he yet observes that, in consideration of its inestimable service to education, " we might still make use in some way of its form of thought and *especially of its great wisdom of life* which for 2,000 years had been proved to be particularly efficacious " (p. 85).

This work was published before the War ; and

<sup>1</sup> Subordinating does not involve stultifying, but bringing into useful subjection to a higher purpose.

Jung, relying as very many of us did on the stability of a civilization which has since received a staggering shock, considers that the weakening hold of Christianity was due to the fact that the "enormous feeling of redemption," which animated the first disciples, "had practically ceased to exist." "Most certainly," he writes, "we should still understand it, had our customs even a breath of ancient brutality, for we can hardly realize in these days the whirlwind of the unchained libido which roared through the Rome of the Cæsars. The civilized man of to-day seems very far removed from that. He has become merely neurotic. So for us the necessities which brought forth Christianity, have actually been lost, since we no longer understand their meaning. *We do not know against what it had to protect us*" (p. 80).<sup>1</sup> It is quite safe to say that the experience of the last few years has taught us—if it has taught us anything—against what we still need the same protection, *viz.* that identical 'ancient brutality' which asserted itself as masterfully as ever when favouring conditions presented themselves. The very thing for which all humanity is now crying out is *redemption*, redemption from its overpowering passions and their terrible results.

The word indeed may have changed; what we chiefly hear spoken of is the need for world-reconstruction, alike in its political and social aspects; but what all who think to any extent profoundly on the subject, realize to be the true demand, is not for rebuilding but for *re-birth, re-generation*, the significance of which is identical with redemption. And further it is also deeply felt that this re-generation must *necessarily start from within*. It cannot be attained by any

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.

system of legislation, however admirable and far-reaching, nor by any international League for Peace, however unanimous in its pronouncements, but only by a complete revulsion of the inner life, manifesting itself indeed in these external institutions, but of a far greater and more constraining power than they without it could ever be, because a spontaneous, and therefore in the true sense of the word a natural, outcome of human spiritual evolution.

The simple fact that scientists as such, and particularly those who deal with mental science, have departed so far from the attitude taken up towards religion by their predecessors in the 19th century, is of itself a phenomenon calling for serious attention. It marks a progress towards the scientific recognition of man as experiencing other than animal needs and aspirations, as having the (at any rate latent) possibility of attaining a development which from the material point of view is transcendent. Trotter and Jung, neither of them believers in the Christian revelation, seem from different standpoints to arrive at this conclusion. Another very recent writer, who does not occupy the same sceptical position as they do, states in an exceedingly able essay on 'The Psychology of Power' that, "speaking as a student of psychotherapy who as such has no concern with theology, I am convinced that the Christian religion is one of the most valuable and potent influences we possess for producing that harmony and peace of mind and that confidence of soul which is needed to bring health and power to a large proportion of nervous patients. In some cases I have attempted to cure nervous patients with suggestions of quietness and confidence, but without success until I have linked these suggestions on to that faith in the power of God

which is the substance of the Christian's confidence and hope. Then the patient has become strong."<sup>1</sup>

To this deliberate expression of opinion the same author adds the following weighty words: "I have tried to show that the experience of applied psychology, and especially psychotherapy, points towards the conclusion that *we are living far below the limits of our possible selves*, and that there are open to us sources of power, available through the right use of our instincts, which, if directed to noble purposes, will free our minds from those worries, anxieties and morbid fatigues which spoil our lives, and will free us for a life of energy and strength" (*ibid.*, p. 115).

It has long been the present writer's conviction, that the sufferings endured by many of the world's best workers, due to a sense of impotency, and to what is regarded as the inevitable 'reaction' after any period of extra mental or physical exertion, are very largely, if not wholly, preventible, if we but knew the way. The way is now made clear to us: it is to transform those crude instincts handed down by our animal ancestry and re-direct them to high and noble purposes, thus not suppressing but making use of the extraordinary energy and vitality they possess. This is the process which analytical psychologists call 'sublimation,' and by its means it is possible "to press into our service the passions of the soul, (to) fill our sails with the very winds and gales which threaten the shipwreck of our lives; tap the resources of the lightning which ruthlessly destroys, and turn its electric power into the driving-force of our enterprises" (*ibid.*).

Thus would be brought to a glorious conclusion

<sup>1</sup> Essay III., by Captain J. A. Hadfield, M.A., M.B., in *The Spirit* (edited by Canon Streeter), p. 118.

that inner conflict between the higher and lower elements in our nature, between the 'spirit' and the 'flesh,' of which the noblest among us are the most conscious, and which has nowhere been more powerfully or graphically described than by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans (vii.). He saw and he experienced that the victory lay in the triumph of the Christ-life over all which is inimical to that purest and highest manifestation of the Divinely human. He did not see, because scientific knowledge of the natural was far as yet from being in a position to aid him, that the way to that triumph lay through natural channels. Therefore is it that his teaching has been so easily and so mistakenly understood to advocate, not subordination, but stultification of the physical. Therefore did the great soul of Augustine, and the lesser souls of many who followed in his steps, deem that the practice of the severest asceticism, the crucifixion of the flesh, was the only way to achieve mastery over the animal passions. Asceticism, in the sense of self-restraint and self-control, is indeed necessary as a means of self-discipline. To carry it to the excess of destroying or weakening those natural powers which are the heritage of every man and woman, is to defeat its own end, which is simply to raise up that which is the lower element in human nature, till it is fully fit to be the instrument and expression of the higher. Possibly in the time of Paul, under the conditions of ignorance as to the relation between the mental and the physical which then and long afterwards subsisted, it may have been imperative that extreme asceticism should be the path for earnest souls. In certain rare cases it may be the path now; but to follow it is a confession of weakness, which in the light of our present psycho-

logical knowledge is (generally speaking) culpable. It ought not to be required, because we have been shown (and education should be so directed as to make this increasingly clear) the possibility and the consequent duty of so re-directing and transforming the resources of power latent in our inherited instincts as to turn them into aids instead of hindrances to our spiritual life.

Psychology is in fact opening out to us the way so to guide our evolution (and in the case of a being possessed of a high degree of self-conscious intelligence it must to a large extent be voluntarily guided) as to achieve the development of a veritable super-*man*, not a super-brute as in the case of Nietzsche's 'big blond beast,' nor a de-humanized, sexless pseudo-angel, but *man* in the two-fold nature of male and female possessed of, and in full control of, all the human powers thus complementarily expressed. *Pari passu* with the individual unification which will thus result, will advance the unification of the race, not to be achieved through violently suppressing differences whether of nationality or creed, but through the recognition of their necessity, as presenting contrasting aspects of reality, under all of which lies a deep and abiding unity. It is not possible that the world of human life should be harmonious while the individual personalities composing it are inwardly discordant. Every individual who 'possesses his soul,' is master and ruler of it, in that 'patience,' offspring of the Divine peace, which is the root of all efficient action, is contributing directly to peace in his social environment, and through it to the world at large, as efficaciously as though he were an actively prominent member of the League of Nations.

E. M. CAILLARD.

## THE MEANING OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

F. G. CONSTABLE, M.A.

THERE still exists confusion as to the meaning of the term 'consciousness,' from which confusion results as to what consciousness itself imports. Professor James Ward says that the use of the term consciousness in psychology, when treated as a science, has led to manifold ambiguities which are something of a scandal. But there is no doubt that his last great work, *Psychological Principles*,<sup>1</sup> has gone far to get rid of these ambiguities. In this work he holds that 'experience' is the obvious term that should be used in psychology where consciousness is now generally used. But he does not hold that psychology is to ignore consciousness.

The confusion that exists arises in great measure from want of recognition of the different standpoints from which consciousness is viewed by psychology and metaphysics. What is now mainly attempted is to show that the difference exists only in respect to consciousness—that there is no conflict of principle between psychology treated as a science and metaphysics. The 'field of view' of metaphysics extends to transcendence of the relation of subject to object. The 'field of view' of psychology is restricted in that, in Prof. Ward's words, "it is not called on to transcend the relation of subject to object or, as we may call it, the

<sup>1</sup> The pages given in the text refer to this work.

fact of presentation" (p. 39). But the Professor also says: "On the other hand, . . . the attempt to ignore one term of the relation is hopeless; and equally hopeless, even futile, is the attempt, by means of phrases such as consciousness or the unity of consciousness, to escape the implication of a conscious subject" (p. 40). The foundation of both psychology and metaphysics exists in the self-conscious subject. But psychology does not touch the question of what this subject is *per se*.<sup>1</sup> It confines itself to considering the subject *plus* its experience.

We can here take a short step tending to the clearing of our way. The term 'consciousness' is meaningless unless in reference to a conscious subject. This statement is, I think, in agreement with Prof. Ward. For on reference to his famous *Encl. Brit.* article (xx. 37, 9th ed.) we read the following sentence: "We can imagine consciousness without self-consciousness, still more without introspection, much as we can imagine sight without taste or smell." But in the following edition this statement is cut out, though the context remains; and in the Professor's last work I can find nothing to support it. *Cosmic* consciousness, I would suggest, by analogy, is also meaningless unless we predicate a Transcendental Being with transcendental self-consciousness. And can we *start* with Bergson's *élan vital*? Must we not have Transcendental Being behind?

In all cases it would seem that consciousness is meaningless without the self-conscious subject or transcendental self-conscious being at the back.

What we start with, then, is this:

<sup>1</sup> Such questions as immortality have, at any rate since Kant's day, ceased to be regarded as psychological problems; for Kant, immortality was a postulate of the practical reason.



Consciousness is meaningless without a self which is conscious ; the conscious subject is the foundation even of psychology treated as a science. There must be the self-conscious subject to whom presentation can be made before any presentation *can* be made and be the subject of consideration by the subject as *his own*.<sup>1</sup>

Psychology then, treated as a science, starts with an assumption of the existence of a conscious subject. I cannot, myself, distinguish this 'starting point' from Kant's starting point :

"I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that 'I am.'"

There must be *self*-consciousness or there is nothing for presentation to be made to and accepted.

Now psychology is not called on to transcend the fact of presentation : it must, necessarily, not only have subject, but object, if its procedure is to be scientific. But is this all that psychology requires? Can it start with the subject and presentation to the subject, or what is sometimes termed 'givenness'? Some so start, but Prof. Ward points out that it is a false start : we cannot begin with two unrelated 'things.' Where is the relation to be found? In *attention* on the part of the subject, or *awareness* of what is presented. We must have activity on the part of the conscious subject or we cannot *begin* to consider psychology as a science.

Just as Darwin confined his attention to man in relation to the objective universe, so psychology, if treated as a science, must relate the conscious subject to the objective universe : it must consider man *in relation to* the objective universe. The question of a soul in man did not come into Darwin's scheme. In the

<sup>1</sup> We must not confuse consciousness with presentation to consciousness.

same way when psychology is considered as a science, no question of man's having or not having a soul is involved. If, as I believe is true, Prof. Ward has firm belief that man has or is a soul, that belief has nothing at all to do with psychology treated as a science. Throughout his great work he takes extreme care to keep psychology clear from trespass on the grounds of the metaphysical.

It is from confounding the metaphysical with the psychological that we find such confusion in what has been written about 'states of consciousness.' Subject is confused with object.

Psychologically the term 'states of consciousness' is commonly used. But how? By change in the object not subject. As Prof. Ward stated before his great work appeared: "Since it is the subject not the object that is conscious, the term 'states of consciousness' implies strictly a subjective reference." The term consciousness is misused. This is why the Professor holds the proper word should be 'experience' not 'consciousness.' The self-conscious subject may be regarded in the abstract as a timeless, spaceless receptacle. But psychology must give it activity; must give it (or couple it with) experience. Psychology considers its possible experience drawn from our objective universe. This experience varies largely; the self-conscious subject does not so vary. The use of the term 'states of consciousness' has led to confusion between the self-conscious subject as *experiencing* and the experience of the self-conscious subject.

Again, the term 'sub-consciousness' is frequently used and widely differing meanings are given to it.

This subject is fully considered by Prof. Ward; it is considered acutely but warily. His reason for

wariness, I think, may be found in the difficulty of examining into what is termed sub-consciousness without trespass on the field of the metaphysical. He says: "The intensity or vivacity of a presentation within the field of consciousness depends—we have seen reason to think—partly on what we may call its inherent or absolute intensity, partly on the attention that it receives. But this does not hold of presentations in sub-consciousness.<sup>1</sup> These sub-presentations, as we ought perhaps to call them, cannot be severely and selectively attended to, cannot be singled out as direct objects of special attention" (p. 91).

Again he says: "The hypothesis of sub-consciousness, then, is in the main nothing more than the application to the facts of presentation of the law of continuity" (p. 93).

Now mark this: Psychology, as a science, *is* called on to bow to the law of continuity. But, as it does not transcend the fact of presentation, it can deal only with the discrete; even in mathematics we have no 'continuous calculus' to our use: we have but an infinitesimal calculus. Any consideration of continuity<sup>2</sup> leads us into the realm of metaphysics. Science, it is true, has nothing to do with the metaphysical, but I think what is above stated shows that it is based on the metaphysical in the ultimate.

Let us attack the sub-conscious from the metaphysical point of view. I will term the consciousness of the subject normal consciousness. What relation

<sup>1</sup> Psychology *does* admit presentations to sub-consciousness. So this sub-consciousness is sub-consciousness of the psychological ego.

<sup>2</sup> Thought can deal only with *relative* reality; the thing-in-itself transcends knowledge. It is reason that drives us to acceptance of the law of continuity. But we cannot use thought as to continuity without first reducing it to presentation in the discrete. May we term continuity *real* reality?

to the normal consciousness has the sub-conscious? Bear in mind that the sub-conscious—by its very term—cannot be treated as a presentation to consciousness. Sub-consciousness may, by hypothesis, be held to be a universal impersonal consciousness, so that normal consciousness is this general consciousness inhibited by manifestation in innumerable personal forms of consciousness. But this hypothesis I would reject. For, as before stated, consciousness is meaningless without a self-conscious subject or being at its back.

We cannot fix any hard and fast line of distinction between the conscious and sub-conscious, if we accept the law of continuity. If we use the term sub-presentations in relation to the sub-conscious these sub-presentations cannot be treated as different in kind from presentations: they differ only in degree of exactness; there must be in them or they must be given a certain degree of exactness before they can be direct objects of experience. The fact that only when of a certain exactness can they become the subject of attention, shows but limitation in the power of attention. And bear in mind that *attention* is a power of the self-conscious subject *in relation to* the objective universe.

I suggest that the sub-conscious may, in Bergson's words, be considered as "a too widely diffused consciousness which, for the concentration necessary for thought, requires the inhibition of the brain."<sup>1</sup> But mark how far Bergson's hypothesis carries us. With all due respect to the learned professor it carries us close to Kant's hypothesis when he says: "The body would, in this view of the question, be regarded, not as

<sup>1</sup> Kant, before Bergson, had referred to the 'focussing' function of thought.

the cause of thought,<sup>1</sup> but merely as its restrictive condition, as promotive of the sensuous and animal, as but a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life."<sup>2</sup> For Bergson uses the term 'thought' in its ordinary sense, and it is in its ordinary sense that it is applicable to the sensuous and animal.

I think I am interpreting Bergson correctly in holding that his too widely diffused consciousness is the *consciousness of the subject*.<sup>3</sup> And, if so, I can find no difference between Bergson's subject with its too widely diffused consciousness and Myers' subliminal self.

Myers gave to the same, one personality a subliminal and a supraliminal consciousness. He holds that the latter is an inhibited form of the subliminal consciousness. He says:

"I suggest that each one of us is in reality an abiding psychical entity far more extensive than he knows—an individuality which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The Self manifests through the organism; but there is always some part of the Self unmanifested."

He continues, speaking of the psychical action of this psychical entity:

"All this psychical action, I hold, is conscious; all is included in an actual or potential memory below the threshold of our habitual normal consciousness."<sup>4</sup>

Again he says:

"I hold (to continue) that this subliminal con-

<sup>1</sup> Kant here uses the word 'thought' as transcending thought correlated to motion of the brain.

<sup>2</sup> Meiklejohn's *Kant*, p. 478.

<sup>3</sup> I have no authority for giving this interpretation. I give it because, otherwise, I am unable to attach any meaning to the words 'too widely extended consciousness.'

<sup>4</sup> S.P.R., *Proceedings*, vii. 305.

consciousness and subliminal memory may embrace a far wider range both of physiological and of psychical activity than is open to our supraliminal consciousness, to our supraliminal memory. The spectrum of consciousness, if I may so call it, is in the subliminal Self indefinitely extended at both ends. . . . Varying our metaphor, we may say that the range of sensation covered by our supraliminal consciousness or memory resembles the range of temperature covered by our ordinary thermometers. The thermometer's range represents but a small segment of the temperatures whose existence in the cosmos is implied by the very nature and constitution of the planet on whose surface our short range of temperature prevails. Even so our supraliminal consciousness, with its short range of sensation and memory, is, I think, demonstrably based upon, demonstrably implies, a consciousness of wider scope."<sup>1</sup>

Myers, I think, is not in opposition to Bergson in holding that there is in each of us consciousness which, for the concentration necessary for thought, requires the inhibition of the brain.<sup>2</sup> But he goes further than Bergson, he holds—and I can but think not in opposition to Bergson—that this too widely extended consciousness is the consciousness of the subject as a *psychical entity*. For Bergson's hypothesis would appear to lead to the same conclusion, in that he holds it is merely a particular if necessary concentration of consciousness which is required for the reception of thought: he admits the fact of the too widely extended

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306.

<sup>2</sup> Hypothetically we may say the subliminal self functions with sub-presentations. For these sub-presentations to take on the exactness of presentations the inhibition and concentration of the brain is necessary. The supraliminal self functions with these presentations.

consciousness. And must we not give activity to this too widely extended consciousness? What activity? All activity of thought related to correlation of brain-movement is exhausted.<sup>1</sup> The activity must be psychical: it transcends the animal and sensuous.

I am now going to venture on perilous ground. I suggest that, though psychology is not called on to transcend presentation, it is not in conflict with the claim that the subject *can* transcend presentation.

Psychology can place no limit at all on what Prof. Ward so happily terms sub-presentations; but it must admit they do exist. All it holds is that, before they can be severally and selectively attended to, that is singled out as direct objects of experience, there must be a certain degree of intensity in the presentation itself in order that the presentation may come within the (limited) field of attention of the subject. This gives no limit to the sub-presentations themselves;<sup>2</sup> the limit implied is in the field of attention of the subject; it is the field of attention which is limited, in that only a class of sub-presentations can come within it; the sub-presentations must have a certain degree of intensity before they can come within the field of attention and, therein, exist as presentations.

But the only facts that psychology, treated as a science, can deal with are those which have taken place in or are part of man's normal consciousness or experience. Sub-presentations, however, *have* taken place in our consciousness and no limit can be put on them. It follows that the consciousness<sup>3</sup> of the subject

<sup>1</sup> The animal, the sensuous, is exhausted.

<sup>2</sup> Psychology does not trouble about the question of limit or no limit.

<sup>3</sup> Not the normal consciousness but the full, 'too widely diffused' consciousness of the subject of which the normal consciousness is an inhibited part—of which, in Myers' words, it is 'a slice.'

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has, open to it, this limitless content. Here, again, we find not only that the too widely diffused consciousness is the consciousness of the subject, but that psychology, treated as a science, must recognize that, at its foundation, it is based on the metaphysical. The psychological 'I' is not exhaustive of the 'I am.'<sup>1</sup> Psychology does not deny that the 'I am' may transcend presentation.

Now, though Kant's Transcendental Philosophy has been very generally accepted, his Dialectic has been the subject of much adverse criticism—in some cases I cannot but think from misunderstanding of its object and purview. But, however that may be, I submit that the reasoning above set out from Ward, Bergson and Myers is in general agreement with the following assumption of Immanuel Kant:

"Nay, the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), the determination of which is represented by the succession of different states in time, is not the real, proper self as it exists in itself—not the transcendental subject—but only a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to it, unknown being."<sup>2</sup>

Psychology, as a science, does not transcend the fact of presentation; its field of investigation is what may, perhaps, be termed the sensuous internal intuition of the mind, which it *must* treat as the object of consciousness: psychology must start with the conscious subject. And psychology must bring within its field what it can only term the sub-conscious, because it

<sup>1</sup> The 'I am' is a subject for which experience is possible. The psychological 'I' is this subject *plus* its experience. In psychology the experienter is considered as determined by his experience.

<sup>2</sup> Meiklejohn's *Kant*, pp. 807, 808.

must consider presentations to the sub-conscious—happily termed by Prof. Ward sub-presentations. It is not the part of psychology to attempt any determination of the sub-conscious. The only point I make here is that it admits the existence of the sub-conscious.

Returning to the metaphysical, we may try to give more definite meaning to the term sub-consciousness, and herein we interfere in no way with the science of psychology. In fact psychology, by admitting the fact of the sub-conscious, justifies us in the reasonableness of our trial.

What is the consciousness of the subject? By admission it exists in normal consciousness and in sub-consciousness. But this consciousness is *one*: it is the 'I am.'

If, with Kant, we start with the transcendental subject as the real proper self, our course is clear, though the 'I am' is still left as no more than a transcendental fact transcending thought.<sup>1</sup>

The transcendental subject has full consciousness: in relation to normal consciousness this full consciousness is, in Bergson's words, a too widely diffused consciousness *for thought*.<sup>2</sup> It requires the *inhibition* of the brain for the concentration necessary for thought. We may use the analogy of sight; sight requires the inhibition of the microscope to be able to give exactness to minutiae in order that they may become direct objects for thought. This analogy, however, must not be carried too far, for the transcendental subject cannot be held to be without knowledge. It is rather

<sup>1</sup> Synthetical unity of apperception does not define self-consciousness; it is no more than a power of the 'I am' in relation to the objective.

<sup>2</sup> Thought is limited in that it is relative and exists between limits of contradiction.

that, for it, knowledge is subsumed under the wider power of what I have termed insight.<sup>1</sup>

We must be conscious subjects before we can use thought, for thought cannot be used by you or me unless it is *your* thought or *my* thought. Thought is not creative. It is the self-conscious subject who uses thought for creation.

But is thought the result of creation by the brain through concentration of the too widely diffused consciousness? Bergson does not allege this. He does not allege that the brain has any effect at all on consciousness in itself. All he really alleges is that thought is correlated to motion of the brain; therein arises *inhibition*, not creation. There is antecedent power in the subject, the subject of the too widely extended consciousness. For observation of the minutiae of our universe (the animal and sensuous) the subject requires the microscope of the brain.<sup>2</sup> Its consciousness is concentrated when looking through the microscope, is inhibited for power to focus its general experience on direct objects of experience. But the subject still exists with its too widely diffused consciousness. The consciousness required for attention to these objects of experience is but the supraliminal consciousness. The brain but opens a particular pathway for the activity of consciousness. The supraliminal is but a part of the subliminal consciousness. Only the supraliminal is required for attention to presentations which result from the concentration and inhibition of the brain. The brain acts but as a

<sup>1</sup> I do not use the term 'intuition,' for that is used, even by Kant, as having different meanings. How, in logic, can thought have *itself* for object? Must not the power which has thought for object transcend thought?

<sup>2</sup> Our universe as a microcosm requires the microscope of the brain for observation.

machine on the external in concentrating it so that from it may result the objective.

Kant's statement that imagination is deep buried in the soul of man carries us a step further.

We can determine the limits of thought, in that we can determine it as relative and existing between limits of contradiction. This proves a power in the subject transcending thought, a power I term insight. To imagination we can give no limits: it is imagination itself which informs us that the test of real reality is the *absence* of internal contradiction. Imagination transcends thought in that it makes us aware of the limitations of thought.<sup>1</sup> And how do we define imagination? We fail utterly in attempts at definition. Kant may deduce *forms* of imagination, but he leaves imagination *itself* deep buried in the soul of man. But still Kant relates imagination to knowledge or experience: he makes knowledge or experience subjective to imagination in the form of productive imagination.

Before closing this paper let me state, shortly, the conclusions which I think follow from what has been stated.

If there be for each one of us the full consciousness above referred to, then our habitual (normal) consciousness is, in Myers' words, but 'a slice' of our ultimate consciousness. We are, in Kant's words, transcendental subjects or, as Myers suggests, continuing psychical entities. The transcendental subject functions with imagination, 'deep buried in the soul of man.' And thought?—thought which requires the attention only of the normal consciousness? It is an inhibited part of imagination, inhibited in that it

When we reason in transcendence of presentations we use imagination.

**cannot** proceed beyond what is correlated to the motion **of** the brain. Never forget that the subject can **transcend** thought, in that it can determine thought **as** limited—as relative and as existing between limits **of** contradiction.

But, I think, the most important conclusion is **this**: There is no conflict or contradiction between **psychology** treated as a science and metaphysics. Both *start* with the self-conscious subject as a transcendental **fact**. Psychology confines itself to consideration of **the** self-conscious subject *plus* its experience.

F. C. CONSTABLE.

# PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RECONSTRUCTION.

DORA E. HECHT.

As an agent of spiritual evolution psychoanalysis has perhaps not received the attention it deserves. Yet a method that enables the individual to regain control over factors of his mental and spiritual individuality with which contact had been lost—can justly claim consideration when problems of reconstruction are discussed.

First let us endeavour to realise from the psychoanalytic point of view the causes of the spiritual unrest that is unhappily such a common feature at the present time. The era from which we are now painfully emerging was distinguished by the intellectuality of its outlook, the consequence of a long preoccupation with the function of thought and its manifold applications in the external world. A standard of values based upon such an exclusive mental attitude was bound to prove inadequate for the satisfaction of man's spiritual needs. The closely allied regions of feeling, emotion and imagination were so neglected as to make them appear of secondary significance, the residue of a former age of development which a riper evolution was justified in disregarding and hoping to kill with contempt.

The one-sidedness of this development inevitably resulted in an obvious displacement of energy, since

vital forces cannot be arbitrarily transferred from one psychic function to another. The consequence was that a considerable sum of energy, finding its normal outlet blocked, became unconscious (a process that is essentially automatic and not subject to will), and lapsed into a phase of evolution much anterior to that attained by the conscious factors of the soul. The disproportionate value generally accorded to the intellect and its derivatives is now seen to be due to the unconscious discrepancy in the degree of development reached by the function of thought and that of feeling, emotion and the cognate power of imagination.

Obviously the development of a function depends to a considerable extent upon the amount of energy consciously bestowed upon it in the form of interest or love (liking). The more intense this interest is—that is to say, the more energy is consciously concentrated upon the function in question—the greater are the potentials of its development. Moreover, so closely are the factors of ability and interest allied, that any withdrawal from consciousness of the element of feeling implied in the term interest inevitably and quite automatically results in a diminution in both the energetic and the actual value of performance. The maximum value both of conception and achievement is obtained only when conscious and unconscious energies combine to develop the powers bestowed by nature.

Were it conceivable that a fully equipped human being should never acquire the art of walking upright, obviously certain sinews and muscles would atrophy for lack of use, so that ultimately a real incapacity would result. Similarly modern man has so long neglected to educate the functions of feeling, emotion and imagination that he seems, in these latter days, to have



become actually incapable of directing them for appropriate use. Consequently these functions being undeveloped fall yet further into disuse, and are now regarded with disfavour by a generation that has lost touch with any other avenue of understanding save that of intellect. Since, however, the balance of psychic functions is as essential for the health of the race as are the due exercise and nurture of physical functions, there results a state of disorder amounting to disease, the effects of which are manifest in the spiritual, mental, political and social unrest of the time.

By laying stress not only upon the physical origin and primarily sensory nature of feeling (a character which the long neglect of the function has tended unduly to emphasise) but also upon its spiritual potentialities, psychoanalysis has rendered a notable service both to the cause of human understanding and to that of mental and spiritual reconstruction. For it now appears that man for long had unconsciously regarded the desires of his senses and physical nature generally either as directly opposed to or else identical with the ultimate good of the individual and the race. That is to say, in differentiating sense-satisfaction from that of spirit, he had failed to see that sense-craving is but the rudimentary manifestation of an essentially spiritual impulse. He had not discerned the lower form as the germ whence the higher is evolved. By the conscious and deliberate subjugation and sacrifice—not repression—of the beast in man energies are freed that are destined to vindicate the essential spirituality of human nature.

Hitherto, owing to spirit having been deemed to be opposed to matter, sense was necessarily either

neglected or exalted, sometimes even unconsciously deified, according to the phase of evolution reached and the native aspirant tendency of the individual, community or race. The consequence was a great disharmony between conscious thought and unconscious feeling upon such questions as the relation of body and soul, sexuality and cognate subjects, particularly among the more evolved members of the community. Such causes as vegetarianism, abolitionism, physical culture and so forth, all appear as an unconscious aspiration towards a more spiritual conception of life.

The rehabilitation upon a spiritual basis of physical manifestations of sensation and feeling, now discerned as the nucleus of immeasurable spiritual potentials, logically results in the admittance of spiritual equality among the functions of thought, sense, imagination and feeling. The three last-named had, probably owing to the difficulty of differentiating spiritual from sensory functions, become in a great measure unconscious, and thus had been relegated as it were to a back number of psychic development. Moreover the inclusion of these functions in the zone of conscious development necessitates the evolution of another spiritual power, that of intuition, which correlates the logical and illogical factors.

We have thus two ways in which the science of psychoanalysis enlarges our insight into the potentialities of human nature.

In the first place, by revealing the roots of sensual and spiritual love or interest as potentially identical, man's realisation of the actual is enriched by the addition of the potential. Sight and faith are thus merged in that larger vision which, transcending the

bounds of sense, accords equal validity to that which actually is and to the potentialities contained therein. Thus both future and past are merged in a vitally active present, full of tolerance, compassion and hope—in a word, of faith in the potential perfectibility of the race.

In the second place, by including the functions of sensation, feeling, emotion and imagination among the factors of development, psychoanalysis joins with Bergson in reinstating intuition as a vital function of adaptation. This again avowedly involves the rehabilitation of instinct, of which intuition is the sublimated form.

We have here two significant factors for the task of spiritual reconstruction with which the present generation is confronted. The one provides an entirely new basis for judgment by extending the sphere of understanding so as to include those things that are potential with those that actually exist. The other, by emancipating sensation, feeling, emotion and imagination from the tyranny of an almost ubiquitous intellectuality, furnishes an equally new basis of action, both actual and potential. For the ultimate source whence the motor-force of action is derived, lies in the energy contained in feeling. Therefore to extend or intensify conscious feeling is to enlarge the scope of potential action by the admittance to consciousness of a corresponding sum of energy. Moreover the rehabilitation of sensation, feeling and emotion, implicit in an extension of their consciousness, secures to these functions the same degree of conscious control as that so long enjoyed by intellectual activity.

The conscious and deliberate control (discipline) of one function by another is possibly the most potent

factor of development the soul possesses. It may indeed be termed the *via regia* of spiritual evolution, in so far as that process is determined by conscious factors. Therefore the exclusion of a function from consciousness, even if it be but partially effective, is bound to result in a diminution in the degree of effective control exercised over it by other psychic functions. How disastrous this may be in the case of the lower sensual passions, history and experience alike testify. But other functions of adaptation, such as thought, feeling and imagination, are equally dependent upon this mutually corrective action; and the slightest deviation from the path of perfect consciousness is bound to deprive the delinquent of a corresponding degree of evolution. This being the case, the law of psychic development might be formulated as perfect reciprocity of correction of all psychic functions. This condition obviously implies another—namely, the entire consciousness of the several functions; since any degree of unconsciousness involves a corresponding loss of control.

Here we reach the ultimate cause of that disharmony in the development of psychic functions which has already been described as the outstanding feature in the mentality of the present generation. Through long repression the functions of feeling, emotion and imagination have escaped the systematic correction of the function of thought, that continually developing factor, and thus have automatically become regressive. In other words, whilst reason and intellect were constantly at work demolishing old structures and creating new, both the content of and modes of manifesting feeling-toned factors remained substantially the same. The consequence was an anachronism, a

dissonance in what should be an integral development of psychic functions. Proofs of the existence of this conflict are not lacking, for instance, in the prevailing discontent, unrest and anxiety, and most significantly in the quota of energy of which the several functions consciously dispose.

One of the saddest features of the social structure at the present time is that, although no era has been more prolific in schemes for the amelioration, through harmonious organisation and development, of the several fabrics of which the social organism is composed, the list of achievements is comparatively brief. The significance of this disparity between idea and performance obviously lies in the fact that the energetic value of thought is not sufficient for both conception and execution. The motor-force upon which action depends is inherent in the function of feeling and its concomitants—emotion and imagination. Thought alone can produce but a skeleton. The spirit of life can be infused only by means of a vital reciprocity of the feeling and thought-toned factors of the psychē. This reciprocal action is however impossible unless the several functions by remaining fully conscious continue to develop in harmony with the essentially directive tendency of the soul. The discovery, or rather recovery, of contact with the spiritual agent of direction, inherent in the individual soul and through it in that of the community, class or nation, is indeed the urgent need of the day. Without it mankind cannot attain that spirit of love, enthusiasm, faith and willing sacrifice by which alone great and enduring works are accomplished.

An age that has a purely intellectual attitude towards life necessarily lacks vitality, just as one

purely emotional or imaginative would lack constructive power. A combination of all the means of adaptation is an essential condition of human progress. To stultify one function arbitrarily, in order to enrich another, is to ignore the cosmic law of evolution, the spiritual basis of which is the equilibrium of psychic functions. (To avoid misunderstanding, it is necessary to state that we are here concerned only with the equilibrium of psychic functions from the energetic point of view.)

We are here confronted by the energetic (psycho-analytic) theory of life in its ultimate issue. Reduced to its simplest form it may be expressed in the formula: the motor-force of feeling is the basis of energetic performance. Since the function of thought expends its energy in construction (idea) and that of feeling in execution (performance), no adequate achievement is possible unless both sources of energy co-operate in the energetic discharge (intensity) of their several contents.

It will be noticed that this theory takes less account of the particular content of the function under discussion than of its energetic discharge. That is to say, from the bio-psychological point of view here adopted, the emphasis of value follows the energy and not that which caused its discharge. In other words, the performance itself is valued upon a basis of intensity, without regard to its components. Moreover the said intensity may be termed the real instigator of action, since it signifies the concentration of motor-forces which sooner or later must inevitably create a channel of discharge. Such a channel will be appropriate in proportion as it is conscious, since unconsciousness signifies lack of control, as has already been pointed out.

The energetic theory of life, as here outlined, consequently involves a radical revision of values—moral, mental and spiritual. For it is clear that this theory absolutely discredits any static standard as applied to the ceaseless evolution of which all life consists. In the realm of intellect this fact has long been realized. No modern can consciously retain through manhood the conceptions of material and spiritual things that were proper (and therefore substantially true) for him in childhood. A static conception of truth has become impossible.

But, although the intellectual apprehension of the facts of nature as revealed by modern science has radically altered man's conceptions of external things, his standard of moral values has remained practically as it was in the days of his intellectual ignorance. Indeed, as the conquest of nature in this realm of science advances, the discrepancy between intellectual and moral standards and ideas becomes increasingly pronounced.

This discrepancy is due to the fact that morals, albeit not unaffected by the evolution of the intellect, pertain primarily to the region of feeling. Consequently any breach of the law of evolution with regard to the function of feeling necessarily involves an arrest in the development of morals. But a static morality is a *contradictio in terminis*, as much an anachronism as a static conception of the universe.

It has already been pointed out that such an arrest in the development of a feeling-toned factor signifies a repression of the function involved. This repression of feeling has been observed to be a prominent feature in the mentality of modern man, and it increases in depth and extent in proportion as his mental faculties

develop. Consequently it is by no means astonishing to find that much of the morality current at the present time differs in form of expression, but not in its essential content, from that of our ancestors. This fact is particularly evident in the moral standards by which the majority among us judge such questions as the relations of children and parents, sexuality and usury, to all of which a much wider significance pertains than that usually accorded them.

The situation thus created might be described by saying that a modern man's thought repudiates much to which his feelings unconsciously adhere. Consequently the leaders of thought and action are apt to be in the position of men who, consciously wielding all the intellectual weapons of a twentieth-century armoury, unconsciously rely upon and adapt their methods to an age of charms, witchcraft, poisoned daggers and so forth. This assertion appears exaggerated; nevertheless it accurately describes the mentality of a modern intellectual when confronted by a problem of morality, particularly in one of the three spheres indicated. Moreover an unconscious feeling-toned attitude, such as that involved in questions of religion and morals, is a far more powerful factor in the formation of judgments than conscious thought can be, since a vast momentum of potential energy lies behind the elements of repression.

We are now in a position to review what we have gained by this brief survey of the mentality of modern man, and to connect it with the task of spiritual reconstruction that awaits us. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it seems advisable to remark here that this paper is not a diagnosis of the 'world-soul,' but simply an attempt to convey an impression from one



particular point of view of some of the factors making for disintegration most frequently encountered at the present time.

In the first place, then, we discerned an extraordinary discrepancy in the degree of development attained by thought and the feeling-toned functions of the soul, the outcome of which is that the latter are to some extent discredited by the thoughtful. Further this disparity was seen to be the consequence of neglect, and not of any deficiency inherent in the functions themselves. Potentially indeed the rudimentary manifestations of feeling-toned impulse or sensation were shown to be identical with the roots of that spiritual aspiration which is the highest heritage of man. We are thus led to conclude that the materialism and frank absorption in the concrete which are such a striking feature in the mentality of the modern man, are but the logical outcome of the long repression and consequent neglect of the spiritual function in its primary form. If this be the case, and I for one cannot doubt it, the spiritual reconstruction of the civilized world must begin with the education instead of the repression of those first instincts of feeling, sense-love and imagination. An unconscious manifestation tending in this direction has latterly been made evident by the craving for excitement, sense-satisfaction and unreality to which large sections of the community are subject. The unseeing have regarded such things as a portent of ill. Doubtless a more enlightened generation will see in the rage for moving pictures, the 'Jazz' craze and so forth, the rudimentary form of an unconscious aspiration for the things of the spirit, the kingdom of which every man is an inheritor.

We then perceived that the rehabilitation of sense, feeling and imagination necessitated the development and conscious acceptance of another power, *vis.* intuition, by means of which the true significance of their manifestations is apprehended.

The fact was also noted that the absence of the corrective influence which one function is designed to exercise over another, is a further cogent cause of psychic disharmony. Moreover such a deflection from the path of integral development involves a loss of directive control, since the mutually corrective action of psychic factors constitutes as it were an apparatus devised by nature to regulate the discharge of energy into the several functions. Consequently the loss of corrective power includes a loss of direction, a fact that is most apparent in the disordered mentality of the day.

We then examined some of the facts of repression and the disharmony resulting from the unequal distribution of energy in the several functions of the soul. First of all we observed that a repression signifies an anachronism, since a repressed function automatically falls into disuse, instead of being constantly subject to the evolutionary principle of life. A further feature noted was the withdrawal of energy, not simply from the particular function involved in the repression, but also in a marked degree from that power of conception or execution with which each function is ultimately identical. Consequently an arrest of thought-development really signifies also a check in the evolution of the power of creation or conception, whilst a check in the development of feeling unfailingly results in a diminution of executive power.

Subsequently we traced the energetic (psycho-analytic) theory of life to its sources in the region of

sense, feeling and emotion, perceiving that harmonious evolution is dependent upon the due development through conscious direction of these the initial creative impulses of the soul. Each of these factors was seen to be susceptible of innumerable transformations and sublimations, whereby the individual or community evolve in accordance with the instinct of direction within them.

Finally it was seen that the aforesaid discrepancy of thought and feeling-tinged functions is nowhere more apparent than in the region of morality. For by the conscious and extensive cultivation of intellect man is perpetually enlarging his conception of his place and functions in the cosmic scheme, a conception which his regressive feelings entirely fail to endorse. The consequence is a divergence of conscious and unconscious aims and standards, resulting in some degree of arrest in the development of a power that above all others should provide both the momentum and direction of individual, social and national progress.

For whence can enthusiasm, that most prolific generator, arise save from the source where moral feeling meets intellectual understanding and purpose? And what driving power so urgent as that of a strongly held thought united with great intensity of feeling? Of these twain alone the faith is bred which, overcoming the mountains of disbelief, credulity and mental and moral inertia, will ultimately secure to mankind that spiritual regeneration, which now as so oft aforetime is its greatest need. Spiritual reconstruction can have no other foundation, nor any that is more stable, than that of an evolutionary law of love, wherein thought, feeling, emotion and imagination attain their consummation.

DORA E. HECHT.

## THE SELF-SUGGESTION OF THE SAINTS.

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WHEREVER one turns in the province of mystical or devotional literature one finds practices advocated which are full of the possibilities of self-suggestion. It is the object of the present paper to show that this fact need bring no discredit whatever to mysticism or religion, and to urge that self-suggestion is not only inevitable but philosophically and theologically justified.

Everything really hinges on the true interpretation of the old statement which tells us that God is *within*.

I venture to think that readers unacquainted with a work which is not so generally read as it deserves, being too philosophical for most theologians, and too theological for most philosophers, Moberly's *Atonement and Personality*, will derive some sense of illumination from the following passages.

Moberly is not a very easy author to read, but his statements are so important that I venture to quote at some length.

"The gift of the Spirit is a gift—an objective gift if you will—how different from the original 'I' to whom He is given! yet this very gift is only real after all, *in so far as He is in me subjectively realized*. So that after all it is perhaps not so much, nor so distinctively, true to say an objective gift, as a subjective receiving and response; nor so much, or at least not so ultimately,

something that is conferred on the 'I' as what the 'I' becomes in, and through, receiving. He is not a mere presence in me, overruling, controlling, displacing. *What He in me does, I do. What He in me wills, I will. What He in me loves, I love.*"

"The Spirit of the Incarnate in us is not only our personal association, but our personal union, with the Incarnate Christ. To clothe the phrase for a moment in other language, He is the subjective realization *within, and as, ourselves*, of the Christ who was first manifested objectively and externally, for our contemplation and love, in Galilee and on the Cross. He is more and more, as the Christian consummation is approached, the Spirit within ourselves of Righteousness and Truth, of Life and of Love. He is more, indeed, than within us. He is the ultimate consummation of ourselves. He is the response, from us, of goodness and love, to the goodness and love of God. He is, with quite unreserved truth, when all is consummated, our own personal response. He is so none the less because He is also (and was, at first, in the way of distinction and contrast) the response which out of, and within, and as, ourselves, He Himself—not we—very gradually wrought. His presence in us is *His* response in us, become ultimately ourselves; He is Christ Himself in us, become the Spirit which constitutes us what we are; and therefore, though in us—though ultimately ourselves—a response really worthy of God, really adequate to God; a mirror, an echo, nay even a living presentment and realization of what Christ Himself is, who is the Eternal God.

"The communicant life is not either a privilege or a joy, if it is not a real seeking after, and finding, Christ Himself: if it is not a development of the process of

translation which may be equally described as the 'forming of Christ within' or (after 'bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ') that attainment of full-grownness which is 'the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ'; that is to say, in other words, as Christ within the self, or as the self within Christ."

Moberly is so permeated with his one principle that when he is not expounding it, he is leading up to it. Thus when he is discussing the Christian Trinity he defines the Holy Spirit as the Divine Personal response which God elicits to Himself from created spirits.

"What He in me does I do." "Within and as ourselves." "In us, ultimately ourselves." Surely these phrases interpret to us the real meaning of all who have spoken intelligently of God as within. What follows? Surely this: that for a man who stands at any stage of the process of ever-increasing union, and for whom the cherishing and developing of that union is life's one aim, there can be no such thing as mere self-suggestion in the ordinary sense, *because the whole connotation of the word 'self' is altogether different*. In the case of the really spiritual man what looks like self-suggestion from the outside, is really the means of giving the God who acts through the self and in the self's own action, the opportunity to do so more and more.

Let us now put Moberly's principle to the test. For the sake of clearness I put what I have to say in the form of three propositions.

(1) God is not to be found in the mind considered as its own *object*. Not only is our possession of a capacity for *real* introspection highly improbable, but

the people whom one would expect to exercise such a power, did it exist, and who do in fact make a constant use of such terms as 'introversion,' namely the Mystics, can be shown to employ these terms in quite a peculiar and misleading sense. What they call 'introversion' is what ordinary folk would call aspiration.

(2) The inspired aspirations of the Mystic do not, however, for the greater part of his 'way' announce themselves as divine by any intrinsic mark of identity. Their divine character is simply postulated or inferred.

(3) At the end, however, of the Mystic's progress a stage known as 'transforming union' is distinguished from the other stages, because God does reveal Himself within the subject (not the object), and is thus consciously recognized as God. The very contrast shows that this was not to any considerable extent true of the preceding stages: God was present, but He made no direct unmistakable announcement to show that it was He.

(1) As to our first proposition: Why is it that when we are told that 'God is within,' we do not naturally or immediately think of Him as within *the self*? Partly because, as we shall see when we come to our second and third propositions, His presence is latent, and latency in the subject is a difficult conception to ordinary thought. In the *objects* with which mind deals, we are continually discovering things which we were not aware of the moment before, but in regard to the subject we think that we know all that there is to be known.

But, if I may generalize from my own case, there is another reason,—*viz.* our bad metaphysics or psychology. We have contracted the habit of picturing the conscious subject to ourselves as a sort of indivisible

fixed point, in opposition to the full reality of mind which forms or is capable of forming its object. But can a point think? Surely in the process of thinking the whole thinking capacity must be at the command of the self which does the thinking? The whole mind in other words must be in or behind the subject. This would be true, even if thinking were, what I would argue it is not, a penetration deeper and ever deeper into reality: to penetrate deeper we should need an increment of penetrative power.

The conception of the subject as a point is thus clearly absurd. But if the subject looks like proving to be eventually or potentially the whole mind, how about the object? Does that contain the whole of mental reality also? We can best, perhaps, reply with another question. If, as we are assured so often, our thinking, when it deals with the outer world, gets only an abstract and partial view of that world's reality, is it probable that it gets a complete insight into the world within?

Whatever be thought of this line of argument, the best proof for most of us is to be found elsewhere. The people who have talked most of introspection, or at any rate of 'introversion' and the interior life, have been the Mystics. And yet the Mystics can easily be shown not really to have been looking into their own minds at all. By introversion, to judge them by their actual procedure, they meant little more than turning *from* other things, thoughts and activities that they might practise the presence and submit to the action of God. To turn inwards was to forsake all else in order to devote themselves to the loving thought of Him, who is present, as they agree with Moberly in saying, in the soul's response to His presence elicited, really, by



Himself. Doubtless we do acquire knowledge of ourselves involuntarily, inasmuch as, to quote a comparison that seems a favourite with many, the Divine Sun like the natural draws up and makes manifest the damp and vapours of the lower self; or we learn what we are from the character of our distractions. But these things are not the main things. They are incidents and episodes whose only real value is to provide the Mystic with additional incentives to faithfulness in practising God's presence and submitting to God's grace and increasing in God's love.

In such matters of spirituality the authority of Father Augustine Baker stands high. And he almost seems to suggest that the talk of introversion is little more than a fashion or a pose, when he tells us that "*the actual practice of this introversion consists principally, if not only, in the exercise of pure internal spiritual prayer,*" which prayer, as he later explains with such admirable lucidity, is God-inspired *aspiration*. The introverted soul is not the soul which is gazing into the depths of self, but the soul which is losing the very thought of self in that attitude of continuous longing "to cease from which," in the words of Eckehart, "is sin."

Here is a description of Mystical introspection from the pen of its greatest master, St. John of the Cross :

"The Soul, regarded as spirit, has neither height nor depth of greater or less degree in its own nature, as bodies have which have bulk. The soul has no parts, neither is there any difference between its interior or exterior, for it is uniform; it has no depths of greater or less profundity, nor can one part of it be more enlightened than another, as is the case with

physical bodies, for the whole of it is enlightened uniformly at once. . . .

“Love unites the soul with God, and the greater the love, the deeper does it enter into God, and the more is it centred in Him. According to this way of speaking we may say that as the degrees of love so are the centres which the soul finds in God. Thus, a soul which has but one degree of love, is already in God, who is its centre: for one degree of love is sufficient for our abiding in Him in the state of grace. If we have two degrees of love we shall have reached another and more interior centre still. But if the soul shall have attained to the highest degree of the love of God, the love of God will then wound it in its inmost depth or centre; and the soul will then be transformed and enlightened in the highest degree in its substance, faculties and strength, until it shall have become most like unto God.”

Such is Mystical introspection: the soul by becoming filled more and more with love, penetrates deeper and deeper into—not self but—God. This can be called introspection, simply because God who loves in and through and as the self, is in *that* sense within. There *can* be no secret inner shrine, if it is really true that “the whole soul” is “enlightened uniformly at once,” so that “the presence of God in consciousness is not that of an individual and separable fact but of the all” (A. E. Waite).

Clearly then for the Mystics introspection is a figment, a *façon de parler*. It is in the subject that God dwells, loving in the subject's love. “The love of God, or the God who is Love, the Holy Spirit, infuses Himself,” says St. Bernard, “into the love of *the man*.”

(2) Our second proposition was that in all but the very highest stages of Mystical development it

is impossible for the human subject to distinguish, except by differences of quality, the divine action from his own. "God moves the will," says St. Thomas Aquinas, "from within": all that the man knows is that he finds himself willing. It is as when, to reproduce a comparison of Maine de Biran's, we carry out a post-hypnotic suggestion without a suspicion that our impulse comes from without; or as when in the script of some automatic writer telepathic communications from some absent friend are blended indistinguishably with the products of the writer's mind.

That is why, as Moberly points out, it is so very natural to speak of the Holy Spirit as 'It.' He shows Himself to us simply in the fact that we ourselves are different; our own attitude, our own tendencies, are somehow changed. A spiritual writer of the last generation (the Rev. John Ellerton) speaks of "human nature renewed in Christ," and adds "not the personal Christ but the Indwelling Christ," the Christ, that is, who characterizes 'me,' so that I come to regard Him (though wrongly) not as a Person, but as a congeries of characteristics. Similarly it is our custom to describe the personal action of the living God as 'grace' because it shows itself *adjectivally* by the appearance of certain qualities in the human self.

The same peculiarity of the divine action can be illustrated from an author quoted already, the Ven. Fr. Baker. His whole book is devoted to two main contentions: the first that the Mystic is to keep himself continually open to the divine inspiration; the second that the perfect prayer is the prayer of infused aspiration. As to the inspiration, Fr. Baker is quite clear that it comes to us by the way of our own faculties:

our judgment finds itself more profound than when it is unaided, or our will finds itself possessed by a 'blind' impulse to act in this way or that.

The aspirations are distinguished from the 'acts' which I have previously made myself, by their purity, by the spontaneous way they rise up and possess me without my seeming to have done anything to procure them myself, but there is nothing else really to show me whence they come. How can I be sure that either inspiration or aspiration is really the work of the Holy Spirit? Baker attempts a reply only in regard to the inspirations: I have prayed and therefore must assume my prayer is answered. Presumably the same type of answer would cover the second case too, only that the sweetness and peace which accompany the aspiration, together with the unsought way in which they come, make the discussion of the point unnecessary. Clearly then in the case of inspiration or the infusion of the Mystic's love, as in the case of grace, the divine action shows itself impersonally. The deduction may be so obvious that there is no escaping it, but a deduction it remains. As Hugh of St. Victor put it: "*He comes hidden.*"

In one of Eckehart's sermons the imaginary objector is made to interpose: "You began by telling us to be completely passive, and now in your description of it the passivity has got somehow transformed into a condition of longing." Eckehart replies that the aspiration is divinely infused. But the only proof he can give for this is that, once a man has completely surrendered himself to God for God to act for him, he must accept the action that follows as God's. In other words God does not declare Himself. He is inferred.

Apparently, moreover, the qualities of the divine

action above alluded to are not infallible criteria. We are told by all the great writers not to rely on feelings and impressions, but on 'naked faith.' "God is no more present," says St. John of the Cross, "when He seems to be present than when He seems to be absent."

"Thou couldst not seek Me if thou hadst not already found Me." "Lord, where wast Thou when I was tempted?—In thy heart." In these and similar sayings we find an assertion of the principle that God's Presence in the self may be quite unrecognized.

(3) Our third proposition affirms that at the final stages of Mystical progress God, who has been hitherto unrecognized, announces Himself at last. The whole process of the way can, in fact, be summed up in the words of the great Flemish Mystic Ruysbroeck: "God works this ghostly touching in us first, before all gifts; and yet it is known and tasted of us last of all. For only when we have lovingly sought God in all our practices even to the inward deep of our ground, do we first feel the gushing in of all the graces and gifts of God."

Let us then glance at the end of his long journey when the Mystic has reached what is called alternatively the 'transforming union' or the 'spiritual marriage.' An old word for the condition was 'deification'; and perhaps no better proof that some profound modification of the thinking subject actually takes place, could be found than the acceptance of such an amazing term as 'deification' by men of such consummate humility as the Mystics. The best name for the state is perhaps the 'transforming union.' 'Deification' is too startling, and 'spiritual marriage' invites misunderstanding. The condition, whatever name one gives it, may or may not have been preceded

by ecstasies or 'extraordinary passive unions,' temporary invasions of the mind by the Divine Being, which convey the same sensation of sharing the divine consciousness in a vivid yet less permanent way. But in any case, according to the various writers, the 'transforming union' is an infinitely higher state than any ecstasies, these being only as it were transient anticipations of the culminating condition when God is consciously and permanently possessed.

First let me quote those three leading students of Mysticism, the Ven. Augustine Baker, Fr. Poulain and the Abbé Saudreau.

"In the active unions which souls, during a less perfect state, have with God, God is in them as an object distinct from them, and so contemplated by them; but in the state of perfection He is not only the object and end, but the only *perceiving principle* also of all their operations" (Baker).

"The soul is habitually conscious of the divine co-operation in all her higher operations and in the depth of her being. . . . In concurring in our supernatural acts God makes them His own; He renders them divine and *shows that He does so*. . . . We are *conscious* of the communication of the divine life. God is no more the *object* of the supernatural operations of the mind and will, as in the preceding degrees. He shows Himself as being the joint cause of these operations. . . . In the lower degrees the transformation has begun, but we know it only by faith" (Poulain).

"The transforming union, which in fact is merely sanctifying grace in its highest degree, seems to absorb, or rather to *penetrate* without destroying them, *all the soul's energies*; and then all—or, at least, nearly all—the

soul's works are wonderfully supernaturalized, and its entire life is, as it were, made divine." Souls who have attained this pitch of sanctity are "habitually conscious of the promptings of the Holy Spirit" (Saudreau).

Next, let us quote (after Poulain and Saudreau) the testimony of some less well-known mystics to this experience.

"My God, Thou hast willed to divinize my soul, so to say, by transforming it into Thyself, after having destroyed its individual form." God "has made me participate in the knowledge whereby He knows Himself, and in the love wherewith He loves Himself" (Ven. Anne-Madeleine de Remuzat). "She felt God Himself think, speak and act in her, and become the cause of all her movements" (Mother Veronica of the Heart of Jesus). "I often felt it was our Lord's pleasure to reign over all the movements of my soul and body. He did this as though He were the soul of my soul and body of my body" (Surin). "I realized most surely that God was my action, my strength, my light, my power, my will, my prayer, my praise, my giving of thanks to Himself" (Marie de Sainte-Therèse). "This Sovereign Spirit, who operated and acted within me independently of myself, had acquired such absolute dominion over all my being, spiritual and even bodily too, that it was not in my power to arouse in my heart a single movement of joy or sadness save in accordance with His pleasure, or employ my mind except with what He set before it" (Blessed Margaret Mary).

Now let us turn and see what the greater Mystics have to tell us. There can be little doubt, I suppose, that no names stand higher than Eckehart, Ruysbroeck, St. John of the Cross, St. Teresa, and (though here I hesitate) Jacob Böhme. Eckehart's idea of the

transforming union can be seen in the extremely interesting tractate 'Sister Katrei,' of which an excellent translation is now obtainable. "Sir," says the Sister to her Confessor, "rejoice with me, I am God" (p. 21). "Theologians say," comments Eckehart a little later, "God is bound to draw His likes *out of their self-hood into Himself*" (p. 24). Or see the dialogue between the Sister and the Confessor on p. 25. "Art there for good?" he asked. She answered "Yes. . . . I am as before I was created, just God and God."

Ruysbroeck's teaching appears in the following passage of *The Sparkling Stone* (pp. 197, 8): "Further we find a more subtle and inward difference between the secret friends and the hidden sons of God. . . . The friends possess their inwardness *as an attribute*, for they choose the loving adherence to God as best and highest of all that they can and will reach; and that is why they cannot with themselves and their own activity penetrate to the imageless Nudity. For they have, as images and intermediaries between God and themselves, *their own being and their own activity*. . . . They keep something of their own selfhood, and are not consumed and burnt to nothingness in the unity of love. And though they may desire to live for ever more in the service of God and to please Him eternally, they will not *die in God to all the selfhood of their spirit and receive from Him a God-formed life*."

For the teaching of St. John of the Cross (the most important we possess) I would refer the reader more especially to that greatest of all Mystic writings *The Living Flame of Love*. For our present purpose two sentences suffice: "The soul *seems to be God rather than*



*itself.*" "The soul becomes a living flame and *conscious of it.*"

As to St. Teresa I would not go so far as Mr. Waite in thinking that her mystical development was starved and stunted by her 'Medusan directors.' But certainly they contrived to make her very cautious in some of her expressions. Still, what she hardly dared say openly, she very broadly hints. "Now," she says, "God acts differently; our pitiful God removes the scales from the soul's eyes, that it may see and understand something of the grace received, in a strange and wonderful manner, by means of intellectual vision." "The mind need not act or search for anything, as the Lord who created it wishes it to be at rest, and *only to watch, through a little chink, what happens within.*"

Jacob Böhme's testimony is enshrined in a curious yet beautiful passage: "My will-spirit, which now is in Christ's humanity, lives in Christ's Spirit, that shall in his power give sap to the dry tree, that it may arise in the sound of the trumpet of the divine breath in Christ's voice, which is also *my voice in his breath*, and spring afresh in Paradise. I shall be . . . an instrument of God's spirit, wherein he makes melody with himself, with *this voice which I myself am*. He has brought the voice which sounds in his presence again into us: *he is become that which I am and has made me that which he is*, so that I may say in my humility I am in him his trumpet and the sound of his instrument and his divine voice." (Compare St. John of the Cross: "God bestows upon the soul His own power so that it may love Him. It is as if He put an instrument in its hand, taught it the use thereof, and played upon it together with the soul.")

But the student who would study this condition has now at his disposal, thanks to Fr. Poulain, a document at least as important for his purpose as the records of the great Mystics of the past in *The Spiritual Journal of Lucie Christine* (Kegan Paul). Lucie Christine was a French married lady who had been ordered by her Director to write down in a diary accounts of the extraordinary Mystical graces she experienced. One can thus trace her progress almost day by day. I cull for our present purpose the following sentences. "I adore Him, but the divine action penetrates and transforms my adoration; the Divine Being *thinks, lives and loves in me*. I live no longer except through Him." "In place of her own poor being, the soul finds the . . . Sublimity of God." "God makes the soul partake of His own self; She is nourished by His Substance." "She is not able to know herself except through Him." "She . . . can do nothing else but adore, and even then, it is Jesus *who adores in her*." "Jesus showed me, *gave me His Divine Being*."

Let us now glance at our results. We have found the transformation of the human self by the Divine Co-factor described by such leading authorities as Augustine Baker, Poulain and Saudreau. We have found the two latter quoting, besides the greater Mystics, the statements of four less known witnesses whose testimony bears out the description to the letter. Then we turned to the five principal Christian deponents to Mystical experience, and found the orthodox Ruysbroeck, St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa telling the same story with the doctrinally suspect Eckehart and Jacob Böhme. Lastly we were able to refer the reader to the private personal diary of a

Mystic of our own day, whose warrants were sufficient to satisfy such an expert as Fr. Poulain.

But even here the evidence for the 'transforming union' has hardly been broached. It is as extensive as Mysticism itself. Precisely the same claims are made by the Mahomedan Sūfis. And a recent *Hibbert Journal* contains a very interesting article by Dr. Estlin Carpenter on the Tamil Āiavas, whose testimony is absolutely at one with the Christians and the Sūfis: "Unite with him indissolubly by loving him in all humility, and practise 'I am he'; then he will appear to you *as yourself*."

But the evidence is more extensive still. For, as Mr. Waite shows, we have to explain how it is that so many Mystics, Sūfi, Christian and especially (because more generally) Hindu tend to lapse into pantheism; and an obvious explanation is afforded by accepting the accounts of the 'transforming union' wherein the subject, as St. John of the Cross puts it, "seems to be God rather than himself." To arrive at a human analogy for the 'transforming union' we have only to add another touch to the one adduced already, and suppose that the automatic writer whose pen has been guided occasionally by the absent friend, suddenly undergoes one of those sudden seizures, when the agony of another is not only communicated but realized personally as though it were one's own. To make the analogy more perfect we might suppose (1), as indeed is possible, that telepathy is itself the proof that souls are not separated as bodies are, and that consciously and unconsciously the very selves of friends interpenetrate, and (2) that the original impulse to write automatically was itself telepathically conveyed.

In any case I think it can be claimed, if the

evidence for the 'transforming union' be accepted, that it is an experimental verification of the principle of Moberly. Moreover, on the one hand, the fact that God is known at last suggests that the belief in His presence all along was not a mistaken one, and on the other hand the contrast with the lower stages is expressly ascribed by the witnesses to the truth formulated in our second proposition,—*viz.* that God acts in and through our humanity for the most part in a hidden way. The final question which needs to be faced is this. How far is the testimony to this main phenomenon invalidated by the suspicions attaching to other claims of the Mystics?

In the first place, as we have just seen, the basis of our belief is wider than the testimony of individuals, being coextensive with Mysticism itself.

In the second place, the Mystics themselves draw a sharp line between the 'transforming union' and the state of aspiration deepening into absorption or even ecstasy which precedes it. Feeling and vision are always more or less suspect and comparatively unimportant.

"St. John of the Cross," says Poulain, "does not think of distinguishing between the first three degrees (quiet, union, ecstasy). His one desire is to reach the last, the spiritual marriage. All that lies before seems to form one whole. It is of small moment to him whether there are separate hostels on the road; he wishes the soul to sojourn there for the shortest possible time. So that, as far as he is concerned, the true mystic halting places are reduced to two: (1) the transforming union and (2) all that leads to it."

St. Teresa goes even further. While the infused aspiration of quiet forms for her (as it must for us all)

*Reviews & Notices*  
 New Psychology in relation to life L. G.  
 Father W. Doyle & Alfred A. Bahilly  
 Theory of Relativity, H. Wolden Carr  
 Phenomena of Materialization by Baron  
 Redemptin, Hindu & Xian Sydney  
 Selections from Purbayat & Odes of Hafiz  
 Spiritual Body C. E. Dyer & Members of Persian  
 Psychoanalysis The Quest. Barbara  
 Anchari Eylan W. Bayle

Vol. XII.

JANUARY, 1921.

No. 2.

- The Ophite Mysteries and  
 Early Syrian Christianity .... Vacher Burch.  
 Some Consequences of the  
 New Psychology .... E. M. Caillard.  
 The Meaning of Consciousness .... F. C. Constable.  
 Psycho-analysis and  
 Reconstruction .... Dora E. Hecht.  
 The Self-suggestion of the Saints.... V. C. MacMunn.  
 Indifferent Arms .... Herehaught.  
 Jesus and the Blood Sacrifices .... Robert Eisler.  
 The Educational Value of  
 Comparative Religion .... Percival Gough.  
 The Illumination of the Shadow .... E. P. Larken.  
 The Widow .... V. H. Friedlaender.

Reviews and Notices

*Prerequisites of Study of Böhm C. J. Darr*  
*Chapman in Science & Gnomonics Perchance P.*  
*Cosmic Commonwealth Edwin Holmes*  
*Man's Survival after death C. L. Seward*  
*Twenty acres at Laudes, D. & de Gran*  
*The Dawn of Hope - Mission de Brum*  
*methyots, D. B. Jones*



# The Quest.

## A Quarterly Review.

Edited by G. R. S. MEAD.

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Vol. XII.

APRIL, 1921.

No. 3.

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Mystic Feeling and the Emotional Life ....	Prof. A. Caldecott.
A Modern Interpretation of Alchemy ....	A. H. E. Lee.
A Beggar at the Gate ....	Moysheh Oyved.
The Man of Asia ....	L. Adams Beck.
The Experience of Divine Immanence in Nature ....	Robert M. Thouless.
The Non-Historicity School ....	Dr. K. C. Anderson.
Orthodoxy, Psychology and Mystical Experience ....	The Editor.
Spring in the Woods ....	A. R. Horwood.
Footprints ....	F. J. Cannon.
On a Good Friday ....	B. E. Baughan.
A Swan Song ....	Oliver Fox.

Reviews and Notices.

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21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C., 2.

Single Copies, 3/- net; 3/3 post free.

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[P.T.O.]

Doubtless in a multitude of text-books is trouble, to which may be charged a signal inconsistency in the *Outline* application of this theory of 'tradition.' According to the text 'tradition comes into the world' among the mammals of the 'opening of the Cainozoic period'; that is to say, in the chronology adopted in the text, somewhere between 40,000,000 and 4,000,000 years ago (p. 35) and long before the advent of Man. Yet it is subsequently protested (p. 73) that "primordial man could have had little or no tradition before the development of speech," and Neanderthal man (third Interglacial Age—only 100,000 to 50,000 years ago) is expressly stated (p. 49) to have had "nothing that we should call a language." It is therefore competent to enquire what, exactly, is intended by the Cainozoic 'tradition.' Is it a soul-process, psychical persistence of the habitual? <sup>1</sup> And, if so, was that not immanent throughout? Short of that, by 'tradition' we are not fed. We are given existence, not persistence; *dharmas* without an *abhidharma*; processes of the suns, but no active eternal purpose; we are not so much enlightened by Wells the seer as crammed by Mr. Wells, schoolmaster. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*

Nature itself is subdued to what it works in, like the dyer's hand; and in all fairness it is at once to be ceded that even seer-deliverances are, similarly, apt to be tintured proper to the status of their authors. Thus, if we take what, quite recently, has been instanced as 'perhaps the loftiest utterance ever penned on the subject,' <sup>2</sup> together with others, more or less lofty, which have come to the present writer's mind casually and familiarly, without so much as

<sup>1</sup> Cp. 'For Difference,' Oct. no., 1918.

<sup>2</sup> T. W. Rolleston, in 'Life and Death,' *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1920.

rising from his chair or reaching for a book of reference, the tell-tale *cliché* is to be discerned in every instance. The utterances are these :

(a) "Thus we are men and we know not how ; there is something in us that can be without us and will be after us, though it is strange that it hath no history what it was before us, nor cannot tell how it entered us. . . . There is surely a piece of Divinity in us, something that was before the Elements and owes no homage to the Sun."

(b) "I proceeded forth and came from God ; neither came I of myself, but He sent me. Why do ye not understand my speech ? "

(c) "It is He that hath made us and not we ourselves, we are His people and the sheep of His pasture."

(d) "'Specs I growed."

(e) "I confess myself an Englishman, born unto and under the protection of the English laws, and that what I have and am, I have and am by virtue of English laws, left and bequeathed unto me by my fathers who were also Englishmen."<sup>1</sup>

(f) "We are such stuff as dreams are made of, and our little life is rounded with a sleep."

(g) "Whose secret presence, through Creation's veins

Running quicksilverlike, eludes your pains ;

Taking all shapes from Máh to Máhi ; and

They change and perish all—but He remains."

<sup>1</sup> Nothing is here for scorn. The words are excerpt from the solemn defence of one tried and excommunicated at the Old Bailey in 1651 for schism, a consequence of his mystical opinions. It is to be recalled that his contemporary, Wingate, describes the maxims of English law as 'prime emanations of the Eternal Wisdom.' The delinquent of 1651 was one Robert Norwood, who indiscreetly held that "the soul of man is of the essence of God." His defence, in pamphlet form, is in the B.M. Library.



(h) "I am a part of all that I have met."

Here, in all, we have mysticism in terms of *métier*: intimations of existences, seen to be proceeding and relative, from, in each instance, occupational points of view, which, *seriatim*, may be thus freely sketched:

(a) Obviously the academic standpoint of the age in which the Norwich doctor lived. Though he refuses their bondage, yet the tenets of Paracelsus and Galileo are the *media* and measures of his testimony. (b) He whose singular *métier* is sonship, ever calling himself the Son of Man, proclaims the Fatherhood of God. (c) The inspired Judæan herdsman marks the Divine 'pasture.' (d) The simple, healthy, growing child ("What should it know of death?") perceives but growth. (e) The Englishman, with innate sense of ancestry, founds on his own Englishry. (f) 'Fancy's child' fancies himself a phantasy. (g) The libertine in wine, woman and wisdom, with reinforced sensibility, feels 'a secret presence, through creation's veins.' (h) The sojourner of Odyssey, the old dog long on the hard road, inherits every touch of it. So the idiom tells the tale, the gesture presents the drama. The call may be out of the deep, but its articulation is immediate and quick of the vulgar tongue. Lacking the familiar, the intimate, we are in the case of the absent love-lorn swain:

"Ne ought I see, though in the clearest day,

When others gaze upon theyr shadowes vayne."

Yet with

" . . . th' onely image of that heavenly ray,

Whereof some glance doth in mine eie remayne

Of which beholding the Idæa playne

Through contemplation of my purest part,

With light thereof I do myselfe sustayne."

And here, by the way, the Spenserian sonnet provides yet another occupational point of view, that of the intimacy of the constant lover.

Such are the soul-conditions in which normal man finds the path of return, apprehends source, knows himself of the Infinite, beholds the Idæa.

“For we are not cut off from our source nor separated from it, even though the bodily nature intervenes and draws us towards itself, but we breathe and maintain our being in our source.”

If this can be held true in regard of the above miscellany of post-Glacial human emotions, it is assumably as true in regard of those earlier, intimate, familiar soul-conditions of the Cainozoic mammal at large; and the *Outline* does well to exhibit the latter as amplified in the viviparous, nest-building, home-founding, young-protecting occupational trend occasioned by the approach of the Glacial periods, by a falling thermometer, that is; but it does ill to describe them by so narrow a term as that of ‘tradition.’ Emotion did not then ‘come into the world,’ and the ‘nervous organization necessary to receive tradition,’ though doubtless then augmented, was already there.

Nor does it suffice to present a purely parental and social *métier* to the exclusion of the hedonistic incentive in mating; for under that restriction the human stance and sexual confront remain physiologically unaccounted for. Above all, the monistic reticence of the *Outline*, which swerves at ‘soul,’ and stops dead short at ‘spirit,’ is dominated by an utilitarian, survival-of-the-fittest sense of bodily necessity, which grudges the second term of human existence and—by wholly ignoring it—denies the third. Its ‘tradition,’ with such endowment of ‘spirit’ as may be assigned

to reptilian and mammalian species, may account for the remarkable social organizations of the hymenoptera and for the structurally marvellous brains of the elephant and the horse, but will it account for the grace of Man, 'in apprehension so like a god'? Shall we not, rather, fall back on the Pauline argument that "when sin abounded grace did much more abound," with an inference that something redemptional of 'spirit' was conveyed in the human sexual relationship? Failing such inference the *Outline-economy* leaves us much where we were. In fine, the great work, paying no deference to the mystical duality of sex, with its profundities of aversion and attraction, and finding no use for that inner, triadic apprehension of life, the value of which, at least as an empirical gauge of those forms of energy which come to us as light and sound, is now vindicated, falls short of cosmogony. That is, and ever will be, the case with any treatise which does not allow and proclaim that:

"Before this World's great frame, in which all things  
 Are now contained, found any being place,  
 Ere flitting Time could wag his eyas wings  
 About that mightie bound which doth embrace  
 The rolling Spheres, and parts their houres by space,  
 That High Eternal Powre, which now doth move  
 In all these things, mov'd in itself by love."

That is plain as well as pretty English, just as Marlowe's "make me immortal with a kiss" is plain and strong. Tennyson's endorsements of these impel us to an apotheosis of Poetry standing, with warm and outstretched hand proffered to Science, Philosophy and Religion, waiting, waiting, waiting. We, for shame, are a pedantical and meticulous generation, seeking after a sign when there needs no sign to be given us

but the signs of the whirling, waltzing planet and the common chord. For as the gamut of a ray of light is empirically resolved by the principle of the 'three-colour process' in printing, so, by that same familiar habit, is the spectrum of life itself empirically, yet effectually, to be resolved.

*Now, forasmuch as Maister W. his Outline doth trauerse in point one of the charges For Difference, here Herehaught putteth on his tabard againe.*

HEREHAUGHT.

## JESUS AND THE JEWISH BLOOD-SACRIFICES.

ROBERT EISLER, Ph.D.

IN his excellent paper 'Round the Cradle of Christendom' in the July number the editor dwells emphatically on the *communis opinio* of Bible scholars, that Jesus, although 'a great lover,' did not breathe a word of protest or even of distaste against the chief ritual of the Jewish cult system, those bloody sacrifices which up to the last turned the temple of Jerusalem into, what Mr. Mead calls—with some exaggeration in view of the contemporary hecatombs offered at Emesa, Heliopolis, Baalbek, Bambyke, Pergamon, etc.—'the greatest sacred abattoir the world has ever seen.'

If this were true, it would be all the more unworthy of the great teacher of humanity, as such protests had been already uttered at a very early time by the Israelite prophets,<sup>1</sup> and as even our oldest collection of Midrashim<sup>2</sup> says quite precisely—with reference to Psalm 50<sup>13</sup>—"Shall I eat the flesh of bulls or drink the blood of goats? Offer unto God *thanksgiving* and pay [thus] thy vows to the Most High!"—that *in the Messianic age all sacrifices will be abolished* and replaced by *thanksgivings*—what the Christian church speaks of by the now familiar Greek expression '*eucharistiai*.'

The discontinuation of animal sacrifice—even of

<sup>1</sup> Amos 44, 522-25, Hosea 56, 813, Is. 111ff., 2213, Jer. 620, 721.

<sup>2</sup> Pesiqta X. 77a, with S. Buber's notes. See *Monatsschrift für Gesch. d. Judentums*, 1899, p. 153f.

the time-honoured obligatory Easter lamb-eating—in the synagogue-service, necessitated by the destruction of the one legal place of sacrificial slaughter in the year 70 A.D., was justified ever after by a remarkable Talmudic interpretation<sup>1</sup> of Hosea 14: “We shall pay the calves [with] our lips,” that is by vicarious prayers. In connection with the above-quoted psalm-verse about God repudiating the blood of slaughtered animals, yet requiring thanksgiving as fulfilment of vows undertaken, the text “Take with you *words* and turn to the Lord. Say unto him: Take away all iniquity and receive us graciously; *so will we render the calves of our lips*” (Hosea 14) became the basis of a new system of bloodless spiritual worship and moral atonement by prayer and repentance, and that at a very early date; for I have no doubt that the Essenes, who sent valuable ‘dedications’ (*anathēmata*) to the temple, but abhorred blood-sacrifice, did so with regard to the above quoted scripture-texts.

It would be very strange, if Jesus, who has twice repeated on different occasions (Matt. 9<sub>3</sub>, 12<sub>7</sub>, cp. Mark 12<sub>32-34</sub>) those words of God through the prophet Hosea, would have sided in this respect with the priestly orthodoxy and not with the progressive ‘non-conformist’ movement, whose antipathy against blood-sacrifice was shared at that time by the partisans of ‘philosophic’ religion throughout the civilised world.

“It is recorded,” says my valued friend, ‘that Jesus in one of the most dramatic moments of his prophetic activity not only furiously denounced the priestly profiteering, which made huge fortunes by trafficking in the temple meat-market, but proceeded to a physical

<sup>1</sup> Schroeder, *Satzungen u. Gebräuche des talmudischen Judentums*, Bremen, 1861, 189ff.

act of violence against the servants of the sacerdotal company. But there is no hint of protest against the root of the evil."

Yet, as a matter of fact, there is such a hint, and a very clear one too, although hardly recognizable in the English bible and greatly obscured even in the Greek testament itself.

The Lord's words at the so-called 'purification of the temple' (Mark 11<sub>15</sub>, and the parallels): "Is it not written: My house shall be called of all nations the house of prayer, but ye have made it a *den of thieves*?" or, as John 2<sub>16</sub> has toned it down still more effectively, 'a house of merchandise,' do not, of course, convey such a hint, as we read them *now*. But Jesus did not speak the language of the Greek heathen in the precincts of the sanctuary. What he said is a literal quotation, not from the Septuagint, but from the Hebrew of the prophets Isaiah (56<sup>7</sup>) and Jeremiah (7<sub>11</sub>). And there the words 'den of thieves' or 'den of robbers,' as the Authorized Version says in Jer. 7<sub>11</sub>, read '*me'ārat parīšim*.' Now the stem PRŠ does not in the least apply to any offence against property, as 'stealing' or 'robbing' (stealing by violence); it means 'to break, dismember, lacerate' something, and is said of human criminals as well as of carnivorous animals and birds of prey. What the prophet means to say is 'a cave of murderers' (the '*Mördergrube*' of the Luther bible), or even a 'den of slaughterers.' Accordingly, if Jesus contrasts the whole world's 'prayer-house' of Isaiah with Jeremiah's 'den of slaughterers,' this blood-smeared word alone suffices to show that Jesus *does* contrast the 'pure offering' of prayers throughout the whole world (Mal. 1<sub>11</sub>), the bloodless spiritual cult of the already world-embracing

synagogue (*beth thephilah*) with the dire Deuteronomic monopoly-slaughter-house of the blood-deluged Mount Zion.

However anxiously modern theologians may try to overlook the historic fact,—Jesus the Nazarene was a great, heroic and conscious *revolutionary*, admittedly come to bring to the world not peace, but a sword (Matt. 10<sup>24</sup>) and a fire (Lk. 12<sup>49</sup>). It is as a dangerous revolutionary that he was spied upon, opposed and finally executed by the conservative priestly ruling class and their Roman supporter.

What he did on the memorable day of the so-called purification of the temple, he did as one in power immediately after his triumphal entry into Jerusalem, where he had been hailed as the Messiah ben David, as the at last returning anointed King of Israel, by a frenzied multitude. He meant to attack at the head of his followers the ruling hierarchy where it was most vulnerable and to abolish, under his authority as Messianic ruler, what was most abhorrent to his religious conscience in the existing pseudo-theocracy. If he expelled the *bankers*—not mere innocent petty money-changers, who simply bartered Jewish shekels against the coin of all countries for the convenience of the temple-taxpayers according to a legal tariff, but a whole exchange of real bankers and big money-lenders, as well as the buyers and sellers of the huge temple-market,—if he drove out these with a scourge from the sacred precincts of God's own house, he *meant* to realize at last the passionate concluding words of the prophet Zechariah: "In that day there shall be no more the huckster<sup>1</sup> in the house of the Lord of Hosts";

<sup>1</sup> *ha-Cana'ani*, lit. the Phenician, at that time a disparaging name for the whole class of merchants without regard to national extraction.



he meant to direct a deadly attack against the centre of the national banking and bartering system, against the money-market and goods-exchange that had established itself under the inviolable shelter of the great Jewish sanctuary, even as the same big market-fairs thrived in the precincts of all the great Greek, Egyptian, Syrian and Babylonian sanctuaries<sup>1</sup> and places of pilgrimage.

He knew quite well what he had done and what he had to expect from his exasperated foes, who now "sought how they might kill him; for *they feared the people.*" On the very eve of the farewell supper, when he told his followers both in symbol and openly that "the things concerning me have come to an end," he exhorted them to arm themselves for the great final *Messianic war*: "He that hath not a knife<sup>2</sup> let him sell his cloak and buy one." Only when they answer<sup>3</sup>: "Lord, behold here two knives!"—each of us is doubly armed—does he say grimly (Lk. 22<sup>36-38</sup>): "That's enough! For I say unto you that this which is written (Is. 53<sup>12</sup>) must yet be accomplished: And he was reckoned among the lawless" (*anomoi*, revolutionary transgressors of established law and order).

But in spite of the obvious fact that the original tradition about this memorable event has been tam-

<sup>1</sup> We know from countless documents that the treasury of every Egyptian, Greek and Babylonian temple was a huge public *bank*, and the temple of Jerusalem, where in the time of Antiochos Epiphanes the savings 'of widows and orphans' and certainly also of other less helpless capitalists were hoarded, was certainly no exception to the rule, since we know how the Scribes contrived to circumvent the scriptural prohibition of interest, discount and usury by the same system of 'voluntary gifts' to the lender, which is still practised under the rule of the same prohibition in the whole Mahometan world.

<sup>2</sup> *Macharia* is the usual short curved dagger, hidden in the clothes of the Jewish fanatics of that time, of the 'Sicarii' or 'Dagger-men' of Josephus (*Ant.* xx., 8, 10, *Bell. Jud.* ii. 18, 3 and *Acts* 21<sup>38</sup>), not the impossible soldier's 'sword.'

<sup>3</sup> Each of them of course, not one speaker only producing *two* weapons for *thirteen* men!

pered with by the timid, disheartened Christians—no more the fervent Jewish ‘Messianist’ revolutionaries of the first generation—who followed the Pauline, that is the Roman, or rather Provincialist, *bourgeois*-doctrine of obeisance towards every legal government (Rom. 13, Tit. 8, Pet. 2<sup>13-17</sup>), it is quite manifest even now that this was not the only, perhaps not even the main, aim of his attack.

True, in Luke 19<sup>st</sup>, the most ‘Pauline’ of the gospels, the story is cut down so as to represent a procedure directed exclusively against the officially unauthorised, private marketing in the sacrosanct place :

“And he went into the temple and began to cast out them that sold therein and them that bought :

“Saying unto them : It is written, My house is the house of prayer ; but ye have made it a den of thieves.”

Of course, if nothing was to be abolished but the objectionable profane marketing in the temple fore-court, it is easy to see why the gospel of John (in spite of the scriptural quotation being spoiled by the change) prefers to substitute ‘a house of merchandise,’ or ‘warehouse’ for the original *me‘ārat parišim*, which would appear as a gross exaggeration if applied to a lively oriental bazaar, where sellers and buyers deal quite contentedly with each other in all friendship, absolutely without violence and, as a rule, also without fraud, to the mutual advantage of both parties.

But in this case the proper verse to quote for a ‘master of scripture,’ as Jesus was, would have been the pertinent verse of Zechariah, not the inappropriate furious denunciation of Jeremiah.

As a matter of fact, the authentic *words* of Jesus

do not tally with his action as reported by Luke, but only with the version of the story to be found in *John 2*<sub>131</sub> :

“And the Jews’ passover was at hand, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem,

“And found in the temple *those that sold oxen and sheep and doves*”—that is to say all possible victims of the sacrificial cult, including the thousands of passover-lambs needed for the feast.

“And with a scourge . . . he drove them all out of the temple *and the sheep and the oxen too*.”

The sheep and oxen which he found *inside the temple area*, cannot be understood as cattle exposed there for sale. There never was and never could have been a market-show of cattle with all its unavoidable filth in the sanctuary itself. They can only be meant for the sheep and oxen, *that were being led up to the altar and the other slaughtering-places for immediate sacrifice* by intending offerers *and by the official cattle-dealers and drivers*, helping their patrons and customers.

Consequently what John describes, is clearly and unmistakably an attempt *to interfere by force with the sacrificial cult-system itself*, with the very livelihood of the priests, not only with their revenues from market-duties and the banking-out of the temple-treasures. It goes much farther than the moderate opposition of the Essenes had ever dared. They rejected blood-sacrifice only on their own account, and did not interfere with other people continuing the old holy rites. Moreover, they made up the loss to the priesthood by sending in valuable voluntary gifts to that same temple-treasury, against the revenues of which the Nazarene Messianic teacher had now directed such a

formidable blow. There is nothing so much as this far-reaching revolutionary action of Jesus and his followers that finally decided his fate with the priests and other leaders of the conservative party in Jewry as well as with the military representative of the foreign trade and imperial taxation exploited by the ruling knights and senators of the Forum Romanum.

If Mark (11<sub>15</sub>) and Matthew (21<sub>12</sub>) do not mention the trade in oxen and sheep of the dove-sellers, much less oxen and sheep themselves being driven out of the temple by Jesus, I am not sure that John did not still read a fuller text of this synoptic verse, which was later on curtailed to its present shape. The public, for whom Mark and Matthew wrote, may have known beforehand that the 'dove-sellers' *were* the general dealers and brokers in sacrificial animals of all kinds—this is what I infer from the comparison of the synoptic version with that of John—so that to drive them out of the temple meant to stop almost the whole supply of sacrifices to the altar. For in the quite developed economic system of that time it was certainly not usual and not convenient even for a peasant or cattle-breeder to drive one of his own animals for miles and miles from his home to Jerusalem, when a large and well-stocked cattle-market was to be found close to the temple. As people in a cattle-breeding land with rudimentary publicity they must have known that 'profiteering' to any notable extent was hardly possible in the open, central free-trade market of such a land. Accordingly there was no need to formulate the narrative in such a precise way that the reader should not mistake an attack, which he *knew* quite well to have been directed against the sacrificial system and the financial administration of

the national temple, for a riot against a certainly non-existent 'profiteering' of the cattle-dealers and against the equally non-existent usury of the bankers in their money-changing business, which was quite satisfactorily regulated and not at all monopolized or monopolizable.

For the readers of Mark and Matthew there was never any doubt about the fact that it was the whole system itself, and not any minor abuses in its working, which Jesus' famous and long-remembered, though unsuccessful, Easter-pronunciamento had tried to abolish.

As to Luke's account, it is obviously curtailed by one verse in order to minimize the illegality of Jesus' proceeding by leaving out every hint of the tradesmen in question acting on behalf or in the service of the official cult-system.<sup>1</sup> He omits the overthrowing of the bankers' tables and of the stools of the cattle-brokers because he knows quite well that their money-changing business is an authorized one and absolutely necessary for the collection of the legal temple-taxes and that the cattle-trade served the needs of the holy altar of sacrifice. Thus curtailed, the narrative seems to imply that only those people were ejected who had desecrated the holy area by carrying on their own private and wholly profane business on sacred ground.

On the other hand, 'John,' who wrote at least a generation later, probably in Asia Minor and for a non-Jewish public, may have thought it necessary to go considerably out of his way in order to make the real primitive sense of the story clear to his less well-prepared readers. Yet, as the same author follows the

<sup>1</sup> If the foreshortening of the narrative were the work of a Jewish-Christian partisan of blood-sacrifice we should expect the mention of the money-changers to have been left untouched. Besides such a Judaizing tendency might be expected in Matthew, but never in Luke.

*attenuating* tendency of Luke's version by toning down the Lord's picturesque quotation from Jeremiah 'a den of slaughterers' to the colourless word 'warehouse,' I am inclined to attribute the amplified account of Jesus' action against the sacrificial cattle-trade to a peculiar *source* of the fourth gospel, by preference to that 'Ebionite' gospel<sup>1</sup> that makes him say—evidently on this occasion—"I have come to *abolish the sacrifices* and if you do not cease to sacrifice, the Wrath will not cease [to weigh] upon you," a testimony that has not received, in my opinion, the attention it deserves for the history of Christian origins.

Considering this state of our documents the reader will perhaps begin to doubt the accuracy of the prevailing belief,<sup>2</sup> that according to the gospels in the matter of sacrifice Jesus throughout his life observed the Jewish law as commonly practised in his time, not as it was interpreted in sectarian (Assidean<sup>3</sup> and Essenian) circles. The proofs that are usually put forward are indeed very weak. The purificatory sacrifice of Jesus' mother and the passover-pilgrimage of his parents do not prove anything for the views of the grown-up son; the fact of their being related exclusively by Luke accords well with the latter's intentions as manifested in his curtailed account of the 'purification of the temple.' The injunction to the leper to offer the prescribed purificatory sacrifice (Mark 14 and parallels) seems to belong to the very

<sup>1</sup> Epiphan. *Hæres.* xxx. 15.

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Prof. G. F. Moore in Cheyne's *Enc. Bibl.*, 4226.

<sup>3</sup> Psalm 50: "Gather my saints (*hassidai*) together unto me that have made a covenant with me about sacrifice," could well be the special hymn of the community of 'Hassidim' containing their characteristic doctrine of sacrifice. The 'Saints' of Matt. 27:52 are nothing else but the Hassids. In Acts 9:11, 26:10 and in the Pauline Epistles the name is applied to the earliest Christians. No better proof could be demanded for the historical connection of the two sects.

earliest stage of Jesus' public life, and is not given to one of his disciples but to an outsider; besides the words are evidently intended to show that the miraculous cleansing of the leper was technically certified by the competent expert authority; they are therefore comparable in this respect to the usual medical certificates in the Lourdes miracles. As they are, moreover, manifestly in contradiction to the immediately preceding modest words of Jesus: "See thou say nothing to any man," they may well be the addition of an early narrator. In any case I should not build much upon them.

The essential question is whether at the end of his life, after what had occurred in the temple, on the night before his death he shared with his disciples in the solemn eating of one of those same passover-lambs, the customary ritual slaughtering of which he had himself interfered with a few hours before. He *might* possibly have done so without hesitation, for there is a long way to travel from opposing blood-sacrifice (as a feature of worship and a method of propitiating the divinity) to the strict observance of a vegetarian diet. There were confirmed vegetarians enough among the leading spirits of the time: remember the Nazireans, John the Baptist, who lived on wild honey and carob-pods,<sup>1</sup> James the brother of Jesus,<sup>2</sup> who abstained from wine and all animal food, and Simon Peter, who lived on bread and olives,<sup>3</sup> at least before he had experienced the mystic vision of the heavenly veil, 'the garment of creation' with all God's creatures in it,<sup>4</sup> not to speak of

<sup>1</sup> Not locusts, cp. *Enc. Bib.* 2186, 2499.

<sup>2</sup> Hegisipp. in Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 223.

<sup>3</sup> Epiph. *Hær.* xxx. 15; Clem. *Hom.* xii. 6.

<sup>4</sup> See on Acts 1011ff., 1115ff., the writer's book *Welltenmantel u. Himmelszelt* (Munich, 1910), p. 230ff.

Banus, Josephus' anchorite teacher, and of Essenes and Therapeuts. But the dietary freedom of Jesus—misjudged by his ascetic opponents as the 'gluttonous man' and 'wine-bibber'—is especially contrasted in Matt. 11<sup>9</sup>, Luke 7<sup>37</sup> (Q) with John's severe 'fasting' and abstinent habits.

So it is difficult to say whether the remnant of the 'poor' 'saints' (*ebionim*, *hassidim*) of Jerusalem (Rom. 15<sup>26</sup>), of the earliest communist Jewish Christian church, known later on as the 'Ebionites,' followed the example of Jesus—at least in his latest days—when they abstained from all animal food, or merely the example of his Nazorean brother James. They were certainly anxious to meet the rash objection of their enemies that Jesus himself had eaten of the passover-lamb by inserting into their special Aramean gospel, after the canonic verse Matt. 26<sup>17</sup>, the words of Jesus: "Did I desire with desire to eat with you this passover in the flesh?" (cp. Luke 22<sup>15</sup>). To understand this we must remember that outside of Jerusalem, where alone the passover-lambs could legally be slaughtered, especially in the Diaspora, the passover was celebrated in a modified form *without the sacrifice of the passover-lamb*,<sup>1</sup> so that this dish was left out in the passover-supper, even as it was and is celebrated by the Jews since sacrifice as a whole has become impossible through the destruction of the national sanctuary.

People who were opposed to blood-sacrifice, may have celebrated even in Jerusalem itself the same kind of fleshless passover-meal which those of their countrymen who could not join the passover-pilgrimage to Jerusalem, had celebrated at home everywhere where

<sup>1</sup> Friedmann & Graetz, *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1848, 354f., E. Schürer, *Gesch. jüd. Volk.* III. 144. note 29. The passover-lamb is *not* mentioned in the passover papyrus of Elephantine, Arnold, *Journ. Bibl. Litt.*, 1912, p. 9.



the Deuteronomic legislation had been whole-heartedly accepted. If we remember that Jesus certainly symbolized the impending sacrifice of the 'suffering' Messiah's body and blood, *not by any of the well-known Pauline allusions to the sacrifice of the passover-lamb*, but simply by breaking a piece of the unleavened bread and pouring out for his disciples a cup of wine, it becomes quite possible that really no passover-lamb was served on the table of the Last Supper, especially as such a dish indeed never figures in any one of the frequent early Christian pictures of sacred meals.

The only reason why no absolute reliance may be placed on the testimony of the Ebionite gospel (the *logion* itself is of course an invented one) is the fact that these ascetics—who abhorred wine after the manner of the old Rechabites—went so far as to celebrate the Lord's Supper with *bread and water*, although the exclusion of wine is manifestly discordant with the passover-rite celebrated by Jesus, the 'wine-bibber,' and due to the example of James, the first 'bishop' of the Jerusalem church, who must have celebrated the *agapæ* with water under his Nazirean vows. If in this essential detail of the main ritual of the new Messianist *kahal* the example of James prevailed over that of Jesus, the same may be responsible for the 'Ebionite' opposition to eating a 'flesh'-passover.

Anyhow we cannot overlook the fact that from the first there existed even in the original Jewish-Christian church a strong anti-sacrificial and even vegetarian tendency, claiming to be based on the injunctions and teachings of Jesus himself, and that this opposition against the national ritual and general diet may have

contributed, quite as much as the opposition to the Jewish food-laws in another party of the church, towards the growth of the Jewish Messianist congregation from a simple synagogue sect into a religious community apart from Judaism as a whole.

It is true that the Messianists worshipped assiduously in the temple as long as it existed. They assembled daily in the so-called 'Hall of Solomon' in the temple forecourt (Acts 2<sup>46</sup>, 3<sup>11</sup>, 5<sup>12</sup>), and their first 'bishop' James was seen to kneel for hours in the sanctuary until his knees resembled those of a camel (Hegesippus, *l.c.*). But there is not the slightest reason to suppose that they ever participated—any more than the Essenes—in the sacrifices of the altar.

The charge that the origins of Christendom were ever stained with the blood of the countless animal victims flowing through the great sacred slaughter-house of Jerusalem, and that Jesus himself, although a great lover, was deaf to the groans of the suffering speechless creature (Rom. 8<sup>22</sup>), which had appealed so strongly centuries before to a Gotama Buddha, a Pythagoras or Empedocles, cannot be upheld any longer in the face of the above-sifted historical evidence.

ROBERT EISLER.

Brilliant and subtle as is Dr. Eisler's exegesis, it still remains incredible that so all-important a fact, if it were a fact, could possibly have fallen into the background and been so whittled away. One would have thought, on the contrary, that it would above all things have been dwelt upon in the full force of its significance and have become one of the clearest memories of the whole tradition. In such a matter tradition might be expected to exaggerate but never to minimize.—ED.

# THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION.

PERCIVAL GOUGH, M.A., M.R.A.S.

THE aim of this essay is not to add to the vast mass of materials connected with the primitive culture of mankind in their bearing upon religion; it is an attempt to suggest the educational value of those materials in the light of the most recent work on the subject.

Under the influence of evolutionary philosophy knowledge fell apart, a century ago, into numerous branches, each forming a separate field of investigation and each becoming divided into subsidiary sciences. In the case of the physical sciences it was possible almost at once to apply the results to the needs of practical life. But when the behaviour of mankind was subjected to scientific methods of investigation it was not easy to see what beneficent use could be made of the rich, if sometimes grotesque, harvest of ritual, custom, mythology, belief and the other (to us) irrational cultural traits of primitive society which were disclosed.

The first effect of this disclosure of the humble elements of man's primitive life was to discredit religion and hastily relegate it to a purely evolutionary process within the world-order. The materials provided by the early workers in this field were seized upon and made use of by rationalists in a widespread propa-

ganda against the spiritual foundations of religion, with the result that the atmosphere of the nineteenth century was charged with a naturalistic interpretation of religious phenomena based upon unassimilated knowledge gleaned from the new study of man covered by such subsidiary sciences as anthropology, geology, philology and the like, which began to win independence in the latter part of the century.

There is much more than a hope that the study of Comparative Religion will enlist educationalists into its service so that a reverent and spiritual interpretation may be given to the wealth of detail already to hand, and that the possession of so many facts concerning man's past history may yield the mastery of a few principles. In this way Comparative Religion will stand between the "antiquated heavy artillery of the apologists" and the pernicious "absurdities dear to the free-thinking orator."

It is hardly likely that theology in the old sense of the word will recover its educational value now that it has been bereft of the offspring to which it gave birth and sheltered for so many centuries; it is, however, unthinkable that the present *impasse* in the world of religious education can continue, for religion bears along with it in every age so much of the culture of mankind that the neglect of any systematic teaching of religion in our schools would give but a frail skeleton for the mind to gaze upon. It ought at least to be possible to teach the facts which go to show wherein religion consists, where it has met a universal need, what immeasurable services it has rendered to mankind, and at the same time explain how past generations have suffered from ignorance and fanaticism, which were not the fruits of real religion, but which must be laid to

the charge of the whole of society dominated certainly by a religious culture in which politics, religion, art, science, custom and law were inextricably mingled.

The wise teacher who aims at training his pupils to form judgments and does not attempt to influence opinion, would find tremendous assistance in the treatment of history, literature and other humanistic studies by the introduction into Secondary Schools of a course in Comparative Religion adapted to students of from 15 to 18 years of age.

I have found and felt myself great diffidence and nervousness in teaching history to an intelligent class for fear of offending religious conviction; the result is that the positive contribution of religion to a particular age in history is slurred over and a kind of vapid neutrality, on fire only when dealing with the atrocity-side of religion, leaves the inquisitive mind of the adolescent indifferent or unsatisfied.

By the introduction of Comparative Religion into the school curriculum a definiteness would be given to the historical side of religion which would make the subject really alive; and the word 'science' is sufficiently neutral to disarm suspicion of propaganda.

Moreover I fancy the earnest teacher at home with the subject would find himself in too large a world to allow himself to be limited by sectarian views. That is my own experience in making use of some knowledge of this subject in class-work, for like all sciences that rest on the bed-rock of facts it makes the teacher entirely dispassionate in presenting it to his pupils.

The lack of religious teaching in our schools is in no way due to the indifference of the teacher. At present the teacher is glad to escape from the responsibility of teaching religion. This is not due

to indifference; it is the natural honesty of a man who, whatever his own attitude towards religion, possesses no other equipment for teaching than his own convictions of a positive or negative kind, and in facing a class of mixed beliefs he is reluctant to give any bias to the naturally receptive mind of the pupil. He has an instinctive and very right feeling that his own religious convictions are the outcome of a social and cultural heritage alien to that of the children who listen to him, and he is unable with his present knowledge to select the common element in a subject so interblended with emotions that are not only the child's, but are shared with the child's ancestry and are part of a more vital environment than that of the school. The feeling that he is on holy ground is the reason for the attitude of the teacher towards religious instruction; and it is a healthy and proper instinct, which is capable of being turned to good uses under conditions that give the teacher an approach to the subject which raises it above the peculiar cultural inheritance of the individual pupil.

The study of Comparative Religion in my opinion would raise this subject above the doctrinal stage and take it into the psychological stage, and would disclose the ground over which religion works rather than the strategy which religion has used. It would moreover reinforce at the very centre the new tendency in education which places the child and the child's needs in the heart of all systems.

With historical studies enlarging themselves from the narrow limits of the nation to the comprehensiveness of a world-view, and with the method of teaching approaching a more synthetic aim, it will be far easier to avoid the short views of party-strife and sectarian

bitterness. In the hands of the wise teacher, by means of the larger scope given to the history of mankind, the crudities of partisanship will be softened, and a new teaching of the full meaning of religion over long periods will make for a new understanding based upon charity and sympathy. Along with this enlarged view of history will go a deeper knowledge of human evolution, disclosing the deeps out of which mankind has climbed and showing the wide horizons to which he is advancing. A horizontal and vertical movement in historical studies accompany each other and correct each other, and the scientific approach to religion exploring the vertical line will throw light where nothing else can upon the horizontal movement resulting in cultural, racial and religious differences.

In this twin movement which is at the flood to-day, nothing throws so much light as religion does upon the heights and depths of human nature; nor is there any other activity of man's nature capable of bearing the weight of the new unity towards which we hope knowledge is advancing.

Moreover, as knowledge and the desire for knowledge reach out and down, they arouse a deeper and wider emotional life which will not be satisfied by the old traditional religious teaching; nor will those released emotions be met and united by a more rigid separation between secular and sacred knowledge. Only a new synthesis in which the method of science and the spirit of religion are blended, is capable of claiming the devotion of the whole man and of giving a value to the branches of knowledge often in danger of being lopped off from the tree of life.

Now the study of Comparative Religion, possessing the whole armoury of scientific method and being

pursued, as it is, in a spirit of reverence, seems to me to be eminently suited for the *rôle* of mediator between the old humanities and the new science; and since the chief authorities on the subject are laymen the suspicion of clericalism will be absent.

It appears to me that those who desire that future generations should be free to arrive at a spiritual interpretation of life, are allowing their case to go by default through a tenacious but unwise championing of a worn-out method of teaching. It is forgotten that a dogmatic form of teaching in religion was actually the scientific method which did once meet the emotional needs of the populace, just as the dramatic method of teaching once met the spiritual needs of the ancient Greeks, and meets the same needs among savage races of the present day; it is also the dramatic method that is inevitable in the case of very young children. Each of these methods in its vigour gave stability of belief to society till the release of a wider emotional life required a change. The survivals of these methods are still among us. Totemism, mythology, ritualism, animism and taboo all suggest a state of mentality which could respond only to dramatic representations of such truths as mankind had advanced towards; and Gnosticism probably stands for a prolonged attempt to organize the emotional life, which had been disintegrated by the inrush of new ideas consequent upon the Alexandrian conquests, upon the basis of a dramatic representation of truth. This was succeeded by an era of dogmatic representation revolving around Christianity, which used the method of teaching most suited to a mentality that demanded a more inward grip of truth, and prepared the ground for the reception of truth borne along to the mind through the still more penetrating



method of science. The passing of each of these states of mentality into a higher state is marked by the tendency to rest in the symbol rather than to lead an active existence in the spiritual truth represented, and to be content with a method or system to the neglect of principles.

We are in the midst of such a transition now, and are witnessing the sterility of a time in which survivals show unwillingness to release their hold over men's minds, and in which new truths cannot reach us because of the barrier of a method of presentation not yet abandoned.

I fancy it will be found, on looking back some years hence, that the question of religion in education was more a matter of dispute concerning method of presentation than about the essential that finds a universal demand for entry into coming generations. And it is because of this that the claims of Comparative Religion in the education of the future ought to receive acknowledgment, for this branch of science brings the method by which alone truths can be imparted and received to-day. By rejecting this study we are blocking up the way to thought, for the new materials disclosed by this method will still require the work of thought in the field of interpretation before they can affect the sphere of action, either individual or social. Science is above all a method that releases material upon which interpretive thought can act. Within the scope of the material thus disclosed thought is free, just as thought was free to act within the scope of the material revealed by the dramatic and dogmatic stages of presentation. The danger in education lies in the timidity that prevents the mind from roaming over material that the mind itself has amassed; and in

religious education this policy is likely to result in a destruction of the axis around which human thought has revolved in every age.

I have said that sectarian compromise and exclusive or denominational teaching do not seem to touch the difficulty at its heart—which is the welfare of the child and the future of the race, and my experience is that this is realised by the chief agents in the matter—the teachers, to whom the vexatious disputes over religious education appear to be opportunist tactics of sectarian jealousies. It is, after all, always the teachers who will ultimately control the actual impact upon the child-mind of the knowledge in their hands, and nothing to my mind would bring more relief to teachers or interest to the pupils than the liberty of imparting and the pleasure of learning what the science of Comparative Religion has to show about the complex culture of mankind, which is interwoven not alone with the humanities but also with the sciences which have sprung from the same matrix.

PERCIVAL GOUGH.

## THE ILLUMINATION OF THE SHADOW.<sup>1</sup>

E. P. LARKEN, B.A.

It was the aim of the owners to establish a correspondence as perfect as possible between themselves and their shadows, because the process of perfecting themselves for the Shadowless Land was in exact proportion with the closeness of touch into which they were able to come with their shadows. Perfect correspondence was of course impossible. This is obvious when we remember that the personality of a shadow was based upon innumerable preceding personalities, and was formed by the welding together of these by the forces brought to bear upon them from the owners and the power of darkness. As it was therefore impossible to establish perfect correspondence, the work of the owners was to make the correspondence as little imperfect as might be. Perfect correspondence, had it been even possible, would have identified the shadow wholly with the owner and there would have been no more shadow. But imperfect correspondence, or correspondence as little imperfect as might be, was another thing, and we have now to consider some of the means adopted by the owner to establish this.

Under normal conditions and in its waking life the shadow felt itself to be one complete whole. Under abnormal conditions and in its dreams it was

<sup>1</sup> For previous essays in shadow-lore see *THE QUEST* for Jan. 1914, Jan. 1915, Jan. and July 1918, and July 1919.

different. In the latter case the one single personality of which it was conscious was, or might be, broken up, and the personalities, which as we have seen went to the building up of this one personality, could make themselves manifest. For example: dream-life was part of a shadow's normal life. In its dreams a shadow became dimly aware of the manner in which it was built up. It found itself, even the most commonplace, the shyest, the most unimaginative of shadows, found itself an actor; moreover it found itself a skilful actor of many parts, each one of which was played in the most life-like fashion. Its own consciousness, it found, resided in one or two at most of the *dramatis personæ*, divided sometimes between these and the rôle of a spectator who was regarding the drama passing before its eyes in a more or less detached fashion. For the rest the actors were, or appeared to be, entirely independent of the shadow's own personality and control, saying and doing things of the most unexpected and unlikely character, things which neither the normal shadow waking, nor the partially normal shadow dreaming, felt that it would ever think of saying or doing itself. But on awaking the shadow could not but become aware that each one of the actors whose deeds it had been watching, whose words it had been listening to, who had caused it such great perplexity or sorrow or joy, such a sense of glory and triumph or of shame, terror and despair, was in very truth *itself*.

What was the meaning of this? The obvious meaning—it may not have been wholly correct, obvious meanings seldom are wholly correct—was that this one personality of which the shadow was normally aware, had been in the dream broken up, and that the

foundation personalities, which as we have seen went to the building up of the single shadow-personality, had been given free field for action. In this supposition the shadow was certainly partially correct. Of course it is not to be supposed from this that the contributory personalities which made up the shadow-personality, broke loose and ran riot during the shadow's dream. Nothing more is meant than that an influence, in the form perhaps of memory inherited by the shadow from one or more of these contributory personalities, passed into the normal consciousness of the shadow and, becoming to the shadow's imagination personified, followed the lines marked out by its or their original nature. Thus the dramatic power of the shadow which so surprised it, was due to the impulse derived from one or more of its contributory personalities acting mechanically upon the normal dream-consciousness of the shadow.

Now it was necessary for the owner, in order that he might gain the fullest possible benefit from the association, to get into communication, to establish correspondence, with his shadow through various channels, some of which were the contributory shadow-personalities of which the shadow became aware when they were disintegrated in its dreams. Direct inter-communication was impossible, if the existence of the shadow was to be preserved. A shadow was so constituted that it could not endure to be brought in any full sense into direct touch with its owner. If this should happen, the shadow would perish and the owner would therefore sacrifice the full benefit which he would otherwise draw from the association. The channels sought for communication with the full personality of the shadow had therefore to be indirect.

and hence arose the use made of the inherited personalities which contributed to the building up of the full shadow-personality.

For the most part this communication of the owner with the shadow took place through that part of its personality of which the shadow was not aware. That this was so we have seen before. The explanation of this lay in the inhibitive power exercised, unintentionally it may be, by the full, conscious personality of the shadow on the approaches or the influx of the communicating power. In that part of its personality of which the shadow was unaware—whether sleeping or waking it matters not, although the phenomenon was more marked while the shadow was sleeping—the elements of which it was composed offered themselves readily as channels for the communication from the owner. Whereas when once the whole conscious personality was aroused, it offered a strenuous resistance to such communications.

Therefore the shadow was, generally speaking, unaware of the immediate action of the owner. It became aware that such action had taken place by indirect means, that is by the result which followed the action.

But this was not always the case. There occurred occasionally in the experience of many of the shadows moments when communication came, or rather seemed to come, immediately, directly and at once from the owner. These experiences were very rare, and their rarity made them all the more impressive. Even in these rare cases preparatory spade-work had been done in that part of the shadow's personality of which it was unaware, before the illuminating flash lighted up its consciousness. The shadow became, in this way, duly

réceptive. Then, by what I have called the preliminary spade-work of the owner, the unconscious part of the shadow's personality, the inhibitive instinct, a sort of instinctive jealousy of interference, was lessened and the action of the owner to establish the correspondence he desired was on this side given full play.

Now it may be asked: By what apparent ways did the owners seek to establish this direct communication or correspondence with their shadows? To this the answer is that no two ways wholly identical were adopted for the purpose, for the reason that no two shadows were wholly identical in their natures, that is in the constituent parts of which they were built up. General ways in common were adopted, but each way was modified according to the nature of the shadow concerned, with which the owner sought to establish correspondence.

We have seen how the instinct to mutual attraction among the shadows was moved from its shadowy, and therefore perishable, level when touched by the owner's sense of oneness, as it must inevitably be touched when the owners made use of this channel for establishing communication with their shadows. The same thing is true of other shadowy instincts. There was not a shadow to whose imagination beauty and goodness, in some one or more of their many forms and under some one or more of their many disguises, did not make an appeal—beauty through form or colour, harmony or rhythm, goodness through courage or self-sacrifice, skill, loyalty or sincerity. These things came in an endless variety of form, often enough disguised out of all recognition, to other shadows; but however strange the form, however deep the disguise, in them the owners found channels for their purpose. For the

shadows had an instinct for these things as they had an instinct for mutual attraction. Now beauty and goodness as they appealed to the shadows partook of the shadow-nature. So far as the shadow was concerned these things began and ended as things of the shadow. But when used by the owners as channels for their communication, these things told another tale.

The particular form of beauty, the particular manifestation of goodness, which appealed so strongly to the imagination of a shadow, began and ended as I said in itself. It was of the shadow-nature and followed the destiny of all shadowy things. A beautiful face or form ceased to be beautiful in a few years; the sunset colours faded even while the shadow was watching them; the music died in the air and passed; the brave deed, the act of self-sacrifice, the craft and skill, before which the shadows stood amazed, might indeed be enshrined in history, but they too were felt, in themselves, to be but shadowy things, perishable and limited by the law which bound all things in Shadowland. But when any one of these things, in any one of its multitudinous forms and disguises, was used by an owner as a means of communication with his shadow, the shadow learnt in some dim way that the beauty which fired its imagination, the goodness which inspired its passion, answered to something in the land of the owners which could never pass away, as the shadowy form of it must pass away. What that something was the shadow only felt; it could not know. The owner in communicating with it by this shadowy channel told it that the something was there, and by telling it this illuminated the whole of the shadow-being. Forms of beauty and goodness, which were made use of by the owners as channels for their



communication because they appealed to the imagination of the shadows, were not in themselves all. They told the shadows—each form separately, however strangely disguised it might be to the eyes of the shadows when used as channels—of ideas which lay altogether outside the shadowy world. The form, in itself, was nothing, because it partook of the shadow-nature of which, as we know, ultimate nothingness was the destiny. The idea was all, because it belonged to the owners.

Now in order to get into full touch with their shadows the owners made use of these channels which, in themselves nothing, were all important as a means towards perfecting the desired correspondence. In doing this, inevitably—the owners could not have hindered it, even had they so desired—the forms of which the shadows were aware and which appealed to their imaginations, became transfigured by the corresponding ideas residing in the land of the owners. The result was the illumination of the shadow-nature by that of the owner and, proportionately to the illumination, the removal of the barriers which prevented the owners from coming into touch with the shadows. Thus was made easier the fulfilling of the purpose of the owners. The effect upon the shadow's consciousness of this apparently direct method of communication was curious. The shadow felt as if it had been emptied of itself and filled with the owner. This of course was not the case, but it serves to show us how, by this means of illumination, the end of the owner was served. The shadow saw, naturally enough, in such occasions of apparently direct communication mainly the effect which the illumination had upon itself. The shadow would not have been a shadow had it seen

otherwise. Moreover it was the pleasure of the owner that his shadow should see the matter in this light. In drawing the shadow personality nearer to itself, or by obtaining fuller power over that personality, the owner was able to complete the perfecting of himself.

E. P. LARKEN.

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## THE WIDOW.

WHY do I hate her ?

She was not the first,  
Nor yet the prettiest or cleverest  
That took you from me. . . .

No ; she was the last.  
That makes the difference, Val—that you are dead.

The last. . . .

Oh, yes, I *know* it was all right !  
You never were unfaithful to me in  
The vulgar sense ; your mind was clean—was good ;  
The white heat of your love for poetry  
Kept you immune from commonplace intrigues.  
Only, that same white heat desired to spread  
The secret of its rapturous pure glow. . . .  
So women fooled you, time and time again.  
They held their breath—that they might hold your  
hand ;  
They looked unutterable, yearning things,  
And made you think that they, too, lost themselves  
In burning beauties of the written word. . . .

They didn't, Val!—not one of them did that.  
Dishonest, swift adaptability  
Was what they used on you ; but what they *loved*  
Was your lit face—idealising them.  
For that was what you did, Val ; when you met  
A pretty woman, you were always sure  
Hers was a spirit-beauty like your own,  
And rushed, enchanted, to salute your kin.  
Then for awhile you trod the floor of heaven,  
Swung, in the skies of art, from star to star,  
With her for your companion . . . till she tired.  
For they were always tiring, weren't they, Val ?  
Poor Val!—there always came a time when they  
Were not content with childlike hand-in-hand ;  
A serpent shared the paths of paradise ;  
And then sore, puzzled, out of breath, you dropped  
To earth again—and me.

Those are the times

That I can bear to think of now, Val : you  
Would be a little quiet, a little glad—  
Glad of your wife, your children and your home.  
For weeks, sometimes, your wings would never stir ;  
You would just stroll the lanes with us, or come  
Down to the beach and chat with fishermen,  
Go for a swim, make of the children's games  
A wonderland with some new, freakish thought.  
But then—how well I learned to know the signs!—  
You would fall silent, restless—fretful, even,  
At last—until there came the day when you  
Would kiss me lightly, suddenly, and say :  
“ Well, Mumsie, well—*this* sort of thing, you know,  
Won't keep the family ! ”

Oh, you were right,  
Of course ; you had to do your work in town—  
The work that kept us all. And I?—I had  
To choose between the children, Val, and you.  
Did I choose wrongly?—God knows!—I have been  
Punished, in any case. . . .

Val, Val, I knew  
What you were going back to—flattery  
From idle, worthless women who would love  
Your starry gift as much (or almost) as  
They loved their latest evening gown—would wear  
Your soul as they wore jewels, that other women  
Might envy them. . . . “Valentine Wynne?—oh, yes,  
I know him intimately. What?—Oh, quite!  
Thrillingly handsome: poets so seldom are!” . . .  
But what was I to do?—You couldn’t afford  
A house in town for all of us; and then  
There came that chance—your former bachelor niche  
With friends and their old housekeeper; while I  
Could live so much more cheaply here, and give  
The children Nature’s kindly, sane upbringing.  
Not that it was to last, of course!—You were  
To work so hard that we could make fresh plans.  
Only, meanwhile . . . meanwhile, Val, you are dead;  
And *she’s* alive, tasting voluptuous woe. . . .

I never thought I had this tiger-woman  
In me, that aches to spring and crush and rend. . . .  
So poor a thing she is!—nothing at all  
In her own self; fragile and sickly-sweet;  
A flower to make a rich man’s buttonhole  
For half a day, and then not only die  
But be forgotten. . . .

Val, if you had lived,  
 She would have been forgotten by both of us  
 Before to-day! Her only claim to life  
 Is that she was the woman you held endowed  
 With all perfection—on the day you died.  
 Her only claim . . . and yet how strong, how strong!  
 For she will never die now while I live;  
 How can she?

Death, that sprang at you and tore  
 Life in a dozen breaths out of your grasp,  
 Left you small time for thinking . . . but yet, Val,  
 Wasn't there just (after thought's first wild stab—  
 "*This is the end!*") one second when your mind  
 Was given to us—Nick, Rosemary and me?  
 Oh, was there, Val?—or was it *she* you saw? . . .  
 I wonder—I must wonder till I die. . . .  
 And so—in that eternal doubt—she lives!

Val, you went much afield to find some soul  
 Akin to yours—and yet it sat at home;  
 You never thought of looking there, and what  
 You did not ask I could not give. . . .

Yes, yes!

I know you loved me when you married me;  
 You loved me for the beauty I had then.  
 But when that paled—when I had given it  
 To make two flowers for you—you thought my soul  
 Paled, too.

That was because you never knew  
 My soul. It had no gift of flaming straight  
 Into my face, as yours had; I can feel  
 (God, I can feel!) but feeling makes me dumb;  
 And so you thought me unresponsive, cold—  
 And what love thinks us we are doomed to be.

You never read *my* poems—that I had made  
Into your son and daughter. . . .

Oh, I know

Their minds are yours, and fasten on the world  
Of books as hungry dogs devour a bone—  
With ravenous ease ! But all the rest—their souls,  
Innocent, ardent, pitiful and strong—  
Their bodies' health, and that elastic poise  
(Like tall June grasses careless of rough winds)  
That people turn to stare at—these are mine !  
Foreseen, forewilled within my very soul ;  
My inspiration and my gift to them.  
You never made more lovely poems yourself  
Than I in Nick—in Rosemary ! And yet  
You never talked, you never read aloud  
To *me*, Val, of the things that I, too, loved.  
That was for other women—women who  
Had smiles and tears close to the surface, and  
Could use them skilfully, each in its place  
(Since they had not to feel, but only act).

I bore it, Val ; it is my loss, it seems,  
That I found strength to bear it. Weakness would  
Have served my purpose better—tears have called  
Upon the chivalrous boy in you, and made  
You see—in part. . . .

But yet I could not, Val !

I loved the boy, but what I longed for was  
The man you were to be.

Ah, you made strides—

Such giant strides in thought, and in the art  
That was a *belle dame sans merci* indeed  
To me (and yet I loved it—and for itself !)

How could I doubt that some day you would be  
A man, and know me for your mate?

That was

To be my chance : I was content to wait. . . .

Chance ? Wait ? Content ?

Fool that I was—fool, fool!

*O mighty Death* . . . (what am I saying and why?)  
*Time's wingèd chariot* . . . (how I hear your voice  
Loving each loveliness !) has come—and gone.  
If I had spoken sooner. ?

I couldn't !—I couldn't ! . . .

But now you're dead, and somehow I can speak  
As though you heard me. . . .

Val, my dear, my dear !—

*Why did you die before her day was done ?*

V. H. FRIEDLAENDER.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO LIFE.

By A. G. Tansley. London (Allen & Unwin); pp. 270; 10s. 6d. net.

THE author of this, on the whole, clearly and well written volume thus summarizes its scope and purpose: "The main ideas underlying the description and argument of the foregoing chapters are: first that the inherited instincts of man form the basis on which the whole of his mental activity is built up; secondly, that, as the result of the working of these instincts on the experience presented to the mind, mental complexes are brought into being which determine the form of the further working of the instincts, and, indeed, nearly the whole life of the mind" (p. 260). Speaking generally, it must be allowed that the 'New Psychology' is emphasizing facts, in the complicated mechanism of the human mind, the importance of which has not yet received due recognition; but before the scheme can be even outlined in its right proportions, it will be necessary to introduce considerable modifications into the tentative sketches of its pioneers.

Mr. Tansley falls into a radical error when (p. 82) he undervalues the achievements of philosophy as compared with those of science. He writes as if he were not aware, on the one hand, of the services of philosophy as a self-criticism by the mind of its basal assumptions and its modern change of method and, on the other, of the upward struggles of science from small beginnings—of its errors—of the hard-and-fast theories of some of its dogmatic exponents. The new and freer method is being applied to all departments of thought. And there is especial danger in the subject before us, where observation is so difficult and uncertain, of attempting to establish a 'scientific' theory on insufficient data, or forcing facts into the framework of a preconceived theory. The writer of this volume is an admirer of Professor Freud and speaks highly of his work, yet at the same time admits that he has fallen into these errors. He writes:

"We need not enter here into a criticism or discussion of



Prof. Freud's often very skilful and ingenious attempts to show that all dreams are really the expression of unfulfilled wishes as fulfilled, no matter how unpalatable such an interpretation may appear on the surface. But we must express the view that the Freudian theory is conceived on too narrow lines. The study of dreams by modern methods is still quite young and there is yet much to be learnt about them. It seems certain, in the first place, that many dreams are mere mental fragments, just as are many waking thoughts. . . . But when we come to consider dreams which are more or less complete and rounded wholes, we must admit that the Freudian method of interpretation is very often quite valid and its results quite convincing. It does not, however, seem to be true that all such dreams are the expressions of wishes, whether repressed or unrepressed" (pp. 121, 22). And the experience of most people will probably confirm the criticisms rather than the theory, which may hold true in a minority of selected cases, but is very far from possessing the general character that Freud assigns to it. But, though he thus criticizes Freud, there are several instances in which the writer supports him in assuming an experience to be universal which many, who have not shared it, will rightly deny to be such. Such generalizations depend upon the false assumption that all minds have identical experiences, whereas the opposite is true. No doubt there is a common mental basis, but the experiences of different minds, both external and internal, are as various as faces and characters. There are great racial as well as individual differences, as was made very evident in the course of the War by the gulf between the German mentality and that of other nations.

There is also a very special danger in generalizing from pathological cases. What Mr. Tansley says in this regard is doubtless true: "The most important general conclusion reached is that the abnormal activities of the mind, as seen in cases of hysteria and insanity, are but extreme and unbalanced developments of characteristics and functions which form integral parts of the normal healthy mind. On the basis of this conclusion we are able to interpret many of the most baffling phenomena of the normal mind in the light of these pathological developments, and thus to obtain a far deeper insight into mental structure and functions, in just the same way that pathological developments of the tissues and functions of the body throw light upon normal physiological processes." The difficulty, of course, lies in assigning their exact relative value in the normal mind to these 'extreme

and unbalanced developments.' That they are such alters their whole character. It is for this reason difficult to argue from disease to health whether of body or mind. The tendency of those who are constantly engaged in observing such cases is to exaggerate the significance of these unhealthy symptoms. This holds more especially with abnormalities of the sexual instinct, because it is one of the strongest. There is unfortunately a strong tendency in psycho-analytic writers to regard it as the sole original spring of psychical energy, which is wrong biologically and contrary to experience. It is misleading to specify this as the only source of the spiritual energy which takes the form of art and religion (p. 84). And normal healthy experience revolts against the suggestion that the caresses of child and parent have a suppressed sexual basis, as is maintained in the chapter on 'By-ways of the Sex-instinct.' Of the two leading exponents of this psychology Prof. Freud is the most committed to the sex-idea. He sees sex everywhere, just as at one time some anthropologists explained most things by a sun- or a serpent-theory. The writer of the present volume by no means follows him blindly. He writes: "The Freudian school hold that all the primitive psychic energy of a child is sex-energy in a wide sense, but there is no more ground for this belief than in the case of primitive man" (p. 85). The author, however, defends the use of the term *libido*; but, to say the least, it is an unfortunate designation for psychic energy at large, though quite appropriate in the narrower use of Freud (p. 63, note). This term is used by Professor Jung to cover all psychic energy from the narrowest animal cravings to the highest ideal aims. It can hardly, then, be said to be appropriate. And it must be remembered that there is here no materialistic preconception, the relations of mind and matter being regarded throughout from the point of view of parallelism, thus placing all these widely differing spiritual elements upon the same spiritual level.

H. C. C.

FATHER WILLIAM DOYLE, S. J.

By Alfred O'Rahilly, Professor in the University of Ireland.  
(Longmans); pp. 340; 9s. net.

FATHER WILLIAM DOYLE, S.J., whose dates are 1878 to 1917, offered himself as a Chaplain for the Front in November, 1914, was accepted after a year's waiting, was a zealous Padre amongst the

Irish troops, went into the fighting with his men, and was killed in August, 1917. During the year and a half that he served in the army he was as brave as the bravest there, and the beauty of his character shone out in his selfless efforts to help the dying and the dead. The description of his life as a Military Chaplain in the Great War, from p. 214 to the end, reminds us of similar stories of other Padres who, under his and other forms of Christianity, gave themselves and their lives for their country, and lived and died as bravely and as nobly. The able author of this book, however, has written of Doyle in the style in which the life of a Saint is usually depicted for the use of devout people. We doubt not but that his rich and powerful Society will, in due course, agitate for, and obtain, the costly sanction of his Canonization, as a tribute to the Jesuits, to France and to the War itself. With this view the work goes far beyond what was needed to describe Fr. William Doyle, either as priest or patriot. Indeed the first part of the book, nearly two-thirds, is taken up with the life of Doyle, which resolves itself into his life as a Jesuit. Born of pious Irish parents in 1873, the youngest of seven children, young Doyle was always frail and delicate, of a highly strung and nervous temperament. Such a lad, in such surroundings, in Ireland, was pretty sure to enter the Religious life, and in 1891 he went into the Jesuit novitiate of Tullaby. We are told all about his long training as novice, Scholastic philosopher, theologian and priest, through some fifteen years. All this is described fully and frankly and, as it were, from within, with copious quotations from his notes of Retreats made and other private papers. We are given further many intimate self-revelations of his inner life, which he had expressly directed should be burnt at his death. These his Jesuit superior handed over to the author for use, and they are here published for the edification of pious readers.

While some will take these pages as recording the life of a new Saint of to-day, they will by many others be judged deeply interesting and as affording good matter for psychological study. All that is here written is a perfectly true and genuine record of an enthusiastic soul who worked out the teachings of his superiors, and sought to live the life of a Mediæval saint in these days of movement and modernity. His mortifications were extreme: he aimed at immolation; and his life and death in the War were in his view the carrying out of his call to suffering and martyrdom. This is all written up elaborately with commendation, and it will

doubtless be read by many and even copied by some similar ardent spirits. It is clear that, when he came to use his training in active life at the Front, Doyle shone out as a fine and fearless chaplain, who, not only fulfilled all his spiritual functions, but was always cheery and cheerful, encouraging and enlightening to his men in their many hardships. None the less, looked at from the outside, it will seem to some that, granted the premises, his life could not have been otherwise. The terrific training given by the Jesuit system forms a character and a style of sanctity which has its well-nigh inevitable result, at least outwardly. Yet while we see this, and know that many of the men who live through that moulding will arrive at this state, it sometimes happens that the machine goes wrong. The late George Tyrrell is the most recent example. He stood all the tests and went through the whole drastic training, was a leading light in his Society and a popular director, wrote brilliant books which sold well and are still selling. Then he became the apostle of Modernism and ended in utter failure, out of his Order, and excommunicate from the Church for which he had done so much. But, as against this apparent breakdown of the searching system through which he passed, it must be noted that Tyrrell in his own autobiography, written when about 40, practically admits that he never really believed in anything or anybody. How is this to be explained? When we know that fully half of those who enter this novitiate fall out on their way through the two years of trial, while others fail in later stages, it seems strange that one who got to the winning post, should never have been truly known to those with whom he lived? Was there too much externality in his life or, as we say to-day, was it mainly 'camouflage' to keep up the tradition?

This book, at all events, gives the genuine portrait of a saintly soul, simple and strong in goodness of character. Yet one wonders whether he would not have been just as good and as great, essentially, had he been a simple parish priest, doing his daily work and going out willingly to the War as a Military Chaplain. This is an interesting point in Spiritual Psychology. Is it possible for any methods in the Religious life to alter the fundamental character of a human soul? The two cases of William Doyle and George Tyrrell are full of interest for comparison. Do these many prayers, mortifications and immolations make any substantial difference in the development of racial or inherited tendencies? It is the old question of cause

and effect. The true inner life of a man can never be changed from outside; but his ways, words and habits can be moulded and drilled in detail, leaving the interior soul or heart to grow and develop as it will.

F. W.

### THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY.

The General Principle of Relativity in its Philosophical and Historical Aspect. By H. Wildon Carr, D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. (Macmillan): pp. 165; 7s. 6d. net.

PROFESSOR WILDON CARR here presents us with a timely and useful contribution to the rapidly increasing literature of the subject. It is not so much an exposition of the Einstein theory itself—though that is most excellently and concisely summarised in so far as it bears upon the fundamental concepts of space, time and movement—but is an endeavour to estimate the relation of the theory to, and its effect upon, the general trend of philosophy and metaphysics; and we are presented with an extremely useful survey of the historical aspects of the problem. Apparently Dr. Wildon Carr thinks that the revolution which the modern theory will effect is going to be very great indeed; that it will in fact effect as complete a change as that which was brought about by Descartes when he revised the philosophical outlook upon the world on the basis of the Copernican astronomy. Time alone can show whether this will be so or not. At present the position appears to be somewhat singular, for both Idealists and Realists seem inclined to claim the theory in support of their own particular views. In and by itself the Einstein theory has nothing whatsoever to do with philosophy or metaphysics; it is pure empiricism. It is a wonderful advance in our knowledge as to *how* we see things, but it leaves untouched the question as to *what* things are: that is to say, the fundamental question as between Idealism and Realism. The primary revolution which it effects is in science, not in philosophy; but any distinct scientific advance is bound to have its repercussion in philosophical thought and even in theology.

Dr. Wildon Carr appears to think that the theory takes us back to the conceptual Monads of Leibnitz; but this is a very debatable point. Our own view is that it does not in any way touch the root-question of Reality—of a Reality, that is to say,

which transcends all the relativities of Appearance. It does not touch the antinomies of Kant; it neither brings us nearer to nor takes us further from the 'thing in itself.' From one point of view it may appear to deny that such a 'thing' exists; and this is apparently the point of view which Dr. Wildon Carr takes when he says: "There is no absolute physical reality which a mind may contemplate in its pure independence of the contemplator and the conditions of his contemplation. The new principle is that every observer is himself the absolute, and not, as has hitherto been supposed, the relative, centre of the universe. There is no universe common to all observers and private to none" (p. 23). But the Realists are hardly likely to accept that proposition. They will point out in the first place that as a matter of fact the—assumed—constant velocity of light is such an absolute: it is invariable for all observers whatever may be their 'frames' of reference; and surely this must imply a physical reality purely independent of the contemplator and the conditions of his contemplation. In the second place, not only is this so, but the whole intention of the theory is to preserve the order of nature intact while the perceptions vary. To do this, absolute time and space, which were previously considered to be invariables, are now taken to be the variables, and the physical fact remains invariable. For example: a measuring rod moving in the direction of its length is said—somewhat misleadingly—to be shortened in proportion to its velocity. But it is only perceptually not physically shortened. Granted the existence of the rod at all, it cannot at one and the same moment be actually six inches long to suit one observer to whom it is moving at a certain velocity, nine inches to suit another to whom it is moving relatively at lesser velocity, and twelve inches to suit still another. We do not give up our concept of a real rod of a definite length, although we can never know absolutely what that length is. Further, the 'interval' in four-dimensional time-space is precisely the same for every observer; for variations in one dimension are proportionately compensated for in others. This again points to the fact of an invariable thing in itself independent of the observer.

Metaphysics in its attempt to penetrate the infinite and compass the absolute, has hitherto always been compelled to turn back and move in a vicious circle. The Einstein theory now provides metaphysicians with a concrete squirrel-cage of curved space, round which they can move quite happily and endlessly without the bugbear of having to go out in a straight line into

infinite space. But the theory does not do away with the corresponding bugbear of infinite time, for we have still to regard time as a straight line extension which never began and will never end.

If, on the basis of the Einstein theory, philosophy—as Dr. Wildon Carr appears to think—is able to re-orient itself in the direction of a *spiritual* reality—well and good. But if, even to-day, we can have two such philosophers as Mr. Bertrand Russell and M. Bergson taking opposite views of Zeno's arguments against movement, it may well be that the question as to what bearing the theory of relativity has on the question of Reality may still be debatable some two thousand or more years hence—if it can last as long. It stands on the very perilous ground of negative evidence; on the fact that, so far, the existence of the ether of space is not a demonstrable physical reality. When we remember that the scientific dogmatism of last century as to the indestructibility of the physical atom rested on the same basis of negative evidence, and that it is now utterly swept away, we shall not be too confident as to the survival of the present theory of relativity.

W. K.

#### PHENOMENA OF MATERIALISATION.

A Contribution to the Investigation of Mediumistic Teleplastics.

By Baron von Schrenck-Notzing, Practising Physioian in Munich. Translated by E. E. Fournier d'Albe, D.Sc. (Lond. and Birm.). With 225 Illustrations (Kegan Paul); pp. 340; 35s. net.

IN a lengthy article in *THE QUEST*, July, 1914, attention was drawn to these very remarkable mediumistic physical phenomena so strikingly illustrated by the amazing photographs with which the German and French accounts were equipped. They are a valuable and unique collection. The body of the letterpress consists of a carefully recorded series of experiments carried out under the severest tests that could be devised to eliminate the possibility of fraud. The medium was examined in every part of her person, changed into a specially designed tight fitting garment, sewn up round the neck and wrists, and both hands and feet were held. Mlle. Marthe Béraud, the subject of these searching experiments, is not a paid medium. Already before the author carried out his systematic investigations (1909-1913), she had been adopted by Mme. Juliette Bisson, the widow of the distinguished French

dramatist. It is this lady who has mothered her, explained to her the importance of the matter, and encouraged her to continue, in spite of strong personal disinclination, to submit herself to long and painful investigations out of which she got and gets no profit or enjoyment. Many scientific men have thus been able to witness the phenomena.

The large-paged handsome volume before us is considerably increased from the first German edition (1914), and now includes a history of the controversy that arose after its publication, subsidiary material collected by the author and other investigators and additional photographs.

The photographs were all taken by flash-light, and of course shew only a momentary phase of what for the observers was a gradual building up process and the reverse, the plasm issuing from various parts and organs of the medium's body and returning thither. In the case of another medium who exhibited somewhat similar phenomena, a cinema-film was obtained. Whatever might be the state of the plasm, crude or highly developed, the instant the photograph was taken all disappeared like a flash into the medium and her extremely sensitive nature suffered very greatly from these rude nervous shocks. The substance is shewn in many phases of what may be termed embryonic development: patches, streaks, lumps and tangles of strings or cords, membranous tissues, in which may be seen the hint of the features of a face or to which are attached partial organic formations, such as a finger; then again a series of masks in different stages of manufacture. There is also a number of finished faces, most of which give the impression of being reproductions from photographs, as indeed it has been proved that some of them are. But it is impossible to give briefly in words any adequate notion of the multifarious processes and products of this teleplastic laboratory. The photographs and detailed description alone can do this. As the tale unfolds it throws down challenge after challenge to our scepticism, and yet when all is told it persuades us that nothing but the absolute conviction that these things have occurred under the most exacting conditions of scientific control, could have given those concerned the courage to present such an account to the world. No one with any ulterior object to serve would have dreamed of putting before the public so much that is by no means free from suspicion or pleasant. Some of the faces produce a most disagreeable impression, to say the least of it, and there is much to shock the æsthetic taste. It is a clinical story for the most part and we have



to read of the labouring to bring forth, of straining and convulsive effort, groanings and cries of pain, fainting, vomiting and blood-spitting; and yet we have been informed by a very competent observer that in the earliest days it was all very different. The substance was brilliant and the appearances beautiful. There has been a steady æsthetic deterioration as harder and harder conditions have been imposed and the medium reserved for purely scientific investigation.

If, as out-and-out sceptics aver, it must in the nature of things be all ascribed to fraud, then the least we can say is that Mlle. 'Eva C.' is a very exceptional genius to have remained undetected for the dozen years since Mme. Bisson adopted her, and all the more so when many of the plainly 'manufactured' forms shown are such as at once to provoke suspicion and therefore challenge investigators to be acutely vigilant. It is rumoured that in 1906 she was exposed in Algiers, where in the preceding year Professor Richet examined her materialisations and testified to their genuineness, and all kinds of accusations and hypotheses of deception have been put forward since then. It is a familiar and facile 'explanation'; but Baron von Schrenck-Notzing's important and impressive volume should do no little to put it out of count for all impartial readers. The phenomena are regarded by the author and also by the translator, who has witnessed some of them, as manifestations of "a new, or rather hitherto unexplored, function of certain human organisms." In the Introduction hypotheses are discussed but none is put forward, as attempts at explanation are considered at present premature. All therefore is treated with much restraint and with the sole purpose of giving a faithfully objective account of what took place. It is with such physical phenomena of mediumship that exact science can make the best beginning, and the present volume should be studied together with the late Dr. Crawford's sound experimental work on a very forcible, if less formally developed, phase of the same dynamic plasm that is of so protean a nature.

#### REDEMPTION—HINDU AND CHRISTIAN.

By Sydney Cave, D.D. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 263; 10s. 6d. net.

THIS is one of the recent volumes of 'The Religious Quest of India' series, edited so carefully by Drs. Farquhar and Griswold and so excellently produced by the Oxford University Press. It represents

the present high-water mark of Missionary enlightenment and is a pleasing example of the new spirit of courtesy in religious controversy. This is all to the good and deserves encouragement; the Missionary mistakes of the past are freely admitted and deplored and the failure of Christianity to represent the religion of Jesus is frankly confessed. Nevertheless it can hardly be said that as yet the failures on the other side are proportionately allowed for, and the doctrines accorded an ungrudging statement. Far more could be said for them by their competent defenders, and it is to be hoped, if not quite to be expected, that upholders of them in India will bestir themselves to make a serious and courteous answer. It is unfair to argue that the failure on the one side is in spite of the doctrines and the failure on the other is because of the doctrines. It seems to us, for instance, vain to continue to assert that the goal of spiritual endeavour in India leads practically to non-existence, and that the supreme idea of God is that of an insentient, unconscious and incurious abstraction. It is true that the Godhead (Brahman) is conceived as the Beyond, transcending the notion of the Lord or Logos (Īshvara). Brahman, however, is not an empty abstraction but the One Reality; if there is reluctance to be satisfied with any, even the highest, man-thought attributes as adequate expressions of what the whole universe fails fully to reveal, nevertheless, when any are ventured, we find Brahman declared to be self-existent reality and self-revealing knowledge, in loving blissful union. Brahman cannot rightly be said to be unconscious, although for our present highest consciousness such transcendent super-consciousness as is ascribed to the Godhead must remain the 'Divine Dark.' The ideal of spiritual knowledge is equated with the very nature of the Divine. Brahman, so far from being nescience, is the very self of knowledge (*jñāna-maya*). The Godhead is omniscience and *a fortiori* omniscient. Nor again can the doctrine of *karma*, which seems to be the special *bête noire* of Dr. Cave, be easily disposed of, unless the law of cause and effect is to be jettisoned. Dr. Cave writes as though it were impossible to be ever free of *karma*, whereas the whole doctrine of *mukti*, or liberation, is that a man may here and now burn up all attachment to the fruit of action and become *karma*-less. Freedom, liberation, salvation, is precisely this rising above the polarized realm of the law of cause and effect which conditions the whole activities of the self in separation; this is to be achieved through union with the freedom of the universal spirit by whose wisdom the whole process of becoming and personal

existence in time and space is made subject to the fundamental law of action and reaction being equal and opposite. Good action as well as bad falls equally under this law; but super-personal activity, that is action without any self-reference, is possible, and this alone spells spiritual freedom and true knowledge. The latter part of Dr. Cave's volume is devoted to setting forth the idea of a Personal God as the final revelation of truth, and that too pre-eminently and indeed uniquely in the person of Jesus. This has been done often before, and Dr. Cave makes eloquent use of all the best arguments that can be marshalled in its favour. But it is hardly to be expected that he will convince his Indian audience if they are at all instructed in their own doctrines. Educated religious Hindus are by no means averse from giving high honour and reverence to the great teacher of Christendom, and they cheerfully admit the legitimacy of the Personal God idea as an indispensable element in theology; they are however unable to agree that this notion constitutes the supreme truth of religion or that Jesus exhausts the revelation of God to man. They remain unpersuaded themselves, chiefly owing to their religious heredity and its super-personal doctrines; and their confidence in them is by no means diminished by the knowledge that in the West also large numbers born and bred in the Christian tradition are equally unable to accept the positions which Dr. Cave defends as the final revelation of religious truth. The insistence that Christianity possesses a holy and moral God and that India is without one is hardly in keeping with the profession of following the better way of a sympathetic appreciation of the best in that ancient land of high religious endeavour.

#### SELECTIONS FROM THE RUBAIYĀT AND ODES OF HĀFIZ.

Collected from many old Persian Manuscripts and rendered into English Verse by a Member of the Persian Society of London. Together with an Account of Sūfi Mysticism. London (Watkins); pp. 147; 10s. 6d. net.

THIS luxuriously produced volume contains much that will delight lovers of the great Persian poet who was a contemporary of Dante. The author, who has sought far and wide among the many poems attributed to Hāfiz to make his selection, is at great pains to bring out the mystical implications of what only too frequently have all the appearance of frank earthly love-songs depicting every mood of

passionate longing for the beloved. Mingled with this are ecstatic outbursts singing the praises of the wine-cup. It must be confessed that it is no easy matter to read high mysticism into some of it. Nevertheless it seems plain from the less veiled utterances of the poet that he intended all to be construed in this sense. For ourselves we could have wished that he had more frequently revealed his high purpose, had written more odes free throughout from what must be to most readers, at any rate in the West, frequently misleading. Rarely in this selection or in other translations do we come across odes that can be left to speak for themselves in simplicity. Couplets, however, can be frequently chosen, as for instance the following from five different odes, telling us who the Beloved really is and what the wine-cup.

- (a) This borrowed life which the Friend entrusted to Hāfiz,  
I shall one day deliver up to Him when I see His face.
- (b) Not now only have I, distracted in heart, laid my face  
On Thy threshold, for in Eternity-without-beginning I laid  
it there.
- (c) He who has, like me, drunk in Eternity-without-beginning a  
draught from the Friend's cup—  
Through intoxication raiseth not his head till the morning of  
the Resurrection.
- (d) Drink wine: for if eternal life is to be obtained in the world,  
Its only source is the wine of Paradise.
- (e) They gave me wine from the cup of the splendour of His  
attributes.

Of Hāfiz as a poet, all who know the original are loud in their praises. The music of his verse has secured for him an imperishable niche in the temple of fame, perhaps even more than the concealed Sūfism which only those who have long familiarity with the symbolism of religious love-poetry can hope securely to discover for themselves in the bulk of his writing. Our Hāfiz-lover has provided his readers with a sketch of Sūfism and with a glossary of frequently recurring words and expressions susceptible of a mystical meaning, or varying spiritual meanings according to the context, and these will prove of good service. But the Anacreon of Persia is at his best when he leaves on one side the symbols of tavern and wine-cup and lips and eyebrows and tresses, and uses other modes of high suggestion. Thus :

"The bird of my heart is a holy bird; its nest is the throne of God:  
It is weary of its cage, this body; it is sated with the world.  
When my bird flies from this dust-heap  
It will again take up its abode in that nest."

Or again, addressing would-be teachers unknowing of the true path:

"O ignorant one! strive to become a master of knowledge;  
until thou hast traversed the road, how can'st thou become a  
guide of the road?"

"Yea, O Son! strive to learn from the instructor of Love in  
the school of divine truths, so that one day thou mayest become  
one of the fathers.

"Sleeping and eating hath kept thee far from the high ranks  
of Love;

Thou wilt reach the Friend when thou becomest sleepless and  
foodless."

That is to say, give up self-indulgence and become spiritually  
vigilant and carnally selfless.

#### THE SPIRITUAL BODY.

By C. E. Rolt. Edited with an Introduction by W. J. Sparrow-Simpson. London (S.P.C.K.); pp. 145; 6s. net.

THIS is a second posthumous volume by Rolt, whose *Dionysius the Areopagite* was reviewed in a recent issue. The author accepts the supernatural phenomena studied by psychical research, especially the physical and psycho-physical orders of them, fully admitting even the testimony of Crookes, for example. He surveys the 'miraculous' narratives in the Gospels, especially the resurrection-wonder of the theophanies, but without any signs of paying attention to the critical work done on the documents. The manner is rather that of the Sunday School and at times quite naïve. Rolt apparently thought that, if he admitted the genuineness of present-day psychical phenomena, and then assumed that Jesus was a past-master therein, he would win back all of the lost positions of orthodox traditionalism from rationalistic criticism. The theory of a 'spiritual body' he uses as the *deus ex machina* for his apologetics. The 'subtle body' notion is indeed a most fruitful hypothesis, and it is a pity that Rolt was so unknowing of the classical tradition on the subject; an acquaintance with the

history of the development of the speculations thereanent prior, contemporary with and subsequent to the time of Jesus and the N.T. writers, would have enabled him to check his own speculations and values by the comparative method. What the writer does not seem to see, and what many others who accept the genuine and veridical nature of scientifically observed supernormal psychical phenomena and use this to re-establish the so-called 'proof from miracles,' apparently fail to understand, is that a 'wonder' is no proof whatever of the lofty character of the wonder-worker, much less of the truth of his doctrines, and least of all of the absolute claims of divinity made by his worshippers on behalf of Jesus.

Rolt would lightly set aside the 'empty tomb' problem and the resurrection of the actual physical body dogma, by assuming that Jesus by his wonder-power, which our author avers he possessed in highest perfection, disintegrated his dead physical body and so left the linen clothes lying. Well, suppose we admit this as being possible, and for our part we are not prepared to deny such a possibility, how are we better off as regards the claim of an immediate divine manifestation ethically conditioned? The whole of Rolt's contention is that the 'miracles' were shown in order to arouse or confirm the faith of the feeble, and were the more physical the less the power of their faith. Is this an ethical mode of behaviour? We venture to think it is not. The prophetic power in its highest sense is spiritual and not psychical. The disintegration of a gross body, or the 'materialisation' of a subtle body, is no proof of the immediate power of God. We have ourselves too great a veneration for the character of Jesus and his high prophetic activity to set the matter on so low a ground. Jesus, we hold, was not a magician nor even a medium in the common sense of the term. Let it be for once understood that, even when the whole range of psychical possibilities is conceded, when this door is, not only not ajar, but flung wide open, we are still only at the beginning of our task of determining really spiritual values. Rolt has failed to see this, and his essay suffers in proportion. He fails also in the comparative method, and for students his exposition is marred by wearisome repetitions, though perhaps as a popular exponent he has well measured his audience in this respect. Had he been able to revise his MS. himself, however, it is possible that this feature might have been removed. From a general point of view the interest in the fate of this little volume is worth emphasizing. It is published by the S.P.C.K., and intended for wide circulation.

This marks an important moment in the history of the present controversy as to the place and value of psychical phenomena in the religious life. The booklet goes forth, so to say, with the *imprimatur* of respectability upon its back.

#### PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory. By Barbara Low, B.A.,  
Member of the British Psycho-analytical Society, etc.  
Introduction by Ernest Jones, M.D., L.R.C.P. London  
(Allen & Unwin); pp. 191; 5s. net.

A DIFFICULT task was undertaken by Miss Low in this book. To make such a subject intelligible to laymen, and to present it at the same time in condensed form, needed all the ability which this little volume shows her to possess. Freud's theory of the Unconscious presents this creature as an *ensemble* of purely primitive impulses, repressed by a force which he calls the Censorship, and never allowed to emerge into the normal field of consciousness except in some symbolic disguise, such as dreams, fantasies, etc. Of course the bone of contention, gnawed with increasing vigour by Freud's opponents, is his theory that these impulses are all of a sexual nature. The son's devotion to his mother is a subterfuge under which he unconsciously indulges an incestuous attachment begun with the first nestling of his infant body at the breast. All human relationships are interpreted in this light; all the imaginings of the artist are expressions of erotism; the scientist's thirst for knowledge is developed from repressed curiosity regarding the functions of his body in infancy; and so on. Such a theory is naturally resented by the average person who, to the eyes of the Freudian, betrays by his 'resistance' yet another unconscious effort to hide what lies in the obscene depths of the 'normal' psyche. It must be remembered, though, that few doctors have a chance of accurately gauging the normal (either physical or mental), since healthy people avoid them. Hence Freud's admittedly wide experience lies almost exclusively in the field of pathology; moreover the cases which gravitate to him are of that type whose abnormal tendencies are in the direction of sex-mania, he having specialized on that line. It is therefore only natural that his view should be biassed. Miss Low reminds us of Schopenhauer's words about scientists who fail to be scientific in their research through the "intention . . . to find out again some preconceived opinion, or at least not to wound

some favourite idea." This *dictum*, quoted against Freud's opponents, will recur aptly to a student reading, with open mind, the works of Freud or of Dr. Ernest Jones—the authors most quoted by Miss Low. Once having formulated his theory Freud can never again be without an axe to grind, though that axe will doubtless be hidden, with other gruesome objects, in the Chamber of Horrors which he terms the Unconscious. A 'scientific' method which interprets phenomena positively or negatively, according as they fit or do not fit the hypothesis, is open to criticism. If you dream you are building a tower you are indulging a sex-impulse; if you dream you are demolishing one, the meaning is the same, since "an effect may operate negatively as strongly as positively." Applied to other sciences this method suggests Colney Hatch. "The psyche is one entity," we are told. "Unconscious and conscious mind are but two aspects of this entity." Then why should these two aspects develop so unequally? In the normal psyche evolving as a whole, Unconscious and Conscious would be subject to the same 'forces of civilization.' Impulse becoming finer as reason increased, the 'Pleasure-principle' would dominate throughout, Reason teaching Impulse to seek that pleasure on higher planes of experience. Intelligence and determined honesty can lead to harmony without the perils admitted by Freudians (Transference, etc.), and other dangers which they naively ignore, such as telepathy between analyst and patient. Nevertheless, Psychology is indebted to Freud for work which, apart from his peculiar obsession, has thrown new light on the activities of the Unconscious, and (with necessary modifications) is already of practical use in the treatment of the abnormal.

E. E. M.

#### ARCHAIC ENGLAND.

An Essay in Deciphering Prehistory from Megalithic Monuments, Earthworks, Customs, Coins, Place-Names, and Faërie Superstitions. By Harold Bayley, Author of 'New Light on the Renaissance,' etc. London (Chapman and Hall); pp. 894; 25s. net.

In the Jan. no. for 1910 and the Oct. no. for 1914 we reviewed Mr. Bayley's voluminous works entitled *New Light on the Renaissance* and *The Lost Language of Symbolism*, and were regretfully compelled to remark with severity on his utterly uncritical use of



word-play—a very riot of clangs, assonances and libertine associations from the most elemental depths of the sub-conscious—instead of the sober, disciplined methods of sound comparative philology. In the present volume Mr. Bayley continues his wild career. Examples of the easy virtue of his fancy may be found on well-nigh every page. For instance (p. 76): “From Gnosus, whence the Greeks drew all their laws and science, came probably the Greek word *gnosis*, meaning *knowledge*.” Surely any fifth-form boy on the classical side could have told him that Gk.-Lat. *gno*, Eng. *know* (*cnā*, *knā*), Sk. *jñā* (*gñā*) all go back to a common language-stock of roots. Whether or not Gnosus was the originating centre of Hellenic laws and science—a very debateable point—place-names are very rarely, if ever, the origin of root-ideas in language. On the next page we note the phrase: “The Pythagorean or Gnostic symbol known as the pentagon or Solomon’s seal.” But ‘Solomon’s seal’ is the hexagon and not the pentagon, and the pentagon is not peculiarly Pythagorean, much less Gnostic; it is far more ancient. So much for two pages; and they are not exceptional pages. On the other hand, Mr. Bayley has collected a huge mass of material and opinions bearing on the very obscure and puzzling prehistoric traces and on the embryonic indications of archæology and history which have to be analysed and criticised in any attempt to reconstruct the barest outlines of the archaic evolutionary development of the most primitive stock of our very mixed heredity. The volume is interestingly equipped with upwards of 600 illustrations, picturing as many archæological puzzles. We certainly owe thanks to anyone who can throw light on the origins of the British race. But while we applaud Mr. Bayley’s industry, we deplore his extravagant aberrations in word-play, which is with him the ‘master-key’ to unlock every puzzle. He would be well advised to keep clear at any rate of languages of which he patently knows nothing, and so save himself from such ‘howlers’ as the following. Having premised that the elephant symbolises “the vanquisher of obstacles, the leader or opener of the way,” he continues (p. 160): “Ganesa, the elephant-headed Hindu god, is invariably invoked at the beginning of any enterprise, and the name Ganesa is practically the same as *genesis*, the origin or beginning.” But *Ganesha* means simply ‘lord’ (*isha*) of the ‘kinds’ or ‘hosts’ (*gana*) of creatures, and has nothing to do with *genesis*, which again does not mean ‘beginning,’ but ‘generation.’ It is true that the book *Genesis* comes at the beginning of the Bible, but . . . ! Mr. Bayley would do well

to make a study of the methods of psychoanalysis, and especially of the elaborate work done by it on word-association; he would then be able to resolve the 'philological' complex which is the cause of so many distressing symptoms in his neurotic literary children.

PREREQUISITES FOR THE STUDY OF JACOB BÖHME.

By C. J. Barker. London (Watkins); pp. 82; 1s. net.

THIS enthusiastic paper originally appeared in the now defunct *Seeker* in 1913. Mr. Barker is a devoted student and admirer of Jakob the Theosopher, and has laboured assiduously over the texts in English translation, of which he has edited and republished a good half-dozen volumes. What advice then does he offer to those attempting a first acquaintance with this obscure writer, or rather automatist, who frequently knew not what he wrote, and disclaimed all comprehension of its meaning when out of the psychical state? We are asked not to nail down the script and rack it on the Procrustean bed of criticism, but rather to let ourselves enter into the spirit which inspired the scribe and become as little children of simple and unquestioning faith in the high excellence of the inspiration. "If a man would reach into the ground wherein God knows Himself," writes Mr. Barker, "man must lay aside reason, and call to his aid a faculty other than reason." Here our Böhmist uses the term 'reason' for the discursive reason or understanding solely. For ourselves we ascribe a far more extended and profound meaning to the term. Pursuing his thought Mr. Barker writes: "Close your book, or his book, as the case may be. Remain where you are in your study, and listen. Be very still. Forget all about Böhme, and forget all about yourself. Listen!" In this way our friend believes that all the obscurities and contradictions of Böhme's script will be cleared up, and we shall get into immediate contact with that Spirit which illuminated him. Well, there is something in this as a mode of meditation or contemplation; but it does not solve the many problems of that intermediate subconscious world through which all that came to Böhme reached him. Like all the mystics, Jakob, or whatever complex stood behind him, is mixed in expression. The danger of pushing this mode of interpretation to an extreme, is that it begs the whole question,—namely, whether in all things Böhme's inspiration was immediate and unadulterated, straight from the realm of truth itself. It is evident that any or every 'scripture' in which a man

has plenary faith, could be so envisaged and so approached; and the result would simply confirm his preconceptions, prepossessions and prejudices. For ourselves, we prefer to rely on the harmonious exercise of all the functions and powers of our complex human nature as being most probably the safest mode of approach to the mystery of the Spirit which over-arches and subsumes all, and therefore we approve a searching analysis and wise criticism of Böhme's works, remembering of course that he must be ultimately valued by what he wrote originally mainly in the vigorous German of his day. What came through him was at times strongly courageous over against the narrow orthodoxy of the day, and has a message in it for our own times; but it is not all so.

#### A NEW CHAPTER IN THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT.

By Benchara Branford. London (Chatto & Windus); pp. xlviii.+190; 5s. net.

MR. BRANFORD has been hailed as a seer and compared to William Blake. In his previous work *Janus and Vesta* he wrote of the world-crisis and of that which should follow it. It was, in many respects, a wonderful piece of work; a little difficult to follow by reason of its apparent lack of symmetry. The present volume marks a distinct advance towards simplicity in style on that of its predecessor, and at the same time shows no falling off in the quality of its vision. The Prelude states the need of the present age in words of deep significance: "In these days of world-wide agony, confusion and unrest, what can be more necessary to statecraft than to open all the windows of the soul to the inflow of all facts and truths: the facts that speed to us with clamant voices on the hurricane pinions of Space from living and breathing fellow-mortals, suffering and striving in the wide reaches of the earth: the whispered truths borne softly upon the unwearied wings of Time from the far past of our ancestral experience? For time-tested truths are the grand beacons ahead lighting up our path: fleeting facts are the homely lanterns guiding our feet." A genuine philosophy of statecraft is greatly needed to-day when, on all sides, a policy of opportunism is blindly followed. Mr. Branford in this book forecasts the gradual evolution of a world-society which shall be humanistic in spirit, 'geographical in warp, occupational in weft'—and emphasizes the wonderful opportunity offered to the Anglo-Saxon peoples at the present juncture of world-politics for the development of a wide commonwealth which

shall ultimately avail to bring peace to the earth. Vision and effort, the goal and the quest, are set before the readers of this book in a manner at once arresting and practical. It is philosophy brought from the realms of pure thought and allowed to function in the world of men and affairs.

H. L. H.

THE COSMIC COMMONWEALTH.

By Edmond Holmes. (Constable); pp. 118; 5s. net.

THE present day is, of necessity, a time for high and clear thinking on fundamentals. In this essay the author bids us reconsider our conception of God. He claims that the collapse of our social structure is due to defects in the ideals upon which it is based, and that the supreme task before the present generation is to achieve a fresh ideal of the nature of God. "We have too long thought of God as the autocratic Overlord of the Universe. Has not the time come for us to think of Him as the symbol and centre of cosmic unity, as the Presiding Genius or President of the Cosmic Commonwealth?" Mr. Holmes is a little hard on 'the orthodox,' whom he is inclined to misrepresent as conceiving of God almost solely as transcendent—an omnipotent autocrat—and neglecting altogether the complementary truth of divine immanence. He is probably right in suggesting that of late the emphasis on the divine transcendence has been unduly stressed, and that democratic ideals call for a revision of this conception of God. Modern man does need to think of God as immanent in the Cosmic Commonwealth, directing it from within: though the other conception is still needed lest we make the mistake of identifying *vox populi* with *vox Dei*. Mr. Holmes' book, delightful and suggestive as it is, certainly runs the risks entailed in this identification. The author has said some things that badly needed saying. He has opened up a mystical conception of corporate and civic life. He has set before his readers a lofty and inspiring ideal. He has shewn mankind to be not merely a heterogeneous collection of individuals but a single entity—a Cosmic Commonwealth. This needed saying, for there are still many people who conceive the purpose of life to be the salvation of their own souls, and who regard religion as a private affair between themselves and God. Mr. Holmes sets us thinking and, though we may not agree with all his conclusions, yet we are extraordinarily grateful to him for the mental stimulus he never fails to give.

H. L. H.

## MAN'S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH.

Or the Other Side of Life in the Light of Scripture, Human Experience and Modern Research. By Charles L. Tweedale, Vicar of Weston, Otley. London (Grant Richards); 2nd ed., pp. 582; 10s. 6d. net.

THE second edition of Mr. Tweedale's useful volume is considerably enlarged from the first. It is worth reading, not only because it classifies and summarizes from the 'classical' literature of the widespread Spiritualistic movement, but also because of the number of first-hand evidential cases which have occurred in the author's own family circle, owing chiefly to the mediumship of his wife. The evidence adduced tends largely to put the unassisted subconscious theory out of court. The book is also of interest as being the favourable pronouncement of a clergyman of the Anglican community concerning psychical phenomena, as his strenuous contention that, if such phenomena are held to be fraudulent or to be sufficiently explained away by the theory of the subconscious, then one of the most essential elements of traditional Christian belief based on the authenticity of the narratives of the New Testament documents must be jettisoned. You cannot have it both ways. We regret here to have to remark that, like so much of the new Spiritualistic apologetics for the 'proof from miracle,' though it is strenuously denied there is any 'supernatural' element in the phenomena, the rush forward is too hurried, owing to the imprudent treatment of the narratives as all of equal validity. There is such a thing as New Testament criticism; and though 'psychical' considerations modify some of the 'rationalistic' positions, they by no means dispose of all of them. It is also a pity to find the Greek quotations so inaccurately reproduced. Surely Mr. Tweedale could have refused to pass the proofs until they were correct. It is the same with the German quotation on p. 362.

## TWENTY CURES AT LOURDES.

Medically discussed. Dr. F. de Grandmaison de Bruno. Translated by Dom Hugo Bénévot and Dom Luke Izard. Preface by Sir Bertram Windle, M.D. London and Edinburgh (Sands); pp. 270; 7s. net.

THE case for the Lourdes Miracles is ably put before the Medical Faculty by Sir Bertram Windle in his short preface. Dr. de

Grandmaison gives particulars of twenty cases, two of which are ruled out, as being incomplete cures. The remaining eighteen were accomplished when the sufferers were in such a condition that any possibility of a normal cure was out of the question, except after much lapse of time. Some of them were instantaneous; others took place after more than one immersion in the Lourdes water; two, at a distance from Lourdes. Grave disease of bone and tissue was cured by means which Dr. de Grandmaison can only call miraculous: *i.e.* not within the domain of ordinary therapeutics. Each case has been submitted to the most careful medical investigation and analysis, both at the Bureau des Constatations at Lourdes, and by eminent medical men in Paris and elsewhere. The patients were sent with their own doctors' medical certificates and recommendations, and most of them were kept under observation on their return from Lourdes. Not one of the eighteen cases cited has relapsed. Dr. de Grandmaison writes as a medical man, without heat or prejudice, describing each case clearly, with explanations of technical terms, for which the lay reader will be grateful. He argues that no known clinical experience can explain the cure of cancer of the tongue or breast, gastric ulcer of long-standing, fistula, tuberculous abscess, within a few minutes. The diseases should have taken a number of months to cure, if their healing and tissue repair had occurred naturally. The waters of Lourdes have been analysed, and are not found to possess any therapeutic quality. Dr. de Grandmaison states plainly that he believes the 'miracles' to be due to the direct intervention of the Virgin Mary. He says that if the sceptic will not go so far, he must at least acknowledge their super-normal nature. If the integrity of the doctors concerned in the examinations and reports and the unimpeachable character of the testimony to the reality of the cures be granted, there is nothing to be said against Dr. de Grandmaison's conclusions, in so far as the cures cannot be accounted for on any medical theory. The second part of the book deals with 'objections' and their answers. It is a good summary of the Catholic position, stated in reasonable and lucid terms. Fraud, suggestion, hypnotism are ruled out of court. The question of these cures cannot be dismissed lightly. The Catholic may account for them to his own satisfaction. To the non-Catholic, and even more to the non-Christian, they must for the present remain a mystery, which only an increase of knowledge along psychological and psychical lines can solve.

O. S.

## THE DAWN OF HOPE.

By the Hand of Edith A. Leale. London (Kegan Paul); pp. xvii. + 199; 5s. net.

THIS book consists of a series of communications received by the authoress from her dead son. There is nothing at all remarkable in the actual messages. They resemble a host of others received in similar circumstances. It is surely time to concentrate more attention upon the method of communication and less upon the results. From the scientific point of view, the method is the more valuable factor; for every clairvoyant and clairaudient person seems to receive the same kind of message. The authoress of this book describes her messages as inspirational rather than purely automatic, and denies the influence in any degree of the subconscious faculty. Three clergymen contribute introductory notes to the book.

H. L. H.

## AMETHYSTS.

By D. B. Jones. London (Elkin Mathews); pp. xviii. + 223; 7s. 6d. net.

THIS volume is a collection of social and ethical essays, written while the author was campaigning in German East Africa. They are brilliant little papers on a variety of subjects, chief amongst which is the ever-present problem (if it is a problem?) of sex. The African environment has seemed to cast a spell over the author, and the reader feels the detachment as well as the luxuriance of the tropics in the writer's method of treatment. It is a book that tempts a reviewer to quote, for the thoughts are original and expressed in admirable English. All who love *belles-lettres* should become familiar with this new writer's work; they will find themselves eagerly looking forward to his next book. He brings the atmosphere of contemplation into the fret of contemporary life, and steeps the world of bustle in the stillness of an eternal calm.

H. L. H.

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THE Editor regrets that owing to ill-health his promised paper on 'The Religion of Jesus and the Religion about Jesus' has had to be abandoned.



# The Quest Society.

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Mystic Feeling and the Emotional Life - - - - -	Prof. A. Caldecott	289
A Modern Interpretation of Alchemy - - - - -	A. H. E. Lee	302
A Beggar at the Gate - - - - -	Moysehe Oyved	316
The Man of Asia - - - - -	L. Adams Beck	317
The Experience of Divine Immanence in Nature - - - - -	Robert H. Thouless	333
The Non-Historicity School - - - - -	Dr. K. C. Anderson	345
Orthodoxy, Psychology & Mystical Experience - - - - -	The Editor	360
Spring in the Woods - - - - -	A. R. Horwood	379
Footprints - - - - -	F. J. Cannon	386
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A Swan Song - - - - -	Oliver Fox	400
Reviews and Notices - - - - -	- - - - -	401

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numerous cotton threads had been pulled out of the fabric, and there was much fraying, showing that the plasma has a considerable rubbing action as it moves upwards. As before, the small projecting parts of the embroidery were most heavily marked.

Traces and tinges of carmine could be seen going right to the top of both stockings.

The whole foot of each stocking was affected by the dye. Carmine had gone in at the heel and sides of the shoes, then under the heel and along the sole and up over the toes. There were well-defined traces up the front of the foot inside the shoe. The parts of the foot most affected were the places where it was pressing most tightly on the shoe, such as the ball of the heel and the bearing surface near the toes.

The whole of both stockings looked as though they had been scraped by something adhering tightly to them, moving up and down, pressing into the wool and tearing little ridges in the wool. The deductions from this experiment are as follows:—

- (1) The plasma comes from the trunk, goes down the stocking, adhering closely to it and scraping it along its length.
- (2) The plasma enters the shoe and goes right round the foot of the medium.
- (3) It is possible that no plasma originates in the foot, but that it all comes downwards into the shoe from the trunk.
- (4) The plasma must have considerable consistency, for it has a strong tearing action on the stockings and knickers.

It should be noted that, in the above test, the carmine, as it moved downwards and struck the region of stocking at the edge of the shoe, was thickly deposited on the fabric there, but that sufficient got inside the shoe to suggest that the

FIG. L.




FIG. E.





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In the emotional nature I include Feelings, Emotions and Sentiments, as these are discriminated in recent psychology, in gradation from simplicity to complexity. And these not only as recipient, but as out-reaching Affections for objects, whether things or persons; and as existing in a state of suspension with constant pressure towards satisfaction in the form of Desires.

I assume that Teleology is established as a principle in the emotional as in other regions of mental life: *i.e.* that no feeling or desire arises except in correlation with some situation of the soul; that each has a value of an intrinsic kind and a value in the welfare of the soul as a whole. They are such as "our nature cannot help feeling," as Plato said. Ultimately, though often obscured, feelings are all "related to the preservation of the individual or of the species," as Ribot propounds. There are indeed many instances where we have lost the functional clue: surplusages and deficiencies; and these may be in fact more abundant than perfection of working is; but philosophy rightly contemplates norms and standards, unless it is prepared to accept defeat and abandon the field.

I will not, however, follow Plato's method in *The Republic* and begin with the perfect soul, but, reversely, work upwards. As the individual soul begins to live, a few simple feelings present themselves in correspondence with the simple situations in which it finds itself. Enjoyment of food, of bodily movement, curiosity, liking to possess things, fear, anger, and so on. And I take it as proved that the individual child begins with a considerable deposit of dispositions to particular forms of feeling due to inheritance.

But the constituents of even a simple plurality cannot occupy the limited platform of consciousness simultaneously, and the necessity arises from some *order* being established among them. For a time all appears to be sheer conflict according to their respective strength. The lowest conception of Order in a plurality is that of a presumed equality of rights: in this, as Plato says, "all appetences are alike, and

ought to be equally respected"; "a man in this stage will one day drink to excess, on another be under strict training; at one time indolent and careless, at another, applying himself to severe study; he will at one time be absorbed in trade, at another in public affairs." Here we have 'democracy' in the soul: the first kind of following 'nature' of the three specified by Butler. Now and then individuals seem to find such a life pleasant and liberal and happy, and they follow it to the end.

But such examples are few: in most, this rudimentary Order is broken into by inward disruption or by pressure from external situations. Sooner or later the differences in inherent strength of the emotions tells: some one or more gradually assume predominance and by the operation of 'habit' establish it. The restlessness of 'unchartered freedom' *tires*, even where there is not the positive distress due to chaotic conflict of wild and lawless passions. The Order which is brought about by successful acquirement of dominance by strength is that of the 'tyranny' in the soul, in Plato's exposition: the second kind of following 'nature' in Butler's. Such tyrant feelings and desires usually retain mastery by suppressing others; or they may bring them into subjection, offering themselves as their 'champions' they enlist them as their body-guard. Notoriously frequent examples are love of gain and love of power; but history is full of examples of souls who have emerged from the instability of democracy only by entering under the tyranny of ruling passions.

It is a question of no small interest which of these kinds of Order is the lowest in value. Plato seems to abhor with most vehemence the tyranny; others

will try to regard this as an upward movement, capable of preparing a throne, as it were, for feelings better entitled to leadership: control has begun, they think, and this is a gain. It is a problem which presents itself in education and in family life: would you rather deal with a child abounding in impulses and emotional susceptibilities, but wayward, volatile, inconstant; or with one whose feelings are concentrated in two or three 'passions'? And it is often raised in Christian Missionary circles, as between the hopefulness of work among 'nature-peoples' or among those already disciplined by Confucianism or by Islam.

It seems reasonable to work out ascending grades of title to predominance by reference to the grades of excellence in the several feelings, both for their own inherent qualities, and for their influence on the working of intelligence and activity. Desire for property has claims above those of carelessness and unthrift; desire for good repute above those of property, as Plato thinks when he places plutocracy below timocracy, in both the State and the Soul. And when we rise above mere fame or reputation to honour, and above self-seeking to general benevolence, we are evidently advancing towards the higher levels of what we should estimate as well-conducted lives and admirable characters.

But I am concerned to ask: Is there any one Emotion or Sentiment which, both by its own inherent value and its potency for the good of the total emotional nature and of the soul as a whole, has an indefeasible right to dominance and rule? Is there any one which enables us to see that its supremacy would lead to that *unification* which must be the possession of the perfected soul?

I propose to take as our guide the ascending degrees of complexity signified by the terms Feeling, Emotion and Sentiment. The order of merit or excellence is thus settled by the reflection that an Emotion is a system of simpler Feelings, and therefore contains them and their excellences, and ranks above them; and similarly for Sentiments. The attainment of the higher comes later, and when it comes it lifts up the lower into greater utility for mental life than this could have had by remaining in isolation. Passing over the relations in this respect of Emotions to simple Feelings, we find a fairly general agreement that the highest in order of merit are three great Sentiments: Respect for Truth, Admiration of the Beautiful, and Respect and Adoration for the Good. And beyond these, some of us at least, would place the Religious Sentiment. Let us examine, briefly, the claims of these. Each of them finds considerable support for a claim to sole sovereignty; but obviously a higher claim could be made for the supremacy of their synthesis if that could be effected.

It is to the Sentiment of Respect for Truth that philosophy is due. Its quest is for Reality; whether it be beautiful or austere plain or even repellent, whether it be good or evil, whether it confirm religion or dissolve it, that it be supreme is the claim of intellectualist philosophies. What are we to say to this claim? Is mankind generally prepared to regard its *sages* as the men who have attained most nearly to the ideal harmony of the emotional life? Or is this the estimate that is formed by those who have the high privilege of trained intelligence? Is Respect for Fact and Law, perceived or demonstrated, capable of filling so high a function as to

demand the subservience of every other Sentiment of which we are capable ?

In dealing with this claim we need not resort to the rude vigour of Dr. Johnson when (besides mercilessly exposing the hypocritical philosopher) he calls up before *Rasselas* a genuine lover of truth, but dismisses his claim on the youthful enquirer by showing the collapse of this Sentiment in the presence of a tragedy in the personal affections which befell the sage, and left him in a misery which his respect for reality was unable to assuage. But even Spinoza qualifies his prevalent devotion to the philosophical Sentiment, by turning, in spite of his reduction of personality to a shade and his branding of all feeling as imperfection, to borrow the language of feeling and setting at the apex of mind the 'love of God.'

But the greatest confidence in the supremacy of the Sentiment for Truth is in our day exhibited not by philosophers, most of whom admit at least the co-operation of other sentiments in their final 'faith'—but by men of science. "No class of men since the world began have ever more truly or with more conviction 'worshipped,'" Seeley thought; *i.e.* made their dominating Sentiment really supreme, as I should put it. And it is true that the civilized world seems more ready to encourage devotion to science than to any other of the pursuits of the highest order, as is shown in the multiplication of facilities for scientific study and research in the universities of the world. But a heavy discount must be made for the world's intention that science should lead to utilitarian benefits; and it is far from being expected that we should all of us leave all other pursuits for the laboratories of science or the record-rooms of history. Making full

allowance for the right of the pursuit of truth to employ some at least of the best minds and to be at least a partial occupation of all men, it would be preposterous to assert that this is the ideal for all men and all women: that the Sentiment of respect for Truth and extension of knowledge of Reality is regarded by the judgment of mankind as entitled to monarchical dominance in the life of Feeling for every human being.

Supporters of the claim of the Sentiment for Beauty to supreme sovereignty in the life of Feeling are found, but they are few. That admiration for the Beautiful is well entitled to a place on the tertiary level of Sentiments is denied by some, grudgingly accorded by many, but allowed the chieftainship only by individuals sparsely scattered through the ages. To answer "Why should I be good?" with "Because it is so beautiful!"—is regarded as a playful exaggeration of which the Oxford tutor alleged to have propounded it was as conscious as his hearers. Indeed we find men so highly gifted with the sense of Beauty in literary style as were Newman and Martineau explicitly denying it even equality with Truth and Goodness. And the world seems scarcely to approve of more than a few of its members being assigned to the special cult of the Beautiful—and that with great peril to their soul's total health—and has ready for application to those who obviously exaggerate its claims the terms 'æsthete' and 'sentimental' in a derogatory sense.

Far more widely allowed is the claim for supremacy made for the Sentiment for the Good—the Moral Sentiment; whether it be taken as respect for Duty, or admiration and love for it as attractive



and delightful, as both of these are acclaimed in Wordsworth's noble ode.

Taking first the respect for Duty, for the obligatory imperatives of Rightness. High is the valuation assigned to the souls who have been dominated by unshakeable allegiance to this Sentiment, which Kant tinged even with awe and designated 'Reverence.' And souls who have become tired of incessant emotional conflict, bruised in dire battles of the passions, may well draw from submission to the controlling power of the sense of Duty some attainment of order and health and peace. But to others this submissive attitude appears to be a confession of failure to establish perfection of character. The rigour of such a rule involves the suppression of many legitimate emotions and desires in the nature of which the ideal as synthetic is missed.

The other mode of the Moral Sentiment, as love for Good, because of its beneficence and attractiveness has a higher claim. It is properly regarded as having a unique regard for the Good as Good at its centre, gathering around it by attraction goodness in many concrete forms. Impossible to define in its central feature because of the simplicity of its quality on the objective side, it is correspondingly beyond analysis on its subjective side as a Sentiment; and it is therefore unable to undertake vigorous rule over our contending Feelings, until it gets itself expressed in concreted forms of goodness with their corresponding Emotions. But when the central element is invested with a retinue of attendant particular Emotions and Affections, it becomes capable of sustaining a high claim for supremacy. An inner devotion to the Good when working with such concretes as the domestic affections,

or patriotism, or philanthropy, or self-improvement, has unified many noble souls, raising not a few to the heights of heroism. But so long as the central element of the Sentiment is directed upon a finite object, it is precluded from power to effect a unification which is both comprehensive and complete; and the Moral Sentiment even at its highest still leaves us 'looking for another.'

It is here that we have what Eucken terms the 'turn to Religion'; here is awakened a feeling for the Infinite. At the farthest stretches of respect for Truth, of adoration for Beauty and of love for the Good, we are still left standing on the verge of finitude, peering into an *au-delà*, a Beyond. And then may arise within us, welling up from the *au-delà intérieur*, the desire for God: desire, until it finds its object; love, when even for a moment satisfaction is attained. The sense of being loved by God, and the outgoing of responsive love to Him, is the central fibre, the unique and unanalysable feature and factor in the Religious Sentiment. When this *lives*, it tends to gather round it into a 'system' the three great Sentiments just surveyed, and by their means partly, but by direct action of its own also, the possibility of the unification of the whole emotional nature comes into sight.

That it is possible appears from a scrutiny of the situation itself. It is obvious that on the objective side there can be no competitor with Deity, rightly conceived; sovereignty is His essential prerogative.

This is so for other forms of 'Deity' than the highest: we may acquiesce in the provisional use of the term Religion for our attitude when at one stage we look upward to the next highest, and so onward and onward till we reach the terminus of the

finite.<sup>1</sup> But Religion properly and ultimately signifies the attitude of looking beyond all finiteness and limitation. And as this is true for Thought, we may accept its indication as to what is true for Feeling. It is, surely, plain that the dominance of a completely synthetic Feeling-system has ground for assuming rule over the claim of a partial system. True it is that great vigour may be exerted by a single Passion which has, as is usual, gathered around it a few subservient myrmidons. But when we think of all the Feelings which under such a tyranny are suppressed, we are sure that this cannot be the kind of Order which we can unreservedly approve. Rather, we shrink from it as from a peril to our health.

No space is at disposal here for more than a reference to the support to this *à priori* indication that would come from an inductive enquiry into the historical evidence for a general acknowledgment of the supremacy of the claim of Religious Sentiment. I can speak only for my own reading of human testimony, which leaves no doubt in my mind as to what that testimony is, both in the wide sense of *consensus gentium* and the specialized sense of the experience of the highest souls.

My last position is, that it is only if the Religious Sentiment contains the genuinely Mystical Element that it can claim the *de jure* right of sovereignty among the Feelings. This is so objectively; the

<sup>1</sup> Let me support this by two quite recent testimonies. Professor Alexander has just issued (*Gifford Lectures*) the presentation of a philosophy in which 'Deity' is regarded as the next stage beyond the highest to which the individual has at a given stage of development attained. But it is always the highest conceivable by him, relative though it be. Dr. Bosanquet (*What Religion is*) has issued a powerful plea for Religion as the central attitude of the soul, whatever form its Object may take. The impassioned cry is: Any Religion may serve; but at all costs, Be religious!

Reality to which Mystical Feeling corresponds is at the summit of Reality, or it is non-existent altogether; and subjectively, in the Sentiment itself the Mystical Feeling is the core and centre—the golden thread at the centre of the complex cord, the nucleus whence the synthetic activity is directed.

So potent is its force and attractiveness that too often it overwhelms the soul and gives rise to the aberrations of Mysticism of the exclusive type—" Bearing, like the Turk, no brother near the throne." But this is not what I am justifying; I am endeavouring to vindicate the synthetic function of Mystical Feeling. And I claim for it an affinity for all positive Feelings: for the three tertiary Sentiments directly, and also for the others mainly through these, but to some extent directly also. It attracts the love of Truth, of Beauty and of Goodness round itself; they come clustering about it, finding in it what they lack in themselves. It stands like Napoleon among his Marshals or Nelson among his Captains, the leader himself conscious of *de jure* dominance, and they acknowledging it without reserve. No plots or mutinies prosper when such a voluntarily based dominance is established. The ruling influence is able to extend itself even towards the negative passions, negative in that they are the elements of disorder and ill-health in the emotional economy. But as each of these has also a function in the teleologically constructed mind, its heart of goodness is touched and brought into play. Anger, for example, and Pride are joined up before they cross the line where they become mischievous; they are put into use as submerged mines are used to protect the battle-fleet.

Here then is an ideal for the emotional life—an

ideal of unification which it should share with our thoughts and conduct. As Coleridge claims :

“ All thoughts, all passions, all delight,  
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,  
All are but ministers of love,  
And feed his sacred flame.”

The attainment of such unification, and its effective peace and happiness, is for the vast majority of men and women only an ideal. Even after victorious attainment conflicts and insurgencies persist. In a small group of well-attested experiences I find that two-thirds experienced a series of severe vicissitudes after an apparently complete establishment of unity. Yet there were some who seemed to have achieved a final dominance. “ The natural enmity to the pure love of God seems now totally removed from me,” says one of the group. “ As for the enemy I know not what is become of him. I have neither seen him nor heard of him for some time, I think he has quitted the field,” says another.

Space prevents my doing more than indicate that the Religious Sentiment has the paramount claim to dominance in the emotional life, because it is the most capable of drawing the other Sentiments and Feelings into attachment to it; and that it is the most capable of extracting the maleficent features from injurious passions and yoking them into the general service. And, further, that supreme sovereignty and full power can only be looked for when the Religious Sentiment has at its heart and centre the genuinely mystical quality and character. To its claim, when so constituted, we may apply the ringing sentences of Butler in his panegyric of Conscience. Distinguishing between

fact and ideal, between 'is' and 'ought,' we affirm that: "Had it strength, as it has right, had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." Only, for 'world' we here say the inner life in its Feelings, Emotions and Sentiments, its Affections, and its Desires.

Here then is to be sought by men the deliverance alike from the tyranny of any ruling passion, and from the anarchy of a hundred claimants to equal influence. And we find rising into at least ideal vision the positive happiness and peace proper to the establishment of order and harmony in that Emotionality which, in spite of Stoics and of all Ascetics whatsoever, is a primary constituent of the soul.

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(Read at an Open Meeting of the Quest Society, Feb., 1921.)

## A MODERN INTERPRETATION OF ALCHEMY.

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THE object of this paper is to compare the old theories of Alchemy with the new theories of the Freudian psychology, and note how far they seem to dovetail into each other.

We shall begin by remarking the resemblance between (*a*) myth, legend, folk-lore and ancient romance, and (*b*) the phenomena of our normal dream-life. Both consist largely of symbols and symbol-making; of sudden and complete transitions from place to place; of knowledge arriving without apparent perception; of mutability in the hero or dreamer. The theatre of Myth and Dream alike is staged in some Otherworld where our ordinary laws of space and time do not apply. Myth and Dream, Janus-like, show two faces, one external and one hidden. In dreams, these aspects are known as the 'manifest dream-content' and the 'latent dream-thought.' It is with the latter that the older alchemists and the newer psychoanalysts—from different standpoints—concern themselves.

Of the Freudian dogmas it might be said—as Matthew Arnold said of Christianity—that we cannot do without them, and yet we cannot do with them as they are. Freud is undoubtedly right in holding that many of the subconscious activities of his patients are sexual; but when, and so far as, he explains all human

emotion in terms of sexuality he disproves himself as a thinker. To express the primary in terms of the secondary is to demean it; to interpret the secondary in terms of the primary is to ennoble it. For Freud the average dream is simply a fragment of superseded infantile mentality, and the myth of folk-mentality, which he vaguely suggests may be 'sublimated' into normal practical energy. Psychoanalysis reveals a somewhat muddy side of the human psyche; we hear much of the 'Oedipus-complex,' the legend shadowing forth the infantile wish-fulfilment of slaying a father and marrying a mother; but the question must be asked: What is the transcendental significance of all this? May not the mud conceal a pearl? May not the manure be merely a preparation for the hidden seed-growth? Are not these dark, Titanic impulse-yearnings actually the alchemical 'Stone' at the Black stage? And if the 'Stone' is conected by Art, as the Alchemists declared, into a White and a Red stage, may we not say—in modern terms—that the implied content of the libido-urge, common to all human nature, is deeply spiritual and indeed the actual 'stuff' whence are derived the lofty inspirations of seer, adept and saint?

The writer of *The Golden Treatise* (always recognized as a sort of canonical scripture of Alchemy) and Maeterlinck in his famous children's play both use birds as symbolical of something 'birdlike' in our psyche: the primitive 'urge' ever flowing or flying up unnoticed from the deeps of our being. In its 'Black' (i.e. elemental, primitive) state, the Alchemists called it Hermes' Crow. All human beings possess it; it is the commonest, least-valued, because least perceptible, 'stuff' in our mental make-up, except to the trained



inner eye. It is that strange 'slip' which so often occurs between the 'cup' of desire satisfied and the 'lip' of desire ever desiring. It is Protean—phantasmal—the many-coloured glass tinging with ever-varying hues the White infinity; yet on this shape-shifting efflux—the 'flying bird,' to name it by one of its thousand names—the alchemic analytic Work depends.

An instructive example of the pursuit of this 'Blue Bird' is to be found in Herbert Silberer's careful and lengthy analysis<sup>1</sup> of a Rosicrucian allegory first published in German in 1785. The outer story is as follows. The dreamer, or hero of the tale, wanders meditating into a forest. He is told by its inhabitants that he must learn to subdue a lion with fiercely shining eyes, separate its 'red' blood from its 'white' bones and revive it afterwards. By a dangerous path he reaches a garden with 'red' and 'white' roses watered by a gentle rain, while the shining sun forms a lovely rainbow. Presently the 'red' and 'white' become 'bridegroom' and 'bride' who are interned in the marriage-chamber, the dreamer being set to watch. After tender embraces follows the liquid dissolution of the pair into putrefying corpses. At length the waters subside, the sun bursts forth and seven radiant colours portend and accompany the resurrection or transmutation of the dead couple into a royal King and Queen. This strange eventful history—as is usual in Hermetic romance—ends happily on a religious note.

Our task is to reclaim and cultivate this wild of phantasy, with its rank growth of 'primy' Nature, by applying the critical and creative reason to the blindly-

<sup>1</sup> *Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism* (Moffat, Yard & Company, New York), 1917.

yearning instinct that can only wish and do nothing but wish. The leading motives or themes may be briefly tabulated as follows: (1) Isolation—usually in a forest, cavern, inner chamber, anywhere far from the madding crowd; (2) Entrance into reverie—dream-theatre, faery-realm, psychic Hades; (3) Garden or meadow—anticipation of future bliss; (4) Testing or examination—lion or dragon to be killed and the separation of its blood from its bones; (5) Union of lover and beloved—Venus following Mars; (6) Love-death, dissolution and putrefaction; (7) Rebirth and final perfection or fixation of what before was volatile—our ‘bird.’

The first interpretation of our ‘Matter’ may be briefly stated. The dreamer passes into the unconscious state, when his libido aims at return to primæval, infantile bliss—the pre-natal existence in the womb, symbolized as a happy meadow. The ‘lion in the path’ is either the father or the puzzlement of young children as to their physical origin. The dissection of the dead lion into ‘blood’ and ‘bones’ marks the liberation of the sex-force in the dreamer, and its differentiation into male and female elements, which presently appear in the red and white roses and, later on, as bridegroom and bride. Our dreamer not only aims at ‘return to the mother,’ but phantasies himself as spouse and child to her; owing, however, to the ‘dream-censor’ she must be camouflaged as simply a bride. The pair are duly enclosed in the ‘crystal prison,’ the skin. The dreamer is aiming at a greater success than his father achieved—*viz.* of procreating himself afresh and being reborn as a mighty king. For this the amorous pair must first perish, impregnation being associated with the idea

of the life-seed decaying; the womb is like the *earth* into which corn-seed 'dies.' The waters represent *an* infantile memory of the waters in 'Mother Earth.' Rainbow colours begin to gleam—sunlight penetrates the 'tomb'—and the bodies are revived, marking the dreamer's achievement of re-making himself as ideal father-king, with superhuman power and magnificence. He has carried to a term the wish-phantasy (common enough in mankind) that he really springs from royal parentage and that his actual earth-parents are only so by some mistake. He has also watched the whole re-making process, as it were, from the outside, owing to that splitting-up of the Ego, which is a commonplace of dream-life.

We must here pause to note Silberer's contrast between what he calls the *Material* and the *Functional* categories in the symbolizing work of the imagining psyche. The *Material* category is the simple representation of thought-contents, mostly wish-images, the phantasying of certain gratifications. The *Functional* category is characterized by the fact that the condition and structure of such imaginings is itself portrayed. It is called *Functional* because it is not concerned with the actual thought-images, but applies simply to the manner and method in which consciousness functions; thus it may be rapid or slow, easy or hard, joyful or sad, united or disunited. Forests, gardens, roses, bridal pairs, etc., belong to the *Material* category; sleeping, waking, conquest, defeat, success, failure, to the *Functional*. The symbolism of the former changes; that of the latter remains constant, though, of course, it may be sublimated.

Note, further, that the Alchemists wrote of human mentality, not in terms of modern psychology, but

under the picture-symbolism of the metals. Thus 'Saturn' was to them the plastic lead of the psyche, whence 'Mercury' might be extracted and sublimed; this might be done by 'vinegar' or 'antimony,' which is in its moral aspect conscience. Water symbolized the vitalizing medium producing 'Luna,' the silvered or whitened 'Mercury,' representing the affections purified. In due course 'Sol' arrived to redden and complete the Work; the intellect becomes purified in proportion as the affections are purged. Under all the multitudinous forms of Hermetic imagery the whole business was to remove all superfluities and excrescences from the *sub-stantial* nature of man; carefully to segregate the residual vital yeast or Mercurial 'bird'-stuff and then to confect or ferment it into true Sun-gold. Alchemy may thus be taken as a kind of key-interpretation to myth and dream, on the *psychoanalytic* side revealing the depths of psychic phantasy and crude yearning, on the *mystical* side pointing to the heights of aspiration and idealism. A chemical symbolism or nature-philosophy, to all appearance ethically indifferent, may yet be so arranged as to give the cue to any genuine student.

To return to our Rosicrucian allegory. The dreamer in the wood represents the first stage of the Great Work—introversion. The sinking down of oneself into one's own soul appears as the losing of oneself in it. To some degree all the accredited leaders and experts in mysticism encourage the practice—to a greater degree in the cloister, to a less degree in any ordinary place of worship. It has countless names, and any treatise on meditation will supply the A B C of its ordinary methods. Alchemically, it is the first mortification or dissolution. It is the cosmic process,

mirrored in our allegory in the dreamer's wish-phantasy of 'return to the Mother.' Such a process of—as it were—stopping to in-turn upon one's own wheel or life-spin is no child's play; the results of its hasty or unregulated practice are to be found in asylums. All who attempt it must face 'the deep that lieth under,' the vague 'astral' region of flickering images, the 'darkly splendid world' of the Chaldæan Oracles. Full of childish reveries, it is a pseudo-paradise, an Eden out of which the swords of education and adolescence have driven us. Æneas was forbidden to descend therein, in the great psychic journey described by Virgil, without the Sibyl's golden bough to ensure his guidance and safe return to daylight or consciousness. Goethe refers to the same journey when his Mephistopheles speaks to Faust of the 'goddesses throned in solitude,' beyond Space or Time, difficult even to speak of. They are the 'Mothers.' In introversion the libido-yearning sinks actually into its own seducing mother-depths and finds therein the reflected image of the world it has left. Hence Jung speaks much of the 'Terrible Mother,' who is at once Death and Life. For if the psyche remains suspended in the wonder-world of this spaceless, timeless Hades, the human owner becomes a mere shadow in the world above normal life. Many neurotic patients are really examples of the psyche unable to leave the Mother-image and thus unable to adapt themselves to reality. Yet, on the other hand, if the adventurer can tear himself away and travel on, he will return to normal existence with renewed youth and vigour; out of death comes new life. From the Terrible yet Lovely Mother flows unfailing strength. As Stekel says, "When mankind wishes to create something big, it

must reach deep down into the reservoir of its past; and what is true of the race is true of the individual." Through properly-directed introversion psycho-physical energies are liberated which tremendously increase the efficiency of the 'introvert.' He draws upon nerve-centres unused by the average person: there are always more fish in every human psychic sea than ever came out. Oriental teachers refer to these transcendental possibilities under the symbolism of the serpent Kuṇḍalinī, and are also fully aware of the dangers of prematurely awakening them.

The dreamer of our allegory has to perform a task before reaching his garden of delight: to kill the lion and separate blood from bones. By the narrower interpretation the lion stands for the father; but as we have seen symbols can depart from their original and manifest content and become types of a wider experience—advancing from the material to the functional category. Alchemical writers fairly revel in their descriptions of this fight with the 'lyon grene'—green suggesting the raw, untamed Nature-life to be hunted and killed. Often the symbol used is a snake devouring its own tail. In classic legend we find it in the dragon guarding the apples of the Hesperides, the serpents strangled by the infant Hercules, the dragons slain by Jason, the bull of Mithra, etc. In the New Testament it is the 'old (father) Adam.'

The symbol is also a sexual one. Man struggles in his 'pair-of-opposites' (whatever you like to call them) life; the aim of the alchemical lion-fight is to cause a certain new interaction or inter-relationship between them. There is the Masculine Dry Sulphur—energizing mentality which interiorly flames; there is the Feminine Wet Mercury—fluid phantasy which

interiorly moistens; or, simply, Sun and Moon. Our lion is androgynous, bisexual, his red blood masculine, his white bones feminine. His 'death' is the reversing of the engines of the life-urge, one's own nature-spin, whereby are separated or dissolved the two component principles, one of which, the fixed, has to be volatilized, and the other, the volatile, fixed. The task is more mental and psychical than purely physical, and cannot be achieved by a mechanical asceticism. It is painful to turn one's back on—or, by another metaphor, to slay—ancestral instinct, the 'father-lion,' and this is beautifully suggested in the *Bhagavad Gītā* when Arjuna hesitates to fight against his own kith and kin. The Work must take a natural—yet supernatural—course. "Nature rejoices in Nature; overcomes Nature; rules Nature." In other words, the Worker must reverence Nature and do her no violence, but perform, subtly and artistically, just the thing she cannot do unaided, because, as Vaughan said, she has no 'hands' but is simply growth and vitality. After the alchemical lion-fight, the libido-subject becomes hermaphroditic and at a certain stage is termed *Rebis, res bina*, the double thing. Hence the allegorical picture of groom and bride interned in the crystal vessel. The adept who gets virile energy united with feminine receptiveness is crudely depicted in old plates (see H. S. Redgrove's *Alchemy: Ancient and Modern*) as a human body with male and female heads standing on the dragon, caduceus in hand. He has masculinized the feminine and feminized (not simply e-masculated) the masculine in his psyche, and so joined those twain who were divorced by what is usually known as the Fall. He has reached the implied and ultimate significance

of the 'consummation' of ordinary marriage. In this respect the alchemical writers seem to have sublimated sex-symbolism far more boldly than the orthodox Church ever ventured to do—using Nature's beautiful processes, in Masonic phrasing, as substituted secrets for the Grand and Mirific Word. Patmore, however, as an orthodox Catholic, was fully in line with *The Song of Solomon* in declaring that sanctity is not the negation of passion, but its order. Many manuals of mystical devotion shew clearly, reading 'between the lines,' that, when carefully withdrawn from its primitive and customary outsurgings, sexual libido may be spiritually and powerfully energized—passion not de-ordinated but re-ordinated. So also Patañjali and other Easterns assert the transmutability of the sexual urge. Jung declares that the religious instinct feeds upon the unconsciously-incestuous infantile libido. The snake swallowing its own tail symbolizes the cycle of the ever-rolling life-wheel (cf. *James* iii. 5), continually procreating itself. It is good or bad as 'thinking makes it so,' and whoever can redirect its fatal continuity can actually beget himself anew from the 'Terrible Mother,' and attain mystical rebirth. Jung sees in this sacrifice of childish yearnings one of the motives underlying myth, religion and the great artistic creations of all ages. "Adam," says an old writer, "was created of male and female sex, not two different bodies, but one in its essence and two in its potentiality, for he was the Earth, Adamah, Red and White Sulphur, Sun and Moon, and was able to multiply himself magically."

Some readers may recall Dr. Nicoll's remarkable lecture to the Quest Society on the battle-dreams of 'shell-shocked' soldiers, whereby the advance or retreat



of the malady was accurately indicated by the victory or defeat of the dream-Germans. Thus also the success of the introverting mystic is represented by his power to deal with the 'dragon' or 'lion' or 'snake.' If he does not conquer, he may lose his soul as well as his life; it is 'world-power or downfall' in that inner war. Defeat is possible in two ways: either by an active fall into evil magic, a surrender to the transcendental powers of evil implying the inversion of every Divine and human law; or—for most people the more likely danger—a passive defeat, resulting in introversion—psychosis, melancholia and spiritual death. These three possible results—victory and life, crime, darkness and death—are indicated by the Hindu *gunas* or principles of Sattva, Rajas, Tamas.

A remarkable passage in Mrs. Atwood's *Suggestive Inquiry into the Hermetic Mystery* (pp. 187, 188) clearly implies that the hierophants of classic times carried the experiment known half a century ago as Mesmerism or Magnetism to a much further term than the moderns have conceived. Not content with the simple phenomena of lucidity and bodily therapeutics, they induced, by theurgy, a deeper trance on the subject-neophyte, and were able properly to segregate his Vital Spirit (*i.e.* libido turned upon its own source) away from the defilements and impressures implanted by birth into sense-life, and so open his 'divine eye,' through which alone universal truth may be perceived. Those who passed the ordeal walked 'by sight,' not simply 'by faith.' If we grant the possibility of a magnetized subject so regressing in consciousness, contact would easily be established with the elementary kingdoms; and it was open to the subject to linger and explore the physical world from within (as modern

science explores it from without), and manipulate these meta-physical forces—*logoi spermatikoi*—which determine its normal outward shape and nature. Probably some did linger there; but it was no halting-place for such as wished to rectify their own life-germ and 'take the manhood into God.'

Over-speculation on these points may easily become dangerous; for if we get any real light on the deviation of the individual human life from the interior law of Light, we cannot afford to play idly with it, any more than a soldier can afford to dally with the keys of the fortress he is expected to hold at all costs. Nevertheless the Hermetic theories are invaluable to those who decline to be bound by the popular dogma of the man-in-the-street that human nature is unchangeable. It is only unchangeable as long as we do not grip the real problem—to catch that 'flying bird.' It is true that this and the rest of the alchemical jargon take some thinking out: to think alchemically is to think—if one may coin the word—intro-mythically. The mythical 'grene lyon,' 'Diana's doves,' etc., belong to our psychic world, not to that of the Zoological Gardens. Yet they stimulate thought to such a degree that once you 'get going' you do not stop at the usual mental *termini* of the average man. Thus the concept 'supernatural' suggests to him either something incredible, or, if it be credible, yet defying further analysis or discussion. Yet the 'supernatural' simply implies that which remains over and above (or below) when we have conceived too narrowly of the 'natural'; as telepathy and the Schrenck-Notzing phenomena must appear after the limitations of materialistic science. If, however, we mean by 'nature' (as we ought) simply the boundless possibilities of growth

and vitality, we shall not erect any mental notice-boards such as that implied in the word 'super': the supernatural is the natural, and the ectoplasms of Mdle. Eva, whatever their importance or use, are as much a part of 'nature' as the butterfly emerging from the chrysalis. That which we began by ruling out as 'supernatural' resolves itself into Nature—Nature is extended and raised thereby. To the Alchemists Nature was a kind of Holy Catholic Church entity, all of whose processes were sacramental and symbolic to her student-disciples.

Replace the term 'natural' by 'Sulphur,' 'supernatural' by 'Mercury.' At once you are obliged to think of things instead of names. The process of search brings a recognition that both these things are inseparable in a third something—which we may call 'Sun'; but as all three are really inseparable, they can freely change places in the mind. No barrier-words like 'supernatural' will prevent further speculation, until finally an inner illumination takes place—the 'new birth.' Philosophical Mercury and Gold indicate something in man and God which ultimately turns out to be the One; or Sulphur and Mercury are found to be the same, differing only in a certain relation of the one to the other; just as the known and the unknown—or the conscious and the unconscious self—are ultimately identical, the one decreasing as the other increases.

So also the opposites of Aversion and Attraction are not really independent but each is inter-dependent on—indeed part of—the other. A, who hates B and loves C, is one and the same being; the Universe is one containing, as it does, all three. The ever-impelling libido strives for what satisfies and repels

that which conflicts with it; if it be turned to one eternal concept (philosophical Gold or some other symbol) the complete man will be transmuted into that one concept, for human nature is always characterized (*i.e.* given a character) by the ruling passion-libido. When interest in external objects has begun (extroversion) the libido is, as it were, ejecting *itself* as an object; it is a kind of psychic self-eviction. Not only does the libido nucleate its own ideal, but waters that ideal with its own life-force. Hence the alchemical jumble and mixture of 'Red Man,' 'White Woman,' 'Our Noble Son'—all three being the same agency at work, seen from different angles. Hence the familiar phenomena of marriage and childbirth are crude externalized type-copies of the magic processes whereby Subject and Object are convertible terms in the inner world.

The symbols of Alchemy and other schools remain unchangeable, for they are the 'ancient landmarks' of the dreaming mind. Symbolic teaching remains as the shortest and surest method by which the universal is brought into the sphere of the individual consciousness. It is precisely their universality, as belonging to all nations and tongues, that makes alchemical symbols at first difficult to interpret. They are telescopes pointed soulwards through which we can gaze into the starry vault of the unconscious, and trace therein, like the astrologers, not dead space, but mighty figures emblematic of our own psychic 'heavens.' They are fitted to every grade of culture and do not perish with the lapse of time. To each person symbols represent his own truth; to everyone they speak a different language. No one exhausts them. While concrete shape is necessary for the

physical eye, abstract symbols are necessary for the spiritual eye; the wise man will use both eyes, not as opponents but as partners. So also that strange hinterland—the psyche-libido—should be viewed not only with the critical-rationalist eye-glasses of Psycho-analysis but also with the mystic-spiritual magnifying-glass of Alchemy.

A. H. E. LEE.

(Read at an Open Meeting of the Quest Society, Nov. 1920.)

### A BEGGAR AT THE GATE.

ALONE. I walk along alone. I faintly breathe and inwardly I pray for holy days.

Oh, I would give all that I have, all I may have, for one inspired moment!

The days when God spake unto me are over. I can find no peace, no rest.

I am all awake and listening to exhaustion, but I cannot hear the heavenly music.

Yet will I not cease to stand as now I do on expectation's tip-toe; maybe I have not heard the last.

By waiting like a beggar at God's Gate I may chance get a glimpse of the Great Banquet.

I may catch the sweet note of a flute, if it be only its echo.

I may pick up a fresh rose dropped by a merciful angel. Then, oh then, will I run like a bearer of good news, describe what I have heard, what I have seen, and show them all the fragrant flower of heaven.

But to-day! To-day is a day of sobs and sighs, a day of waiting, a night of wailing.

MOYSHEH OYVED.

## THE MAN OF ASIA.

L. ADAMS BECK.

MANY are acquainted with the fact that there is a Buddhist Religion and that its adherents are more numerous than those of any other; but how many know anything of the personality of the Founder of this faith which determines the attitude of hundreds of millions toward all things worldly and spiritual?

If the average Westerner formulates any picture of the Buddha it is generally as an image in bronze, seated with folded feet and hands in a state of passive contemplation, further removed from all earthly interests than the remotest star. It may then be worth while to attempt to rescue a wonderful personality from this air of unreality by trying to catch a glimpse, through the most ancient scriptures, of the Blessed One as he moved and spoke, a visible holiness, yet not beyond the joys and sorrows of humanity, a man amongst men, more than five hundred years before Christ.

Sir Edwin Arnold, in *The Light of Asia*, popularized him as a young prince, beautiful and compassionate, who made the triple renunciation of Love, Power and Wealth that he might save a foundering world; and so, going forth into the wilderness, he passed through the stages of asceticism, temptation and final enlightenment, and entered upon his career as a teacher, evaporating into the dreamland of metaphysic and mystic contemplation.

But Sir Edwin drew on later and corrupt sources. The Buddha was much more than this. His humour, strength and humanity escape us, and we know in general less of him as a man than of the martyred Buddha of Greece—Socrates. Yet we may know almost as much and may note the many points of resemblance between the two. For the Buddha used his dialectic like Socrates himself as a means of instruction, and both possessed the sweet reasonableness, the dry humour, the homely illustration that set forth the truth to the willing or unwilling, be it in Athens or in the Indian Grove of Ambapālī. Let me try to give the picture drawn by his traditional words and the words of those who loved him, of Gotama Buddha—

“ . . . the Way, the Law, Apart,  
Whom Māyā held beneath her heart;  
Ānanda's Lord.”

And first, this historical Buddha is not the only Buddha. The word is a term and not a name. There have been, it is said, former Buddhas. Another, Maitreya, the Buddha of Love, is yet to come. It is a term perhaps best translated as ‘The Awakened,’ but he has many other titles. He is the Excellent One, the Lord, the Tathāgata, he who has fulfilled all as a man among men, the Bhagavat, the Blessed. And surely these ascriptions scarcely exaggerate the deep love, the patience and sweet serenity, which illuminate that life of eighty years spent in the service of man.

Of his doctrine I do not propose to write. It is only too often misunderstood and travestied by misconceptions which have led to its dismissal as a ‘heathen religion.’ Not so does enlightened Buddhism regard

Christianity. The Voice that spoke in Judea is to them authentic and worthy of reverence. But this is a vexed question and I leave it.

It were better to enter the atmosphere of calm in which the Blessed One dwelt when he wore flesh, and which his world sought and seeks at his feet. And first we are told that he was beautiful of person and stately of aspect—a man of great family and of the noblest Aryan race. A king, seeing him approach, exclaims: “Be careful, Sirs, of this man; beautiful is he, very great and pure. Such a person is of no low caste.” And again: “Delicate and fine of colour,” an aristocrat even among the fastidious aristocrats of India. His eyes are often referred to as being of a peculiarly dark and piercing blue. He spoke with extraordinary grace and choice of language. Very often those who heard him had the impression: “Never man spake as this man.” He was known to many who could record their recollections, for it should be remembered that his was no life of retirement from the world. The Bhagavat went up and down amongst men and women of all classes. No thought of his time was alien to him; and if the sense of tears in human things was so far present to him that in his mind it overshadowed the joy of life, this was only because in his Norm he offered the way of pure joy to all who live. But he was no ascetic. To the son of Māyā, as to the son of Mary, it is said that the reproach was made that he came eating and drinking, a friend of publicans and sinners. But in him also Wisdom was justified of her children.

With his disciples the Blessed One wandered through certain parts of India. At certain seasons, especially the rainy season, he would pause and establish himself for a time in some place where



men and women of all ranks and classes flocked to learn of the Doctrine—from the haughty Brahman to the outcast woman. For to that Reason, which had weighed and dismissed pride and power, caste and its restrictions had ceased to have any meaning.

Here is a picture (translated by Professor Rhys Davids) of the routine of the Buddha's day during the times at which he rested from his wandering mission. Setting aside an allusion to 'supernatural' favours, this early account is believed to be substantially exact.

"For the Blessed One used to rise up early and out of consideration for his attendant was wont to wash and dress himself. Then till it was time to go on his round for alms, he would retire to a solitary place and meditate. When that time came he would dress himself in the three robes, take his bowl in his hand, and sometimes alone, sometimes with his followers, would enter the neighbouring town or village for alms, sometimes in an ordinary way, sometimes wonders happening. . . . Then, clad in their best and brightest, and bringing garlands, they would come forth into the streets, and offering their flowers, would vie with one another, saying: 'To-day, Sir, take your meal with us. We will make provision for ten, and we for twenty of your followers.' So saying, they would take his bowl, and spreading mats for him and his followers, would await the moment when the meal was over. Then would the Blessed One discourse to them, with due regard to their capacity for spiritual things, in such a way that some would take the layman's vow, and some would enter on the Path, and some would reach the highest fruit thereof. And when he had thus had mercy on the multitude, he would arise from his seat and depart to the place where he had lodged.

"Then afterwards, standing by the door of his chamber, he would give exhortation to the brethren, such as this: 'Be earnest, my brethren, strenuous in effort. Hard is it to abandon the world. Difficult to attain is the opportunity of hearing the word.'

"Then would some of them ask him to suggest a subject for meditation suitable to each, and when he had done so they would retire each to his solitary place and meditate on the subject set. Then would the Blessed One retire within the private chamber, perfumed with flowers, and, calm and self-possessed, would rest awhile. Then he would arise from the couch and for a space consider the circumstances of the people near that he might do them good. And at the fall of the day, the folk would gather together, bringing with them offerings of flowers. And, to them, seated, would he, in a manner suitable to the occasion, discourse of the Truth. And in the evening he would sit awhile alone, still in all his robes, till the brethren began to assemble. Then some would ask him questions, and some would speak of their meditations. Thus would the first watch of the night pass, as the Blessed One satisfied the desire of each, and then they would take their leave. And part of the rest of the night would he spend in meditation, walking up and down outside his chamber, and part he would rest, lying down, calm and self-possessed within. And as the day began to dawn, rising, he would seat himself, and calling up before his mind the folk, he would consider the aspirations which they in previous births had formed, and think over the means by which he could help them to attain thereto."

Is it stretching probability too far to believe that

this beautiful description may also convey some dim likeness of the

“ Sinless years

That breathed beneath the Syrian blue ” ?

The friend of the Blessed One, nearest and dearest to his soul, was the disciple Ānanda. Ānanda could not always comprehend the utterances of that mighty mind, that fathomless love, but when the wings of his intellect drooped, the heart of Ānanda never wearied. “ I cannot understand—I love.” And that love never failed the Buddha, either in life or in the supreme moments of the Great Death. This man the Master singled out with a special tenderness.

Here is a passage strangely reminiscent of scriptures better known to us, and beautiful exceedingly in its recognition of the light that shines in dark places.

“ Now the courtesan Ambapālī heard that the Blessed One had reached Vesālī and was dwelling in her mango-grove. And ordering vehicles to be made ready she mounted one of them and proceeded to her garden. There she alighted and went on foot to where that Blessed One was, and took her seat respectfully on one side. And when she was thus seated, the Blessed One instructed, aroused, incited and gladdened her with high discourse. Then she addressed the Blessed One and said :

“ ‘ May the Blessed One do me the honour of taking his meal, together with the brethren, at my house to-morrow ? ’

“ And the Blessed One gave by silence his consent. Then, when Ambapālī saw that he had consented, she rose from her seat and bowed down before him, and keeping him on her right hand as she passed him

[a mark of spiritual respect] she departed thence. Now the nobles of Vesālī heard that the Blessed One was come, and they proceeded with their train to the grove. And Ambapālī drove up against the young nobles, axle to axle, and they said :

“ ‘ How is it, Ambapālī, that thou drivest up against us ? ’

“ ‘ Noble Persons, I have bidden the Blessed One and his brethren for to-morrow’s meal.’

“ ‘ Ambapālī, give up this meal to us for a hundred thousand ! ’ said they.

“ ‘ Noble Persons, were you to offer Vesālī with all its subject territories, yet would I not give up this honourable feast.’

“ Then the nobles cast up their hands, exclaiming :

“ ‘ We are outdone by this mango-girl ! We are outreached by this mango-girl ! ’ And they proceeded to the grove. [Her name signifies a Grower of mangoes.]

“ And they addressed the Blessed One and said :

“ ‘ May the Holy One do us the honour of taking his meal, together with the brethren, at our house to-morrow ? ’

“ ‘ O, Noble Persons, I have promised to eat to-morrow with Ambapālī.’

“ And they cast up their hands, exclaiming :

“ ‘ We are outdone by this mango-girl ! ’ So expressing their thanks and approval of the words of the Blessed One, they rose from their seats and bowed down before him.

“ And the Holy One robed himself early in the morning and took his bowl, and went with the brethren to the place where was the house of Ambapālī, and she set sweet rice and cakes before them, and attended

upon them until they refused more. And when the Blessed One had eaten, she sat upon a low stool by his side, and addressed the Blessed One, and said :

“ ‘ Lord, I present this mansion to the Order of Mendicants.’ ”

“ And the Blessed One accepted the gift, and after instructing and gladdening her with religious discourse, he rose from his seat and went his way.”

Surely the picture of the mango-girl should not be forgotten when the words “ *quia multum amavit* ” are recalled.

Yet the Blessed One viewed the sex with the rigidity of the reformer. They were a danger. The monk must be ware and wakeful where they were concerned. There could be no trifling with the matter, and in Burma and Ceylon to-day stern rules safeguard the monk upon his road to the Great Peace. Mercy, spiritual affection, sisterhood in the faith, reverence in the daily duties, these and no more must the wearer of the Yellow Robe accord. For the laity it was different. They were not pledged to the difficult heights. Ānanda asks concerning the monk :

“ ‘ How should we conduct ourselves, Lord, with regard to womankind ? ’ ”

“ ‘ Don’t see them, Ānanda.’ ”

“ ‘ But if we should see them, what are we to do ? ’ ”

“ ‘ Abstain from speech, Ānanda.’ ”

“ ‘ But if they should speak to us, Lord, what are we to do ? ’ ”

“ ‘ Keep wide awake, Ānanda.’ ”

A hard doctrine, yet if one dismisses it with scorn it can only be by ignoring the plague-spots in our own civilisation. There may be safeguards too many. There can also be safeguards too few.

The parables, the dialectic, of the Buddha are adorned by many references to the beautiful or homely things of daily life. Here is the Buddhist lily, shining among thorns as in *The Song of Songs* :

“As on a heap thrown out on the highway the lily will grow, exhaling perfume and joy, so will the disciple shine forth by his understanding among the people that walk in darkness.”

And here is indeed a Socratic figure. Those who have studied their Plato will delight in the resemblance. It occurs also in the Upanishads.

“Even the Deities may envy him whose senses, like horses well broken in by the driver, have been subdued ; who is freed from pride, freed from appetites.”

And again :

“All that we are is the outcome of what we have thought. If a man speak or act with evil thought, pain shall follow him as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage. If a man speak or act with pure thought, joy follows him like a shadow that cannot leave him.”

“He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me—in those who harbour such thoughts, how can hatred cease? For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time. Hatred ceases by love. This is an old rule.”

The Buddha suffered fools, but not gladly. The ignorant man he did not count as a fool. The perverse fool he scorched in a white flame of truth that might consume his folly. Here is an example of this faithful dealing :

“The fool who knows his folly is wise, at least so far, but the fool who thinks he is wise, is indeed a fool.

“If a fool be among the wise all his days, he will

perceive the truth as little as a spoon perceives the taste of soup.

“As long as the evil deed does not ripen, to the fool it is sweet as honey, but when it ripens, great is the dismay of the fool.”

I give now the beautiful dialogue between the Holy One and the herdsman Dhanīya, who, like the rich man in the *Gospel of St. Luke*, is triumphing in the security of his possessions. Note the humour with which the Blessed One caps his boasting. The two voices sing like birds in the rain.

“‘I have boiled my rice ; I have milked my cows’ ;—so said the herdsman Dhanīya. ‘I am living together with my fellows near the banks of the river. My house is covered, my fire is kindled. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’

“‘I am free from anger, free from stubbornness’ ;—so said the Blessed One. ‘I abide for one night near the banks of the river. My house is uncovered ; the fire of passions is extinguished. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’

“‘Gadflies are not to be found with me’ ;—so said the herdsman Dhanīya. ‘In meadows, rich with grass, the cows are roaming, and they can endure rain when it comes. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’

“‘I have passed over unto peace’ ;—so said the Blessed One. ‘I have reached the further bank, having fought the torrent. There is no further use for a raft. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’

“‘My wife is obedient and chaste’ ;—so said the herdsman Dhanīya. ‘For a long time she has dwelt in my house. She is winning and I hear nothing ill of her. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’

“‘My mind is obedient, delivered from this world’ ;

—so said the Holy One. ‘Nor in me is there evil. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky’!

“‘By my own earnings do I live’;—so said the herdsman Dhaniya. ‘And my children are healthy about me. I hear nothing wicked of them. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky’!

“‘I am no one’s servant’;—so said the Holy One. ‘With what I have gained I wander about in all the world. There is no need for me to serve. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’

“‘I have cows, I have calves’;—so said the herdsman Dhaniya. ‘And I have also a bull as lord over the cows. Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’

“‘I have no cows, I have no calves’;—so said Bhagavat. ‘Therefore if thou wilt, rain, O sky!’”

Then at once a torrent poured down, filling both sea and land. Dhaniya spake thus:

“‘No small gain indeed has accrued to us since we have seen the Holy One. We take refuge in thee, O Endowed with the eye of wisdom! Be thou our Master, O great one!’”

And so Dhaniya, happier than his fellow in our scriptures, enters the way of Peace, and the Holy One sums it up thus:

“He who has sons, has care with his sons; he who has cows has likewise care, for worldliness is the cause of care; but he who has no worldliness is free from care.”

And so ends the Sūtra of Dhaniya.

Can we revive no true picture of the Presence of Peace as it goes on its way, blessing and blessed? Here is a scene that breathes the very spirit of Quiet. I relate it from an ancient scripture.

“Now when the Tathāgata sat among his own



upon the Peak of Vultures, a Heavenly Being approached and laid at his feet a golden flower, praying that he would speak and in sweet speech instruct the Assembly in the Law. The Blessed One received the golden flower within his hand but sat in utter calm and spoke not. And all the Assembly mused what this might mean, but could not know. One only, the Venerable Mahākasyapa, smiled, and was silent. For he had understanding. Then the Blessed One spoke to him who only understood, saying: 'I hold within my heart the thought of Nirvāṇa, the Essence of the Law, and this I have now given to you without words, and without words you have seen and known.'"

The world has known and honoured the story of the death of Socrates since it left the heart of the lover who told it. Let us listen now to the story of what is known throughout Buddha-lands as 'The Great Decease,' for it lacks nothing of beauty nor of wisdom. I condense it much.

"Now when the Blessed One had entered upon the rainy season, there fell upon him a dire sickness, and sharp pains, even unto death. But the Blessed One, mindful and self-possessed, bore them without complaint. Then this thought occurred to him: It would not be right that I should pass away without addressing the Disciples, and taking leave of the Order. Let me now keep my hold on life until the allotted time be come.

"He went out from the monastery and sat down behind the monastery on a seat, and the Venerable Ānanda went and saluted the Blessed One, and took a seat reverently on one side, and said:

" 'I have beheld, Lord, how the Blessed One had to suffer, and though at the sight of the suffering of

the Blessed One my body became as weak as a creeper, yet I took some little comfort in thinking that the Lord would not pass away until at least he had left some instructions as touching the Order.'

" 'I too, Ānanda, am now grown old and full of years. My journey is drawing to its close. I have reached my sum of days, I am turning eighty years of age, and just as a worn-out cart, Ānanda, can only be made to move with much additional care, so I think the body of the Tathāgata can only be kept going with much additional care. It is only, Ānanda, when I am lost in devout meditation that the body of the Tathāgata is at peace. Therefore be lamps unto yourselves. Hold fast to the Truth.'

" And again he said :

" 'How pleasant is the Vulture's Peak, Ānanda; how pleasant the Banyan Tree of Gotama; how pleasant the Squirrels' Feeding Ground; how pleasant the Deer Forest !'

" And the Blessed One exhorted the brethren, saying :

" 'Behold, O brethren, all component things grow old. Work out your own salvation with diligence. My age is now full ripe, my life draws to its close. Be earnest, be steadfast in resolve. Keep watch over your own hearts. Who wearies not but holds fast to this Truth and Law, shall cross the sea of life—shall make an end of grief.'

" And he said :

" 'Come, Ānanda, let us go to Pāvā.'

" 'Even so, Lord,' said the Venerable Ānanda. And the Blessed One proceeded with a great company to Pāvā, to the mango-grove of Kuṇḍa, who was by family a smith. Now Kuṇḍa, as a mark of respect and

love, prepared a meal for the Lord and the brethren, and after the Blessed One had eaten, dire sickness fell upon him. And the Blessed One, mindful and self-possessed, bore it without complaint. And he said :

“ ‘ Come, Ānanda, let us go to Kusinārā.’

And he addressed the Venerable Ānanda, and said :

“ ‘ Fold, I pray you, the robe, and spread it out for me. I am weary and must rest.’

“ ‘ Even so, Lord.’

“ And the Blessed One seated himself. And later the Venerable Ānanda went into the Vihāra and stood leaning against the lintel of the door and weeping, for he thought :

“ ‘ Alas, I still remain but a learner. And the Master is about to pass away from me—he who is so kind.’

“ And the Blessed One said :

“ ‘ Where, brethren, is Ānanda? Go and say: Brother Ānanda, the Master calls for you.’

“ So he came, and the Blessed One said to him :

“ ‘ Enough Ānanda; do not be troubled. Do not weep. Have I not told you it is the very nature of things dear to us that we must depart from them? For a long time, Ānanda, you have been very near to me by acts of love, kind and good, that did not vary and were beyond all measure. You have done well. Be earnest and you too shall soon be free of the great evils.’

“ And Ānanda said to the Blessed One :

“ ‘ How wonderful a thing, Lord, it is that the colour of the skin of the Blessed One should now be so exceeding bright.’

“ ‘ It is even so, Ānanda. There are two occasions on which the body of a Buddha becomes exceeding bright. On the night in which he attains to the

supreme and perfect insight, and on the night in which he passes finally away. These are the two occasions.'

"And they passed on to the Sāla Grove. And Ānanda spread a couch between the twin Sāla-trees, and the Blessed One laid himself down."

(Now follows an incident in which one sees the great gentleman as well as the great saint.)

"And the Blessed One said :

" 'It may happen, Ānanda, that some may stir up remorse in Kuṇḍa the smith, by saying: This is evil to thee, Kuṇḍa, and loss to thee, in that when the Tathāgata had eaten his last meal from thy provision then he died. Any such remorse in Kuṇḍa should be checked by saying: This is good to thee, Kuṇḍa, and gain to thee, Kuṇḍa. From the very mouth of the Blessed One have I received this saying: There has been laid up by Kuṇḍa the smith a karma redounding to length of life, to good fame, to the inheritance of heaven, and of sovereign power. In this way, Ānanda, should be checked any remorse in Kuṇḍa the smith.' "

So in dying the Buddha remembered his humble host, and left joy as his gift.

"And he said :

" 'It may be that there is doubt and misgiving in some of the brothers. Enquire freely. Do not later reproach yourselves with the thought: Our Master was with us and we did not ask.' "

"But the brethren were silent, for none doubted. Then the Blessed One said: " 'Behold now, brethren, I exhort you, saying: Decay is inherent in all component things. Work out your salvation with diligence.' "

"This was the last word of the Tathāgata. Then the Blessed One entered into deep meditation, and Ānanda said unto Anuruddha :

“‘O my Lord, O Anuruddha, the Blessed One is dead!’

And he said :

“‘Nay, brother, he has entered into that state in which sensations and ideas have ceased to be.’”

So passing out of the last stage of meditation the Blessed One immediately expired.

There is not space to tell the strange and beautiful things that befell—the love and reverence that surrounded the pyre on which the outer form which had been so beloved passed away from the sight of man into a little gray ash and bone. Magnificent stūpas were erected over these relics, but greater honours were paid in the hearts of those to whom the Blessed One had been a vehicle of the True Light.

I have given but a few words from these very ancient scriptures. The more one knows the more a mighty personality rises before the mind, and the understanding of it helps as nothing else can do to comprehend all that is best in the thought and spiritual life of Asia. I have found my small knowledge and great love a key to open many hearts and places shut to most Western people. Therefore since the whole world is turning with awakened interest to the Far East, it is well worth while to understand a little, even if the grandeur of the Life touches one not at all.

Of the Doctrine much might be said, and of the failings of present-day Buddhism, of its virtues also. But I have purposely left all this unsaid. Of the Life all may learn who have any care for what is noble.

L. ADAMS BECK.

## THE EXPERIENCE OF DIVINE IMMANENCE IN NATURE.

ROBERT H. THOULESS, M.A.

IN his *Primitive Culture* Tylor quotes with approval Comte's statement that: "The conception among the ancients of the Soul of the Universe, the notion that the earth is a vast living animal, and in our own time the obscure pantheism which is so rife among German metaphysicians, are only fetishism generalized and made systematic." The intention of this quotation is to discredit such pantheism.

But when it has been suggested that an idea in primitive religion is parent to a similar idea in the higher religions, is this sufficient to enable us to pronounce judgment on the latter? If a religious idea has survived the collapse of the system of which it was once a part, or has been revived in a new state of culture, must we not also enquire into the reasons determining this survival or revival.

In the development of religion its elements have been selected and elaborated or disregarded to meet the needs of man's changing mentality. Its evolution has taken place, not by the operation of a force inherent in the early religious systems themselves, but rather as a result of the changing outlook of the worshippers. If we find a particular practice, such as sacrifice, carried out almost universally and at all times, it is safe to conclude that it is an expression of some deep-rooted need in human nature, and that it supplies a permanent satisfaction of that need. The

problem of giving an account of its origin is a psychological and not only an ethnological one.

This paper is an attempt to deal with the psychological problem underlying the above quotation. If it is true that the pantheism of early nineteenth century German philosophers was simply systematized fetishism, it is nevertheless certain that they did not believe it because it had been handed down as an unchanged collective idea from the time when their ancestors worshipped the spirits in trees and stones. It would be truer to regard fetishism and pantheism as products of a type of experience common to the savage and the philosopher, or differing only so far as the metaphysician's pantheism is different from the early man's fetishism. We must now enquire whether we can find empirical evidence of such an experience.

The experience in question is an emotional relation to natural objects which is of the same kind as that which we feel towards a person. The beauty of Nature is seen suddenly to be, not a chance arrangement of non-sentient objects, but something with which we may have intimate personal relations — something towards which we may feel love or awe.

We are assuming that a religious doctrine is essentially the intellectualization of a particular type of experience; and something must be said in explanation of this assumption.

An experience is something lived through and felt; it is purely individual and incommunicable. Religion, being social, cannot rest content with an incommunicable basis; so its experiences must be translated into words. They must be made to pass from the region of indirect phantasy-thinking, in which they have their origin, to the region of directed, com-

municable thinking. This translation into words is the intellectualization of the experience, which gives birth to a religious doctrine. The doctrine never fully expresses the experience, for an emotion cannot be transferred to another by the vehicle of a form of words as satisfactorily as can an intellectual idea. For this reason those to whom religious experience is most real, are most inclined to protest against the inadequacy of accepted doctrines.

The form of a doctrine is of course determined, not only by the experience itself, but also by the existing system of beliefs with which it must harmonize. Thus we find that the same experience is intellectualized in different ways; in other words, under different doctrines. It is true that the experience itself must be affected by the previous beliefs of the individual; that we have, indeed, no right to suppose that any two experiences of two persons are ever the same. When we speak of the same experience, therefore, we imply that some experiences have a sufficient number of common features to constitute a definite type. Our empirical justification for speaking of types of experience is supplied by the fact that such classes are in fact found.

One such type is the experience which we are now discussing, and of which we suggest that the pantheism referred to by Comte is an intellectualization. We suggest too that primitive fetishism is an intellectualization of a similar experience by primitive man, possibly an experience much more normal and vivid to him than it ever is to us.

The character of this experience can be best shown by quoting attempts which have been made to describe it.



We will begin with a case in which it is not intellectualized in a religious way:

“In the midst of a gentle rain . . . I was suddenly sensible of such sweet and beneficent society in Nature, in the very pattering of the drops, and in every sound and sight around my house, an infinite and unaccountable friendliness all at once like an atmosphere sustaining me, as made the fancied advantages of human neighbourhood insignificant, and I have never thought of them since. Every little pine-needle expanded and swelled with sympathy and befriended me. I was so distinctly made aware of something kindred to me, even in scenes which we are accustomed to call wild and dreary . . . that I thought no place could ever be strange to me again.”<sup>1</sup>

A pantheistic account of this experience is found in a book of sermons by a Buddhist monk:

“God is immanent in the world and not outside of it. . . . We know his presence even in the insignificant flower in the field which is trampled under foot by man and beasts carelessly and pitilessly, to say nothing about the starry heavens with their grandeur which is replete with suggestions, or about the huge mass of inert matter on which mountains rise, oceans roar and sentient beings walk.”<sup>2</sup>

It would not however be true to say, as James does of all mystical experience, that we are led to pantheism. It would be more accurate to say that this experience leads to the positive element in pantheism—the doctrine of immanence. Pantheism however contains also a negative element in the denial of the transcendence of its god. If combined with a doctrine

<sup>1</sup> Thoreau, *Walden*, Chap. on ‘Solitude.’

<sup>2</sup> Soyen Shaku, *Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot*.

of the transcendence of God (supplied by reflection on other types of religious experience) this experience leads to theism of a kind familiar in Christianity.

We do, in fact, find numerous theistic descriptions of it. In the account of his conversion, Brother Lawrence says :

"That in the winter, seeing a tree stripped of its leaves, and considering that within a little time, the leaves would be renewed, and after that the flowers and the fruit appear, he received a high view of the Providence and Power of God, which has never since been effaced from his soul."<sup>1</sup>

Similar experiences were known to Boehme. On one occasion, when in a vision he looked into the deepest foundation of things, "he believed it was only a fancy, and in order to banish it from his mind he went out upon the green. But here he remarked that he gazed into the very heart of things, the very herbs and grass, and that actual Nature harmonized with what he had inwardly seen."<sup>2</sup>

An interesting description of this state, by a narrator of a very different kind, is found in the following account of a conversion in Starbuck :

"It was like entering another world—a new state of existence. Natural objects were glorified. My spiritual vision was so clarified that I saw beauty in every material object in the universe. The woods were vocal with heavenly music."<sup>3</sup>

The examples quoted so far have been descriptions in sober prose, claiming to relate actual experiences. It would not be difficult to multiply similar examples

<sup>1</sup> *The Practice of the Presence of God*, First Conversation.

<sup>2</sup> Martensen, *Jacob Boehme*, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, p. 120.

in poetry, though here we may suspect an element of artifice. The possibility of this element does not, however, discredit poetical descriptions as psychological material, since such accounts are, undoubtedly, in most cases based on genuine subjective experiences of the poet.

The Earth-Spirit describing his activities to Faust speaks of "*der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid*,"<sup>1</sup> and thus condenses into a short phrase this emotion of reverence and awe towards Nature.

In the well-known lines from 'Bishop Blougram's Apology,' Browning describes the assault made on an atheistic conviction by :

" a sunset touch,  
A fancy from a flower-bell, someone's death,  
A chorus-ending from Euripides,—  
And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears  
As old and new at once as Nature's self,  
To rap and knock and enter in our soul."

In 'Lines composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey,' Wordsworth speaks in a way which suggests that he is describing an experience actually felt by himself :

" And I have felt  
A presence that disturbs me with the joy  
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime  
Of something far more deeply interfused,  
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  
And the round ocean and the living air,  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :  
A motion and a spirit, that impels  
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,  
And rolls through all things."

<sup>1</sup> The 'living garment of the Godhead.'

An excellent example of a poetic account of the experience which is not interpreted theistically, is found in Swinburne's 'A Nympholept':

"The whole wood feels thee, the whole air fears thee  
but fear  
So deep, so dim, so sacred, is wellnigh sweet.  
For the light that hangs and broods on the wood-  
lands here,  
Intense, invasive, intolerant, imperious and meet  
To lighten the works of thine hands and the ways of  
thy feet,  
Is hot with the fire of the breath of thy life, and dear  
As hope that shrivels and shrinks not for frost or  
heat."

But the poet questions the optimistic intellectualization of the experience which is made by theism. The beauty of Nature is on the surface of his experience, but not the goodness demanded by a belief in God.

"Thee, therefore, thee would I come to, cleave to,  
cling,  
If haply thy heart be kind and thy gifts be good,  
Unknown sweet spirit, whose vesture is soft in spring,  
In summer splendid."

It is instructive also to notice the patterns of religious temperament in which this experience is absent. We may suppose that to a mentality hostile to the idea of divine immanence in Nature the experience would not occur, or if it did, it would be immediately suppressed as something illusory or evil.

No doubt this hostility may be the result of theological or philosophical prejudices against such a doctrine as that of divine immanence; but the wide range of religious thought in which any doctrine

expressing this experience is absent, suggests a deeper reason than this. A hint of what this reason may be can be found in the poem quoted above. The idea that God expresses himself in the beauty of Nature implies an optimistic attitude towards the external world. To the unreflective man, healthy in mind and body, and not much burdened by moral problems, this attitude is a natural one. For him, there is no conflict when he sees Nature as the face of God. The matter is however different with the sensitive soul of the Buddha, tortured by the sight of the misery and cruelty of the world, or of St. Paul, acutely conscious of sin in himself and in mankind. To such mentalities Nature is not good. For them, the experience we are describing would come into conflict with the stronger experience of the reality of pain or evil.<sup>1</sup>

This may perhaps account for its absence from the Gospels and from that ascetic school of Christianity of which the example best known to English readers is St. Thomas à Kempis. We seem indeed to find in some Christian ascetics a deliberate repression of any emotional attitude towards Nature. They hide their faces from its beauty lest it should make them love purely natural things and so steal their hearts from God. "Men draw thither," says St. Augustine, "to admire the heights of the mountains and the powerful waves of the sea—and to turn away from themselves."

This repulsion from natural beauty is expressed also by St. Catherine of Genoa in her *Vita* :

"The sun, which at first seemed so clear to me, now seems obscure ; what used to seem sweet to me, now seems bitter : because all beauties and all sweet-

<sup>1</sup> Itself rationalized in the Vedāntic doctrine of the external world as illusion, and in the Christian doctrines of Creation and the Devil.

nesses that have an admixture of the creature are corrupt and spoilt.”<sup>1</sup>

Nor do we find the experience of the divine immanence in Nature recorded in the writings of such Indian mystics as Kabir and Tagore. Possibly this is due to the extremely abstract and metaphysical trend of their thought, since their harmony with the course of the World and the absence of ethical preoccupations might be expected to predispose them in its favour. No description of this experience can be found in the *Hundred Poems of Kabir*. In Tagore’s works there is one only which might be read in this way:

“Thou art the sky and thou art the nest as well.

“O thou beautiful, there in the nest it is thy love that encloses the soul with colours and sounds and odours.

“There comes the morning with the golden basket in her right hand bearing the wreath of beauty, silently to crown the earth.

“And there comes the evening over the lonely meadows deserted by the herds, through trackless paths, carrying cool draughts of peace in her golden pitcher from the western ocean of rest.”

But the last verse suggests a different reading of this poem:

“But there where spreads the infinite sky for the soul to take her flight in, reigns the stainless white radiance. There is no day nor night, nor form nor colour, and never, never a word.”<sup>2</sup>

It seems that the true reading of it would be as a parable of Nature and God, not as a description of their felt identity.

<sup>1</sup> Baron F. von Huegel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, quoting *Vita*, p. 28c.

<sup>2</sup> Tagore, *Gitanjali*, p. 67.

In Mithraism, on the other hand, we find a religion which absorbs this experience and finds in it a congenial emotional driving force. Franz Cumont says :

*"Les dieux étaient partout et ils se mêlaient à tous les actes de la vie quotidienne. Le feu qui cuisait les aliments des fidèles et les réchauffait, l'eau qui les désalterait et les purifiait, l'air même qu'ils respiraient et le jour qui les éclairait, étaient l'objet de leurs hommages. . . . Les étoiles qui brillaient au ciel, le vent qui agitait la feuillage, la source ou le torrent qui coulaient de la montagne, la terre même qu'il foulait aux pieds, tout était divin à ses yeux, et la nature entière qui l'entourait, provoquait en lui la crainte respectueuse des forces infinies agissant dans l'univers."*<sup>1</sup>

The view suggested in this paper is that behind religious doctrines we must look for the experience they attempt to rationalize. Behind the experience there are psychological antecedents. On the supernaturalistic hypothesis these include a real perceptive insight into the nature of reality. With the question of what is behind the experience, and therefore of the truth or illusion contained in it, we are not attempting to deal. We have tried to show that there is one clearly marked and definite experience of a type which may be called the experience of divine immanence in Nature.

This we suppose to have been intellectualized in

<sup>1</sup> Franz Cumont, *Textes et Monuments figurés relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra*, p. 312.

"The gods were everywhere and mingled themselves with all the acts of everyday life. The fire which cooked the food of the faithful and warmed them, the water which quenched their thirst and cleansed them, the air even which they breathed and the day which gave them light, were objects of their homage. . . . The stars which twinkled in the sky, the wind which rustled the leaves, the spring or the torrent which flowed from the mountain, the earth even which he [the initiate of Mithra] trod underfoot, all was divine to his eyes, and the Nature which surrounded him, aroused in him the religious awe of the infinite powers moving in the universe."

the form of pantheism, and in the doctrine of the Immanence of God in theism, while a similar experience was intellectualized by primitive man as fetishism.

It is tempting too to ask (though it is beyond the scope of this paper to answer the question) whether it is possible to regard the Argument from Design as, in its essence, an intellectual construction from this experience. This might account for the appeal made by the argument even when it is presented in an obviously inadequate form.

This kinship is not indeed apparent from that emotionally unsatisfying form of the Argument from Design in which God is inferred from the lack of any explanation of some of the natural adaptations of organisms. It is however more obvious, when the argument is given such a generalized form as is usual among modern theologians. The following may be taken as an example:

"God must be recognized as working in all processes of the widest range and the most minutely intimate penetration, . . . the wonder will not be merely that this organ fits that use, as if God had solved a problem set to Him by circumstances beyond His control, but that the whole nature of things is such that the interaction of forces in the whole produces the infinite variety of living beauty which we see."<sup>1</sup>

Here we have not an argument from apparent breaks in the causal sequence, but a statement that the hand of God is visible in the process itself and in the beauty of the whole. In this form the Argument from Design seems plainly to be related to the felt

<sup>1</sup> P. N. Wagget, *Religion and Science*, p. 89 (1909 ed.).



wordless experience of an intimately known personality in Nature.

If the view suggested in this paper be correct, we may regard the more developed forms of religions as intellectualizations of successively wider tracts of mental experience. Of these tracts the one here dealt with, which we have called the Experience of Divine Immanence in Nature, is only a small part.

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## THE NON-HISTORICITY SCHOOL.

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It is always difficult to get a name or a phrase for a new theory or working hypothesis. To interpret the New Testament we must begin with some working theory or hypothesis, which is not proved to begin with, but taken for granted with a view to seeing whether it will account for certain facts. The strength of the theory lies in its power to account for the facts. If it does account for them completely, that is regarded as the strongest possible evidence of its truth; the theory is then considered proved. When an increasing number of facts is left unaccounted for by a theory which has long been accepted, it is time to doubt the validity of that theory and seek another. This is the condition in which the Christian world finds itself at present touching the question of the Origin of Christianity.

The objection to the word 'non-historicity' is that it conveys the impression that the person who adopts it has some prejudice against history. But why should he? On the contrary he wants to discover, if he can, what were really the facts of history. The question is, What was the Origin of the Movement which afterwards became Christianity and the Christian Church? Did it begin by the appearance of a man or a God-man in Palestine in the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, who taught and gathered disciples about him? Or did it begin in some other way? There is no prejudice against

history here. Some people imagine that they know all about a theory or hypothesis when they have given it a name. This almost justifies Lord Morley's caustic sentence: "Names are devices invented by superficial people to save themselves the trouble of thinking." Such a person would say: "The 'Non-Historicity School.' Yes, that is one which denies that Jesus ever lived on earth." Now before anyone could make such denial he would have to examine every nook and cranny in the Greek and Roman world of the first century and find no Jesus. How could anyone do that without omniscience? But, whether one thinks that the Movement called Christianity began in a certain way and not in another way is a different matter. There is no objection to the word 'non-historicity' if it is used 'for short'; just as there is no objection to saying, "The sun rises and sets," if we remember that it is not strictly true or exact. The term 'non-historicity' induces a false emphasis—as though the chief interest of the question is whether Jesus lived or not—giving the impression that one's emphasis is on negation and not on affirmation; whereas the chief interest is in the question: How did the Movement begin?

The affirmation here is that the Central Figure of the New Testament is that of a Divine Being. The person who adopts the Non-Historicity theory or hypothesis is not denying that there may have been an actual historic Jesus. No one can prove a negative, and certainly no one could prove such a negative as this would be. The affirmation is that the Person described in the New Testament as the Lord Jesus Christ and by numerous other appellations is not a person who could have lived within the limits and

range of history. Of course every affirmation involves a negation, just as every negation carries an affirmation in its heart. To say 'Yes' is at the same time to say 'No.' To announce a belief is to announce at the same time, by implication at least, an unbelief in something the belief excludes. The denial that the Central Figure of the New Testament could have lived within the range and limits of history, is at the same time the affirmation that that Central Figure was an Aspect or Character or Person of the One Eternal God. That is to say, it affirms his essential Divinity and substantial Godhood. Conversely, the affirmation that the Central Figure of the New Testament could have lived within the range and limits of history, carries within it the additional affirmation that he was a man, and only a man. That is to say, it carries within itself the denial of his Divinity. The two propositions, that the Figure described in the New Testament could have lived within the range and limits of history and that he was Divine, cannot be held together. The one excludes the other. It is here where all the trouble in this question lies. There is an inner contradiction involved in the way in which the Christian Church has conceived of him whom it has called its Lord. It has worshipped him as God and it has tried to follow him as a man, and it has been justified in this by the New Testament itself, or more strictly speaking by an inadequate and imperfect interpretation of the New Testament.

Nowhere perhaps has this inner contradiction been more clearly set forth than in a book, almost forgotten now, published about forty years ago, *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, by Reginald W. Macan. The author shows that both members of the inner contradiction

have remained beside and outside each other, each "false in its special onesidedness, and each justified in its onesidedness against the other. If Christ is God, he is not man; if man, not God." He finds a parallel to this contradiction in the antithesis of matter and mind which has dominated modern philosophy ever since Descartes. "The same process of onesided assertion repeats itself here, with the same solution which is no solution." The progress of metaphysics exhibited, just as the progress of theology has done, "this continued separation and driving out of one another of the two elements set in juxtaposition, now the exclusive assertion of the one, now the exclusive assertion of the other, and then their attempted reunion by means of a third, which in its turn must fall into the same elementary antithesis, or finally their bare re-assertion, one beside the other." The right standpoint for the solution of the inner contradiction in science and philosophy is the principle of monism, because it abolishes the absolute dualism which implies a contradiction in the ultimate nature of things. The same contradiction is involved in the Church doctrine of the Divine and human in the person of the Jesus Christ of the Gospels and Epistles, a contradiction "before which nothing awaits us but permanent intellectual confusion." The only legitimate metaphysics must be monistic; so the only legitimate theology must be monistic, and the only legitimate christology must be monistic; and the question of questions is how this monism is to be reached.

There are only three ways in which you can interpret or construe the Central Figure of the New Testament. Either you must say that he was God

*and* man; or that he was man and *not* God; or that he was God and *not* man. The first is the position of Orthodoxy in all its forms; the second is the position of Liberalism in all its forms; the third is the position advocated in this article. It is an essential part of this third position that the Being described in the New Testament could not have lived within the limits and range of history. The first position is practically dead. Few or none will come forward in these days and boldly advocate that the supernatural Jesus Christ of the Orthodoxy of a hundred or even fifty years ago was an actual historic person—miracle-working, virgin-born, rising from the dead. The second position is that Jesus was a man who lived a strictly human life and that the supernatural features were a halo of accretion which gathered about his memory as time went on. Why does the Liberal retain the belief in the historicity of the Central Figure of the New Testament, while he rejects the statements of the New Testament writers concerning him? Because he is dominated by an unconscious presupposition, *viz.* that there was at the beginning of the Movement, which afterwards became Christianity, an actual historical person or individual who began by teaching and gathering disciples about him. The presupposition of the whole Liberal movement—never once disturbed or called in question—is that the Central Figure of Gospels and Epistles was a man in actual historical reality, but that he was so great a man that very soon legends and myths began to gather about him. The idea is that he was too great, and the impression he made upon his disciples and followers too deep and profound, for them to describe him by anything within the limits of strict humanity. Just

as Alfred Tennyson could not tell all that Arthur Hallam had been to him without bringing in all Nature to help him, sun and flood and air—

“Thy voice is on the rolling air;  
I hear thee where the waters run;  
Thou standest in the rising sun,  
And in the setting thou art fair,—

so it is presumed the disciples and followers of Jesus had passed through such a transcendent experience by their contact and intercourse with him, that ordinary words and metaphors failed them, and they had recourse to myth and legend, to portent and miracle, to express what they felt. And while the Liberal has the profoundest respect for the effort of the disciples and apostles, he does not hesitate to say that they were mistaken and wrong. Their ‘Lord’ was only a man, though an extraordinary one. Paul’s theory of a ‘Man from Heaven,’ John’s Incarnation-doctrine, both doubtless derived from the Mystery-religions of Greece and Jewry, were the mould into which they ran their estimate of their master. This is specially the Modernist conception, which claims that in trying to estimate Jesus Christ you must take into account, not only what he was in himself, but what his closest followers and disciples have said he was. Jesus Christ was not Divine, of course; he was man only, a strictly human being, but he was so great and good and produced such an effect upon those with whom he came into contact, that men have said he was Divine. This is the Modernist doctrine of the Founder of the Faith.

Now this way of putting the matter, which is the characteristic Liberal way, is ‘up against’ the New Testament. It is based upon the mistaken notion

that the development of thought about Jesus Christ in the New Testament is from a man to a God or God-man. There is indeed development in the New Testament, but it is the other way about from the way this view presupposes. It is from God or God-man to a man. What we are to witness in the New Testament, is not the apotheosis or deification of a man, even the greatest of men; it is the humanisation and gradual historicisation of a God or God-man. The Liberal has misinterpreted the New Testament at this point, and his misinterpretation has been due to an unconscious presupposition. It is his unconscious presupposition always which determines the view a man takes; and the only way to alter his view is to alter his unconscious presupposition. It is in a way perfectly natural that the Liberal should be thus dominated, for the historicity of the Central Figure of the New Testament has not been called in question, except by one here and there, until recent times. The Liberal theologians and critics have felt impelled to search for this historical Jesus who, they thought, was the Founder of Christianity, and they have been engaged in this search for over a hundred years. *They have not been able to find him.* To satisfy their rationalistic principles he must be purely and strictly human, and the New Testament presents no such being. The history of that search has been written in Albert Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus*. The book is a critical study of the progress of that search 'from Reimarus to Wrede.' It has well been described as 'a cemetery of discarded hypotheses.' The author says in summing up his 'Results' in his last chapter:

"There is nothing more negative than the result



of the critical study of the Life of Jesus. The Jesus of Nazareth who came forward publicly as the Messiah, who preached the ethic of the Kingdom of God, who founded the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth, and died to give His work its final consecration, *never had any existence*. He is a figure designed by rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern theology in a historical garb."

It is to be specially noticed that the author of these words believes that there was a historical Jesus. His declaration is that Jesus as conceived by the Liberal critics *never had any existence*, save in the imagination of these Liberal critics themselves. The historical Jesus that did exist, "will not suffer himself to be modernised." As historical figure "he refuses to be detached from his own time." He, therefore, adopts what is called the 'eschatological view,' according to which Jesus was a wild apocalyptic enthusiast, belonging exclusively to his own age. There are many who follow him in this, notably Kirsopp Lake and the Abbé Loisy, thus proving how tenacious is the view that there was an actual historical individual of some kind at the beginning of the Christian Movement.

In the judgment of the writer there will be no intelligent interpretation of the New Testament, no account of the Origin of the Faith that is without internal contradiction and confusion, until it is admitted that the Movement did not begin with a teacher who appeared in Palestine and began to teach and gather disciples about him, but in another way altogether. It began as a doctrine. What was the burden of Apostolic preaching? What was the message proclaimed by Peter and Paul, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John in its essence? The writings of the Apostle

Paul are proof positive that it was not the fact that a great teacher had been born in Palestine, for these writings are not a recital of such teachings. There are no teachings of Jesus in the Epistles of Paul, no Sermon on the Mount, or on the Plain. Paul's Jesus Christ never did anything but die for man's sin and rise again for his justification. If we had no Gospels and only the Pauline Letters, we should never suppose that Jesus Christ taught anything. No, the essence of Apostolic preaching was the worship of the One God under the Aspect or Person of Saviour, which came to be called 'Jesus.' And by 'the Jesus' is meant, not an individual, but a doctrine. The earliest Gospel was not the teachings of a personal teacher; it was the announcement of a new Aspect of God, the One Eternal God, that is, a new Idea of God. And the earliest Christians were not followers of a personal teacher, but those who worshipped this new Aspect of God. 'Jesus' was not the only name given to this Aspect of God; there was the name 'Christ,' which, with 'Jesus,' was the name of a divine or semi-divine Being before the Christian era. These two were brought together as the name of one Being by the Movement which afterwards became historical Christianity. But neither the one nor the other denoted at first a historical individual. There is only one way in which this could be. It is not meant that 'Jesus' was God in outward bodily shape; such an idea is absurd. What is meant is that 'Jesus' is one of the names given to the way in which certain highly endowed religious minds among the Jewish Diaspora came to think of God.

It must never be forgotten that the only way in which God can be revealed to men is by the thoughts they have of him. Inward and ever inward is the way

to God. As men's thoughts of God become elevated and purified God is more and more revealed to them. God is always a reflection of themselves. The idea that God takes shape in outward form, as the Greeks thought of Zeus or Apollo, belongs to the very essence of superstition. "It is a canon of religious study," Professor Gilbert Murray teaches us, "that all gods reflect the social state, past or present, of their worshippers." "The god is the collective desire projected, as it were, or personified" (M. Doutté, quoted by Prof. Gilbert Murray, in *Four Stages*, p. 41). Miss Jane E. Harrison teaches us that Dionysus was the projection of the group-emotions of the Greeks at spring-time. Yahveh was the projection of the group-emotions of the Hebrew people at various stages of their history. Thus do all the gods of men arise. The statement in the book of *Genesis*, that God made man in his own image, is the converse of the actual fact, that man always makes his God in his image after his own likeness. This ought to teach us that Jesus Christ, the God of the New Testament, was not a historical person or individual, but an ideal creation that had its existence in the minds and hearts and imaginations of men and women, the projection of the group-emotions of the earliest Christians.

Inasmuch as the human mind is finite and cannot grasp the Infinite, when it tries to conceive of God, it will conceive only of an Aspect of Him. Jesus, therefore, was the Aspect of God which some richly endowed minds among the Jewish Dispersion came to recognise. This is ever the way in which the revelation of God comes to men—through their thoughts of him. We have this principle stated by the author of the *II. Epistle to the Corinthians* (iv. 6): "For God who

commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." What is meant by the phrase 'the face of Jesus Christ?' It is a pure assumption, which has no evidence to support it, that the author means either the personal appearance or the teachings of Jesus the man. There is no evidence that the author ever saw Jesus the man; and even if there were, it is admitted by all competent to give a judgment upon the matter, that the chief interest of the author of the Pauline Letters is not the earthly Jesus but the heavenly Christ. It is to put undue weight upon the word translated 'face' to make it mean a historical person. As a matter of fact it does not mean that, it means 'visage,' 'countenance,' and denotes, in the connection in which the Apostle uses it, 'aspect,' or 'appearance.' In classical Greek it denotes a 'mask,' that aspect or appearance the actor assumed on the stage, a character for the time being. We have no difficulty in saying that Yahveh, the God of Israel, was an Aspect of God as conceived by the Jewish people. Neither should we have any difficulty in saying that 'Jesus' was the 'Person' or Aspect of the One Eternal God as conceived by the choicest minds of the first century.

It is to be noticed that the name 'Jesus' or the double name 'Jesus Christ' in the New Testament is the equivalent of the term 'Lord' in the Old. In the Greek Septuagint the term 'Kyrios' (Lord) is the uniform translation of the name 'Adonai' in the Hebrew. That is to say, it always means God. And in the New Testament the words 'Lord,' 'Lord Jesus,' 'Lord Christ,' 'Lord Jesus Christ,' mean the same thing. Just, therefore, as we have not any word of

any personal Deity in the Old Testament, so we have not in the New Testament any word of a personal Jesus Christ. The words 'the Jesus' is represented as speaking, were all put into his mouth by those who believed in him and worshipped him as God. This is admitted by leading modern theologians in the case of the Fourth Gospel. Dean Inge (*Cambridge Essays*, pp. 253-5) says: "The Evangelist no more wishes us to believe that Jesus spoke all the words put into his mouth than that he spoke Greek. The whole book is a free composition by the writer himself, inspired, as he believed, by the spirit of Jesus." Similar testimony could be given from Dr. Adams Brown, Dr. James Denney, Principal Fairbairn, Professor Thompson, Professor Allan Menzies, Professor Burkitt and Professor Harnack. All admit what is here contended for: no saying of the Fourth Gospel can be quoted as the word of a personal, individual Jesus; the words attributed to him were all put into his mouth by those who regarded him as Divine.

But what is true of the Fourth Gospel is true also of the Synoptics. The whole four gospels stand on the same footing. They are all literature, they are all the utterances of men, and they all bear the stamp of the stage of culture the writers had reached. The distinction between the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel is only relative. The latter is dominated throughout by the central conception of Greek philosophy,—the Logos. It is the Logos who speaks, and not an individual Jesus. The Synoptics are dominated throughout by an element just as dogmatic. This is specially true of *Mark*, accounted by the Liberal critics as the most realistic. The writer is concerned with the dogma that Jesus is the Jewish Messiah or Christ,

and while he gives the dogma a historical form there is no evidence that he wrote history or intended to write it. As an example of the same thing in the First Gospel take the beautiful words (xi. 28-30): "Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light." The words are part of a Christological hymn which betrays, as Pfleiderer points out, its ecclesiastical form. "We can hardly fail to recognise," says Pfleiderer, "that this artistic arrangement of strophes in something like sonnet-form owes something to the moulding hand of the Church." And what confirms this conclusion is the fact that the contents of the strophes are partly dependent upon Jeremiah, partly upon Paul, partly upon a book of the Apocrypha called *Jesus the Son of Sirach*. This means that the believer and worshipper of Jesus the God, who was the author of the words, or adopted them from the ritual of the Community, had before him these authorities when he was penning them. A little examination of the passage will convince anyone of unprejudiced mind that such a composition as this could never have come from a personal, individual Jesus. It could only have been put into his mouth by his worshippers. And so it is of all the words attributed to him. 'The Jesus' everywhere speaks as 'the Lord' and 'the Son of God' in the gospels. This does not deny the divine inspiration of the words, but is rather an affirmation of it. God's revelation is always through the human soul. Have we no message from 'On High' unless we can show the footprints of the 'Risen Lord' on the sands of Palestine or the

garden of Jerusalem? Is not the soul of man more enduring than these? Suppose we discover that all the words that are represented as having been spoken by 'the Jesus' in the gospels were put into his mouth by his worshippers? What then? Are the words less true on that account? Are they less divine? Nay, verily, for the truth and divinity of the words depend not upon their origin but upon their quality.

It is not difficult to answer the question what was the Aspect of God denoted by the name 'Jesus.' It was God as Saviour. This is the meaning of the word 'Jesus.' 'Yahveh' was God as Power, God as Lawgiver, God as Judge. 'Jesus' was God as Healer, God as Protector, as Saviour. And when we ask what was the sin this Aspect of God would save *from*, the answer is at hand. It was that from which the whole world in which these Hellenistic Jews were living, was suffering from,—the sin of Idolatry. The New Testament uses many figures of speech to set forth the terrible nature of this sin, the chief of which was that of being possessed by evil spirits. What a trouble the supposed fact of demoniacal possession has been to the enlightened commentator of the New Testament! How could Jesus, as such commentators have conceived of him—the ideal man of the race, the greatest character of history—endorse such superstition? The thing becomes as clear as day when we understand that those possessed with devils were idolaters, and that the worship of 'the Jesus' was the cure of it. Many other figures of speech were used, such as that the inhabitants of the heathen world were suffering from blindness, or that they were lepers, or that they were dead, or had wandered away from the Father's house into a far country and were employed in feeding

swine, or that they had been robbed and left wounded and half dead in the waysides of life. All the figures denoted the same thing, that the world, especially the Gentile world, had forgotten God, were bowing down to degrading idolatry; and the Gospel or Good News was that the one cure for this terrible state of things was that the world should worship the One true God,—under the Aspect or Person of Saviour. There is one passage in the *Book of Revelation* (xiv. 6 and 7) which tells us unequivocally what was the earliest Gospel: "And I saw another angel flying in mid heaven, having an eternal Gospel to proclaim unto them that dwell on the earth, and unto every nation and tribe and tongue and people; and he saith with a loud voice, Fear God, and give glory to him . . . that made heaven and the earth and sea and the fountains of waters." Those very early Christians—Christians before the name was attached to them—saw in the worship of the One God under the Aspect of Saviour what the prophet Isaiah had predicted: "The land of Zebulon, and the land of Nephthalim, by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan, Galilee of the Gentiles, the people which sat in darkness saw great light, and to them which sat in the region and shadow of death light is sprung up."

K. C. ANDERSON.

(The conclusion will follow in the next number.—ED.)



## ORTHODOXY, PSYCHOLOGY AND MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE.

THE EDITOR.

IN all the great religions there are found those who by the sternest self-discipline have crowned their faith with knowledge of a supernal reality in which the supreme object of their worship is felt to be immediately present to them; it is an overmastering experience which transcends their powers of description and consequently escapes all analysis by the practical intellect. By whatever name we may call this highest level or deepest stratum of religious experience, it is to those who have enjoyed it, one would naturally imagine, that we should look for the greatest measure of agreement on the essentials of religion, apart from the special credal formularies which differentiate the great spiritual faiths from one another. It seems reasonable to believe that just as the truths of science are one in whatever land or race they are set forth, so the truth of spiritual religion is one no matter in what language of traditional forms and institutional practices it is presented. To such a view, however, priestcraft can never assent, for it would mean the abandonment of its claim, not only to possess and control the means of reaching the goal of the religious life, but the right to define its nature beforehand. But if prophets, saints and sages are such as have consciously entered into immediate contact with the Divine Life, they must of necessity, one would

think, be wider minded and larger hearted. If they have vitally entered into spiritual truth, have climbed the height whence the dawn of Eternal Life can break upon their spiritual vision, no matter by the path of what particular faith they have severally begun the ascent,—they at any rate might be expected joyfully to acknowledge the arrival thither of those who have started by some other way. So far, unfortunately, few of them have expressed themselves in this sense, and so curbed that love of rivalry, proprietorship and monopoly in matters of faith which is so deeply rooted in perverse human nature. As it is, there is no doubt that, if the separatist partizans of the various orthodoxies were to see the great founders or leaders of their faiths in loving communion, they would be grievously scandalized. And yet if the greatest heroes of sanctity are not now united in love and knowledge and holiness and one of another in the Divine Life, if they who attained to union beyond the measure of all other men on earth, are now in spirit at variance with regard to the truth of supreme reality, then indeed religion, even in its highest sense—the spiritual religion of the heart, of the inmost self of man—which should bind men together and man to God, would be in its very essence, not only a vain thing, but the most diabolically separative power in the universe. The most insidious foe of true faith is fanaticism; it is this more than anything else which has perverted the beneficent nature of genuinely spiritual religion and painfully exemplified the law of the corruption of the best giving birth to the worst. But we have a right to expect true saints and sages, those who have really enjoyed immediate consciousness of the transcendent nature of the Divine Life, to set a better example.

There are doubtless few of these to-day ; nevertheless the few might do something towards establishing a better state of affairs in the general world of religion. They might set a magnificent example of genuine spiritual comity, and so constitute the nucleus of an unbreakable inter-religious union for all those who value the living of the life of the spirit more highly than the rigid adhesion to formal creeds. Such a trumpet-call to spiritual fellowship would rally to their standard all that is best in religion the world over. But as long as the inter-relations between the great religions are left to the tender mercies of the theologians, with their embittered controversies and intransigent apologetics, there can be nothing else than a state of fratricidal war.

The history of religions and the comparative science of religion have done much to increase general knowledge and to liberalize thought ; they have convinced vast numbers that religions cannot be kept isolated in watertight compartments, since the characteristic phenomena of religion in similar stages of evolution and culture present common features. It is true that these intellectual methods of research in the nature of things deal with externals only and leave the more vital problems untouched. But of late years a considerable amount of work has also been done on the psychology of religious experience, though most of it unfortunately from what may be called an agnostic standpoint, the main effort being to show that all phases of religion can be brought within the scientific domain and interpreted on purely naturalistic lines. The more recondite phenomena are now no longer denied, as once they were by crude rationalism ; nevertheless the general tendency is still to seek to dethrone

them from their exalted status by interpretations which endeavour to empty them of all objective reality and reduce them to pure subjectivism. Agnostic psychology and medical materialism profess to dispose of the whole matter on mechanistic lines and to make meaningless the world-old faith in God and soul. But psychology is still the youngest of the sciences and as yet possessed of no single authoritative voice that can evoke the assent of all its votaries. Naturally no vital science can be positive and exact in the sense in which the physical sciences are claimed to be; the personal factor cannot be eliminated. If normal psychic phenomena and those activities of the mind with which all are familiar, are hard to explain, much more difficult is it to deal with the abnormal or unusual, and most difficult of all to analyse and evaluate the most profound and delicate experiences of the religious consciousness. These are generally spoken of as mystical, and here far more than with any other type of inner experience the actual happening is beyond the reach of scientific inspection. Few psychologists have their own experience to go upon outside the limits of the average normal; on the other hand it is very rare to find a mystic who is a trained psychologist. Thus large areas of the most intensely vivid and personal of all experience is withdrawn from the scrutiny of the would-be analyst. He is forced to depend in the first place on the descriptions of the experiencers, who in the deepest states are so absorbed in the experience as to be incapable of observing it discriminatively; they are rapt out of themselves and overmastered. In the second place, when such descriptions are taken as the subject-matter for analysis and explanation by another mind, be it scientific or

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theological, a secondary element of deformation has to be reckoned with,—the factor of prejudice due to the world-view of the investigator. Here the prejudice of the agnostic professor who would rationalize everything and dispense with soul and God, is as dogmatic as that of the theologian who would seek in the deepest experience of his fellow faithful the confirmation of his special system of supernatural belief.

There are, however, many to-day who are unable to subscribe to the strict doctrinal requirements of any special body of faith, and yet who sincerely believe that the most profoundly vital experience of the religious consciousness is the highest state realizable by man on earth. They believe that in this order of experience alone is faith transformed into an immediate certitude of contact with the Divine superior to all inference or intellectual conviction. And since they find that this experience of spiritual certitude is enjoyed by the saints of all the great faiths, in spite of the formal differences which exist in their respective creeds, they conclude that the experience is not conditioned essentially by belief in formularies, but by fidelity to the basic 'formless' spiritual truth which underlies the credal forms, and most of all by utter devotion to the endeavour to realize it. Man is in his depths a spiritual being, and high religious experience brings into activity this essence of his nature; it is a global experience, a synthetic sense of wholeness of being, the realisation of personality proper, which the language devised to describe the facts of our partial lives and the thought-modes of our separative state of existence, is quite inadequate to express. The experience is the most real that man can live, but it is of an order to which he is otherwise a stranger; he cannot translate

it into the familiar speech of discursive thought without doing violence to, or entirely sacrificing, its essential nature. A single genuinely spiritual experience might give rise to a hundred different forms of expression in the same mind, all of which might exhibit some mode or aspect of its essence; but no one of them nor all combined could do more than suggest the nature of its reality.

The sceptic will of course deny, not only the objectivity, but even the existence of such a state. The medical materialist will attribute the overmastering feeling of certitude associated with it to disease; for him such religious experience falls within the domain of morbid pathology and psychiatry. Agnostic psychology of a less virulent type, while admitting the sanity of life and high moral character of the saints, will contend that the experience is misinterpreted, and has much to say either of the powers of the transliminal self or the elaborations and extra-positions of the sub-conscious. The orthodox believer on the other hand, as we have seen, will instance such experiences, when they happen within his own confession, as confirmation of the truth of his faith-formulæ.

A study, which has just been published, brings out very clearly the latter point of view over against the attempts to deny, belittle or explain away the mystical element in religion, and it may be of interest briefly to consider some points in it.<sup>1</sup>

The Roman Catholic is unquestionably the strictest form of orthodoxy in Christendom, and the Professor of Philosophy at University College, Galway, who is of that communion, is an excellent guide within his own

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology and Mystical Experience*, by John Howley, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Galway. London (Kegan Paul, etc.); pp. 275; 10s. 6d. net.

frame of reference. Within the rigid orthodoxy of this Church the great classical type of Mediæval Christian mysticism was produced, and no spiritual writers have dealt so systematically and discriminatingly with the mystical element in religious experience within their own borders as have those of the Scholastic tradition.

For them all genuine mystical experience is determined from beginning to end by faith—faith in a faith, a highly organized, very precise and delicately articulated body of belief. Practically the main article of this creed is faith in the authority of the Church. Theoretically it is ‘faith in God and his Church.’ The claim of the Church to possess infallible authority is absolute; all progress in spiritual life is dependent on the unqualified acceptance of this dogma. It is the ‘basic primal assent’ (p. 158). “Once we recognize and acknowledge within ourselves that the Catholic Church is the duly commissioned agency through which the Divine Teacher instructs us, we can reasonably give as cordial an assent to its teaching as we would give to the Word of God Himself speaking directly to our inner consciousness. . . . The ‘Creator of all things visible and invisible’ is Lord of the very roots of being, and His Minister Plenipotentiary cannot fail to say what it is the Master’s will that he should say, no more and no less” (p. 145). He who cannot accept this claim, is charged with lack of docility, pride of intellect; he is a heretic with views only and no faith, setting up his private judgment against competent authority. But to-day it is no longer the case of a heretical ‘Athanasius against the world’ of Christendom, of an individual against a one and only Church, but of many churches against a single

church, not to speak of religions against a religion. Are all these to be charged with lack of docility? Docility to what? To truth or an ecclesiastical trust?

With Roman Catholicism it has to be a case of all or nothing; there can be no shadow of tolerance for picking or choosing. "Terrible is the unity of the faith in the Catholic consciousness, at once so strong and so fragile" (p. 152). Should you reject or modify the least particular, you are that pestilent thing called a heretic and excluded from the Divine Grace: "You have rent the seamless garment of the given faith" (p. 154). Yet did not Paul declare that he worshipped after the manner that men call heresy? It must be confessed that the enigma of faith propounded by this Sphinx of Dogma is hard to unriddle. "Assent on competent authority to what is beyond our mental grasp," it is asserted, "is so eminently reasonable that the 'I cannot believe' of the man of good-will is an act of unreason" (p. 159). Note well 'the man of good-will.' There are again many who are docile, who admit fully all the claims of the Church, who have all the will in the world to believe, yet find themselves without faith. Why is this? Faith is not a natural faculty; it is not a latent capacity; nor can a man acquire it of himself, control or compel it. It is given supernaturally. According to the theological definition: "An act of faith is a *supernatural* assent by which the intellect by command of the will and *under the influence of Grace* firmly adheres to revealed truths on the authority of God revealing them" (p. 160).

A man of good-will, a good man of approved life, may have the will-to-believe, yet he does not receive the gift of faith; another, of indifferent life, may be full of faith. The Catholic religious life thus



begins with miracle, and remains a mystery from the very start, dependent on a supernatural gift. It is Grace alone which enables the recipient to give a firm mental assent to dogmas which are beyond the range of natural reason. There is no assurance in the matter; it is given or withheld, no man can say why; it is, humanly speaking, bestowed arbitrarily.

The first stage of faith is mental assent. Thereafter some experience a more intense stage, when "our consciousness, as it were, stretches out beyond its borders into the superconscious, and we get a real though dim and confused glimpse of the Beyond. Here is the borderland between the ordinary way in the spiritual life of Catholics and the path of mystical experience" (p. 162). Though the latter is practically of another order from 'intellectual assent' to 'revealed truth,' the religious life is nevertheless viewed as a continuous growth in faith, though how the 'supernaturally given' can grow is not easy to grasp. But at no stage, if we understand rightly, can it be orthodoxly asserted that even the most saintly saint can feel assured of salvation. The more saintly a man is the more humble he becomes; accordingly it is held that "the touchstone of the true and false in mystical experience is humility" (p. 209). Humility is doubtless an admirable virtue, and it is somewhat remarkable that in a system where such great stress is laid on it in the case of individuals, we find the most arrogant corporate claims advanced. But humility, one would suppose, should not be confounded with subservience and abasement. It is then difficult to approve, if easy to understand, the self-satisfied approbation given by the authorities to such humbly submissive professions as, for instance, that of St. John of the Cross, one of

the most experienced of contemplatives. "I accept," he declares, "the aid of experience and learning, and if through ignorance I should err, it is not my intention to depart from the sound doctrine of our holy mother the Catholic Church. I resign myself absolutely to her light, and submit to her decisions, and moreover to the better judgment herein of private men, be they who they may" (*Ascent of Carmel*, Prologue). It is quite in keeping with such abasement to authority to find it laid down by the same great mystic and director that the only true guide of the soul is 'perfectly blind faith' (*Spiritual Maxims*, no. 29), which apparently for him meant faith in the Church first and foremost. It is understandable that one who had enjoyed the depth of spiritual consciousness to which St. John reached, including so many years of 'the dark night,' which is theoretically reckoned as a mystical state, should be humble in respect to what he experienced; but it is surely straining the virtue over much for him to submit his judgment so unreservedly to the censorship of the inexperienced. The great faiths of the world were founded precisely by those who refused to submit their messages to the authority of their religious environments. In keeping with this canon of humility, however, it is notable that, whereas the conversion-psychosis of the Evangelical brings about a state of *assurance*, so that he feels 'saved,' that of the Catholic results in a state of *compunction*, a mingling of sorrow and hope; and this is a right humility.

If, psychologically speaking, religious experience in its widest meaning has to do with the Beyond, and religion in its spiritual sense is the effort of the human soul to reach out to God, how is the 'mystical' to be distinguished from religious experience in general?

Some would make all religious experience mystical, others would narrow the mystical down to a species of miraculous supernaturalism. Professor Howley characterizes the mystical, psychologically, as the experimental sense of the Divine, or the sense of experimental realisation, or as it were a quasi-intuition of the Divine. Its distinction from ordinary religious experience is sketched as follows: "God may be known and loved through the medium of images, notions, concepts, through all that goes to make up the normal field of religious consciousness, or he may be known and loved, in addition, by some direct psychic process, *sine intermedio*, as the older mystics put it, by direct psychic realisation of the Divine" (p. 185).

The great difficulty is to give a psychological account of this 'sense.' Everything seems to me to point to a synthetic spiritual activity superior to any or all of the normal faculties or powers of the soul. It is the awakening of the spirit in man which transcends the intellectual and other powers of the soul. The Spirit is here more or less what Plotinus called the *Nous*. But there seems great hesitancy in Scholastic psychology to use the term with any very precise meaning.

Our exponent, in seeking for the psychological basis of approved mystical experience, says: "This dim quasi-intuition in an intense act of faith seems to point to the existence of a psychic region normally beyond consciousness, yet, in certain privileged cases, dimly perceptible by consciousness" (p. 165). The half-hearted words 'dim' and 'quasi' sound very insufficient in face of the reports of the overwhelming nature of the experience reported by the mystics themselves. Again 'psychic region' seems hardly to

convey adequately the meaning of the terms used by them to describe their own state,—such as the ground, depth or abyss of the soul, apex or summit of the mind, or vertex of the intelligence, fine point of the mind or spirit, or again simply the intelligence, apparently to distinguish it from the intellect.

Our author then goes on to speak of positing “the existence in this supraconscious region of a meta-noetic element, constituting part of the given of faith, and forming in itself that higher synthesis to which all seeming contradictions in the facts of faith can be referred” (p. 166). The ‘meta-noetic element’ is presumably the gift of Grace. The *Nous* of the universe of Later Platonism may be paralleled with the *Logos* of Christianity, the noetic cosmos with the spiritual world. ‘Meta’ is ‘swank.’ The spirit in man, which is of the Divine Spirit, is so to say native to this spiritual world. Spirit constitutes his very essence; it is not added to the soul at a certain date, making as it were a new creation. But orthodoxy would have it otherwise; for, speaking of the re-formation or fashioning anew of the convert’s ‘faith,’ Professor Howley writes: “His sense of a Divine Teacher is but a dramatization, as it were, of that gift of the higher synthesis—the new meta-noetic element in consciousness, whereby all his difficulties are solved” (p. 179). But surely something also is awakened or brought to birth in consciousness which was already there in being. Is the spirit given at a certain moment in the life of man, a distinctive gift of Grace, or is it not rather connate with the rational soul, being the very ‘image of God’ in which it is declared all men are essentially made? Though intellectually incomprehensible, it seems not incredible spiritually that whatever we become in our upward

climb, through co-operation with the Divine, we have somehow always been essentially in our inmost nature. Regarded from the standpoint of temporal process it may be spoken of as the potential becoming actual; but in spiritual reality it is doubtless otherwise.

In any case the nature of this our deepest self which, when awakened, or when he is awakened to it, becomes the point, centre or nucleus of the mystic's re-formed or new-made psychic cosmos, is very interestingly set forth in a quotation from Blossius, who is cited as an orthodox authority.

"Few rise above their natural powers (and truly no one of himself by his own endeavour can pass beyond them, but God alone raises the man of persevering, humble prayer who does all that he can, above them); few know of the *supreme affection*, the *simple intelligence*, the *apex of the spirit* and the *hidden depth* of the soul. In truth you cannot persuade most people that this depth is in us. For it is further within and more elevated than are the three higher powers of the soul, for it is the source of these powers. It is wholly simple, essential and uniform. Wherefore in it there is not multiplicity, but unity, and these three higher powers are one. Here is the highest tranquillity, the deepest silence, since no image can come here. By this depth (in which the Divine image is hidden) we are like unto God. The same depth which stretches to an abyss is called the heaven of the spirit, for it is the Kingdom of God, according to the saying of our Lord: *The Kingdom of God is within you*. But the Kingdom of God is God Himself with all His riches. Therefore that bare and unfigured depth is raised above all created things and above all the senses and powers of the soul, it transcends place and time, resting in

a perpetual adhesion to God as its beginning; but is essentially within us, and it is the abyss of the soul and its inmost essence. This depth, which the Uncreated Light continually illuminates, when it is opened to man and begins to shine for him, marvellously affects and attracts him" (*Inst. Spirit.* c. 12).

That it is not inappropriate to regard this depth of the soul as our spiritual or inmost self may be seen even from the theory of the proper use of the rosary by the pious. "The repeated petitions enable him to keep his outer self usefully employed, his middle self is busied with reflections on the life and sufferings of his Saviour . . . and his inmost self in the apex of the mind will cling to God" (p. 66).

The operations of our middle psychic self are the normal processes of understanding and will. It is the work of the senses, imagination and instincts that makes up our outer self. If the former are much more simple and unified than the latter, is it unreasonable, asks our psychologist, to suppose the operations of our inmost self to be still more unified (p. 244) ?

This triple aspect of the self is a very convenient point of view, and helps to distinguish the three stages of asceticism common to all mystics: (1) moral discipline, (2) psychic kenosis or the emptying of the mind of all images, emotions, etc., and (3) attention in depth. It should be remembered that in Catholic usage the term 'mystical' has been restricted to certain states of prayer of a non-discursive, *i.e.* contemplative, character. Vocal prayer and meditation, or mental prayer, are *per se* non-mystical. On the border line between the two comes the prayer of simplicity, concerning which there is much dispute as to the class in which it should be reckoned. In any case it is laid

down that "the absence of discursive movements of the mind is the key-note of all mystical experience" (p. 19).

The moral asceticism of the mystic is frequently terrible in its severity. Vices have not only to be overcome, but torn up by the roots. The outer control of the passions, the moral force not to yield overtly to temptation, is not sufficient; the reverberations of temptation in thought and feeling must not be allowed in any way to disturb the mind. For unless the passions are utterly subdued and the instincts strictly disciplined, the second stage of the emptying of the field of consciousness is fraught with grave danger. When the higher centres of control, the intellect and the will, are withdrawn, the lower centres will run riot unless they have been previously mortified, and highly undesirable automatisms may ensue. Again, if we would penetrate to the depth, we must get behind reasonings, conclusions, images, sensations, feelings, likes and dislikes. Not only must the more vivid psychic elements—sensations, images and emotions—be subdued and banished, but all discursive movements of the mind, which are proper in meditation, must cease. "This cessation of mental movement is an essential pre-requisite to mystical experience" (p. 193). Contemplation begins where meditation leaves off. As to the final stage of attention in depth, here the very sense of self has to be over-passed. "The self must become pure subject and no longer see itself as part object" (p. 195). The attention in depth is necessarily to God alone. Only when utterly forgetful of self does the contemplative contact the Transcendent or enter the Divine Presence.

There is a certain parallelism between the philo-

sopher's ultimate conception of the Absolute and the mystical idea of God; but the two experiences are very different. The aim of philosophical speculation is knowledge, we are told; the aim of mystical contemplation is love. Stressing this distinction, which is in some respects perhaps somewhat too precise, our author brings out the difference in experience very sharply as follows: "The Mystic is in love, the Philosopher seeks to know. To the former the experience is real, is lived; to the latter it is a notion expressed to consciousness by a negation, laboriously elaborated from more psychically real experiences. The Philosopher labours upward, climbing from negation to negation until he obtains the ultimate of denial. Although his result expresses the Most Awful Actuality, the Only Ultimately Real, He Who Is, in consciousness it remains the emptiest of notions, only dimly recognized, if at all, in the denial of all experience. For the Mystic this negative idea is the Finger of the Most High touching his inmost being, and his heart blazes at the touch" (p. 229). The poor philosopher seems to come very shabbily out of it, and we fancy that some of the great thinkers could give a better account of their endeavour. The 'negative' idea of God indeed seems overstressed, and it might be suggested that it would be preferable to replace it by the concept of 'transcendence'; the treatment of the subject in this sense would get rid of no little difficulty and render the atmosphere less chilly. In any case the reverence of the reason must necessarily declare that all predications about God are inadequate.

For orthodoxy the *bête noire* of the mystical is called quietism. This is to be sharply distinguished from the prayer of quiet. All prayer has the common



positive element in it of attention. In mystical contemplation the positive psychic element is said to be 'passive' attention. It is contended that quietism, on the contrary, is an entirely negative method—"a system of psychic inertia, with all the possibilities of scandalous excess which self-induced psychic passivity affords" (p. 206). Under quietism are reckoned indiscriminately Yogins, Buddhists, Sūfis, Christian Scientists, New Thought folk, Faith Healers, Spiritists, etc., in fact apparently every form of 'mysticism,' in the most popular sense of the term, that has not the approval of the Roman Catholic authorities. Contradictorily enough, with respect to 'psychic inertia' we are told that the fundamental error of quietism in all its types, extreme or moderate, is the belief that a man can become a mystic by removing the obstacles which hide the Divine within him. The 'removing of obstacles,' which is a matter of such extreme difficulty, as all mystics confess, can surely not be justly characterized as 'psychic inertia.' The main criticism made indiscriminately against this host of people of such very different beliefs and practices is that they hold there is a somewhat of the Divine latent in every man, and that thus believing, when they look to find the Beyond, they find simply themselves, and that, too, to their own undoing. This wholesale condemnation is uncharitable, to say the least of it, even for a book which is furnished with the '*nihil obstat*' and '*imprimatur*.' To many of us the idea of the potentially Divine in man coming into communion or union with the Divine in the universe, or the spirit in man with the Divine Spirit, is no mean faith to hold. What else does the 'image of God' in man mean? However, our critic will have it that the error of quietism in all its forms

“rests on the assumption that we have only to remove obstacles to find God not only morally but experimentally.” But surely if you can remove the ‘veils,’ as the Sūfīs say, He is there. You may contend that it is a gift of Grace by which the ‘veils’ are removed; nevertheless the belief that God is ever there and does not come or go, is good doctrine and not lightly to be despised. The faith of many of those who are here lumped together as quietists, is that there is no arbitrariness about ‘Grace’; God is no respecter of persons. They also insist strongly that co-operation is the essence of the Great Work. In India there are two doctrines of Grace, known as the ‘cat’ and ‘monkey’ theories. The cat carries her helpless kittens about in her mouth, the young of the monkey cling to the mother. We have to work out our own salvation, while having faith that it is God working in us. When then we are assured that quietism “tacitly assumes that the Divine is a latent factor in consciousness,” we see that, if we take the term to include all its critic would have it embrace, this is but half the story at best. From this one-sided premise, we are asked to conclude that quietism “confuses the Divine with that wide indeterminate concept of being to which we may attain by pushing the process of abstraction to its furthest limits” (p. 207). This is certainly not true of the vast majority of the folk referred to, even if it is true of some of them. As a matter of fact the expansion of the term ‘quietism’ to cover so enormous a field has entirely overshot the mark and rendered nugatory what might have been legitimately said against ‘psychic inertia.’

In conclusion a word may be said on the psychic accompaniments of the mystical experience proper,

those shadows which are only too frequently taken for the substance. Here the judgment of the greatest exponents in East and West are in accord. When visions and locutions proceed from the senses or imagination, there is ample room for illusions of every kind; when they are of the intellectual order, that is "when they are communicated to the intellect directly without images or any given of sense" (p. 270), they are less liable to misconception. But in any case, for the true mystic "the sense of the Divine is the most real feature in the whole psychose, although it may not be the most vivid" (p. 186).

This is what really counts in the whole matter; and the more mystics of this type we have in the present days of dissatisfaction with the theories of the theologians, the more chance will there be of a genuine revival of what is most vital and true in religion.

G. R. S. MEAD.

## SPRING IN THE WOODS.

A. R. HORWOOD, F.L.S.

I come, I come ! Ye have called me long,  
I come o'er the mountain with light and song :  
Ye may trace my step o'er the wakening earth,  
By the winds which tell of the violet's birth,  
By the primrose-stars in the shadowy grass,  
By the green leaves opening as I pass.

SPRING ! What a host of joyous memories this word, the most beautiful in the English language, conjures up in our minds. Let us dwell or linger a moment over these memories, as we pause on the threshold of the year, the year of life, its beginnings.

Spring is the beginning of the year. The French know this, and their word for Spring means 'first time,' and the Romans had a word which implies greenness or freshness. But in our simple Anglo-Saxon word all the beauty of Spring is conveyed. It is a word-picture, so simple, so satisfying and withal so complete.

Yes ! The Winter is over. Spring is here. Gone is the gloomy silence of winter days at length. With the arrival of Spring everything is changed, the days lengthen, the dawn appears over the hills in fresh roseate hues to brighten the mornings of a new life, to usher in Spring's advent to a brighter tune.

Mother Earth awakens. Everything is astir with a restlessness which thrills all things, every fibre of our being, every living thing. Like the Phoenix, which perished on its own funeral pyre to spring afresh into

life a new being, life is reborn again. Life reasserts itself, is rejuvenated. For this is a time of renewed energy. All things are as it were on the move, pushing forward, pressing onward. There is a perpetual, ceaseless struggle for more air, more light, towards the sun. Each flower, each being animate, or we might even say nanimate, seeks a place in the sun.

Such is the joy of Spring. A time of laughter. There is laughter in the sunbeams, mocking laughter too, as they come and go over the hills. There is again a glory in this joyous season of our English Springtide.

"Oh to be in England now that April's here!" The spirit of Spring calls us out into the woods and fields. It is the call of the wild, the lure of the sunshine and warmth of the rejoicing Earth in all its new comeliness. In Spring comes truly the rebirth of beauty. It is a time of the fluttering of wings, of love and courtship, when each bird seeks again its first bowery abode in the copse or hedge. In the Spring too "A young man's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of love." What being can resist the insistent call of Nature?

The music of Nature regains its language. Apart from the song of the insects and the birds, the very earth has its own orchestra. What melody is more refreshing than that of the murmur of the rivulet, now babbling in a piping treble, now in a hoarse tenor, now a bass? Always its note is liquid, and even in its fierce passions, as floods and currents swell its roar, or as the ocean waves break on the shore, its melody is bright and crystal. Its murmur is as lisping as infant's syllabic metre. It was the voice of the river-god. Just as the wind whistling in the recesses of the woods was like the voice of the syrinx,—a long-drawn note of

shrillness. The deepest note in Nature and below the zero of music is the bass roar of thunder, the crescendo of notes. It is in the diminuendo scale, as the peal rolls away gradually and faints at an immeasurable distance until it merges into silence, and echo knows it no more. So too rain has its own peculiar melody as it falls on the rocks or on the dry earth, a note that cannot be played by human instruments.

There is something appealingly beautiful about the shades and tones of colour in the bright cool world of Nature at this season. There are the greens so tender and clear of the trees and foliage of plants, the tints of the meadows and fields. But not all are greens; there are still some browns, and some of riper ochreous tinge. They are russet too, a few of them, and some are amber and gold. The woods, white with bridal bloom, or golden with catkins, or green, or deepening purple with swelling buds and flowers, wear festal robery. In the light pollen-and-scent laden breezes in the woods the boughs are swaying, the waters are rippling in the brooks, birds are singing, and all the fair face of Earth is awakening from its long trance. How we love the gleam of the sunshine, its warmth, its radiance! Tempered with the cool breezes, no ozone from the sea is half so healthful. On our spirits it has an exhilarating effect, a tonic influence. It rejuvenates, making things throb again with energy.

Gone are the rude blasts of treacherous March, yet still we must expect the wild freaks of the boreal winds which come in April and May to try our temper, to test our fruits and spoil their blossom and promise. The soft breezes sway the leafless boughs of the late-leaving trees, and through them falters a whisper of days to come. Over the hills the clouds are creeping

as the winds are driving them onward, and so the forests of young lances, now springing up in serried ranks in the meadows, wave and bend as the spiked halberts in the fields of waving corn. Seated on a windy knoll, we may see the shadows rolling onward, with billows of sunshine chasing the shadows, and the shadows the sunbeams, like mighty armies struggling in battle, all surging onward.

Rain falls. Sunshine follows, making everything scintillate with diamond dust, giving to all things a freshness. So come the veils of vapoury beauty which follow and cast a softness over gorgeous tints. How refreshing is the rain too, and how it enlivens all Nature with a new activity, imparting a new moistness and verdure to the green mantle of the fields and woods, now changing to gold !

Cloudy days,—how beautiful they are ! There are days when half the land is in the sun, and half is under cloud, when light fleecy clouds go chasing each other under the blue sky and over the tops of the hills, making a purple glow fall on them ; then sweeping down their sides, they cover the valleys and sink the meadows, erstwhile gleaming with gold, with buttercups, into the darkest gloom. A moment flies, and then the fields are like a cloth of gold ; again, may be, the sun shines over us and the skies are deepest blue once more. The shadows pass over the hills and dales as the crest and furrows of the waves succeed each other in rhythmic harmony.

If we listen we shall hear the tinkle of the little brook hard by. How sweetly it falls on the ears with its sibilant note !

The air is full of light and freshness, full of gracious song. How rapturous is the melody of these first

Spring-days! We shall not often hear the roll of Earth's big drum these days, the thunder, but when it does come with Jove's anger, the flashing lightning, falls of hailstones sometimes bruise and harm the budding twigs, and trees are struck, and sometimes animals and men.

But now all the trees and flowers are filled with the vitalising sap. Buds and leaves unfold, and flowers open. The earth is like a *champfleurie*, a garden of flowers. There is a light of vernal bloom under the new green of budding trees. It is a sign of the unfolding of the year. In the woods we come across some early trees, or trees flowering or leafing before the rest. We seek its explanation in the seasons, the soil, or habitat, but we do not really know the why and the wherefore of these strange happenings. The leaves rustle and sigh in the woods attuned to the melody of the dance. It is the voice of Pan, the God of fruits, of wine and plenty.

What colours the flowers display! The first flowers were green. Later the whites and yellows came into being in the progress of time and evolution, then the red, then purple, and lastly the heavenly blue.

It is the yellow flowers that bloom earliest in the year, and they take their imagery from the sun, whose hues they have borrowed. So the first flowers bear the image of the sun. Of his golden splendour are the flowers of the Lesser Celandine, Buttercup, the Winter Aconite, Gorse, the Crocus, the Daffodil, the Dandelion, Coltsfoot, and Archangel, Cowslips, Primrose. This largesse of gold, which is the prevailing note in Spring, after its verdure is surpassed, gives place to the royal blue of Bluebell-time in the woods. Insects love the blues in Nature best, and the blue flowers yield them



sweet and choicest nectar. This much they know. It is the colour of the April skies, the Neapolitan seas. A Bluebell-wood has its tones too, from the deepest blue and purple flecked with white to misty blues, like cloudless skies or the dim haze following the dawn, when the dew-drops glisten like diamond points. This colour is nearest to that of the azure hues of ether.

This is the time of the coming of the butterflies too. Upon the pools the gnats in a small cloud float in the warm air, performing their aerial dances. On warm sunny days when they make a perpetual holiday, the bees are humming over the golden Catkins of the willows, where they find plenty to take back to their hive of industry and stores of honey.

The voice of melody makes itself heard in the woods with the awakening of bird-life into being, in all its abundance and variety. There is a regular chorus of bird-music at dawn and dusk. And through the livelong day, as the summer birds return, and our own natives resume their courtship and begin to nest, there is one long symphony of sweet song. Now we can listen entranced to the wild sweet song of the Missel-thrush. And the Song-thrush trills its notes "pure as the song of angels," where too the mellow rollicking song of the Blackbird is heard. From Heaven's gate the Skylark blythe and gay showers down on earth a rain of melody. In the distant trees the wild Ringdove coos anon. All day long we may hear the melancholy note of the Chiffchaff, and the sweet plaintive simple song of the Willow-wren. The Wood-wren has a sad tremulous note, as of sweetness long drawn out. The curious notes of the Grasshopper are 'chirped out,' whilst the Wood-pecker laughs its mocking reply. Sweet and joyous is the song of the Blackcap. The

shrill *que que que* is hissed out by the Wryneck in rapid tones repeated as he darts here and there. His so-called bride the Cuckoo weeps its dolorous complaint, since no bird loves it. Sweetest of all is the song of the Nightingale, so tremulous, so joyous, so plaintive, so rich, so varied.

This is a picture in words of Spring in the woods. Let us go forth and test its tone, enlarge its imagery.

A. R. HORWOOD.

Leicester Museum.

## FOOTPRINTS.

F. J. CANNON.

Footprints that perhaps another . . .

LONGFELLOW.

IN a dingy room, at the top of a tall lodging-house in Camden Town, a man sat writing.

Books of every size and description were piled around him: leather-bound, gold-embossed editions—once gorgeous and good to look upon, now dog-eared, worm-eaten and soiled; ragged coverless volumes, picked up for a few pence with a dozen others from some obscure bookstall or old curio-shop; and up-to-date sixpenny editions looking sadly out of place and ill-at-ease among those venerable old classics.

In whatever way the outside of the volumes might differ, the contents had one thing in common. That dingy-hued charred old *Pliny's Natural History*, lying cheek by jowl with Jefferies' *Open Air*, and Walton's *Compleat Angler* thrown carelessly on the top of Maeterlinck's *Bee* and Thoreau's *Life in the Woods*, and that dull, uninteresting-looking volume, rather like a school arithmetic or grammar—don't we know White's *Selborne* when we see it, however different may be its size and binding?—Nature was the thread which ran through all those pages, in and out, with many a varied twist and turn, yet binding all together with the unity of truth.

The man ran his fingers distractedly through his

hair. It was stifling up in the little attic, and his brain refused to work in obedience to his will.

"I am sitting in a pinewood," he had scrawled on the sheet of foolscap before him; and the irony of the words struck him anew as he glanced round the sordid little apartment in which he sat. The drab wall-paper and gaudy prints mocked his efforts to picture the shady coolness of the wood.

"In front of me are sturdy fir-trees and graceful silver birches; on the ground are masses of golden bracken—last year's dead fronds; while among the fir-cones and pine-needles, tender green bracken-fronds are thrusting their pointed heads."

A large discoloured stain in the cheap, shabby carpet caught his eye, and the man sighed impatiently. That last sentence was not bad, however, and he wrote on hopefully:

"On my left a long straight path leads to what looks like a small common—a little oasis in the forest. How delightfully the purple heather contrasts with the brown stems of the pines and the tender hue of green which shows on every tree and bush. For Spring is here! Spring in the forest! Spring among the pines! Glorious, life-giving, youth-inspiring Spring!"

The fever of inspiration was upon him now, and he went on recklessly:

"On my right are hundreds of baby larches, whom someone has planted for the benefit of future generations." (Good, that! Surely he had read somewhere that larch-plantations were often found in pine-woods.) "The sombre fir-trees in between make a splendid foil to the light green tips. And everywhere are the sounds of Nature: bees hum among the pine-needles, birds twitter from the trees."

He raised his head and listened for a moment to the ceaseless sounds from the street below: the whirr of motor-cars, the rumble of carts and omnibuses; then once more he plunged his pen into the ink and went on afresh:

"As I write a dove coos softly from the topmost branch of the tree against which I am leaning. So gentle, so low, so tender a song that it could scarce be known as the song of a bird, but is like that of some yet more delicate creature with the heart of a woman."

The writer read over the last sentence with a thrill of exultant delight; never had he written anything better! Then an uneasy suspicion crept into his mind that the words were familiar. Had he written them before? No, he was certain that he had not; but he might have read them elsewhere. Pshaw! What did it matter, one way or the other? He must live, and no one would be the wiser.

The oppressive heat of the room made him drowsy. Would that he were indeed among the pines, instead of straining mind and brain to write of that which he had never seen!

The sounds from the street sounded far away and muffled; his head jerked backwards uneasily, then bent itself upon his arms outstretched across the table. The writer slept.

Night had fallen upon the city; the stars shone forth above the smoke-grimed housetops; and the horns of passing motors and taxi-cabs sounded clearly in the air.

And still the man in the high garret slept.

Suddenly he stirred uneasily and awoke to the fact that he was not alone. A strange unusual atmosphere was in the room; the scent of pines was

in the air; salt-laden, fresh sea-breezes fluttered the curtains at the window and scattered the papers about the table and floor; and that indefinable presence grew and spread until the man was irresistibly drawn to turn his head and look behind him.

What was it that he saw there in the gloom? The waving of branches in the moonlight, the flap of many wings and the ceaseless flitting of countless insects; and in the midst a form—dim, shadowy and mysterious, and yet withal familiar.

The man bowed before a presence greater than that in which he had ever stood before. Who was this—known, yet unknown, felt, rather than seen and understood?

“Ah, lad!” said the Presence, and the voice was as the murmuring of many streams or the sighing of wind in the tree-tops, “Why write of things of which you know naught and understand less?”

The man was silent. How could he explain that he wrote of Nature because a chance article of his—gleaned second-hand from others’ books—had placed his feet on the first rung of literary success? How explain to this strange ethereal being, who looked him through and through with eyes as deep and clear as a mountain pool, that country articles were the rage of the day, the fashion of the moment—what matter if those who wrote knew little, so long as those who read knew less? And if editors would not take his stories—or his articles on Ancient History and Norman Architecture—why, then, he must write about what they *would* accept, and pocket the proceeds with thankfulness.

“I know all that,” said the Voice, and the man started, so sure was he that he had not spoken one

word aloud of all those thoughts which had skimmed so rapidly across his mind.

"But, lad, why write of things and people that are past and dead? Is there not enough in life to-day, ay, and in Nature—human nature—to rouse a spark of interest in those for whom you write? Write of the London streets at night, when most lie sleeping in their beds. Write of the great, broad, drifting Thames, by night and day the same old river in its sooty blackness that flows 'twixt woods and meadows to the open sea. Write of the streets at dawn, when men first wake and meet the business of the day anew. Write your *own* thoughts of what you see and hear, not others' thoughts, decked out to meet the fashion of the day."

The man made no reply. He tried to speak, but made no sound, and bent his head ashamed, as his strange guest lifted a paper from the floor and read aloud the words which he had written so short a time before.

"'. . . on the ground are masses of golden bracken, last year's dead fronds, while among the fir-cones and pine-needles, tender green bracken-fronds are thrusting their pointed heads.'"

"Untrue," sighed the spectre. "Is bracken golden after winter's rain and snow? . . . And why do you say 'pointed heads'? The heads of bracken which push their way up through the ground are curved and brown and hairy, not tender green and pointed, as you say."

The voice read on—sadder and ever sadder as it proceeded:

"And heather? . . . *purple* heather . . . when the bracken scarce shows above the ground! You even

say 'tis Spring; and yet you write of purple heather! Besides, why write of the Spring in August?"

Again the writer tried to excuse himself, tried to explain that he had intended to correct the article before sending it for any editor's perusal, and that he would undoubtedly have perceived so glaring an error; but no words came and his visitor continued to read.

"'As I write a dove coos softly from the topmost branch of the tree against which I am leaning. So gentle, so low, so tender a song that it could scarce be known as the voice of a bird, but is like that of some yet more delicate creature with the heart of a woman.'

"How long since I wrote those words!"

The man gave a sudden start. He remembered now! Was the spirit of Richard Jefferies indeed before him? But hark! his strange visitor was speaking.

"Yet 'twas not of doves I wrote, as you have it here: 'twas of the willow-wren's song." He paused, and turned over the pages of a book on the table; then read once more: "So gentle, so low, so tender a song the willow-wren sang . . ."

"I knew the pine-wood of which I wrote," he said. "But you . . ." He paused once more and looked sadly, lovingly, at the man before him.

"Come out with me!" And together, though the man knew not how it was done, they passed through the open window out into the darkness beyond, and looked down, down upon the sleeping city as they journeyed through the air.

On, on, until all was dark and vague . . . and he waked with a start to find himself in a forest, where all was still save for the sigh of the wind through the trees over his head, the songs of the nightingales in the distance, and at intervals the rustle of a rabbit



among the grasses at his feet, the hoot of an owl, or the cry of a night-jar.

“My pine-wood!” said the gentle voice. Then once again he knew nought until he found himself on a lonely common beside a lake which gleamed dully in the moonlight, while bats flew silently above, and thyme and heather sent forth their fragrance into the midnight air.

Once more he waked, to hear the splash of waves and to feel the fresh life-giving breath of ocean winds upon his brow.

How long he gazed upon the great dark sea, watching the break of the spray upon the pebbles and the path of silver moonlight leading from the beach to the vast unknown beyond, he could not tell. Then someone spoke :

“Could you write of this from *books*—write so that all who read may understand?”

Then darkness once more, and again he waked, to look down wonderingly upon Nature’s night. He was on a high hill; dark clouds were scudding swiftly across the face of the peaceful moon, and fields, woods, rivers, all seemed fast asleep and dreaming of the wondrous things gone and yet to come.

“Nature is never finished,” said the voice. “The end is the beginning, and the beginning but the forecast of that which is to come.”

\* \* \* \* \*

The first faint rays of morning light stole in through the open window of a top-room in a London lodging-house, and fell on the motionless figure of a man with head bent upon his arms outstretched across the table.

He awoke, and looked curiously round the little

room : nothing was changed therein, but oh, what a change within himself ! He was no longer the willing hack, a paid machine to turn out ignorant articles in obedience to certain editors' demands. He was free—free as the wind or the sea—with the golden key of 'searching after truth' to unlock the heart of Nature.

It did not take him long to pack his books and other few belongings into a box and address it to the house of an old aunt, where he knew he would ever be welcome. Then he boiled the kettle and got breakfast ready, as was his wont, ate it leisurely and stretched himself luxuriously as he thought of the future which lay before him, and finally went downstairs to settle up accounts with his landlady and to arrange for his box to go to its destination.

She was sorry to lose him, the woman said. "'Tweren't many as gave as little trouble and paid up as reg'lar."

"But it's my belief he's come inter a fortin'," she told her husband. "He looked that bright an' 'appy as I've never seen 'im look afore."

Meanwhile her ex-lodger was walking briskly in the direction of Gravesend.

There were few people about, for it was early yet ; but the streets were full of interest to him, as his future was full of possibilities.

His first article should be called 'A Tramp from London to the Country,' he decided, and wondered a trifle anxiously if his usual editors would appreciate the different tone of his future contributions. Then he relapsed into his former mood of gay content as he remembered that these same editors—thanks be they were few and far between as his many rejected manuscripts bore witness—had no idea that hitherto

he had known as little of Nature herself as they, and consequently would not be predisposed to carp and jeer at his new attempts.

\* \* \* \* \*

A cornfield—after reaping—in the gloaming. In a corner of the field a man sat idly with his back against a shock of corn.

Suddenly he drew a note-book from his pocket and began to write.

*"I am writing in a cornfield after sunset. The harvest moon is rising slowly, slowly in the sky and to and fro—to and fro—above my head flits the first bat of night."*

The man stretched out his arms with an all-embracing gesture of the country sights and sounds around him. Across his memory, like some faint recurring echo—came the murmur of the voice in his dream :

*"Write your own thoughts of what you see and hear ; not others' thoughts decked out to meet the fashion of the day."*

"Thank God, I am an honest man at last!" he breathed.

F. J. CANNON.

## ON A GOOD FRIDAY.

WAKE, wake thee up, my Sense,  
To a new keenness ;  
Cleanse thee, my Spirit, cleanse  
To crystal cleanness !  
Not yet the Air hath shed  
Her young austerity,  
Scarce the first Sunbeam sped  
His golden charity,  
His cheerful charity.  
But . . . is the Sun made new ?  
Or my sight dipt in dew ?  
O Brother Heaven, what blue !  
Heart, what hilarity !

Bright little Cloud up there,  
Fly, for I'll chase you ;  
Nimble Air, nimble Air,  
Run, run ! I'll race you.  
Wall-warmth and chimney-gloom  
To such as need them ;  
But give me chilly room  
For a fine freedom,  
For a fine freedom,  
Following these Feet that rush  
Unseen through brook and brush,—  
Ay, ay, you shouting Thrush,—  
Spring's ! The Lord speed them !

On ! through the leafless lane,  
 Prankt all with Posies—  
 Dark violet-eyes again,  
 Cool-cheek'd Primroses,  
 Blackthorn with buds of milk,  
 Palm, pale and pearly,  
 Fern-heads in hoods of silk,  
 Curious and curly,

Question-marks curly.

Oh for a million eyes !  
 All's question and surprise,  
 Startle and ecstasies,  
 April, and early !

All too is right Spring-fare,  
 Merry, but meagre ;  
 Enough, but none to spare,  
 So all are eager.  
 Riches in every twig,  
 Each bud addition ;  
 Every spray, every sprig  
 Sprightly with mission,

Tip-top with mission.

Hope waves a hundred wings,  
 Promise builds nests and sings ;  
 Bright from his burial springs  
 Growth, the Magician !

Single-star Daffodils  
 The green Mead sprinkle ;  
 Bold gold beside the rills  
 King-cups a-twinkle.

Light off the Beechen-tips  
Glisters and glances,  
Lays to the Brook his lips,  
On the brink dances,  
Prances and dances,  
Where, each a tiny one,  
Celandines glass the sun.  
Old Earth, how full of fun  
You are and fancies !

On ! On !  
Harken ! what whistling sweet ;  
Listen, what laughter !  
What trip of fairy feet  
Follows me after !  
Lo ! last year's Leaves in hosts,  
Tumbling and flying,  
Light-hearted jolly ghosts,  
Quite done with dying.  
Back would they go and stay  
Green on the boughs ? Not they !  
" Ho ! baby buds," they say,  
" You're fixt, we're flying ! "

Now 'neath these Hazel-trees  
Naked and slender,  
'Mid Blue-bell revelries,  
Shy still and tender,  
By the Brook, gold in haste,  
Bright brown at leisure,  
Down let me lie to taste  
And tell my treasure,  
My untold treasure.  
Springtide so up and up

Hath fill'd my spirit's cup,  
 Here let her stay and sup  
 Deep the sweet measure.

What Power hath me in hand ?

Why am I fated  
 Thus to be feasted and  
 Exhilarated ?

Not a sight, not a thought,  
 But delight's in it !  
 Lo ! hath death taken aught,  
 Life, life doth win it ;

New life doth win it !

Oh, in the world's wide span,  
 Nought I imagine can  
 Gladder be, fairer than  
 My mind, this minute.

A Lizard rustles near,  
 Basking sunwarméd ;  
 A Squirrel cocks his ear,  
 Sits unalarméd.  
 Now is my mind become  
 Calm and capacious,  
 But my heart mettlesome,  
 Nobly audacious,

Nobly audacious.

What exploit sovereign  
 Shall I adventure in ?  
 What soul-emprise begin  
 Starry and spacious ?

Which, forsooth, should we hold  
 More a man's duty :

In hand to gather Gold ;  
In his breast Beauty ?  
Peace ! There's no right or wrong  
This divine season ;  
Breath now is one with song,  
All rhyme is reason,  
Blossoming reason.  
Light, Life, shall through me flow,  
Love, Glory, Goodness glow ;  
All will I have it so ;  
Aught else were treason.

Folk in the Church to-day  
Mourn misbehaviour,  
Lament, bewail and pray  
A murder'd Saviour.  
Blossoms about me blow,  
Breezes sing brightly,  
Birds frolic to and fro,  
All life goes lightly,  
All life goes lightly.

Lips to the budded rod,  
Breast to the breathing sod,  
Heart with the Living God,  
I, too, do rightly.

B. E. BAUGHAN.



## A SWAN SONG.

O SINKING Sun ! fast sinking Sun,  
So redly dying in the splendid West !  
My life is passing with thee, almost done.  
Soon shall I rest.

O weary Heart ! to feel no pain  
When yonder sun drowns in the crimson sea !  
Fame shall not grieve thee with false gifts again.  
Sleep thou with me.

O lovely Earth ! my form is thine.  
Thy flowers shall cover it and all my shame,  
So from the grave of those vain hopes of mine  
Some rose may flame.

O Soul, thou quivering, radiant bird !  
Wing from thy prison-house : God bids thee speed.  
Wisdom and love beyond the spoken word  
Await thee, freed.

O Soul ! my love goes out with thee  
To join the treasure of a thousand lives.  
Though dies the little part that stood for me,  
The whole survives.

O thou Beloved of this life !  
What might have been can torment me no more  
Perchance some other self shall call thee Wife.  
My dream is o'er.

O Night ! dark Night that men name Death !  
Only a red rim marks the setting sun . . .  
Come ! joy and sorrow vanish at thy breath.  
The day is done.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### GOD AND PERSONALITY. DIVINE PERSONALITY AND HUMAN LIFE.

By Clement C. J. Webb. Two Courses of Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen. London (Allen & Unwin); 10s. 6d. each volume.

SINCE delivering his Gifford Lectures Mr. Clement Webb has been elected the first holder of a new chair at Oxford, the Oriel Professorship of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion. The appointment was entirely appropriate to Mr. Webb's reputation as a critic and an original thinker in both philosophy and theology. For the Gifford Lectures Professor Webb selected as his subject the fundamental problem of Divine Personality. Much attention has been given in recent years to this problem, and the contribution of everyone who has something fresh to say is entitled to a cordial welcome.

There are those whose reverence for the Divine Being impels them to decline to attribute to Him Personality, thinking that it must derogate from what is proper to His exaltation above every name or designation. And there are others for whom Personality means values so high that they emphatically attribute it to the Divine Being as the loftiest result of their thought. Professor Webb takes the position of the utmost reverence for God with the highest valuation of Personality, and therefore of maintaining that the supreme idea for theology is 'the Personality of God.'

It is interesting to compare Professor Webb's method with that of Mr. Balfour in his recent Gifford Lectures. Mr. Balfour begins with human personality: our own nature is the datum which needs interpretation. Unconvinced by Transcendental Idealism and other forms of Rationalism he finds a Pragmatic need for Theism as necessary for the understanding of Man, his

thoughts, his desires, his aims and his valuations. This was also the method of Illingworth, who in his admirable Bampton Lectures establishes human personality as his base and upon it, though not by Pragmatism, constructs his belief in Divine Personality. But our Lecturer begins with Personality as the essential character of Deity. His philosophy leads him to this procedure, for there are in his other writings frequent expressions of the Ontological fibre in his thinking, and in these Lectures he expressly justifies his method from the history of thought, especially in religion.

After giving some history of the usage of the term 'Personality,' he selects for himself as its constituents Individuality and Rationality, and finds that this had been well expressed long ago by Boëthius: *Persona est naturæ rationalis individua substantia*—'the individual substance of a rational nature.' But he is very emphatic in making it clear that for himself he understands Rationality to include Morality, the Good as well as the True.

He therefore separates himself from those who, like Mr. Bradley and Dean Rashdall, have a conception of Personality which prevents them from attributing it to any conceivable Absolute, and therefore speak of God as finite, and advise men of Religion to cease to trouble themselves with attempted conceptions of Absolute Reality. On the other hand, he allows consistency to Dr. Bosanquet in denying Personality to the Absolute because for him 'Morality' is not admissible to the highest level: on that level Individuality stands alone and brooks no rival as the character of the Absolute. Professor Webb stands rather with Lotze, who showed the way in placing Rational Morality alongside Speculative Reason on the highest level and therefore makes it an attribute of the Absolute, and indeed only adequately valued when so ranked.

From this fundamental position Professor Webb passes to deal with the relation of Divine Spirit, so conceived, to finite spiritual individuals. In these we discern at once (1) imperfection and (2) sin. The Christian character of the Lecturer's thought is shown in his finding that, instead of keeping the metaphors of *Creation* and *Emanation* separate, there is place for a combination of them in the conception of *Mediation*: of a personal Mediator, that is, who is (1) the Perfecter,<sup>2</sup> the ideal of the human nature which is imperfect, and (2) the Redeemer who leads spiritual beings conscious of sin through their repentance to a union with

the Divine Will. Professor Webb is well aware that there is always something of metaphor in the language of religion; but for us men metaphor is indispensable; and the concrete facts of religion which grip our interest, such as Sin, Forgiveness, Sacrifice, Justice, Reconciliation, oblige us to think of our relations to God in the language of personality. As philosophy, then, has enabled Professor Webb to justify the attribution of Personality to God in severely philosophical terms, so in thinking upon our relationship with Him it is the usage of personal terms, and not abstract terms, which rightly characterizes all religions.

In the second series of the Lectures Professor Webb turns to the principal spheres of human life, which he takes to be the Economic, the Scientific, the *Æsthetic*, the Moral, the Political and the Religious. He applies his Theism to them both separately and in their relations to one another, and in carefully considered ways shows how in all of them the belief in the Personality of God gives both illumination and inspiration. As a confirmation of this method we may refer to Baron von Hügel's demonstration of the support given to the moral virtues by shedding upon them the light of what he calls the 'Supernatural'—the human spirit illuminated from above (*Modern Churchman*, June, 1920). Of course many of the naïve ideas of the Divine nature and government—perhaps most of them—which are found in the religions of the world need reduction and amendment; for this purpose Professor Webb's treatment of the separate spheres of our life will be found to give effective assistance.

To the general scheme, as above indicated, our author adds three Lectures on the value and destiny of the individual person. He is concerned to vindicate his value against Naturalism, to maintain his essential Rationality against Pragmatism, and a certain Substantiality against being regarded as only a temporary 'adjective' of the Absolute. Hence follows a definite ground for belief in Immortality, especially when the Personality of God is understood, as it ought to be, to have as its central attribute and power, personal Love.

Embedded in the Lectures are many luminous references to both philosophies and theologies of the past. But Professor Webb is working on 'the moving edge' of human thought, and assiduously compares his positions with those of recent leaders; especially frequent are his criticisms of Bradley, William James, Bosanquet, Croce, Bergson and Rashdall. And quite constantly

in his mind are the ideas and the expressions of both the Old and the New Testaments.

We may be allowed to express a regret that our Lecturer does not have much recourse to the literature of Mysticism. He finds from it some support, but he might have found much more. But he is moved by an almost Cartesian yearning for the clear vision of Rationalism; and he has probably given us his best by thinking and speaking in the mood in which he feels most at home.

A. C.

ST. IRENÆUS: THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE APOSTOLIC  
PREACHING.

Translated from the Armenian, with Introduction and Notes,  
by J. Armitage Robinson, D.D., Dean of Wells. London  
(S.P.C.K.); pp. 154; 7s. 6d.

THIS is an instructive document setting forth the view of Orthodoxy held by Irenæus, the stalwart Patristic heresy-hunter of the end of the second century. Sympathetic students of the Gnosis may be allowed to retain a sort of affection for the writer of the famous *Refutation of all Heresies*, in spite of his manifest incapacity to do justice to the very various schools and traditions, documents and hearsay, which he lumps so confusedly together, and naïvely derives from Simon the Magian, whom he starts in by calling the 'First-born of Satan' and so bears on gradually. The worthy Bishop of Lyons was exceedingly indignant that any one could suppose that there was any truth in the contentions of any Gnostic of any school. Why!—he peevishly exclaims—how could there be any truth in the matter, and we, the Bishops, not know it? This was evidently one of the chief corns that the shoe so painfully pinched. Well, doubtless the Orthodox party, or those who were subsequently judged to be Orthodox, had also right on their side, for the matter on both sides was very mixed; but they had not the whole truth by any means, and the prophets and mystics kept alive some things of excellence, in spite of the parasitic growths of magical and psychical aberrations that seized upon the lower elements in their presentations and disfigured them. It is vain to expect to find any moderation of statement or scrupulous regard for an accurate setting forth of the views of an opponent in the bitter theological controversies of the time.

Phrases were violently torn out of their contexts, mythological and symbolical narratives were caricatured, the foulest accusations, which might be true of the degenerates in some obscure sects, were generalized. The Pagans accused the Jews, the Jews the Christians, the Orthodox Christians the Gnostic adherents of the Faith of similar crimes and bestialities. Popular controversy turned the most sacred things into ridicule—and, in brief, unregenerate and uncritical minds were then as always in the majority. How little our heresiological controversialist was competent even to transcribe a Gnostic MS. correctly may now be seen at leisure; for a kind fate has preserved for us a copy of one of the original MSS. from which Irenæus made excerpts and a summary. It is now in the Berlin Egyptian Museum, among the Rheinhardt Coptic MSS., and is entitled 'The Gospel of Mary,' or alternatively 'The Apocryphon of John.'<sup>1</sup> As Harnack wrote in 1896: "Owing to omissions and because no effort was made to understand his opponents, the sense of the by no means absurd speculations of the Gnostics has been ruined by the Church Father."

The original Greek of the Irenæic *Refutation*, which stands in such patent contradiction to his name of 'Peaceful,' is only partially preserved, and much of it has to be recovered from a barbarous early Latin translation. There has now been discovered an Armenian version of two of the books (iv. and v.), in the same MS. which contains a translation of the present otherwise unknown treatise of our worthy Pillar of Orthodoxy, entitled *A Discourse in Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*. This new aid to fixing the text of the *Refutation* will necessitate a new and revised version, and we are glad to hear that this is already being taken in hand. The new treatise is presented to the English-reading world by the competent hands of Dean Armitage Robinson, the editor of that very useful series *Texts and Studies* whose cessation is deplored by all students of early Christian literature. What of this *Discourse* of the Bishop of Lyons, which purports to unveil the whole heart of the true Faith? It must be confessed that it is exceedingly disappointing. It is a laboured and wearisome treatise based exclusively on the so-called 'Proof from Prophecy' of the 'in order that it might be fulfilled as it is written' order of exegesis. If the O.T. prophetic utterances would not fit by any other means, even with the help of the

<sup>1</sup> See *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten*, 2nd ed., pp. 579ff. Carl Schmidt's communication 'A Pre-Irenæic Gnostic Original Work in Coptic' (*Kgl. preuss. Acad. d. Wissen.*, July 16, 1896).

ingenious devices which set at naught the most elementary rules of criticism, then they were violently altered to make them do so. In brief, the present-day canons of literary morality were non-existent in this order of go-as-you-please polemical and apologetic exegesis, and the original texts were not infrequently adapted to suit theological and dogmatic preconceptions. Our document is of value chiefly in demonstrating the utter *naïveté* of the mind of Irenæus, to put the most charitable construction on it. If this is the strongest plea he can make out for his Orthodoxy, it certainly was in poor case over against the retort of any philosophical and critical opponents who cared to reply. On the other hand, the treatise under notice is of interest as setting forth the then position of the Orthodox dogmas and the nature of some of the practices of the day, and, as it is comparatively early, is of value for the history of the evolution of these matters in the gradually crystallizing Faith of the West. It should also be of service to Dr. Rendel Harris and Prof. Vacher Burch in their valuable 'Book of Testimonies' research.

#### THE SECRETS OF THE SELF.

Asrār-i Kudī. A Philosophical Poem by Sheikh Muhammed Iqbāl of Lahore. Translated from the Original Persian with Introduction and Notes by Reynold A. Nicholson, Litt.D., LL.D., Lecturer on Persian in the University of Cambridge. London (Macmillan); pp. 147; 7s. 6d. net.

ALREADY in the July number Dr. Nicholson has made our readers familiar with the purport of this remarkable work, in which an Indian Moslem, deeply read in European philosophy, uses the alluring medium of Persian verse to set forth a strenuous doctrine of personal perfection and corporate achievement before his co-religionists. Those who at the same time made acquaintance with some striking extracts from Dr. Nicholson's fine version, will be glad to hear that they can now enjoy the whole of it, and learn more about the aspirations and ideals of the powerful mind which has woven together this "harmony of Indian thought and Persian fancy, of the oldest Moslem religious enthusiasm and the latest European philosophy." There is much that reminds us of Nietzsche and Bergson in some of the utterances of our philosopher-poet; he denies, however, any direct dependence, and

it is clear throughout that fundamentally he always remains in thought and feeling a Moslem. This blend and contrast may be seen in the following lines :

“ The pith of Life is contained in action ;  
To delight in creation is the law of Life.  
Life is power made manifest,  
And its mainspring is victory.”

“ Gain knowledge of Life's mysteries !  
Be a tyrant ! Ignore all except God ! ”

The last words alone save us from the extreme extravagance of the pure ‘ will to power ’ gospel. The vision of the poet is of a world ruled by religion and not by politics, and it is laid down that the regeneration of Islam depends first and foremost on the self-reformation of the individual Moslem. Fortunately Dr. Nicholson is able to quote in his Introduction a number of interesting passages from letters he has received from the Sheikh setting forth his fundamental philosophical conceptions. These throw light on the underlying intention of much that would otherwise escape us in the rich imagery of the poet's diction. For him self-consciousness, individuality, personality, is the very stuff of reality. If obedience to God and self-control are enjoined, nevertheless the whole process of self-realisation must be a ‘ yea-saying ’ to the universe ; it must ever be a positive process working out itself in stages of self-affirmation and self-expression whereby alone that self-development can be achieved which constitutes an ever more and more efficient personality. This is for him the fundamental law of life seeking its proper end. “ All life,” he writes, “ is individual. There is no such thing as universal life. God Himself is an individual. He is the most unique Individual.” This extreme individualism of all life would seem at first sight to land us in all the difficulties of an ultimate pluralism, but this is apparently not the intention ; for we read further in continuance of the thought that, though “ the moral and religious ideal of man is not self-negation but self-affirmation,” the attainment of this ideal of becoming more and more individual, more and more unique, is possible only by carrying out the precept of the Prophet : “ Create in yourselves the attributes of God.” It follows therefore that man can become unique only by becoming “ more and more like the most unique Individual—i.e. God.” The poet is thus very strongly opposed to



anything that savours of Sūfī pantheism and especially to any doctrine of mystical absorption; on the contrary he has the boldness to declare that "he who becomes most like unto God—absorbs God."

Sheikh Iqbāl looks forward to a gradual evolution of humanity along these lines, and to a consummation when at the end, as the perfect fruit of its long and painful struggle, it will bring forth the Ideal Man, whom he sings of as the Vice-gerent of God on earth. In another letter this highest product of humanity is thus conceived :

"He is the completest Ego, the acme of Life both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his Kingdom is the Kingdom of God on earth. Out of the richness of his nature he lavishes the wealth of life on others and brings them nearer and nearer to himself. The more we advance in evolution the nearer we get to him. In approaching him we are raising ourselves in the scale of life. The development of mankind both in mind and body is a condition precedent of his birth. For the present he is only an ideal; but the evolution of humanity is leading towards the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals, who will become his fitting parents. Thus," he concludes, "the Kingdom of God on earth means a democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on earth."

But what of the countless millions who pass hence falling so immeasurably short of such an ideal? Of these nothing is said; no provision seems to be made for their continued development, though this seems to be a necessity if the vast majority are not to be excluded from the proper fulfilment of their nature.

But much of the exposition leaves us with a feeling that the dogma of egoity is being pushed to such extremes as to exclude a more comprehensive world-view. Thus with regard to religion, it must be remembered that by this Sheikh Iqbāl always means Islam. His ideal is to build up a free independent Moslem fraternity—"a Theocratic Utopian state, in which all the Moslems, no longer divided by the barriers of race and country, shall be one." Beyond this his vision does not seem to extend.

The corporate religious ideal is as individualistic as the rest of the doctrine, and could only too easily be made to favour a policy of aggressive self-assertion.

#### MIND-ENERGY.

Lectures and Essays. By Henri Bergson, Member of the French Academy, Professor at the Collège de France. Translated by H. Wildon Carr, Hon. D. Litt., Professor in the University of London. London (Macmillan); pp. 209; 10s. net.

THE papers before us are not simply a translation but have been gone over very carefully in detail by M. Bergson himself with Dr. Carr so as to give them the same authority as the original French, which bears the title *L'Énergie Spirituelle*. There are seven pieces in all and they have been chosen to illustrate the concept that reality is a spiritual activity. The best known are the Romanes Lecture on 'Life and Consciousness' (1911) and the Presidential Address to the Psychical Research Society (1918); others go back a decade and include a study on Dreams, which appeared in 1901. With brilliant analysis and approaching the subject from many points of view our philosopher labours to show that the life of the mind is superior to the mechanical determinism of matter and indeed uses it for its own purposes. Wherever there is choice, there is consciousness, no matter how feeble, and this is the beginning of freedom. The life of the mind is the principle of freedom and in man is winning towards ever greater expression; no bounds can be set to possibility in this direction. But the more we probe into the matter the more we find that the major part of our mental activity escapes us, so that to-day we might almost say that, if in the past the chief problem of philosophy has been to define the nature of consciousness and explain its genesis, in the future its most pressing task will be to explain the nature and genesis of what we speak of as the unconscious. A finger-post pointing in this direction is set up by M. Bergson in treating of the way in which mind contrives its self-improvement by veiling the major part of its activity in order to concentrate more effectively on the immediate life-task. It is one of this acute investigator's most characteristic contributions to philosophic thought and allows us to appreciate his standpoint perhaps better than any other. He frequently recurs to it, as in the following passage:

"I believe that our whole past still exists. It exists subconsciously, by which I mean that it is present to consciousness in such a manner that, to have the revelation of it, consciousness has no need to go out of itself or seek for foreign assistance; it has but to remove an obstacle, to withdraw a veil, in order that all that it contains, all in fact that it actually is, may be revealed. Fortunate are we to have this obstacle, infinitely precious to us is the veil! The brain is what secures to us this advantage. It keeps our attention fixed on life; and life looks forward; it looks back only in the degree to which the past can aid it to illumine and prepare the future. To live is, for the mind, essentially to concentrate itself on the action to be accomplished. To live is to be inserted in things by means of a mechanism which draws from consciousness all that is utilizable in action, all that can be acted on the stage, and darkens the greater part of the rest. Such is the brain's part in the work of memory; it does not serve to preserve the past, but primarily to mask it, then to allow only what is practically useful to emerge through the mask. Such, too, is the part the brain plays in regard to the mind generally. Extracting from the mind what is externalizable in movement, inserting the mind into this motor frame, it causes it to limit its vision, but also it makes its action efficacious. This means that the mind overflows the brain on all sides, and that cerebral activity responds only to a very small part of mental activity."

The phrasing here makes it appear that brain does something of its own over against mind, but in keeping with the general contention elsewhere it is mind that uses body. We must of course take into account the obstacles of every kind that the life-force has to meet on its way, nevertheless the whole of evolution seems to mean that it is mind which works within it and seeks, not only to free itself from trammels, but also to surpass itself. By many similar reflections we are led continuously in this direction, but are not carried definitely further. Averse as M. Bergson seems from drawing the conclusion, much of what he writes seems to suggest purpose in the fundamental nature of things. Life-urge, mind-energy, spiritual activity, look like non-committal terms; but if they convey the impression of being creative means for progressive ends, as the whole tendency of the philosopher's thought implies, they might with advantage be subsumed under some still higher concept.

## THE FUTURE LIFE IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN INQUIRY.

By Samuel McComb, D.D. London (J. M. Watkins); pp. viii. + 240  
7s. 6d. net.

IN the Prefatory Note the author quotes a well-known dictum of which his subsequent pages are a delightful and stimulating contradiction. "Nothing new has been said for immortality since Plato, and nothing new against it since Epicurus." In these days a wealth of new learning has thrown fresh light on the old question of the life after death, and into this present volume are gathered the results of the teaching of philosophy, of psychical research and of Christian revelation upon the age-long problem. The result is to show that, while there is nothing new under the sun, yet it is possible that the passage of years should bring to light fresh evidence which should avail to confirm the speculations and half-hopes of the past.

Dr. McComb gives in the first chapter an exceedingly comprehensive definition of immortality. It is "the survival of bodily death of that part of man which is called, variously, soul, self, spirit, individuality, personality, or whatever other term may be held to be synonymous with these." The full acceptance of the doctrine of immortality by the present generation is handicapped by specific causes which are peculiar to the age. Dr. McComb classifies them under three heads, and deals with each separately: the traditional form in which the hope of immortality was expressed has broken down; the rise of modern materialism which appears to find in consciousness simply a function of the brain; and the materialistic conception of history due more particularly to the rise of Marxian Socialism—these are the hindrances to a belief in immortality which this book sets out to contradict. To these we would add a real lack of any desire for a future life, a phenomenon prohibiting belief which Dr. McComb notices, but to which we venture to think he does not attach sufficient weight.

In dealing with the Christian revelation the author notices the apparent silence of Christ in His direct teaching about the future life. He suggests as an explanation of this fact that "the ethical teaching of the Gospel rests on immortality as its essential presupposition." To any close student of the New Testament this presents an interesting line of thought, and certainly Dr. McComb makes the most of it. He is convinced of the reality of

Christ's personal resurrection and makes that the real basis of the Christian contribution to the problem.

Although still in its infancy as a science, Psychical Research has made no small contribution to the solution of the problem of immortality. The value of this contribution is carefully analysed and is shewn to be full of promise for the future. "We must acknowledge that the psychical researcher has made out a good case for himself, and has established the probability that ultimately his thesis will be proved to the satisfaction of all competent judges."

A theory which rests upon a single line of proof is still only a theory. As fresh arguments are brought to bear upon it and are seen to support it, it begins to pass from a possibility to a certainty. It is not too much to say that in view of modern knowledge the theory of immortality is rapidly passing from the stage at which it is capable of denial.

H. L. H.

#### THE REVELATION OF JOHN.

By Arthur S. Peake, M.A., D.D., Ryland Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester. London (The Holborn Press); pp. 390; 6s. net.

ALL that Professor Peake writes deserves the respectful attention of students. His work is always marked by scholarly soundness and sane judgment. How high he stands in the opinion of those best qualified to judge is shown by the facts that he is the first Nonconformist (a Primitive Methodist) appointed to a chair of biblical exegesis in an English University and that Oxford has conferred upon him the 'D.D.' Dr. Peake had originally no intention of writing the present volume, but was suddenly called on as late as Oct. 1918 to supply the place of the appointed Hartley Lecturer for 1919 who was obliged to leave England on an important mission. How well prepared by his long previous studies Prof. Peake was for the very difficult task of treating the most puzzling document of the N.T. is amply shown by his careful and excellently documented treatise, which as far as its writing was concerned was thrown off at breakneck speed. We have before us a sane Introduction to the study of a composite apocalyptic document which, though it got into the canon only so to say by the skin of its teeth, has ever since exercised a tyrannical influence on every phase of traditional Christian eschatology. It has turned the

heads of countless multitudes and hung the mill-stone of an (in some ways) monstrous symbolism round the necks of generations. It might almost be said that few who have attempted its exegesis have escaped with full sanity. Only in more recent times, when the critical and comparative method has been used, and especially of late years with the deeper knowledge of general apocalyptic literature which we now possess, has a better way been won of evaluating this weird document. Dr. Peake is exceedingly well read in the literature of the subject and approaches its many problems with a full knowledge of what has been already attempted. His own conclusions are sober and sound and will serve admirably as a good foundation on which to build for the future. He is more generous to this ancient apocalyptic composite than we are ourselves inclined to be. After reading his informative and instructive work we pulled down our Westcott and Hort and renewed our acquaintance with the Greek original. Even with this text before us, which prints the LXX. O.T. quotes and tags in larger type, it is startlingly evident how artificially the 'Lamb' *motif* is joined on to the older Jewish apocalyptic notions; how much more then would this be apparent if larger type were used for quotations or echoes, clangs and *clichés* from the extant non-canonical Jewish apocalyptic literature? But what strikes one most is the vindictive spirit of so many passages—so utterly old Jewish minatory and non-Christian. And then the frequently inartistic or monstrous symbolism, which blind faith alone has tolerated for so many centuries. A seven-horned, seven-eyed lamb and a cubical city, and a marriage between them, and then the product!—the consummation of what? Such symbolism is bad even for apocalyptic and it is time frankly to say so. Much has been softened down in the Authorized Version, and many a sounding phrase, when referred to the original and construed with a knowledge of antecedents and environment, evaporates. The Greek is barbarous, the Aramaic peeping through, and frequently it is utterly out of grammatical construction; it, however, well suits much of the content. If only those fanatics who see the whole of Christianity through the fantastically coloured glamour of *Daniel* and *Revelation* could be induced to read Prof. Peake's sane pages, and mark, learn and inwardly digest them, we might perchance be saved some repetition of the fond folly of which they are the inheritors. But we fear they are inaccessible to any treatment—even that of psycho-analysis! Where we think our learned exegete has narrowed somewhat his wide outlook is by

not paying sufficient attention to the psychical element; this is the main ingredient in the mixture, and it alone excuses a number of things that otherwise would be entirely without apology. The book is a marvel of cheapness in these days of the plutocracy of the hand-workers.

THE LIFE AND STORIES OF THE JAIN SAVIOUR PĀRÇVANĀTHA.

By Maurice Bloomfield, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in the Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore (The University Press); pp. 254; \$3 net.

THERE is no more important subject of research for students of Buddhist origins than that into the earliest contemporary Jain religion, and yet comparatively little work has so far been done in this direction. We are therefore very pleased to welcome Professor Bloomfield's 'essay' in a new field of Jaina studies. The scholarly volume under notice is an analysis and summary of the contents of *Pārçvanātha Caritra*, written by one of the Jain pontiffs Bhāvadevasuri, which was recently (1912) edited by two Indian scholars and published at Benares. Pārçvanātha is the last but one Jaina Tirthamkara, Buddha or Saviour, and is traditionally believed to have been born in 817 B.C., some two centuries and a half before Mahāvira, the last Saviour. This Caritra is practically a Jaina Jātaka, or cycle of birth-stories, or more precisely a frame-setting of legends purporting to be incidents in ten of the previous incarnations or transcorporations of the Saint, into which is introduced a large number of characteristic Indian folk-tales, *Märchen* and edifying narratives, the whole being devised in the interests of the Jain religion. Prof. Bloomfield offers his study as a preliminary contribution of matter that will be serviceable for an encyclopædia of Indian folk-stories, and equips it with valuable philological notes and an appendix dealing with parallels to the *motifs* of the tales and a list of proverbial sayings, none of which however are very striking. A note on the meaning of the term Pratyeka-buddha has specially attracted our attention. Usually this is taken as the designation of one who has attained by his unaided powers the knowledge necessary to Nirvāṇa, but does not preach it to men. He is sometimes referred to disrespectfully as the 'solitary rhinoceros.' Professor Bloomfield suggests (p. 5, n. 2) that its original meaning was 'enlightened by some particular thing, circumstance or occurrence.' In a book of so scholarly a nature it is difficult to understand why a Professor of the Johns

Hopkins University should put his English colleagues' nerves ajar by the casual introduction of phonetic spelling. If he is convinced of the necessity, then he should use it throughout consistently; as it is, one is constantly having one's nerves painfully shocked by such barbarisms as 'thru,' 'tho,' 'elefant,' 'camfor.' As to the main theme of this legend-cycle, it is well known that Indian contemplatives are promised as one of the psychical or abnormal powers a recovery of the memory of past births. But, as with the Buddhist Jātakas, so with this Jain Caritra or recital of saintly gestes and exploits, we are unable to convince ourselves that there is any genuine psychical element in it. The whole is transparently a pious fiction, and the kārmic links are too naïvely conceived to convince even a believer in the reincarnation doctrine that he is face to face with any elements of genuine history; it is all too mechanical for an actual greater life-sequence.

#### THE ESSENTIALS OF MYSTICISM.

By Evelyn Underhill. London (Dent); pp. vii. + 245; 8s. 6d. net.

THE author of this attractive volume has won for herself a position of authority among students of Christian mysticism. She combines the power of insight and sympathy with careful scholarship and a genius for painstaking research. She clothes her work in the fair garment of a charming prose style.

The essays under notice have been collected from the pages of various journals and reviews in which they have appeared from time to time during the past eight years. The first of these papers (which appeared originally in our own pages) is an attempt to analyse the phenomena of the mystic consciousness with a view to determining what is of the essence of that experience. Miss Underhill, faithful to her usual framework of the Threefold Way, studies each of the stages of the mystic's advance in turn. Gradually she reduces the varying experiences of individual mystics until she arrives at a common content. For instance, she refuses to be led away by external manifestations, such as ecstasy, locutions, visions and the like. These are of frequent occurrence, but they are not of the *esse* of mysticism. Mysticism is wholly interior: it is the union of will with Will.

Three papers of great interest follow. 'The Mystic and the Corporate Life' shows that the cloister or the cell is not the necessary environment of the spiritual pilgrimage. The outward conditions of life may vary enormously, and the development of the interior life can never be entirely uninfluenced by externa



happenings. The mystic owes much to the sense of a corporate life within the Church, and himself makes no mean contribution towards that life. He is no individualist; he is a member of a body. This truth is worked out in a particular instance in the essay 'Mysticism and the Doctrine of Atonement.' Just because he partakes of the corporate life, the mystic shares the need of man for an atonement with God. A final refutation of the conception of a mystic as an individualist is given by Miss Underhill in 'The Mystic as a Creative Artist.' He cannot, dare not, keep his experience to himself; he must pass it on. To this end he employs the wholly inadequate symbolism of words, colour, song and music to suggest experiences that are beyond description. Miss Underhill quotes at length from the great mystic poets to prove her assertion that he is "a creative artist of the highest kind—the mediator between the transcendent and his fellow-men."

'The Education of the Spirit' is an appeal to parents to recognize that education must not stop short at the physical and mental. It must extend to the spiritual, if the growth of the human personality is to be in any sense equal and complete. The science of prayer is difficult of apprehension and of practice, and the author includes a valuable essay on 'The Place of Will, Intellect and Feeling in Prayer.' Exception might be taken to Miss Underhill's contention that "prayer begins with an intellectual adjustment," is helped forward by the emotions and sustained and completed by an act of the will. It is at least arguable that an act of the will is needed before any prayer can be made.

The rest of the book is concerned with essays dealing with various mystics and types of mysticism. Of the former those on Mother Julian and the Blessed Angela of Foligno are much more convincing than those which deal with some of the modern French mystics. Miss Underhill is obviously in greater sympathy with the older school than she is with the more modern. The neglect, or *per contra* the gross exaggeration, of asceticism which is characteristic of so many modern mystics makes for an emasculated mysticism which compares unfavourably with the more robust type of the middle ages. Such, at any rate, is the general impression which this instructive volume conveys.

We are grateful to the author for collecting these scattered essays and giving them a more permanent form; they should provide a fresh stimulus for the study of Christian mysticism.

H. L. H.

## THE TWO CREATION STORIES IN GENESIS.

A Study in their Symbolism. With Footnotes, Appendices and Index. By James S. Forrester-Brown. London (Watkins); pp. 292; 12s. 6d. net.

IN a higher stage of culture the only way to make the contradictions of the old myths tolerable is to allegorize them. They are then held by the allegorists to be symbolic wisdom-formulæ, designed by superhuman foresight from the beginning to shadow forth supernal truths which were far beyond the comprehension of those to whom they were originally delivered. Thus Philo of Alexandria would persuade us that, when we listen to the stories of the patriarchs, it is not with an Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and their wives that we have to do, but with high spiritual virtues and the mysteries of the moral regeneration of the soul, and so on and so forth, and that thus Moses had long anticipated Plato in philosophy. Now-a-days we read Philo, not because we believe his theory, the apologetic subterfuge with which he salved his conscience, but because we are interested in the lofty religio-philosophic ideas of his day, which he so deviously read into the myths and stories of the Old Testament. It is, however, highly probable that, when we are dealing with a genuine myth in its original form, that is with a truly inspired utterance clothed in harmonious imagery, it may be treated as though it were a mystic algebraical formula, with appropriate correspondences in higher ranges of being, thought and emotion. But you have first to catch your myth before you can cook it; you have first to assure yourself that you have the original form before you, and that it is a genuinely prophetic and poetical utterance. Now it is exceedingly improbable that the Genesis myths as they now stand are original; on the contrary everything goes to show that they have been greatly altered in transmission. We remember once publishing an exceedingly clever 'esoteric interpretation' of 'Old Mother Hubbard.' It was a delightful piece of work, dovetailing in all the highest mysteries of Neo-theosophy in the most convincing fashion. It annoyed the faithful no little, for it laid bare the inherent vice of many a pretentious and solemn 'study' or 'revelation' held in high repute, by showing that the merry irresponsibility of free-associationism could juggle quite as skilfully as the esoteric exegete. There is a fascination in it all, it must be

confessed, and we have yielded to it ourselves. Some of the great myths and mystical utterances clearly invite such treatment; but there is much of little or no value that masquerades in borrowed plumes.

Mr. Forrester-Brown has evidently read widely, taken an immense amount of pains with his material and laboured most industriously on the famous texts which for so many centuries have persuaded the faithful that they possessed in them the immediate and inerrant revelation of God concerning the beginnings of the world and man. Our interpreter sublimates the whole matter, takes it up onto a lofty mystical plane, and would have it that it figures forth the mysteries of spiritual genesis both of the soul of the world and of man far prior to any material manifestation. We agree that the most fruitful method of myth-treatment is the psychological, because the myth proper is first and foremost a psychical construct or product. Psychogenesis, therefore, is the most natural scheme of reference. Once then the interpreter can make his given imaginal mythical material fluid, can volatilize the fixed, he can combine it with or transform it into a scheme of ideas which he has obtained from other sources or come at by other means. Mr. Forrester-Brown carries us into a region of mystical speculation which reflects some of the greater intuitions of the past and some interesting views current in certain present-day circles of adventure. There is much that is suggestive in what he has to say, but it is exceedingly difficult to be persuaded that the Genesis-stories originated any of it in his mind. As then with a Philo or an Origen, a Gnostic or a Neo-platonist, we are keenly interested in the philosophical, mystical and psychical notions of their day and circle, apart from their allegorizing industry, so here we are interested in our allegorist's views, while at the same time remaining sceptical that the original myth-framers or the subsequent deformers or transformers of the original theme would have imagined or thought the matter in the terms of like-natured minds of a later and more cultured age.

#### THE PSYCHIC STRUCTURES AT THE GOLIGHER CIRCLE.

By W. J. Crawford, D.Sc., Author of 'Reality of Psychic Phenomena' and 'Experiments in Psychical Science.'  
London (Watkins); pp. 151; 10s. 6d. net.

THIS is from a rigidly scientific point of view one of the most important contributions to the study of physical or psycho-physical

mediumistic phenomena which have yet appeared. It completes the trilogy of the late Dr. Crawford's methodical, ingeniously controlled and minutely recorded observations of the powerful manifestations, chiefly of percussive and levitational phenomena, obtained in the private circle of the Goligher family of Belfast, mainly through the exceptional mediumistic endowment of one of the daughters, Miss Kathleen. The patience and unwearied enthusiasm displayed week after week, month after month, and year after year, in the gradual certification of every step forward, displayed by all concerned—investigator, medium, sitters, and last but not least 'operators'—is beyond praise. The whole constitutes one of the most valuable, in some respects perhaps the most valuable, body of evidence yet brought before the public. It is difficult to see how any open-minded reader can fail to be deeply impressed by the facts which have passed the severe tests of observation applied to them by Dr. Crawford. In this third volume the long years of patient testing of the obscurer stages of the phenomena have been crowned with complete success. Gradually, stage by stage, the mystery of the at first invisible link between the medium and the completely visible and audible phenomena has been laid bare, and the camera has revealed for all to see the psycho-physical structures whereby the levitation of the table and the rest of the phenomena were mediately brought about. By a long series of elaborate and ingeniously devised physical tests it has been proved that the material basis of the structures is a substance or plasm which issues from the body of the medium, ultimately in this case mainly from the lower portion of the trunk of the body. It issues and returns, and in its return deposits on the clothes and skin particles of material—clay, staining matter, etc.—it has been in contact with in carrying out the experiments devised by the investigator and achieved by the 'operators.' For it must be clearly understood that all is done throughout by intelligent invisible co-operation. Of this most important factor Dr. Crawford says little. He specifically states that the psychological side of the problem is beyond his competence; he is dealing purely with the physical facts. These latter entirely confirm the basic similar phenomena recorded in the elaborate volumes of Dr. Schrenck-Notzing and Dr. Geley, who have so carefully examined the mediumism of 'Eva C.' Telekinetic phenomena and those of so-called materialization, or more simply solidification, are operated by means of a fluid substance of protean possibilities which emanates from the

body of the medium. It may vary in its transformations from extreme subtlety to a density as hard as steel; part may be solid and visible, part gaseous and invisible. No one who realizes the importance of this posthumous volume of Dr. Crawford, which has been seen through the press by Mr. David Gow, the editor of *Light*, but will regret sincerely that we have this careful, methodical and painstaking worker no longer with us to continue his valuable investigations; and it is to be hoped that some one of equal scientific ability will be found to slip into his place and utilize for the general good the exceptional opportunities for research offered by the highly trained and now famous Goligher circle. The volume is furnished with 37 woodcuts and 46 photographs which add greatly to its interest and value.

#### THE AḤMADIYA MOVEMENT.

By H. A. Walter, M.A., M.R.A.S., Literary Secretary Y.M.C.A., India and Ceylon. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 185; 3s. 6d. net.

THIS is a painstaking and carefully documented account of the most active modern propagandist movement among the Mohammedans in India. The Aḥmadiya or Qādiānī sect was founded by Mīrzā Ghulam Aḥmad of Qādiān, in the Panjāb, some seventy miles from Lahore, in 1889. He was well born, well educated and able; but his mystical experiences intoxicated him to such an extent that he claimed to be not only the Madhī, but also the 'promised Messiah,' who had come 'in the spirit and power' of Jesus Christ, and an incarnation of Kṛiṣṇa. It goes without saying that such claims were subjected to the severest criticism by orthodox Mohammedans, Hindus and Christians, and the history of the movement is by no means a peaceful one. Mīrzā Ghulam Aḥmad died in 1908 after giving his authority to the highly elaborated legend that: "Jesus did not die on the cross, but was taken down by his disciples in a swoon, and healed within forty days by a miraculous ointment called, in Persian, *Marhām-i-'Isā*. He then travelled to the East on a mission to the lost ten tribes of the children of Israel, believed by Aḥmad to be the peoples of Afghanistan and Kashmir, and finally died at the age of 120, and was buried in Khān Yār Street, in Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir." In reviewing, in the April number for

1918, the well-produced translation of the Qurān issued under Aḥmadiyan auspices and commented upon in the interests of the movement, we referred at some length to this legend and the genesis of both its old and new elements. Outside India little is known of the Qādiānī sect; but it may be noticed that the driving power behind the *Islamic Review* in this country and the activity of Khwaja Kamaluddin, the recent Imam of the mosque at Woking, were derived from this source. Those who desire to become acquainted with the origins, history and claims of this now somewhat considerable movement in Mohammedan India will find a mass of material in Mr. Walter's volume; the material is subjected to considerable criticism, as might naturally be expected, but is of interest as indicative of a widespread unrest and dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs among the world-faiths. At the same time ideas of more friendly intercourse between them are widely entertained and even attempts at fraternization have been proposed. Thus Aḥmad just before his death proposed to form a union of the Ārya Samāj, Hinduism and Islām. Friendly relations with Christianity were, however, not in the programme, for the founder's son, the present Khalifa, states that the chief reason why the title of Messiah was given to his father was that he was destined "to fight against 'Church Christianity' and to break its power." He adds: "By proving that Jesus died a natural death, the new reformer gave a fresh lease of life to Islām, and now the Musalmāns are for all times saved from falling a prey to Christian missionaries." Such 'proofs' may satisfy Qādiānīs, but the legend woven round the tomb at Srinagar is as little likely to convince the student of history as the similar romance of Notovich, *La Nouvelle Vie de Jésus*, published about 1890. Aḥmad seems to have taken this invention, fathered on the Buddhist monks of the Himis monastery near Ladak, as a serious piece of history, although the monks had never heard of Notovich and denied all knowledge of the documents he declared were in their possession. The swooning of Jesus theory, of course, goes back to the Qurān, which denies the resurrection. Perhaps the chief feature of the Aḥmadiya movement is that, while it privately claims so much for its founder and believes firmly in his 'illuminations' and mystical pronouncements, outwardly in its controversy with Christianity it takes up generally a rationalistic attitude and makes free use of the most extreme positions of New Testament criticism against traditionalism.

## THE LETTERS OF SAINT TERESA.

A Complete Edition, translated from the Spanish and annotated by the Benedictines of Stanbrook. Vol. I. London (Thos. Baker); pp. 808; 9s. net.

"THE letters of great people are the best revelation of their personality," says Cardinal Gasquet in his Introduction. After quoting Cardinal Newman as to the vital importance of autobiography as self-revelation, he goes on: "What I want to trace and study is the real hidden, but human, life, or the *interiors*, as it is called, of such glorious creations of God." Biographies written from outside, and more or less officially, are of little if any value for this purpose. Especially is this so when we are dealing with the sanctity of soul and spirit where motives which are hidden and unknown become all-controlling.

But in the case of St. Teresa it is unlucky that the many letters she wrote to St. John of the Cross, with his to her, have all been lost or destroyed. The intimate conversations carried on upon paper, written out of their eager and ardent hearts, between these two lofty spirits and mystics would indeed have been searching in their power and psychology. Of the Letters that are left there have been earlier partial translations, but this is to be a complete edition, which will include some recently discovered. It is the work of the love and learning of the Benedictines of Stanbrook, will run to four volumes and will give in all 460 Letters with many notes. It should, however, be remembered that the Saint herself has expressed her strong personality in and through all her works. This is especially so in her own *Life*, which is a true autobiography as well as a great treatise on Mystical Theology. Then there is *The Interior Castle* and the *Book of Foundations*, which tell us much about the working of her mind, soul and spirit and the sources of her power.

The Letters themselves in this volume are mostly short, written in a clear, terse style on the need of the moment. There are some typical touches. "My trouble is caused by my no longer being able to find comfort in my confessors—it must come from something higher than a confessor, for nothing that is less than the soul itself can satisfy its desire." This was written in 1578 in that interior loneliness, which was often there beneath her busy life of founding Houses. It follows upon her opening words:

"I assure you, my Father, that I think my joys are no longer of this world, for I have not got what I want and I do not want what I have." Here we have signs of the growth of a noble soul seeking more and more light and looking upward for a larger life. Almost all these letters are headed "Jesus," and open with the words, rather reminding us of the Acts of the Apostles, "May the Grace of the Holy Spirit be with you, Amen." They all breathe the mediæval and monastic atmosphere, with its true poverty above pettiness. They all shew the saint's clear thinking and strong common sense. "In fact the state of the soul varies like the weather: it could not be otherwise: do not distress yourself about it, for it is no fault of yours."

F. W.

#### SUGGESTION AND AUTO-SUGGESTION.

By Charles Baudouin. Translated from the French by Eden and Cedar Paul. London (Allen & Unwin); pp. 279; 15s. net.

THIS most valuable and suggestive book sets forth the doctrines of the New Nancy School, as worked out by Coué and his disciples, of whom Dr. Baudouin is one. Its scientific value is not lessened by the fact that its clarity and animation of style make it acceptable to the general reader as well as the technical student. A great deal of new light is thrown upon the workings of the subconscious mind and a solution offered to several problems which have long baffled psychologists. Dr. Baudouin shows us that the subconscious is not under the control of the will, but of the imagination, and herein gives us a clue to the only too frequent failure of even the sincerest voluntary effort; but he also shows us that the imagination can be influenced by the will, and so gives us an indirect method of approach to the lower levels of the mind which are inaccessible to direct attack. This method of manipulating the subconscious is a most valuable contribution to psychology, and is as important for the teacher as the doctor. It has long been realized that the Freudian method of psychoanalysis, while invaluable for diagnosis and research work, is slow, cumbersome and frequently unsatisfactory as a sole method of treatment; for though it reveals the source of his trouble to the patient, it offers no solution. The followers of Jung introduce much more of teaching and explanation into their method, and aim at a psychological reconstruction. But the workers of



both schools find their task prolonged and frequently rendered impossible by the tenacity of the habit-forming faculty of the mind. A conscious habit is hard enough to combat, but a sub-conscious one is almost unassailable, as all practical psychologists know to their cost. Dr. Coué not only gives us the key to the formation of these subconscious habits but shows us how to deal with them, and thus makes a contribution of great value to therapeutic psychology.

The method of the New Nancy School aims at teaching the patient to take voluntary control of his own subconscious, and it is thus free from the drawbacks of hypnosis or suggestion as generally practised. Its value is not only remedial but educative, and its importance as a method of mental development and training can hardly be over-estimated. The general contention is that the vigour of an individual is in direct ratio to his power to draw upon his subconscious resources, so that we should regard the subconscious mind, not as an ash-bin, but as a treasure-vault.

There is an interesting review of cases of physical disease, not only functional, but organic, which have been cured by the auto-suggestion method, and much light is thrown upon the phenomena of mental healing and of 'faith-cures,' which are being systematically reproduced by medical men at the Nancy clinic.

A chapter is also devoted to the discussion of the use of suggestion in the training of children, but here we would dissent from the author; it seems to us that such a practice as the following is distinctly dangerous. The parent is recommended to creep into the bedroom after dark and whisper commands in the ear of the sleeping child. Surely this is more likely than not to produce a bad warping of character, if nothing worse. Such methods do not take into account the psychology of the development of individuality.

On the whole, however, we would say that the book contains the germ of the psychology of the future.

V. M. F.

#### COMMUNITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY.

By R. M. MacIver, D.Phil. London (Macmillan); pp. xvii + 488; 15s. net.

THE purpose of this book is "to set out the nature and fundamental laws of social life." The author has set himself a noble and difficult task, and has accomplished his purpose in a manner

wholly admirable. The reader is in no way worried by a mass of detail, but rather is he shewn the broad issues of the subject. The relations of a community to its associations, of the associations to one another, of the State to all the rest—these are the fundamental questions upon which the student of sociology most needs expert guidance. Sociology is essentially a unity; it is wrong to break it up and assign a part to psychology, a part to economics, to politics and so on. Social development is the great enemy of war and militarism; and the reader will find abundant corroboration in the events of the recent war-period of much that is said on the subject in this book. Dr. MacIver has not seen fit—nor was it at all necessary—to alter or even modify anything that appeared in the first edition concerning the destructive influence of war upon social progress. The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the bases of sociological science; the second contains an analysis of ‘community’; and the book concludes with a treatment of the primary laws which govern the development of ‘community.’ It is not a popular subject and the treatment accorded it in this book is scientific. For all that the author writes simply and easily, and the uninitiated should find no difficulty in following the drift of his argument. The awakened interest in the problems of social development and the birth of the science of sociology are two of the most remarkable features of contemporary life, and hold within themselves vast possibilities for the ultimate welfare of the human race. In which noble task—the knight-errantry of the twentieth century—Dr. MacIver is a redoubtable champion.

H. L. H.

#### SNOW-BIRDS.

By Śrī Ānanda Āchārya. London (Macmillan); pp. 296; 7s. 6d. net.

THE influence of Rabindranath Tagore is plainly visible in *Snow-Birds*, but the author has nothing of Tagore’s simplicity and intensity. He rambles in a manner which is neither prose nor poetry through a multitude of subjects, from love-songs and war-poems to apostrophes to the ‘Teachers and Leaders of Men’ and the land of Norway. The author’s ideas and their expression are alike *banal*, and his work overflows with metaphor and ornament. He should take to heart Voltaire’s saying: “*L’adjectif est l’ennemi du substantif, quoiqu’il s’accorde avec lui.*”

O. S.

## THE CHURCH AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

A Layman's View. By George E. Wright. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 147; 8s. 6d. net.

THE Church is singularly slow in admitting the validity of the experimental method of establishing the proof of a doctrine. In the sphere of theology she is apt to rely almost entirely on ancient documentary evidence or philosophical speculation for the defence of her faith. In no case is this more apparent than in her method of dealing with the problem of man's survival of physical death. Her accredited teachers are still too ready to set on one side the valuable results of modern Psychical Research and to regard them as contradictory to, rather than confirmatory of, the Christian tradition of the after-life.

It needed a layman to deal with the relationship between the Church and Psychical Research, and Mr. Wright's book is to be commended to all those who desire to come to some conclusion upon the subject with which it deals. He recognizes at their true value the charges which are usually levelled against Psychical Research by the traditionalist school of orthodox theologians: but against these charges, and the position they represent, he brings an immense array of facts which, to the dispassionate reader, go far to prove the possibility of communication with discarnate spirits. His critical examination of the means of communication and of the general evidence in favour of survival is eminently fair. He sets out to examine the objections to research and to the evidence obtained. He finds that the objections to Psychical Research on the part of orthodox Christianity are not based on Scriptural warrant, but are due rather to temporary religious or political conditions, or to bigotry.

There is a real need for the Church (if it is to escape the accusation of obscurantism) to take an unbiassed view of the findings of psychical science. The chief danger which besets the Christian is that of confusing the emotions with the intellect. Infinite harm is done when the passions of men are exploited to the neglect of the intellect. It is easy to inveigh against psychical science or to be unbalanced in pursuit of it. Either attitude will do harm. Mr. Wright's book should help the reader to form an opinion on a subject which the Christian Church can no longer regard as negligible.

H. L. H.

## PURPOSE AND TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By H. Stanley Redgrove, B.Sc., F.C.S. London (Kegan Paul); pp. xvi.+170; 5s. net.

THE author of this book is of the opinion that the doctrines of Swedenborg are not studied enough to-day, and to encourage such study he has here dealt with some of the main lines of the great teacher's philosophy. The six chapters into which the book is divided deal respectively with the Doctrine of Degrees, Symbolism, Ontology, Physics, Biology and Ethics.

Swedenborg has suffered much at the hands of those who have come after him in the world of philosophy; but his most serious wounds have been those which have been inflicted by his disciples and friends. The former have too often treated him as a lunatic; the latter have done him an equal disservice by regarding him as almost divine. Every philosopher has the right to be studied in a cool critical spirit, and this is the service which Mr. Redgrove renders to Swedenborg. He is not afraid to contradict as well as criticize the philosophical doctrines with which he is dealing. One of the weaknesses in Swedenborgianism is its tendency to substitute speculation for experiment. That so many of these speculations have proved, and are still proving, correct is no real defence of a method so scientifically unsound. Mr. Redgrove is quick to detect this tendency whenever and wherever it appears.

Sir William Barrett has recently drawn attention to Swedenborg's extraordinary anticipations of the most modern theories. In his preface to this book Mr. Redgrove excuses himself from an attempt to review the doctrines of Swedenborg in the light of Einstein's Theory of Relativity on the ground that such a proceeding would be premature "until far more is known concerning the implications and fundamental significance of this latter theory."

H. L. H.

## A PRISONER OF PENTONVILLE.

By 'Red Band.' London (Elkin Mathews); pp. 66; cloth 3s. 6d., paper 2s. 6d. net.

A BOOK such as this, with its sheer sincerity, its deep experience, and its fearless facing of truth, is on a different level from the ordinary run of 'made' books. It is a living document—the

document of a soul that has been into the depths and has wrested thence the pearl of great price. Written in verse only, we are told, on account of the absence of writing materials (verse being easier to commit to memory than prose), it frequently attains a fairly high level of poetic expression, yet throughout the truth of feeling outweighs the value of the form. Through bitter experience the gradual development of the writer's conception of the Deity is traced, from a belief in His existence based on the fact of His 'great miracle,' man; through a half-worked-out theory—recalling that of H. G. Wells in *God the Invisible King*—of a God in some way dependent on man, as on p. 81 :

“ If God do not end the War ;  
If he save not man and city—  
Why then Man must even for  
God have pity ! ”

and in the concluding lines of the same poem :

“ For God's sake, Man, to God be fair,  
Lest even He should glimpse despair ! ”

to the beautiful consummation in the Epilogue, when having shown that the doctrine taught him in childhood of God being in heaven had had no meaning for him, he concludes :

“ But when calamity upon me came,  
And I lost friends and money in a night ;  
When, driven to despair, I fell to shame,  
And on my nearest-dearest brought a blight :  
Yea, when of every blessing I was bare  
And to the deepest pit down, down I fell ;  
Whilst crying ‘ There's no God ! ’—I found Him there,  
God dwells in Hell ! ”

S. E. H.

#### THE GREAT BEYOND AND ITS INHABITANTS.

By Adam Boyce, M.B.E. (Recorder), Mrs. Boyce (Questioner), Miss  
Hilda Kathleen Boyce (Medium). London (Kegan Paul,  
etc.) ; pp. 62 ; 2s. 6d. net.

THIS is the product of a family circle who were all three sceptical, had read nothing on the subject of Spiritualism and agreed to read nothing while the investigations were under weigh. Mr.

Boyce is Chief Superintendent of H.M. Customs at Liverpool. The method of automatism was that of calling over the alphabet and table-tilting. The communications are a mixture of familiar elements for the most part, but include phrases from a 'spirit-language,' and the less familiar use in Spiritism of apotropaic formulæ which are, however, not given. The claims are egregious, as for instance the declaration: "This book is the nearest guide to heaven that has ever been, or will be, published"—a feature which plainly indicates the unreliable nature of the communications. The Questioner, whose astuteness is praised by the Recorder, has missed her chief opportunity of 'trying the spirits'; had she operated on this 'complex' doubtless a different story would have been told. For purely evidential purposes it is an advantage that the medium should know as little as possible of the subject; but the investigators should know all they can if their work is to be of any scientific value. The record however is a patently honest attempt to set down what occurred, and so supplies material for analysis. The volume belongs to the series 'Evidences of Spiritualism.'

#### CATHOLIC TALES AND CHRISTIAN SONGS.

By Dorothy Leigh Sayers, Author of 'Op. I.' Oxford (Blackwell); pp. 63; 3s. net.

THESE powerful poems are an expression of a mood that undeniably exists at the present day, though whether it has more than a passing value is doubtful. It is the mood that raises the question: "Is awe indispensable to religion?" It finds support in the kindred mood that seeks a new presentation of the Deity. In the old call to leave the 'silken cushions in the bower of wicked men' and join the 'outlaw' Christ, the minor key of suffering and self-denial is by this writer exchanged for a song of joy in the 'high emprise' on which the Christ is bound as he walks the world, "With music in His golden mouth and laughter in His eyes," while the intimate communion of the Soul with the Divine is expressed (with a force that compels a certain assent) as the companionship of 'Big Brother, Christ' ministering to mental and emotional needs. With all this, the struggle between Christ and the human soul is analysed with profound understanding in the poem entitled 'ΪΑΝΤΑΣ ΕΛΚΥΣΩ'—with its beautiful last verse:

"O king, O captain, wasted, wan with scourging,  
 Strong beyond speech and wonderful with woe,  
 Whither, relentless, wilt Thou still be urging  
 Thy maimed and halt that have not strength to go? . . .  
 Peace, peace, I follow. Why must we love Thee so?"

The conception underlying these contrasts is perhaps shown in the short poem 'Christus Dionysus,' concluding:

"Young Dionysus,  
 Crowned with the thorn and vine;  
 His feet and hands are red with blood,  
 His mouth is red with wine."

Many are no doubt asking at the present time if there is not some way of bringing the joy of earth and the joy of heaven into relation with each other. The question is a real one. Whether the author of these beautiful verses has supplied the true answer, each reader will decide for himself.

S. E. H.

#### A THEORY OF THE MECHANISM OF SURVIVAL.

The Fourth Dimension and its Applications. By W. Whately Smith. London (Kegan Paul). 5s. net.

IT is seldom that a book along psychic lines makes so much demand upon the reader's attentive thought as does this concise little volume. Higher space concepts are invariably difficult and generally obscurely presented, but Mr. Whately Smith is to be congratulated on the admirably lucid way in which he has not only stated his problem, but applied it to certain of the facts elicited by Psychic Research. The position taken up—namely, "that four-dimensional space is a reality, and that the individual consciousness is capable of functioning in a four-dimensional vehicle quite apart from the three-dimensional physical body"—is not unfamiliar, but Mr. Whately Smith has succeeded in demonstrating its necessity both to the arguments for the existence of an Ego, and also for the elucidation of certain psychic phenomena, such as telekinesis, clairvoyance and some aspects of trance-consciousness, which, without its aid, would appear extremely obscure and difficult of explanation.

C. E. W.

## SPIRITUALISM: ITS PRESENT-DAY MEANING.

A Symposium, Edited by Huntly Carter, with six Illustrations.  
London (Fisher Unwin); pp. 287; 18s. net.

THERE are some forty contributions (some of them very brief) to this symposium, representing wellnigh every shade of opinion. It is difficult to summarize these extremely divergent views, and the editor is hard put to it to generalize the outcome of his undertaking. He does, however, as well as can be expected in writing: "The first thing I notice is general agreement that a significant movement is taking place in our midst. . . . The second thing is a disagreement concerning the nature and importance of this movement. Is it a vital cause? Is it a debasing effect? Is it true Spiritualism or false? Is it permanent or transient? These are the questions evoked. Hence two predominant feelings emerge. One is satisfaction, the other is dissatisfaction. A body of contributors whom I will call converts to Spiritualism are perfectly satisfied that a great and good thing is happening. Another body who are not converted are uneasy lest a very bad thing is happening. But neither know what is really happening."

## THE VERDICT——?

By Tertium Quid. Preface by H. A. Dallas. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 302; 6s. net.

THOSE who maintain that telepathy is the explanation of all psychic phenomena, and those who maintain that such manifestations are all produced by discarnate spirits, form two opposite camps. 'Tertium Quid' holds the balance very delicately between the two, and his carefully written little book should be a medium of reconciliation between them. There are many cases of phenomena which can be explained on the telepathy-hypothesis; there are some, notably the 'book-tests,' which he gives in detail, that cannot be so explained. He is a remarkably just and sane investigator, and his experience on court-martials, and as a member of various courts, has given him a training as to the nature and value of evidence which is invaluable in psychical research. The accounts of *séances* with Mrs. Leonard and others are full of interest.

O. S.



## MODERN SAINTS AND SEERS.

Translated from the French of Jean Finot by Evan Marrett.  
London (Rider); pp. 211; 4s. 6d. net.

THERE is a great deal of interesting matter in this small book, in spite of its somewhat misleading title. It is divided into two parts: 'The Salvation of the Poor,' and 'The Salvation of the Wealthy.' In the first part the author gives a description of those numerous sects which spring up mysteriously all over Russia among the peasantry, such as the Negationists, White-robed Believers, Fugitives, Molokanes, and Skoptzi or Self-mutilators, to mention only a few of them. Some of the writings of Tolstoi, as is well known, contain the principles elaborated by many of these sects. M. Finot writes instructively of other well-known leaders, such as the notorious Rasputin and Pistzoff, Samarin and Father John of Cronstadt. The psychology of both the leaders and their followers is of immense interest, and in the short space devoted to these strange upheavals of religious fanaticism the author succeeds in giving us a clear idea of it. The second part deals with the widely-known Mormons and the Christian Scientists, and the obscurer sect of the Sionists, founded by John Dowie, who combined a remarkable business capacity with his gifts as a seer, wherein he resembled another adventurer, Dr. Teed of Chicago, who founded the colony of Estero in Florida on a commercial basis. Schlatter, the Miracle-man of Denver, is perhaps the most mysterious figure of all; he disappeared, after healing thousands without payment and inaugurating a religious revival in Denver. M. Finot goes on to tell us of various sects in France, and ends with a chapter on Thuggee, 'the religion of murder.' He has also some remarks on the Theosophists.

His concluding sentences give the key to his attitude towards his very mixed 'Modern Saints and Seers.' "Often their countenances are made beautiful by love, and they will, at the least, provide us with a golden key to the fascinating mysteries of man's sub-conscious mind. What though their doctrines vanish from sight under the scalpel of analysis? It is no small pleasure to contemplate, and even to examine closely, such delightful phantoms."

O. S.

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Edited by G. R. S. Mead.

Vol. XII.

JULY, 1921.

No. 4.

The Spirit of the Quest	-	Edmond Holmes	433
The Philosophy of Imagining	-	Bertram Keightley	453
The Non-historicity Solution	-	Dr. K. C. Anderson	469
The Secret of the Self	-	Dr. Muhammed Iqbal	484
Some Remarks on Fourth Dimensionalism	-	The Editor	493
The Spirit of Prometheus	-	Margaret Legge	506
Thomas Vaughan in Oxford	-	M. J. H. Skrine	521
The Pillow of Wisdom	-	Yoné Noguchi	539
Dostoevsky	-	Iseult Gonne	543
Reviews and Notices	-	-	546

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**VOLUME XII.**

**NUMBERS 1—4.**

**October, 1920, to July, 1921.**

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# CONTENTS

	PAGE
Alchemy, A Modern Interpretation of. Rev.	
A. H. E. LEE, M.A. - - -	302
Asrár-i Khudí: The Secrets of the Self.	
SHEIKH MUHAMMED IQBÁL - -	484
Astrology as a World Concept. S. ELIZABETH	
HALL - - - -	99
Beggar at the Gate, A (Verse). MOYSHEH OYVED	316
Boehme's Standpoint. C. J. BARKER -	52
Christendom, The Gentile Surround of. THE	
EDITOR - - - -	116
Consciousness, The Meaning of. F. C.	
CONSTABLE, M.A. - - - -	178
Divine Immanence in Nature, The Experience	
of. ROBERT H. THOULESS, M.A. -	333
Dostoevsky. ISEULT GONNE - -	543
Footprints. F. J. CANNON - -	386
Fourth Dimensionalism, Some Remarks on.	
THE EDITOR - - - -	493
Good Friday, On a (Verse). B. E. BAUGHAN -	395
Imagining, The Philosophy of. BERTRAM	
KEIGHTLEY, M.A. - - - -	453
Indifferent Arms. HEREHAUGHT - -	223

	PAGE
Jesus and the Blood Sacrifices. ROBERT EISLER, Ph.D. - - -	230
Man of Asia, The. L. ADAMS BECK - -	317
Mystic Feeling and the Emotional Life. Rev. Prof. A. CALDECOTT, D.Litt., D.D. -	289
Mystical Experience, Orthodoxy, Psychology and. THE EDITOR - - -	360
Non-historicity School, The. Rev. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D. - - -	345
Non-historicity Solution, The. Rev. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D. - . -	469
Orphic Mysteries and Early Syrian Christianity, The. VACHER BURCH, M.A. - -	145
Plotinus and Plato. KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, Ph.D., M.D. - -	75
Prometheus, The Spirit of. MARGARET LEGGE	506
Psychoanalysis and Reconstruction. DORA E. HECHT - - -	172
Psychology, Some Consequences of the New. EMMA MARIE CAILLARD - -	165
Quest, The Spirit of the. EDMOND HOLMES, M.A.	433
Reason and Dogma. EDWYN BEVAN, M.A. -	1
Religion, The Educational Value of Compara- tive. Rev. PERCIVAL GOUGH, M.A. -	244
Reviews and Notices :	
Ahmadiya Movement, The. H. A. WALTER -	420
Amethysts. D. B. JONES - -	288
Arcady, The Dales of. DORA UNA RATCLIFFE -	568

# CONTENTS

V

	PAGE
Archaic England. HAROLD BAYLEY . . .	281
Bacon, Roger. H. STANLEY REDGROVE . . .	563
Beauty and the Beast. STEWARD A. MCDOWALL	556
Beyond, Letters from the. MARY HAMILTON COATS	139
Beyond and its Inhabitants, The Great. ADAM BOYCE . . . . .	428
Body, The Spiritual. C. E. ROLT . . . .	278
Böhme, Prerequisites for the Study of. C. J. BARKER	283
Catholic Tales and Christian Songs. DOROTHY LEIGH SAYERS . . . . .	429
Christ, Tutors unto. A. E. GARVIE . . . .	143
Christ, Vision of the. A QUAKER MYSTIC . .	142
Christianity the Final Religion? Is. A. C. BOUQUET	551
Community: A Sociological Study. R. M. MACIVER	424
Cosmic Commonwealth, The. EDMOND HOLMES .	285
Dawn of Hope, The. EDITH A. LEALE . . . .	288
Doyle, Father William, S.J. ALFRED O'RAHILLY .	267
Dreamland of Reality, The. H. L. HUBBARD .	566
Emerson and his Philosophy. J. ARTHUR HILL .	138
Erotic Motive in Literature, The. ALBERT MORDELL	135
Future Life in the Light of Modern Enquiry, The. SAMUEL MCCOMB . . . . .	411
Genesis, The Two Creation Stories in. J. S. FORRESTER-BROWN . . . . .	417
Glanville, Joseph. H. STANLEY REDGROVE . .	563
Government, A New Chapter in the Science of. BENCHARA BRANFORD . . . . .	284
Hâfiz, Selections from the Rubaiyât and Odes of. A MEMBER OF THE PERSIAN SOCIETY . . . .	276
Happy Tree, The. GERALD GOULD . . . .	567
Immortality, King's College Lectures on. Ed. W. R. MATTHEWS . . . . .	553

	PAGE
Irenæus: The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON - -	404
James, The Letters of William. Edited by his Son HENRY JAMES - - - -	546
John, The Revelation of. ARTHUR S. PEAKE -	412
Life beyond the Veil, The. Vols. I.-III. G. VALE OWEN - - - -	554
Lourdes, Twenty Cures at. F. DE GRANDMAISON DE BRUNO - - - -	286
Mandæer, Das Johannesbuch der. MARK LIDZBARSKI	133
Manichéennes, Les Écritures. PROSPER ALFARIC	138
Materialisation, Phenomena of. Von Schrenck-Notzing (Tr.) - - - -	272
Mesmer, Franz Anton. R. B. INCE - -	563
Mind Energy (Tr.) HENRI BERGSON - -	409
Miracles which Happen. ARTHUR PANNELL -	558
Mysticism, The Essentials of. EVELYN UNDERHILL	415
Neither Dead nor Sleeping. MAY WRIGHT SEWALL	560
Occultists and Mystics of all Ages. RALPH SHIRLEY	563
Paracelsus, Theophrastus. W. P. SWAINSON -	563
Pārçvanātha, The Life and Teachings of the Jain Saviour. MAURICE BLOOMFIELD - -	414
Pentonville, A Prisoner of. 'RED BAND' -	427
Personality, God and. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB -	401
Personality and Human Life, Divine. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB - - - -	401
Psychic Phenomena, Practical Views on. G. E. WRIGHT - - - -	139
Psychical Research, The Church and. GEORGE E. WRIGHT - - - -	426
Psychical Research for the Plain Man. G. M. KINGSFORD - - - -	567
Psychic Structures at the Goligher Circle. W. J. CRAWFORD - - - -	418
Psycho-analysis. BARBARA LOW - -	280

# CONTENTS

vii

## PAGE

Psychology and its Relation to Life, The New. A. G. TANSLEY - - - - -	265
Purpose and Transcendentalism. H. STANLEY REDGROVE - - - - -	427
Quest of an Ideal, In. EDWARD HOLMES -	141
Redemption—Hindu and Christian. SYDNEY CAVE	274
Relativity, The Theory of. H. WILDON CARR -	270
Religion is, What. BERNARD BOSANQUET -	552
Rose Garden, The Secret. FLORENCE LEDERER -	564
Sadhu, The. B. H. STREETER and A. J. APPASAMY -	548
Saints and Seers, Modern (Tr.). JEAN FINOT -	432
Seen and Unseen. YONÉ NOGUCHI -	566
Self, The Secret of the. REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON -	406
Snow Birds. ŚRĪ ĀNANDA ĀCHĀRYA -	425
Soul, The Release of the. GILBERT CANNAN -	565
Soul, The Romance of the. AUTHOR OF 'The Golden Fountain' - - - - -	142
Space, Time and Gravitation. A. S. EDDINGTON -	136
Spiritualism: A Popular History. JOSEPH MCCABE	567
Spiritualism: Its Present-day Meaning. HUNTLY CARTER - - - - -	431
Spiritualism of the Devil, Is? F. FIELDING-OULD -	143
Suggestion and Auto-suggestion (Tr.). CHARLES BAUDOUIN - - - - -	423
Survival, A Theory of the Mechanism of. W. WHATELY SMITH - - - - -	430
Survival after Death, Man's. CHARLES L. TWEEDALE	286
Swedenborg, Emanuel. W. P. SWAINSON -	563
Teresa, The Letters of Saint. The BENEDICTINES OF STANBROOK - - - - -	422
Verdict ———? The. TERTIUM QUID -	431
West, A Soldier Gone. H. M. G. and M. M. H. -	139
Saints, The Self-suggestion of the. Rev. V. C. MACMUNN - - - - -	205

	PAGE
Schuré's Forecast, M. Col. B. R. WARD, C.M.G.	66
Shadow, The Illumination of the. E. P. LARKEN, B.A.	252
Shakti: The World as Power. SIR JOHN WOODROFFE (ARTHUR AVALON)	24
Spring in the Woods. A. R. HORWOOD	379
Subconscious, Some Problems of the. L. M. CORRY	82
Swan Song, A (Verse). OLIVER FOX	400
Tyrrell's Letters (George). H. C. CORRANCE, B.A.	40
Vaughan in Oxford, Thomas MARY J. H. SKRINE	521
Widow, The (Verse). V. H. FRIEDLAENDER	259
Wisdom, The Pillow of (Verse). YONÉ NOGUCHI	539

# THE QUEST

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## THE SPIRIT OF THE QUEST.<sup>1</sup>

EDMOND HOLMES, M.A.

WHAT does our Society stand for? This is the question which suggested itself to me when you did me the great honour of making me your president for the year which has just begun. The title of our Society is a provisional answer to this question. We are embarked on a quest, not on a missionary enterprise. We do not stand for proselytism or propagandism of any kind. We want our recruits to have the spirit of adventure, not of discipleship. We have no secret to confide to them, no theory to explain to them, no catechism to drill into them, no creed to present to them for acceptance. Or if we have a creed—and I think we have—it is not a form of words, but a living conviction, the conviction which has started us on our great adventure, the conviction which is implicit in the idea of the quest.

What is the object of our quest? Is it not ideal truth? On this point we are, I think, fairly agreed.

<sup>1</sup> A presidential address, read at an Open Meeting of the Quest Society, May 19, 1921.



But why have we thought it necessary to seek for ideal truth? Was not the truth of things authoritatively taught to us in our childhood? Was not the Will of God revealed to us, and a scheme of life, based on that revelation, set before us? Yes, it was; and that was why we had to embark on our quest. For we found, as we grew up, that there were many religions and that each of these had its own theory of things, its own interpretation of the Will of God, its own scheme of life. We realized that these could not all be—what they all pretended to be—divinely true. We realized that the religious faith which a man professes is in the main determined by the accident of his birth. We realized that creeds are many, but that ideal truth is one.

*“πολλαὶ μὲν θνητοῖς γλώσσαι, μία δ' ἀθανάτοισιν.”*

Mortals have many tongues—and therefore many creeds. The immortals have one.

There is a passage in one of the prose works of Lessing, the poet and critic, which our Society might, I think, adopt as its motto; “If God held enclosed in his right hand all truth and in his left hand simply the ever-moving impulse towards truth, although with the condition that I should eternally err, and said to me ‘Choose,’ I should humbly bend before his left hand and say: Father, give! Pure truth is for thee alone.”

Pure truth is for God alone. For pure truth is the subjective side, so to speak, of absolute reality, and God alone is absolutely real. And what the Real is in itself is known to the Real and to it alone. If man would attain to ideal truth he must try to rise to its level. He must cease to be phantasmal and must become more and more real. In other words, he must

try to find his true self. But this is a process to which there is no imaginable goal. It is an adventure into the infinite. It is an ascending 'series' in which there is no final term.

"And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond,  
Still leagues beyond those leagues there is more sea."

The effort to become one with the Real, and in doing so to attain to ideal truth, will be its own reward, but it will never compass its own apparent aim. The certainty of its failure is indeed the very measure of its success.

"Give her the glory of going on and still to be."

"You will enter the light but you will never touch the Flame."

Pure truth is for God alone. Does it follow that we who believe this, are a band of agnostics? Our orthodox friends will probably label us with this title and use it as a term of reproach. Have they the right to do so? Before we can answer this question we must come to an understanding with ourselves as to the meaning of the word 'agnostic.' For few words are more loosely used. There are at least four distinct brands of agnosticism. The *first* ought more properly to be called indifferentism. It is the mental, or rather temperamental, attitude of the worldling, the Gallio, the man who "cares for none of these things." Agnostics of this brand are to be reckoned by millions, but there are few of them who take the trouble to call themselves agnostics. For the word 'agnostic' is suggestive of some sort of an interest in great matters; and it is characteristic of the true worldling that such matters do not interest him in the slightest degree. The *second* brand is the agnosticism of the

man who takes an interest in great matters and yet contrives to keep his judgment about them in a state of complete suspense. Agnostics of this type are as rare as the proverbial snakes in Iceland. For though a man may profess entire neutrality in the sphere of high thinking and may even succeed in persuading himself that he is entirely neutral, it is certain that if he has ever seriously interested himself in the greatest of all problems, he inclines in his heart of hearts either towards the positive or the negative solution of it. This leads me to speak of the *third* brand of agnosticism. My own observation is that nine-tenths of those who call themselves agnostics are really negative dogmatists; men who, though professing entire neutrality, have really committed themselves, half consciously, half unconsciously, to the negative solution of the supreme problem. When such persons call themselves agnostics they usurp a title to which they have no just claim. The *fourth* brand is the agnosticism of unformulated faith. It is the attitude of the man who proves his faith in the Real by his unceasing quest of the Ideal; the man whose faith is so secure of itself that it does not ask for any sanction or guarantee, so strong that it breaks all the barrages and bursts all the dams in which dogmatism seeks to imprison it; the man who regards the pursuit of truth as its own goal and its own reward; the man who

“ Finds life's treasure in this endless quest,  
And peace of mind in infinite unrest.”

This is, I think, the only genuine brand of agnosticism. All the other brands are spurious. I will ask those who challenge this statement to go back with me to the root-meaning of the word

‘agnostic.’ The word was coined by the late Professor Huxley. It is compounded of the privative prefix *a* and the word *gnosticism*. The Gnostics seem to have been masters of the art of defining the undefinable, formulating the unformulatable, and pretending to know the unknowable. Such at least has been their reputation. It is probable that their enemies and detractors have done them less than justice. But that is a matter with which we need not concern ourselves. What is certain is that when Huxley coined the word ‘agnostic’ he regarded the ‘gnostics’ as the ultra-dogmatic exponents of religio-philosophical doctrines, and one may infer from this that the essence of agnosticism, as he conceived it, is antipathy to dogmatism and the dogmatic spirit, especially in the region of religious belief and speculative thought.

Why, then, it will be asked, are so many self-styled agnostics negative dogmatists? I think I can work out an answer to this question. I have said that no one who is interested in great matters can remain for more than a moment—a timeless moment—at the point of entire neutrality. From that point one must incline either towards the positive or the negative solution of the great problem. One must either take the path of submission, of trust, of aspiration, of hope—the path which leads at last to the everlasting Yea; or take the path of revolt, of mistrust, of cynicism, of despair—the path which leads at last to the everlasting No. Which path a man shall take will probably be decided for him by what I may call temperamental bias; but he is not the helpless victim of his own temperament, for if he realizes in what direction the chosen path is taking him, it will always be open to him to retrace his steps.

Has not the man who inclines towards the everlasting No as good a right to call himself an agnostic as the man who inclines towards the everlasting Yea? In theory, yes. In practice he seldom establishes his right. In theory Achilles never overtakes the tortoise. In practice he catches him in a few strides. If you make unity your starting point you can do one of two things. You can take the downward path of progressive division—by 2 let us say ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{1}{4}$ ,  $\frac{1}{8}$ ,  $\frac{1}{16}$ , etc.). Or you can take the upward path of progressive multiplication (2, 4, 8, 16, etc.). In the former case, the descent into the infinitesimal will in theory go on for ever, and its ideal goal, which we call *zero*, will never be reached. But all the time, zero is the next-door neighbour to unity, as near to it as 2 is, and it can be reached in practice, on the principle of *solvitur ambulando*, in a single step. If, on the other hand, you take the upward path, you may go on for ever and ever and yet never approach your goal; and since there is no short cut to infinity, as there is to zero, you must resign yourself, in practice as well as in theory, to an endless task. In like manner if, having started from the point of mental neutrality, you take the path of ultra-sceptical disbelief and denial, your root-assumption being that only what is ultimate in analysis is real, you will speedily arrive at the zero of dogmatic negation, and your agnosticism, if you continue to call yourself an agnostic, will be purely theoretical. In practice you will be more narrowly and rigidly dogmatic than you were before you abjured the dogmatism of orthodoxy. But if, on the other hand, starting from the same point, you take the path of trust and hope and imaginative desire, your root-assumption being that only what is ultimate in synthesis is real, you will find that your goal—the

everlasting Yea—recedes from you for ever and for ever, that you have committed yourself to a veritable adventure into the Infinite, and that you will remain agnostic to the very end.

How short is the journey from the imaginary point of mental neutrality to the goal of dogmatic negation, a simple experiment will suffice to prove. Ask the average self-styled agnostic what he thinks about such matters as immortality, spiritualism, re-incarnation, the reality of the spiritual world, the problem of the soul, the idea of the Divine, the moral government of the world, and the like,—and you will probably find that, far from having the tolerance and open-mindedness of genuine agnosticism, your agnostic's attitude is one of comprehensive denial, based on the prepossessions of commonplace materialism. You will find, in other words, that, with or without the consent of his consciousness, he has taken the short cut to the zero of dogmatic negation.

The truth is that the average sensuous, healthy, well-balanced man, though he may well be an idealist on the emotional plane, is a materialist, and therefore a dogmatist, on the mental plane of his life. "The solidarity," says a French psychologist, "of his superior psychism with his cerebral psychism being absolute, all the activities of the former are limited by the extent of the latter and restrained within its conditions." One result of this is that he instinctively takes for granted the self-existence of the world of appearances which surrounds him. The air of intrinsic reality which this outward and visible world wears overpowers him. He cannot resist it; and if he takes any interest in ultimate problems, it must needs control the whole current of his speculative thought. But his primary

postulate, that the world of appearances is self-existent and intrinsically real, is the central dogma in what is not so much a system of philosophy as a rigidly formulated but mainly negative creed. For denial of reality to whatever does not belong to the world of appearances is of the essence of materialism; and as such denial, being instinctive and irrational, is absolute and final, the passage from materialism to dogmatism takes less than a single step.

The man whose mind is in bondage to his brain, may accept without question or misgiving the dogmatism of supernatural religion, with which tradition, habit and formal teaching have familiarized him; but if he should find reason to reject that dogmatism, it is not agnosticism but the dogmatism of what is miscalled 'naturalism' that would take its place. For men of this type of mind need fixed and definite ideas even about things with regard to which, as Joubert has well said, "*toute précision est erreur.*" They have no wings; they cannot sustain themselves in the air; they must always feel solid ground beneath their feet. Joubert would have us "lie to them," as the only alternative to "deceiving them," fearing, I presume, lest if the dogmatism of religion were discredited in their eyes, they should pass on to the dogmatism of denial and revolt. His fear is well-grounded; but the time for following his advice is past.

Such persons, though they may call themselves agnostics—for the word, as they interpret it, means nothing more than departure from 'orthodoxy'—are, I repeat, temperamentally averse from agnosticism. The mental unrest of the genuine agnostic, the unrest which is the counterpart of mobility of thought, is a state of mind which they do not understand. There

is no need for them to keep their judgment in suspense with regard to the ultimate mysteries of existence. For, if the truth must be told, they doubt whether there are such mysteries. What is ultimate, as it seems to them, is not particularly mysterious. In their orthodox days the super-naturalistic explanation of the universe seemed quite reasonable. Now that those days are over, the mechanistic explanation, which is a comparatively simple affair, contents them, and they do not care to look beyond it. In the words of the French psychologist whom I have already quoted, "to them everything is relatively simple because they avoid going to the bottom of anything."

The quest on which our Society has embarked appeals to minds of a different type from this. The true seeker is, as I have already suggested, the only genuine agnostic. For he realizes, as no one else does, that one of the first qualifications for the quest of ideal truth is freedom from bondage to those religious and quasi-philosophical dogmas which block the windows of the soul and shut out the rays of divine light. To realize this is to clear the way for the greatest of all adventures. The genuine agnostic is the only true seeker, the only duly chartered adventurer into the mysterious and the unknown. For the words of the *Kena Upanishad* are eternally true. God, who is supreme reality and therefore ideal truth,

"Is unknown to whoso think they know,  
But known to whoso know they know him not."

And so, if our orthodox friends reproach us with our agnosticism, let us tell them that we admit the impeachment, but that we glory in what they regard as our shame.



I have said that when a man quits the imaginary point of mental neutrality, he must incline (if he does not relapse into pure indifferentism) towards either the positive or the negative solution of the great problem. That we incline towards the positive solution goes without saying. We have taken the path of faith, of hope, of spiritual desire. In doing so we have in a sense prejudged the issue of our quest, prejudged it in the sense hinted at by Pascal when he said: "You would not have sought me if you had not already found me." For we know beforehand that there will be no issue to the quest. We know that in pursuing it we shall lose ourselves in the infinite and the ideal. We cannot help that. We must be true to the vital impulse that has set us seeking. For why have we embarked on this high adventure? What is our ultimate motive? It is not the desire for success, for achievement. We know at the outset that we shall never reach our goal. Still less is it the desire for possession. We know that we shall never be able to imprison ideal truth in a system or a creed. What is it then? Is it not the desire for expansion, for growth, for self-transcendence, for freedom in the true sense of the word, for escape from the prison-house of self?

Why did dogmatism, whether positive or negative, content us in the days when we were in bondage to it? What is the strength of dogmatism? Why is negative dogmatism so ready to claim us as its votaries when positive dogmatism has been discredited by the advance of knowledge and critical thought. I have given the psychological—or shall I say the psycho-physiological?—answer to the latter question. I will now give the ethical answer to the larger question. The strength of dogmatism lies in this, that it ministers to two desires

which are common to all of us, but which it is our mission to transmute or otherwise outgrow—the desire for possession and the desire for repose.

The secret desire of the average man is to become the possessor of a cut-and-dried theory of things, including a solution of the problem of his own meaning and destiny and an explanation of the origin and purpose of the universe,—a theory, set forth in doctrinal form, which he can accept as authoritative and final, and can then lock away, so to speak, in a place of safety, feeling free thenceforth to devote himself, without any mental misgiving or *arrière pensée*, to secular pursuits. The various Churches minister to this desire by providing their votaries with formulated creeds. A price has to be paid for this service. The authority of the Church must be duly recognized, its teaching must be accepted without question and its commands must be obeyed. But the price will be gladly paid by one who desires to be put in possession of ultimate truth instead of having to win it, or try to win it, for himself—one who shrinks from the strenuous labour of high thinking and the wear and tear of mental unrest.

The desire for possession is, however, insatiable. It is not enough for the believer to have proprietary rights in ultimate truth. He must also have proprietary rights in the fountain-head of ultimate truth, in the supernatural God, whose revelation of his will has determined the boundaries of truth and error, of right and wrong. He must feel that he belongs to a community which enjoys the special favour and grace of God,—to a chosen people, a chosen church, a chosen sect, or even a chosen remnant of the elect. He must feel that God is on his side, that God's enemies are his enemies, or rather—for this proposition is all too easily

'converted'—that his enemies are God's enemies, and in particular that whoever would deny or even cast doubt upon his creed, is not only a robber who seeks to deprive him of his most cherished possession and his peace of mind, but is also a rebel against God. When he has persuaded himself of this, he will be ready to take his base desires and his evil passions—his selfishness, his self-will, his ambition, his greed, his love of power, his envy, his hatred, his intolerance—and solemnly dedicate these to the service of God.

For in truth the desire for certitude in the sphere of high thinking, the desire for the immediate possession of ideal truth instead of for the eternal pursuit of it, the desire for a repose which shall never be broken instead of for the toil of an ascent which shall never end,—though it may disguise itself behind such names as obedience, humility, faith, piety, religious devotion, and the like,—is all the time a prompting of the old Adam, the lower self. At the root of it is the besetting weakness of our undeveloped nature, egoism, in a word,—the desire to rest in self for good and all; to avoid at whatever cost the 'growing pains' of self-transcendence; to press all things, to press God himself, into the service of self; to make the individual life co-terminous with the universal, not by expanding the former but by contracting the latter; to silence the ideal, with its insistent demand for devotion and service, by confining it within the limits of the actual; in fine, to achieve salvation by any method but that of out-growing and transforming self.

It is the desire to rest in self—the ordinary, familiar, superficial self, the

“Finished and finite clod untroubled by a spark,”

that generates the fierce antipathy to the psychic and the occult, the haunting dread of the infinite and the ideal, which are characteristic of the average, hard-headed, commonsensical man, who shrinks with terror, one might almost say, from whatever is mysterious and inexplicable, fearing in some secret recess of his consciousness lest it should enlarge the horizon of his thought, break in upon the slumber of his soul, and force him to reconsider his whole outlook on life.

It is a reproach to supernatural religion that, through the definite dogmatic teaching on which it prides itself, it has ministered in all times and places to the spiritual indolence of the average man, to his demand for certitude about great matters, a demand which is the outcome, as we have seen, of two ignobly selfish desires—for possession and for repose. In ministering to this demand, in pandering to the love of finality, in discouraging the spirit of high adventure, supernaturalism has done much to retard and even arrest the development of man's higher nature; so much indeed that it may be doubted if this one disservice does not outweigh all the services that it has rendered to the cause of human progress. Let physical science, with its quasi-professional prejudice in favour of exact knowledge, and its leaning (in the sphere of philosophy) to negative dogmatism, take care that it does not pander to the same human weakness and incur the same reproach.

To find an antidote to the subtle poison of dogmatism is the purpose of the quest. For what does the quest of ideal truth demand of its votaries? In the first place, strenuous and many-sided mental endeavour. In this sentence the word 'many-sided' is all important. To entrust the treatment of the

supreme problem to reason alone, in the narrower sense of the word, would be equivalent to asking for a materialistic solution of it. For reason functions best when it is dealing with the data of the bodily senses, in other words when it is investigating the phenomena and determining the laws of the material world. Therefore to assume that reason is competent to solve the problem of ultimate reality implies the further assumption that the material world is all in all. But if the material world were all in all the quest would have ended before it had begun, ended where the rationalistic free-thinker so often ends—in the zero of dogmatic negation. The higher reason is not wholly rational; or rather it is not wholly intellectual. Hard thinking, as we call it, may enable us to explore the mysteries of mathematics, of physics, of chemistry, of physiology. But when larger and deeper problems challenge us, and when the verification by observation and experiment which physical science demands becomes impossible, conscious thought needs for its own sake to be supplemented by 'sub-conscious' vision; and the name for this is intuition.

The estrangement of reason from intuition is one of the greatest calamities that have befallen the human spirit. And it is a calamity for which religious dogmatism, by its virtual proscription of reason and its demand for blind and literal obedience, has been largely responsible. We owe it to this unhappy estrangement that rationalism is so often indistinguishable from materialism, that the pursuit of truth is so often a mere formality, and the issue of it so often a foregone conclusion. This on the one hand; and on the other hand that mysticism is so often irrational and unconvincing, an upsurging from the

depths of the unconscious, which does not submit itself to the control of reason, and therefore cannot transmute itself, or even begin to transmute itself, into conscious thought.

It is not by retiring into seclusion—the seclusion of a laboratory or a study or a cell—that we shall be able to solve the insoluble problem of ultimate reality. It is by living our lives in the outward as well as in the inward world. Intuition is a moral as well as a mental faculty. It reflects one's character and is continuously modified by one's manner of living. A French moralist has well said that "our taste declines with our merit." The range of taste, as the word is used in this sentence, is unlimited; and as judgment—the power of discriminating between the real and the unreal, the true and the false—is an essential element in taste, it behoves us, if we would train our judgment aright, and so purify our taste and clarify our vision, to try to live wisely and well. "You will fail least in your judgments," says Epictetus, "if you yourself fail least in your life." In nine cases out of ten a man's philosophy is the quasi-rational expression of a temperamental bias. If this is so, and if conduct reacts, as it certainly does, on temperament, it may well be that a man's way of living, though from one point of view the outcome of his way of thinking, is from another the main factor in the evolution of his speculative thought.

It will need but a moment's reflection to convince us that the quest of ideal truth is a moral and a spiritual even more than an intellectual effort. The seeker must bring an open mind to his task, or he will have prejudged the issue of it in his manner of approaching it. We know from experience how fatally the advance-

ment of knowledge in all fields and in all ages has been hindered by the blind prejudice which has its roots in self-love. And what is true of knowledge in general is still truer of that knowledge of ultimate reality which is the goal of our quest. The seeker must think of ideal truth, not as a treasure to be discovered and appropriated and paraded, but as a far-off orb of light to which there are as many paths as there are rays that emanate from it, paths that are ever tending to come together and melt into one another, in proportion as those who follow them, having learnt the great lesson of mutual tolerance, come nearer and nearer to the central flame. For open-mindedness has tolerance as its other self; and tolerance is a great virtue in which a score of other virtues are potentially present. Much of what St. Paul says in praise of charity might with almost equal fitness be predicated of tolerance. Tolerance "suffereth long and is kind"; tolerance "envieth not"; tolerance "vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." Tolerance "never faileth." I am thinking, I need hardly say, of the positive, the active tolerance of the lover of truth, not of the merely negative tolerance of the Gallio. The word tolerance may seem to savour of negativeness and passivity; but when we remind ourselves how terrible a power for evil is intolerance, how fiercely egoistic it is, how ruthlessly cruel, for what horrors it has been responsible, how active a principle it has been of division and strife, we shall realize that its opposite is, in potency if not in actual achievement, a mighty power

for good. Tolerance, sympathy, love—these are the three chief stages in the ascent of the soul to the throne of God. And tolerance is, I repeat, the other self of open-mindedness, being indeed the openness of heart, without which openness of mind cannot sustain itself for more than a passing season. It follows that to keep the open mind which the quest of ideal truth imperatively demands, if the quest is not to abort owing to the seeker caring more for himself than for truth; involves an arduous moral effort which must never be relaxed.

The truth is that the movement towards the ideal is a movement, not of the mind only, but of the whole higher nature of man. This is a truth on which mystics and occultists have always laid the utmost stress. The mystic will tell you that knowledge of ultimate truth is not to be achieved except through consciousness of God, and that consciousness of God is the reward of absolute purity of heart. And the occultist will tell you that only by systematic self-discipline, self-culture and self-transcendence can a man realize his latent capacity for reading the memory of Nature and so penetrating the deeper mysteries of her being. In principle, the mystic and the occultist are surely right. "*La vérité*," says Joubert, "*Dieu seul la voit. C'est en cela que consiste la vérité. Elle consiste à concevoir ou à imaginer les personnes et les choses comme Dieu les voit.*" To see things as they are is to see them as God sees them, to see them, as it were, through the eyes of God. This is ideal truth. This and nothing less than this is the goal of our quest. The goal is unapproachable and unimaginable. Yet the way to it cannot be mistaken. It is the way of never-ending self-development, of the never-ending expansion and



illumination of consciousness, of the never-ending endeavour to become one with God.

The social aspect of the quest is a theme on which there is much to be said. I cannot do more than briefly indicate its importance. When our Society was formed we realized that we, its members, had different ways of thinking about the problems that attracted us, and therefore, if the Society was to prosper or even endure, that we must learn the lesson of mutual tolerance. As we learned this lesson we realized further that the spirit of tolerance is an active principle of unity in diversity and therefore a potent bond of social union and cohesion. We realized the truth of the saying that "each man is to himself absolutely the way, the truth and the life." But we also realized the truth of the counter-saying that "the united spirit of life is one's only true self." If the whole human race could become such a society, I think we might at last begin to hope for the advent of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Ever since the world began, intolerance in matters of opinion has been one of the chief hindrances to our social evolution, one of the most fruitful sources of disharmony, disunion and open strife. And ever since the Jews took it into their heads that they were God's chosen people, religious intolerance has been the curse and scourge of the whole Western and near-Eastern World. Think of the Catholic Church claiming a monopoly of God's grace and favour and virtually excommunicating the rest of mankind. Think of the Arab conquerors of Western Asia and Northern Africa giving the conquered peoples their choice between the Koran and the sword. Think of the thousand years' war between the Crescent and the Cross. Think of the hideous massacres of the Albigenses. Think of the

horrors of the Inquisition in Spain. Think of the wholesale burning of heretics being counted an 'act of faith.' Think of what the religious wars did to France in the sixteenth century. Think of what the Thirty Years' war did to Germany in the seventeenth. Think of Moslems massacring their enemies, as the Turk to-day massacres the Armenian, to the honour and glory of God. And the worst of religious intolerance is that it affects the whole character, that it generates an intolerant disposition, that it makes men dogmatic, self-assertive and self-centred, that it raises to a high power the selfishness of the natural man, and that it easily overflows into the channels of politics and social and economic life. What hope is there of peace on earth and goodwill among men until men can teach themselves the lesson of mutual tolerance—not the tolerance of indifference, but the tolerance of sympathy and understanding—in the various spheres of opinion, and above all in the sphere of ultimate belief? And what chance is there of their mastering this lesson until they have learned to subordinate devotion to their own creeds and churches and war-cries and parties to devotion to ideal truth?

Let us, in conclusion, ask ourselves one searching question. What will be the reward of the seeker? Not the possession of ideal truth. He left that unworthy desire behind him when he embarked on the quest. Not to possess, but to be possessed; to be lost in the infinitude of the Ideal; to be lost in the light of the Divine. Not repose; for that dream too he left behind him at the outset. Not repose, but in its stead the peace which passeth all understanding, the peace of unending movement, of infinite unrest. The path of the quest is the path of eternal failure; but eternal

failure, just because it never accepts defeat, is the only real success, the only success that can never pall.

“Things won are done; joy’s soul lies in the doing.”

If our joy is to endure, our doing must always fall short of achievement. The path of the quest is also the path of unending self-development, of unending growth, of an unending ascent of the arch of life, an ascent which never reaches its meridian. It is the path, in fine, of immortal youth. For all these reasons, which readily merge into one, the quest of ideal truth is, and will always be, its own reward.

EDMOND HOLMES.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINING.

BERTRAM KEIGHTLEY, M.A.

THE author of *Divine Imagining*<sup>1</sup> describes it as a 'continuation of the experiment' begun in his *The World as Imagination*, which was reviewed in these pages several years ago. But while it certainly is that, the reader will actually find it a good deal more. Mr. Fawcett has set himself the difficult task of giving in a short, handy book a lucid, comprehensive and coherent outline of the Philosophy of Imaginism propounded in his larger work, stripped of all side-issues, detailed criticism of other systems and views, and of everything that could add to the reader's difficulty or labour in obtaining a clear grasp of the essentials of his system, its fundamental standpoint and outlook. This the author has accomplished with remarkable success; but it must have cost him an enormous amount of very hard work. The reader will profit thereby, but will not realise the labour involved; for the style is so brilliant and easy that even a beginner in philosophy, or indeed in serious study of any kind, can read it through from cover to cover with an interest that does not flag.

As to the better read student of philosophy, the more acquainted he becomes with it, the more will

<sup>1</sup> *Divine Imagining: An Essay on the First Principles of Philosophy: Being a Continuation of the Experiment which took shape first in 'The World as Imagination,'* by Douglas Fawcett. London (Macmillan); pp. 249; 15s. net.

he find how deep a basis of solid matter and of hard thinking underlies the clear-flowing stream of the exposition.

It must not be supposed, however, that the contents are simply a re-statement of the matter in *The World as Imagination*. The contrary is true. Mr. Fawcett's present work contains much that is fresh: original *aperçus*, telling arguments not used before, and more than one new idea or insight of great value. Among these is one of fundamental importance: the novel concept and term '*consciring*.' The elaboration of this concept, no less than the selection of the term to express it, is one of the notable novelties and forward steps in this Philosophy of Imaginism. Both concept and term aim at rendering clearer and more explicit what was spoken of in the earlier work as the active or creative aspect of the Cosmic Imagination or Divine Imagining.

In ordinary usage we say we are aware of, are conscious of emotions (love, hatred, anger, fear and so forth), of thoughts (clear or confused, pleasant or the reverse, noble or base), of actions, of sensations, of objects and things in the world we call external. Now these words—awareness, consciousness—are apt to carry with them an implication of passivity, of pure receptivity, as though awareness or consciousness were simply a passively yielding surface which receives or reflects what comes to it. But this is not true; not even a half-truth. Indeed the very opposite is the fact. For consciousness or awareness belongs truly to the active, creative aspect of Divine Imagining, is indeed the very essence of that aspect itself; is, as Mr. Fawcett puts it, "*the conscious energy of the universe, that which at once conserves, creates and*

grasps together all contents." If this is realized, it is better then to use a new word, free from the associations and implications that cling about the terms 'awareness' and 'consciousness.' Hence the adoption or invention of 'consciring.' 'Consciring' is the infinite divine activity, akin to the *energeia akinēsia* of Aristotle. It is an activity awaring, grasping together, actively conscious of *all* content, creating, sustaining, destroying and renewing.

Its reflection in our human experience is what psychologists have termed 'attention,' and like attention consciring is capable of re-distribution and of concentration. It is moreover the source and root of all 'quantity,' and signifies the active, creative aspect of that Divine Imagining, the other aspect of which is *content*. And now we reach the portal to Imaginal Philosophy. Having thus disposed of the preliminaries, I will proceed to give a brief outline of the structure.

Imaginism is the view that the world-principle resembles most nearly that phase of our human experience which we call imagining, conservative and creative. The exposition seeks to test this statement in the light of the facts of nature and sentient life.

The first chapter contains a brief statement of the book's thesis—the Imaginal Hypothesis. Chap. ii. deals with what Mr. Fawcett terms the negative vindication of the hypothesis, and consists of an exceedingly condensed, but clear and telling, examination and refutation of various competing solutions of the world-riddle which are or have been current, and of which the central weakness, the fatal defect or flaw in each, is skilfully probed. Chapter iii. discusses the positive vindication of the hypothesis and tersely sets forth the leading claims which are made in favour of Imaginism

as compared with other standpoints and philosophical outlooks. Sixteen in all are formulated, offering solutions of the riddles of Truth, Time, Space, Causation and Chance, as well as other vital problems.

These three chapters may be said to form a sort of General Introduction to Imaginism and lead up to the core and substance of the exposition in the six following chapters. These again fall naturally into two sets of three each. Chapters iv., v. and vi. are occupied with the discussion and exposition of the central idea—Divine Imagining itself. Chapters vii., viii. and ix. deal with world-evolution under the titles: 'The Evolution of World-Systems,' 'The World-System before the Metaphysical Fall,' and 'The Evolution of Nature.' The xth and last chapter treats of God and the Gods. It is in some ways the most original in the book.

In addition there are some ten pages of appendix, dealing rather more in detail with important topics only touched upon briefly in the course of the exposition. These too will be found valuable and suggestive.

Having thus given some general idea of the book I turn to some solutions of special problems which seem novel or illuminative, and to the wide inspiring outlooks that give to Imaginism its fascination.

Let us take first the well-worn problem of Causation, which has been a leading *crux* of Philosophy at all times and has been debated by generation after generation of thinkers from Hume, Kant and Mill down to the present day. Nor has the problem of Causation worried philosophical thinkers only; in Science, during the last thirty years, it has demanded and received an almost equal amount of attention

from the foremost workers in various departments. Nevertheless in Science, no less than in Philosophy proper, an adequate and satisfactory solution is still to seek. Indeed more than one leading thinker in the ranks of Science has practically given up the problem in despair and taken refuge in declaring that it is not the business of Science to discover 'causes' in the proper sense of the term, but simply to formulate 'rules of sequence,' that is statements of the order in which events or phenomena follow one another.

The central difficulty in the problem may perhaps be expressed by saying that both Philosophy and Science alike have so far failed to discover or adequately to formulate what the older thinkers sometimes spoke of as the '*causa causans*' or *active, operative* agency or power, linking each step in the causal sequence to the next. This is of course a very rough and generalized statement; but it may serve to bring into focus the vital point where Imaginal Philosophy achieves one of its remarkable steps in advance. It holds that in every instance of causation the *causa causans* is a fresh, spontaneous, imaginal creative *act*. Such 'acts' tend to repeat themselves, to become habitual, and so to express the conservative or sustaining factor of Imaginal process. Thus we get the regular 'sequences' which Science formulates as 'laws'—not in reality 'eternal and necessary,' but of sufficient 'duration' and conservative stability to meet all our demands for regularity and possibility of prediction.

It may be desirable to give a couple of concrete examples, so as to bring out more clearly what is meant. For instance, when Hydrogen and Oxygen 'combine' to form water, as Chemistry teaches us, according to the formula  $H_2O$ , when an electric spark



is passed through a mixture of the two gases *in the presence of the slightest trace of water-vapour*, we have a typical case of 'scientific causation.' Now Science holds that all these factors—and countless others not specifically mentioned—are 'conditions' for the formation of 'water.' But no one of them, not even the spark, can—scientifically speaking—be treated as the *causa causans*, or if you like 'the producer of the event, which is the formation of water.' Imaginism holds that this *causa causans* is in every instance a recurrent creative imaginal act: 'spontaneous and free' when it happened for the *first* time, but crystallized by conservative habit into a perdurable routine, now so unchanging and invariable as to receive brevet rank at the hands of Science as a 'law of nature.'

Or take another type of causation: the production of a work of Art—say Shelley's *Sensitive Plant*. All the elements involved in the completed poem might be analysed out and they probably existed, one and all of them, before the poem. But the *fusion* of them into a whole, into a work of Art, into that particular poem, is a *creative, imaginal act*, so obviously so indeed that no one dreams of denying it. But in essence it is really only an example of what is always going on everywhere; an instance of what 'causation' really means; an illustration of that creative Divine Imagining, whereof we ourselves, the world and the many worlds around and about us are the offspring.

In connection with the topic of Causation, it may be of interest to note that its true nature exhibits itself conspicuously in the solutions of the conflicts which arise in the historical aspect of the world-process; these solutions being sometimes very stable and conservative, sometimes short-lived and unbalanced. And

this struggle or strife between the opposing tendencies towards conservation on one side and novelty on the other may everywhere be traced and recognized; for example in racial history, where both factors or aspects display themselves on the grand scale.

There is a point which is sometimes overlooked, but which is often of importance. It is that Causation is—or rather particular series of causal sequences are—definitely finite and terminable; as for instance Shelley's poem. It had a beginning: it was 'created'; but now it is 'made,' terminated and finished. Each of us of course assimilates it afresh; but as a 'creation' it *is* and *remains*.

In *Divine Imagining*, as in its predecessor, a good deal of space is devoted to the discussion of Causation and the problems intertwined with it, especially to the interplay of Conservation and Creation. Even for the general reader these discussions should be attractive and interesting owing to the quality and the style and the frequent use of concrete illustrations. Indeed this portion of the work impresses me as being exceptionally well carried through.

Attention must be called also to one or two more essentially philosophical topics upon which Imaginism sheds a brilliant light. Among such Time and Space stand out prominently. The way they are dealt with renders both the problems themselves and the solutions proposed much more accessible and easy to grasp than their previous treatment in *The World as Imagination*. The line of thought along which the 'absolute homogeneous time' of Newton and the mathematicians is exhibited in its true character as being purely a 'command concept,' is a notable advance, as likewise is the solution of the riddle of

Time-succession. Yet another standing puzzle of Philosophy—the problem of Universals—also receives treatment that is both fresh and stimulating.

Before passing on a word of praise should be given to the bold way in which the author has faced, squarely and frankly, one of the greatest difficulties which confront every attempt on Idealist-realist lines to treat both the 'One' and the 'Many' as *equally* real, and to reconcile the Changeless with the Changing.

It is precisely in dealing with such issues and *what they involve* that so many writers, especially of the Absolutist and the Materio-mechanical schools, resort to devices of intellectual *camouflage* wholly unworthy of their theme and most misleading to their readers. Mr. Fawcett takes no part in this game of hide-and-seek. The same remark applies to the problem of the Conservation of the Past, in respect of which a remarkable conclusion is arrived at—namely that the Past, that which has happened, can be destroyed, transformed and beautified, as well as conserved. Though it is also given in the previous work, it here emerges in connection with the discussion of *how* Divine Imagining possesses the Past in a striking and illuminative manner.

Chapters vii. and viii. form a sort of transition from metaphysics pure and simple to a kind of cosmogenesis. They deal with the more abstract aspects of the Evolution of World-systems and with the World-system before the Metaphysical Fall. Comparing them with the treatment of the same topics in *The World as Imagination*, there is a good deal which is fresh and novel, though the general outline remains the same, while more than one point which was left obscure or uncertain in the previous work has

been given clarity and definiteness. An illustration of this is found in §5, where the author adopts quite definitely the view of the Hellenic Platonists and Neo-Platonists, that the phenomenal order as a whole is without beginning, though every one of the perhaps infinitely many phenomenal orders or world-systems of which this order consists has a beginning and an end. Each such system is 'created' or 'evolved'; it passes into the sphere of the phenomenal—or time-process—and passes out again. This passage is a sundering, an exclusion, from the concrete unity of Divine Imagining. It is the insulation of a sub-whole, which becomes so to say 'encysted.' This conception of the 'encystment' of a world-system, particularly in its early stages, is of great value and importance, notably in relation to the problem of Evil. And it must be remembered that by 'world-system' here the author does not mean our little solar system simply as known to us, but the entire 'stellar universe' to which our solar system belongs, with all the worlds and levels, visible and invisible, which pertain thereto.

The discussion of the Initial Situation which opens chapter viii. is decidedly clearer and more effective than in Mr. Fawcett's previous work. Here again important points are brought out with additional sharpness, rendering one's understanding of what he means by 'the Grand Imaginal' far more definite and helpful. One such point is that the Grand Imaginal as it is conscired and upheld in Divine Imagining prior to its 'Fall' into creative evolution may be present *only as content*, just as a poem might be present to a human sustaining fancy. "*It comprises at first no sentient*"; though indefinitely many will appear therein hereafter. And it is just the arising of those sentient

which begets the entire imaginal dynamic, whence proceeds causation in Nature.

The Grand Imaginal is "the field of the primitive imaginals, which differ from one another radically; it comprises the manifold elements by which the creative achievement of the world-process is conditioned: the original plan embodied in the contents themselves as the *manner in which they conspire to harmonious unity*." These are the real primitive existents, 'independent of causation,' of which Mill spoke.

The Grand Imaginal "is not a concept. *i.e.* a substitute fact which stands for, is 'of' or 'about' a reality *other than itself*." It is itself a reality—reality having the concrete richness for which we have to look to perception and not to any abstracting intellectualism—and it is as concretely present to Divine Imagining as a mountain range, or wide view over the plains below it, might be to you and me. Elaborating this theme, the author points to a theory of imaginals as possibly attainable, at least to some extent, and illustrates the real, concrete character of an imaginal in the case of that of colour.

It should specially be noted that while the Initial System or Grand Imaginal 'expresses statically an immanent design,' its 'equilibrium' is *not* mechanical, but is a spiritual harmony, characterized by the divinity of measure. Conflict, supervening on this primal harmony, owing to intensification of conspiring in the Divine Imagining, gives birth to 'sentients' and ushers in creative evolution. It is the unceasing effort *within* the time-process to restore this broken harmony, in alternations of creative and conservative phases, which constitutes the imaginal dynamic of the world-process. And this unrest of the causal imaginal

dynamic continues, in general and in detail, with innumerable alternations, rests and partial harmonizations, until a new and fully harmonious state of the entire system is reached—constituting the ‘divine event,’ or perfect *imaginal solution* of the conflict which broke the primal harmony.

The treatment of Nature and the Creative Appulse in the opening pages of chapter ix. is both terse and telling; but the important point is the way in which that partial abdication of the Divine Imagining, which alone makes possible the arising of sentient insulates from one another, is dealt with, and the straightforward answers given to the ever-recurring question as to the Why of this abdication. The answer suggested is that Divine Imagining in the fulness of its Delight, Love and Beauty, creates, as a lark sings, out of the depth and intensity of its Joy.

In connection with the Creative Appulse new stress is laid upon *thresholds of consciousness*, varying as the consciring appulse intensifies the contents that it sustains, variously and in varied content-regions within the Grand Imaginal, thus producing thresholds of diverse levels and degrees, so creating ‘sentients’ or psychical agents, whose ‘sciring’ insulates them in a way within the parent system. The working-out of this treatment suggests that what we call ‘death’ is simply the temporary relapse of that content-consciring we call the waking-self into the relatively pure content-phase—that is, the condition in which it is only content for some higher order of consciring, but does not itself conscire as a unitary whole. But the task of dealing with the Individual and his psychology is reserved for a future work.

A new suggestion in connection with the evolution

of Space is mooted in this chapter, which has probably been suggested by recent books and discussions on the 'Space-Time' manifold of four dimensions which Einstein has brought into such prominence. In *The World as Imagination* Space is regarded as a definite invention of the Cosmic Imagination subsequent to the Creative Appulse and the birth of the World-process. Mr. Fawcett here suggests that this may not be ultimately correct and that Space is not originated *within* the Time-process, but pre-existed germinally in some manner in the Grand Imaginal. In the earlier work it was regarded as an imaginally modified Time-simultaneity; but it may be urged that the primitive form of content in this regard which we ought to suppose, is not Time, but rather Time-Space. As Mr. Fawcett observes, however, even the space-aspect of Time-Space would not be the full-blown co-existence of positions as noted in Nature, and therefore in any case co-existence will remain as one of the early triumphs of the imaginal dynamic. Other significant points are briefly discussed and their interpretation or significance for Imaginism pointed out, and the chapter closes with two telling and pointed notes on Dissociation and Motion.

The 'xth and last chapter is perhaps the most fascinating of all. It deals with 'God and the Gods' in a way that I venture to think will be found refreshing and stimulating, no less than religiously helpful and valuable to many. The treatment of the subject is of exceptional merit; for, while perfectly frank and outspoken, it is remarkably free from subconscious and still more from camouflaged prejudices and prejudgments. Such assumptions as are made are clearly indicated; there is no attempt to confuse

issues or mask difficulties; while at the same time there is an entire absence of theological bias on the one side and of anti-spiritual preconceptions on the other.

The discussion starts from the presumption, basic in Imaginism, that all action in the worlds 'presupposes sentient,' and these sentients are of super-human as well as sub-human grades. So much can safely be assumed, and even so much, general as it is, opens far-reaching vistas of great, even of practically human, importance. But the very greatest care is indispensable in applying this view to *each and every* particular belief about them, or every case in which their action is suspected or believed in. The author inclines to believe that human sentients probably belong to very lowly levels, and that at the extreme near which *we* lie, the *detached sentient* is simply in process of growth, while at the other extreme, it merges *at its own good pleasure* and to the end of self-realisation into a fulness beyond itself. He suggests that the higher powers, even of this world-system, may be above the life of insulated personality; may be 'coalesced existences' as superior to persons as the tree is to the cells of which it is composed. "The higher conscious powers of our world-system—I do not say of minor worlds such as the solar system and its unseen complementary levels—are perhaps not separate persons, but enjoy a being which comprises associated agents. Just as in my experience I grasp very many contents, so a power of this sort may grasp and include very many conscious centres along with its contents. It would hardly be possible to reach any exalted stage of conscious life, unless the one-sidedness of the insulated agent is to be surmounted in this way"; for insulated personality



implies grievous limitation and defect. Such higher sentients may be—and *are*—many, and we may well call them, as they have been called in the past, ‘gods,’ reserving the term God for the supreme coalesced society of sentients of our world-system; for God is thus Himself insulated (seeing that He is the God of a particular world-system and not, one may be sure, inclusive of all the sentients or contents within it). In this view ‘God’ is regarded as result rather than cause of the world-process; for the starting-point of the world-process, the Grand Imaginal, as was duly pointed out above, was not assumed to be conscious *for* itself, and beings ‘conscious for themselves’ in their own right were regarded as created by the intensified consciring which gives the appulse to the metaphysical Fall, *after* that Fall has occurred.

But another view is possible. Although the Grand Imaginal is sustained by Divine Imagining, it may be—and there seems to be no metaphysical difficulty barring the way—that this region of Its content, this Grand Imaginal, ought to be regarded as *primitively* a conscious whole, as existing *for itself* as well as for Divine Imagining. Then—as Mr. Fawcett eloquently puts it—“the metaphysical fall could be regarded as *literally* the temporary vanishing of Osiris who is to be resurrected to renewed conscious life in the form of the evolved God. In this case the consciring or conscious energy, which is Osiris, might be conceived as redistributed so as to give birth to the new sentients. . . . But at the same time the ‘energy’ deserts Osiris, who, on this showing, is sacrificed or sacrificing Himself to the end of creation; a love passing human imitation being implied. He sinks into division and conflict, but, as one safe within Divine Imagining, to be raised anew

to glory, enriched with all that creation shall bring. It is at this cost that the great eternal spirit is to rejoice in those He loves."

In bringing together these alternative views we have passed over several striking pages to which one would like to return did space permit. But other important matters remain to be touched upon. These will best emerge in the form of a few quotations, which perhaps under the circumstances may be permitted.

Reverting to the sacrifice of Osiris, note that it is not of the type which renounces for renouncing's sake. It is to issue in fulness and richness of living *for all concerned*—for Osiris grown greater still. "It is on the belief in the continuance of individuals, in the plurality of their lives and in their eventual confluence in a divine society—in the God of joy and love who rises sublimely out of the world-process—that the hopes of humanity depend. The creeds, made in stuffy professorial studies, which deny the individual's persistence after physical death, are not only ludicrously, fatuously untrue; in a practical regard they foredoom all the great schemes of social betterment to failure and menace moral, economic, political, artistic, religious, and philosophical interests alike with a common ruin. . . . Nothing but a larger hope, established on sure intellectual foundations, and fortified, where possible, by empirical verification, will bear us successfully through the struggles to come."

"A mere repopularisation of belief in a future life will not, however, suffice; there is nothing of value in the mere fact of survival, which pessimists might admit and regard as, in the long run, a disaster. . . . That individuals survive death may be considered now as proved empirically; but the *value* of this truth

remains problematical and has yet to be appraised in the dry light of philosophy. For the merely spiritistic outlook on life is totally inadequate to what meliorism, based on philosophical insight, must require."

"The outlook magnificent of the Imaginal Hypothesis is needful. My life is a series of adventures, for which this earth, the Borderland, provides episodes; it is a romance, passing the creativeness of poet or novelist, which brings me ever nearer to the dazzling conscious life of God. All that I have dreamed about wisdom, truth and beauty is nothing beside that experience in its concrete, mobile splendour. Questions as to the value of life cannot arise in that region: their answers, one might say, are presented in fact.

"Those who have enjoyed experiences, rare but illuminative beyond cavil, of one of the higher levels of conscious life, will readily understand what I mean. Beyond God, again, lies the ocean of the infinite. Our sails cannot be spread to its winds, but the mystery of its possibilities is upon us and as God we shall look forth on its glory and its beauty undismayed."

This is a real book, not simply a collocation of paper and ink. It should appeal strongly to a public very much wider than the comparatively restricted circle of those who are specially interested in Philosophy. To many readers of *THE QUEST* it should be of deep interest; for most students of Comparative Religion, no less than those whose special tastes incline towards so-called 'Occultism,' to Psychical enquiry and still more towards Mysticism, must often have felt the urgent need for a philosophical basis which will really and effectively serve as a foundation for their particular studies. This they will find, if I mistake not, in the book before me.

BERTRAM KEIGHTLEY.

## THE NON-HISTORICITY SOLUTION.<sup>1</sup>

Rev. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D.

WITH the earliest Gospel neither death nor resurrection from death was connected, except of course in the symbolic way in which those who accepted this Gospel were spiritually raised from death, were cured from blindness, were brought home from the far country, were cured of leprosy, saved from sin, the sin of idolatry. That is to say, the earliest Gospel—Proto-Christianity—was not the appearance of a man or a God-man who taught, gathered disciples about him and died and rose again. All that is the growth of a later day when the pristine beauty of the earliest Gospel had begun to fade. No, it was an Idea, a Doctrine, the Good News about the One Eternal God in the Aspect or Person of Saviour. The notion of an individual, and of the death and resuscitation from death of that individual, is later and belongs to Deutero-Christianity. We are able to trace the steps by which the first passed into the second. The first was the adding to the earliest Gospel, or Proto-Christianity, the story (common to all Paganism) of a Dying God.

Sir James Frazer has devoted a whole volume of his *Golden Bough* to the subject of 'The Dying God.' A reading of that volume will show anyone how widespread was the notion of a God who saved his people by dying for them. The motive for writing

<sup>1</sup> See 'The Non-Historicity School' in the last number for the first part of Dr. Anderson's contribution.—ED.

*The Golden Bough* was to explain why the King of the Wood at Nemi regularly had to perish by the hand of his successor. In trying to answer this question the accomplished author covers nearly the whole of Paganism or Heathenism, and finds the myth and ritual of a Dying God everywhere. He devotes two volumes to the Dying God of antiquity under the title of *Attis, Adonis, Osiris*, and other volumes to the wider and deeper question, Why put a man-God or human representative of Deity to death? There is no notion so wide-spread as this of a God who died for his people. All the nations who were afflicted with the sin of idolatry, were not only familiar with it; they were saturated with it. It constituted the warp and woof of their religion.

It was, therefore, the most natural thing in the world that, when the devotees of these Pagan faiths came to accept the new faith of the One God under the Aspect or Person of Saviour, and join the community of those who worshipped 'the Jesus,' they should carry something of the old faith with them into the new. This always happened. When the Goths and Vandals who overran the Roman Empire, came to accept Christianity, many of their superstitions were carried over into the faith of the Christ. So much is this the case that it is difficult to say whether it was Paganism or Christianity that triumphed. Missionaries who take the Christian faith to Heathen lands to-day, have the same experience. Old superstitions have a most tenacious life, and there are even to-day many survivals of Paganism in the doctrines and ceremonies of the Christian Church.

When we consider how strong a hold the idea of a Dying God had upon the mind and heart of men and

women in the first century, we do not wonder that the idea survived and became the central doctrine of Pauline Christianity and from that of the Christianity of the Church. "Christianity as we know it," that is the Christianity of the Church, "is Pauline Christianity," says Dr. B. W. Bacon of Yale. Liberal Christians, of whom Dr. W. Wrede of Breslau may be taken as a representative, are fond of pointing out that "Paul was the second founder of Christianity" (*Paul*, p. 170). "Paul it demonstrably was who first introduced into Christianity the ideas whose influence in its history up to the present time has been deepest and most wide reaching." This writer does not hesitate to say: "Paul supplanted Jesus . . . thrust that greater Person into the background" (*Ibid.*, p. 180). He does not answer the very natural question, How could Jesus be the greater Person if he allowed himself to be thus supplanted? He does not hesitate to characterize Paul's conception of Christianity by the word 'myth.' He means by that the story of a "Divine Being who forsakes heaven, veils Himself in humanity and then dies." "To one who cannot give credence to it, it is necessarily, in its own essence, a mythological conception." Says Dr. H. Preserved Smith in *The Monist* (April, 1908): "It has been proved from linguistic evidence, proved up to the hilt, that Paul was saturated in the current conceptions of the Mystery-religions, prominent among which was that of the eaten body of the Saviour God, who, in human form, should live, suffer violent death and rise again." That the Eucharist was borrowed from the Mystery-religions is undoubted. Paul introduced it among the Christians and they attributed its institution to Jesus (whom they had come to look upon as the founder of their faith) in

obedience to a common practice. This is the way in which the classic myths arose, the way too in which the Christian myth of a Dying God arose,—the people found themselves practising certain rituals, and the myths arose as explanations of them. "The account of the 'Last Supper' is an etiological cult-story," says Dr. Preserved Smith, "analogous to the Greek myths or to the Hebrew fable of the Passover in *Exodus* xii., designed to authorize a custom otherwise established in the earliest community." "The Christ of *Mark*," says Loisy, "is like the gods of the Mysteries; what he does is the type of what happens to his worshippers and what they must do. The idea and form of the Lord's Supper were suggested by Paul, who conceived them in a vision on the model of the Pagan Mysteries."

This introduction of the Dying God idea into the Christian Movement was helped among the Jews because they were familiar with the idea of the suffering Servant of Yahveh, who suffered and died for the people (*Isaiah*, liii.). The Greeks were familiar with the same idea. See the wonderful passage in Plato's *Republic* (ii. 361) where the crucifixion of the ideal Perfect Man is vividly described. In the Mystery-institutions of antiquity there were enacted dramatic representations of the death of the God. In the New Testament there are texts which can be explained only as references to this custom. The author of *The Epistle to the Galatians* says: "Before whose eyes Jesus Christ hath evidently been set forth crucified among you." This cannot mean that Jesus was crucified among the Galatians, and it is too strong an expression for the idea that they had been *told* that Jesus had been crucified at Jerusalem. . The natural meaning is that they had seen a dramatic representa-

tion of the death of the God-Jesus. In *Hebrews* (vi. 6) we read of some who crucify "the Son of God afresh and put him to an open shame." The word 'afresh' is a wrong translation. The Greek particle '*ana*' does not mean 'afresh'; it means 'up.' The idea is that those who reject the doctrine of the Christ, the Good News of the One God under the Aspect or Person of Saviour, bring it into contempt and disrepute. What 'crucifying' means is made clear by the parallel clause 'putting to an open shame.' The cross was the symbol of shame and disgrace. And here we have the germ of the story of the crucifixion in the Gospels, which it is impossible to read as an historic happening. It is a symbolic way of saying what was the actual fact, that the Jews at Jerusalem rejected the doctrine of 'the Jesus,' and did what they could to repress it. Symbol-writing was the common practice of the time; and the story of the arrest, the trial, the condemnation and crucifixion of Jesus was meant to record the fact that the Jews at Jerusalem, especially the hierarchy, rejected the doctrine of the One God under the Aspect or Person of Saviour, and did what they could to repress the association or community called by the name of Jesus. The reason why it is impossible to read the story of the arrest, the trial, the condemnation and crucifixion of Jesus as history, is not only that it is shot through with portent and miracle, but that it is mainly represented as having taken place during the night-time, which was an utter physical impossibility and was besides against both Jewish and Roman law. There is no more satisfactory evidence for a historic crucifixion.

The story of the resurrection follows on from that



of the death of the God. The story, as it stands, is not the story of the resurrection of a man, but the resurrection of a God. We can see the story growing before our eyes. The germ of it lay in the conviction in the hearts of these earliest Christians that this Movement was of God. They put this conviction into the words "God hath raised up Jesus," which is a recurring phrase of *The Acts of the Apostles*. There are two Greek words translated 'raise up,' *anistēmi* and *egeirō*, neither of which means 'to resuscitate.' *Anistēmi* signifies 'to establish,' 'to appoint,' 'to install,' as a king, a prophet;<sup>1</sup> it means also 'to appear,' 'to stand forth,' as before a tribunal.<sup>2</sup> The same remarks may be made about *egeirō*. In neither is there any thought of resuscitation after death. In both cases the word means the inauguration of 'the Jesus' as the new ruler—that is, the doctrine of the One God in the Aspect or Person of Saviour which was denoted by the name 'Jesus.' The word translated 'resurrection' (*anastasis*) does not mean resuscitation, but establishment, appointment, installation. This was the original meaning, but gradually as the notion of the Dying God obtained more and more power over the minds of the Gentile converts and crowded out the earliest Gospel-message, the word *anastasis* came to mean resuscitation; but this was a mark of deterioration, of the beclouding of the spiritual vision which was gradually taking place as the message came into contact with inferior and superstitious minds. The story of the bodily resurrection, therefore, is the crude, materialistic, interpretation of what was originally a spiritual truth.

<sup>1</sup> *Acts* vii. 18: "Till another king arose which knew not Joseph." See also *Rom.* xv. 12; *Heb.* vii. 11, 15. See also Septuagint *Exodus* i. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Matt.* xii. 41; *Luke* xi. 32; *Mark* xiv. 57; *Acts* v. 86, vi. 9, xx. 30.

The spiritual truth was the conviction of these earliest Christians of the supreme importance of their conception of God,—that is, of God as Saviour. “God hath raised up Jesus” was their way of saying that this new Movement—this worship of the One Eternal God under the Aspect of Saviour—was the one thing the world needed and was in accordance with the Will of the Eternal.

The above conclusion is confirmed by a study of that part of the Gospels which the critics call Q or the Logia. This is a part of the Gospels (strictly speaking of *Matthew* and *Luke*) called the ‘Sayings of Jesus.’ These Sayings are seldom found in *Mark*; hence they are called the ‘Non-Markan sections.’ Now these Non-Markan sections have nothing to say of the presence of Jesus in Jerusalem, where other parts of the New Testament allege that he was put to death. The influence of Paulinism is very strong in *Mark*, but such influence is entirely wanting in these Non-Markan sections. What may be called the distinctive theme of *Mark*—the death of Jesus as forming the content of his Gospel—is not to be found in these Non-Markan sections. One of the greatest New Testament scholars, Professor Harnack, has written a book on these sections, in which the above fact is proved beyond all question. The book is entitled *Sayings of Jesus*. It is manifest that these Sayings of Jesus, while earlier than other parts of the Gospels which relate the stories of Death and Resurrection, do not constitute the earliest Gospel. An unbiassed examination of the Non-Markan sections shows that the teachings in them are made up of reproductions or quotations from Old Testament and Apocryphal sources. After such examination, comparing passages in these so-called

‘Sayings of Jesus’ with their sources, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that they are not the words of a personal, individual teacher, but are teachings put into the mouth of Jesus by his worshippers. Harnack’s title, therefore, is a misnomer, for the earliest Gospel was not the teachings of a personal teacher; it was the announcement of a new Aspect of the One Eternal God, a new Idea of God.

The entire New Testament thus contradicts the notion of Liberal Christianity that Jesus was a man. If there is one thing plain in the New Testament it is that, in Gospels and Epistles alike, the Central Figure is a Divine Being. If we had no Gospels and only Epistles, no one would doubt this. Who would ever imagine that the ‘Lord Jesus Christ’ of Paul was a man? He was a Being who dwelt in the soul of the believer; was the centre of creation; was the reconciling principle of several pairs of opposites; was that in which all things stand together or cohere. As regards the Gospels a host of Liberal critics are telling us that we must no longer look upon the Fourth Gospel as history. But are there any more historical elements in the Synoptics than in the Fourth Gospel? And especially is there any echo of history in the second Gospel—*Mark*? It is plain as day that the Central Figure of *Mark* is presented as a miracle-working and oracle-speaking God and never as a man. All the evidence obtainable goes to show that the story that there was a man *grew*. It was not the Origin of the Movement that afterwards became Christianity; and the supreme interest of the whole matter is in the question, What was the Origin of the Movement? The story is scarcely started in *Mark*, if at all; in *Luke* it is a little further on; in *Matthew* a little further still; and in *John* further

still. This establishes the immense probability, to say the least of it, that the Synoptic Gospels do not contain the Sayings of one man Jesus, any more than the Fourth Gospel. What we have is the Growth of a Story of a human life. In *Mark* Jesus appears as a Divine Being with no human traits at all. As Dr. Preserved Smith says: "Take the 'history' of the first day as told by *Mark* in his first chapter. Jesus calls Simon and Andrew, then James and John, all four at once leaving their nets to become 'fishers of men.' Plainly in the meaning of the author it was superhuman power that constrained them. The next deed is as superhuman; Jesus enters the synagogue and astounds all by his doctrine and authority. The next is equally superhuman; he meets a man with an unclean spirit who at once recognizes him as the Holy One of God, come to destroy such as him. The man is cured instantly by a word of miraculous power. The people are amazed and his fame spreads instantly all around. He then enters Simon's house and at once cures his wife's mother of a fever. The cure is complete, instantaneous. At sunset all the sick and demoniac folk are brought to him; he heals many and casts out devils who all recognize him as their destroyer. So the first day is an unbroken round of miracle, one long exhibition of Divine Power." A favourite word with *Mark* is 'straightway,' as the only way in which it would be fitting for a Divine Being to work. The blessing of little children in *Mark* will be cited as evidence of human traits of character. But look at it: the 'little children' are not children in our sense at all; they are symbols for Gentile converts, for they are those who 'believe on me' (ix. 47), which literal children cannot do. And when it is said that Jesus had com-

passion on the multitude (viii. 2), the compassion is not of a man, but the compassion of a God. The Central Figure never appears as a man in *Mark*.

We can see the Story beginning in *I. Cor.* xv. 4-5; *Philipp.* ii. 5-8; *Gal.* iv. 4; *Rom.* i. 3. At first doubtless it was a Messianic reference, as 'of the seed of David,' because it must be so by prophecy. Later the Story was enlarged by Messianic additions till *Mark* appeared. The basis of *Mark* is an initiatory set of scenes (*praxeis*); but *Mark* added Messianic stories. *Luke* used *Mark's* stories, the Logia, a full edition, and then added chapters i. and ii. from a Hebrew (Aramaic) document which is purely legend or poetical work of art. *Luke* and *Acts* were written circa A.D. 110, near the day when St. Ignatius protested that Jesus was really born and died in very deed. But he protests too much and so gives himself away, showing that he is not standing for the old view, but for the new,—that Jesus was a man. (See *Acts* ii. 22, "A man approved of God.") This is the standpoint of *Luke* and *Acts*. And this is to say, that the Story is *well on its way*. And the significant fact is that the beginning of the Story is not the beginning of the Movement. What was at work between the beginning of the Movement and the rise of the Story? If the Story arose it could not be the beginning. Suppose we say that the Movement began as a doctrine about God as Saviour, and did its work as such up to the time when the Story about a man arose. Suppose that the Story grew as spiritual life declined, and that the growth of the Story synchronizes with the growth of the General or Catholic Church, and both run parallel with the growth of the canon. Suppose we say that the doctrine very naturally got attached to itself the name 'Jesus.'—We

should then have an explanation of things that would fit the facts as a key fits the wards of its lock.

Where did the Movement begin? There are two answers given: Galilee and Jerusalem. Look at the evidence for each. The Synoptics in the main represent the scene of the ministry of Jesus as the Galilean villages, so much so that the Gospel which Jesus is said to have preached there, has been called 'the Galilean Gospel.' The Synoptics represent the mighty works of Jesus, healing of the sick folk, curing of demoniacs, as having been wrought in Galilee. But what evidence is there that a personal, individual Jesus appeared in Galilee? None at all that will bear a prolonged examination. The first thing that presents itself, when that examination is begun, is that the reason for putting the teaching in Galilee is a statement in *Isaiah* (xli. 25): "I have raised up one from the north." It was a common belief that the Messiah was to appear in Galilee; and it is this fact which is borne witness to by the Evangelist's placing the scene of the ministry in Galilee, and not a fact of history at all. When the Story arose that One had appeared, of course he must have appeared in Galilee. The second fact which presents itself, is: there is no confirmatory evidence that there ever was a ministry in Galilee. Surely if there had been, it would have had some effect; some result of it would have been manifest in history. Just think of it,—the greatest teacher that ever appeared on the planet, preaching the purest Gospel ever proclaimed on the planet, 'essential Christianity' as it is called, and there is no result! One would have supposed too that the followers of 'the Master' would have gone to Galilee to carry on his work; but nothing of the kind happens! Galilee is

never mentioned. The Gospel is never proclaimed there. No Church is founded there. No Epistle is sent there. The followers preach in Corinth, in Thessalonica, in Ephesus, in Galatia, in Rome, and as a result there were Churches planted in these places. But the Master himself preached in Galilee, did His wonderful works there, and no result appeared! What is the inevitable inference? *That there never was a ministry in Galilee.* The proof is positive and conclusive—as much so as is possible in any such case—that Galilee never was the scene of the life and ministry of a personal, individual Jesus.

Now what about Jerusalem as the *fons et origo* of the Movement? The German Liberal School, and their followers in this country and in America, have made much of the Primitive Church or Community there, the *Urgemeinde*; but no one knows anything about it. The book of *Acts* was written to show that the Movement began in Jerusalem (see *Acts* i. and ii.). But what critic accepts *Acts* as authentic? Wilhelm Bousset, in his *Kyrios Christos*, rejects these chapters, and even Dr. James Moffatt says that the “untrustworthiness rises as the story advances.” The critics tell us that the story of Paul the persecutor is all fiction. Bousset’s words are: “By no means (*nicht einmal*) is it sure that Paul himself was concerned in the persecution at Jerusalem.” The story in *Acts* ix. “bears the brand of the unhistorical on its brow.” In *Acts* we “are dealing so largely with free creation, and not with any authentic documents,” that all reason for placing the *Urgemeinde* in Jerusalem vanishes. There were many reasons against such a thing. It was natural for the disciples to return to Galilee, and the oldest account represents them as so doing. The aim

of *Luke* xxiv. 47-58, *Acts* i. 4-8, 12ff., ii. 14, is manifestly to represent the Movement as emerging from Jerusalem *against the facts of the case*. Just think of the impossibility involved in the idea that a few Galilean fishermen began at Jerusalem a campaign for the deification of a man who had just been crucified in Jerusalem! On the ground that the ultra-Orthodox are right that Jesus was crucified in Jerusalem, rose from the dead there, and showed himself to the people there, there might be a little probability or possibility that the Movement began there; but who believes these things now? The disciples' stay at Jerusalem is an utter impossibility, and the idea of a Primitive Church there is non-historical.

No, the Movement did not begin either in Galilee or in Jerusalem. It issued from the Diaspora, from the midst of the Hellenistic world. It was the main current in the stream of Jewish-Greek-Roman life. It originated among the most spiritual of the Diaspora, who were emancipated from the mechanical conventions of ceremonial purity, thus accounting for the fact that 'the Jesus' sees so clearly into the heart of spiritual religion, and protests so thoroughly against the tyranny of some of the abuses of Legal scrupulosity. It is a mistake to say that "Christianity began as a Palestinian Jewish sect." To be understood the Movement must be studied as a part of the history of civilization; its apostles and preachers did not proclaim any news about any life that had appeared either in Galilee or in Jerusalem; they did not proclaim any life or death or resurrection of any man, of any 'Jesus of Nazareth.' It is a mistake to speak of 'Jesus of Nazareth.' There was a sect called 'Nazarenes' which was pre-Christian; the name was not derived from a city called Nazareth,



but from a Semitic root N-S-R, meaning 'to guard,' 'to protect.' The word 'Nazareth' is used symbolically in *Matthew* ii. 23. The Evangelist is not telling us where Jesus dwelt; he is trying to describe the religion of those who believe in the Nazarene,—that is the Saviour, Jesus, the Protector, the Guardian, symbolically set forth. There never was a geographical Nazareth; such a place is not known in the Old Testament, nor in Josephus, nor in the Talmud; and there never was a historical Jesus,—that is to say, the New Testament presents no such person; the writers were not thinking of historical matters, but of things vastly more important. What the Evangelists and Apostles proclaimed was 'the things about Jesus.' And that phrase does not mean 'the things about a personal life.' It means the Doctrine of the Saviour,—*viz.* that God was revealing himself then, not so much as Creator or King or Lawgiver, as *Saviour*. The first Gospel was what every Gospel, every new religious movement, is and must be,—a new Idea of God. The Story of a personal individual grew as spiritual life declined. Its triumph was the triumph of the General or Catholic Church, which was the worship of the letter. The process ran parallel with the growth of the Canon.

There is a saying, which on the surface seems so simple that one feels anyone might have said it; but the world had to wait until the acute J. S. Mill came before it was uttered: "Things are as they are and will be as they will be." The application of the saying to the matter in hand is that the Movement we call Christianity began in a certain way and not in another way. It has been assumed by uncritical ages that it began in a certain way. We are discovering that it did not begin in that way. What likelihood is

there that the theory which has been held by the Church without sufficient inquiry,—that the Divine Jesus Christ of the New Testament was a historical person,—will continue to hold the credence of men? The Church has been right in its contention that Jesus Christ, as the New Testament presents him, is a Divine Being; but it cannot refute the arguments by which Liberal Christianity has shown that the passages which have proved this Divinity do not relate historical facts. The work which has been done by Liberal Christianity in showing the non-historicity of those parts of the New Testament which have been the proof-texts of the Orthodox Church, is a work which has been done for all time and can never be undone. The only direction in which a 'way out' can be found from the *impasse* into which Christianity has run itself, is by a frank acknowledgment of the facts of the situation. These are that the Worship of Jesus is of the very essence of the New Testament, and that the human traits with which the New Testament writers undoubtedly clothe him are later, and not historic but symbolic in their character.

Very gladly do I acknowledge my indebtedness to Prof. W. B. Smith. He has, in my judgment, solved the problem of the origin of Christianity, and his name will go down to posterity as one of the great pioneers. The fundamental contentions of his two books, *Der vorchristliche Jesus* and *Ecce Deus*, have remained, in my opinion, unanswered.

K. C. ANDERSON.

## ASRÁR-I KHUDÍ—THE SECRETS OF THE SELF.<sup>1</sup>

Sheikh MUHAMMED IQBÁL.

MY DEAR DR. NICHOLSON,

I was very glad to learn from your letter to Shafi that your translation of the *Asrár-i Khudí* has been favourably received and excited much attention in England. Some of the English reviewers, however, have been misled by the superficial resemblance of some of my ideas to those of Nietzsche. The view of the writer in *The Athenæum* is largely affected by some mistakes of fact, for which, however, the writer does not seem to be responsible. But I am sure if he had known some of the dates of the publication of my Urdu poems referred to in his review, he would have certainly taken a totally different view of the growth of my literary activity. Nor does he rightly understand my idea of the Perfect Man, which he confounds with the German thinker's Superman. I wrote on the Súfí doctrine of the Perfect Man more than twenty years ago—long before I had read or heard anything of Nietzsche. This was then published in *The Indian Antiquary* and later, in 1908, formed part of my book on Persian Metaphysics. The English reader ought to approach this idea not through the German thinker, but through an English thinker of great merit—I mean Alexander, whose Gifford Lectures delivered at Glasgow

<sup>1</sup> The following Letter will be interesting to our readers because of Dr. Reynold A. Nicholson's article, 'The Secrets of the Self: a Moslem Poet's Interpretation of Vitalism,' in the July No., 1920, and of the review of Dr. Nicholson's translation in our last issue.—ED.

were published last year. His chapter on Deity and God (ii. 341) is worth reading. On page 347 he says: "Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. That the universe is pregnant with such a quality we are speculatively assured. What that quality is we cannot know; for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars still are raised to the unknown God. If we could know what Deity is, how it feels to be Divine, we should first have to become as God." Alexander's thought is much bolder than mine. I believe there is a Divine tendency in the universe, but this tendency will eventually find its complete expression in a higher *man*, not in a God subject to Time, as Alexander implies in his discussion of the subject. I do not agree with Alexander's view of God; but it is clear that my idea of the Perfect Man will lose much of its outlandishness in the eye of the English reader if he approaches it through the ideas of a thinker of his own country.

But it was Mr. Lowes Dickinson's review which interested me most, and I want to make a few remarks on it.

(1) Mr. Dickinson thinks, as I understand from his private letter to me, that I have deified physical force in the poem. He is, however, mistaken in his view. I believe in the power of the spirit, not brute force. When a people is called to a righteous war, it is, according to my belief, their duty to obey the call; but I condemn all war of conquest (cp. the story of Miyan Mir and the Emperor of India). But Mr. Dickinson is quite right when he says that war is destructive, whether it is waged in the interests of truth and

justice or in the interests of conquest and exploitation. It must be put an end to in any case. We have seen, however, that treaties, leagues, arbitrations and conferences cannot put an end to it. Even if we secure these in a more effective manner than before, ambitious nations will substitute more peaceful forms of the exploitation of races supposed to be less favoured or less civilized. The truth is that we stand in need of a living personality to solve our social problems, to settle our disputes and to place international morality on a surer basis. How very true are the last two paragraphs of Prof. Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* (pp. 376ff.). I take the liberty to transcribe them here :

“There can be no ideal society without ideal men : and for the production of these we require not only insight but a motive power ; fire as well as light. Perhaps a philosophic understanding of our social problems is not even the chief want of our time. We need prophets as well as teachers, men like Carlyle or Ruskin or Tolstoi, who are able to add for us a new *severity to conscience or a new breadth to duty. Perhaps we want a new Christ. . . .* It has been well said that the prophet of our time must be a man of the world, and not merely a voice in the wilderness. For indeed the wilderness of the present is in the streets of our crowded cities, and in the midst of the incessant war by which we are trying to make our way upwards. It is there that the prophet must be.

“Or perhaps our chief want is rather for the poet of the new age than for its prophet—or for one who should be poet and prophet in one. Our poets of recent generations have taught us the love of nature, and enabled us to see in it the revelation of the divine.

We still look for one who shall show us with the same clearness the presence of the divine in the human. . . . We still need one who shall be fully and in all seriousness what Heine playfully called himself, a '*Ritter von dem Heiligen Geist*,' one who shall teach us to see the working out of our highest ideals in the every-day life of the world, and to find in devotion to the advancement of that life, not merely a sphere for an ascetic self-sacrifice, but a supreme object in the pursuit of which 'all thoughts, all passions, all delights' may receive their highest development and satisfaction."

It is in the light of such thoughts that I want the British public to read my description of the ideal man. It is not our treaties and arbitrations which will put an end to the internecine wars of the human family. A living personality alone will effectively do such a thing, and it is to him that I say :

"Bring once more days of peace to the world,  
Give a message of peace to them that seek battle!"

(2) Mr. Dickinson further refers to my 'Be hard.' This is based on the view of reality that I have taken in the poem. According to my belief reality is a collection of individualities tending to become a harmonious whole through conflict which must inevitably lead to mutual adjustment. This conflict is a necessity in the interests of the evolution of higher forms of life and of personal immortality. Nietzsche did not believe in personal immortality. To those desiring it he ruthlessly says: "Do you wish to be a perpetual burden on the shoulders of time?" He was led to say this because he had a wrong notion of time, and never tried to grapple with the ethical issue involved in the question of time. On the other hand I look

upon immortality as the highest aspiration of man, on which he should focus all his energies, and consequently I recognize the need of all forms of activity, including conflict, which tend to make the human person more and more stable. And for the same consideration, I condemn speculative mysticism and inactive quietism. My interest in conflict is mainly ethical and not political, whereas Nietzsche's was probably only political. Modern physical science has taught us that the atom of material energy has achieved its present form through many thousands of years of evolution. Yet it is unstable and can be made to disappear. The same is the case with the atom of mind-energy, *i.e.* the human person. It has achieved its present form through æons of incessant effort and conflict; yet, in spite of all this, its instability is clear from the various phenomena of mental pathology. If it is to continue intact it cannot ignore the lessons learnt from its past career, and will require the same (or similar) forces to maintain its stability which it has availed itself of before. It is possible that in its onward march nature may modify or eliminate altogether some of the forces (*e.g.* conflict in the way of mutual wars) that have so far determined and helped its evolution, and introduce new forces hitherto unknown to mankind, to secure its stability. But I confess I am not an idealist in this matter, and believe this time to be very distant. I am afraid mankind will not, for a very long time to come, learn the lesson that the Great European War has offered them. Thus it is clear that my purpose in recognizing the need of conflict is mainly ethical. Mr. Dickinson has unfortunately altogether ignored this aspect of the 'Be hard.'

(3) Mr. Dickinson further remarks that while my philosophy is universal, my application of it is particular and exclusive. This is in a sense true. The humanitarian ideal is always universal in poetry and philosophy; but if you make it an effective ideal and work it out in actual life, you must start, not with poets and philosophers, but with a society exclusive, in the sense of having a creed and a well-defined outline, but ever enlarging its limits by example and persuasion. Such a society, according to my belief, is Islam. This society has so far proved itself a most successful opponent of the race-idea, which is probably the hardest barrier in the way of the humanitarian ideal. Renan was wrong when he said that science is the greatest enemy of Islam. No, it is the race-idea which is the greatest enemy of Islam—in fact of all humanity—and it is the duty of all lovers of mankind to stand in revolt against this dreadful invention of the Devil. Since I find that the idea of nationality—based on race or territory—is making headway in the world of Islam, and since I fear that the Muslims, losing sight of their own ideal of a universal humanity, are being lured by the idea of a territorial nationality, I feel it is my duty, as a Muslim and as a lover of all men, to remind them of their true function in the evolution of mankind. Tribal and national organizations on the lines of race or territory are only a temporary phase in the unfolding and upbringing of collective life, and as such I have no quarrel with them; but I condemn them in the strongest possible terms when they are regarded as the ultimate expression of the life of mankind. While I have the greatest love for Islam, it is in view of practical and not patriotic considerations, as Mr. Dickinson thinks, that I am compelled to start with



a specific society (*e.g.* Islam) which, among the societies of the world, happens to be the only one suitable to my purpose. Nor is the spirit of Islam so exclusive as Mr. Dickinson thinks. In the interests of a universal unification of mankind the Quran ignores their minor differences and says :

“Come let us unite on what is common to us all.”

I am afraid the old European idea of a blood-thirsty Islam is still lingering in the mind of Mr. Dickinson. All men and not Muslims alone are meant for the kingdom of God on earth, provided they say good-bye to their idols of race and nationality, and treat one another as personalities. Leagues, mandates, treaties, like the one described by Mr. Keynes, and imperialisms, however draped in democracy, can never bring salvation to mankind. The salvation of man lies in absolute equality and freedom of all. We stand in need of a thorough overhauling of the uses of science which have brought so much misery to mankind, and of a total abandonment of what may be called esoteric politics, which is ever planning the ruin of less clever or weaker races. That Muslim peoples have fought and conquered like other peoples, and that some of their leaders have screened their personal ambition behind the veil of religion, I do not deny ; but I am absolutely sure that territorial conquest was no part of the original programme of Islam. As a matter of fact I consider it a great loss that the progress of Islam as a conquering faith stultified the growth of those germs of an economic and democratic organization of society, which I find scattered up and down the pages of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet. No doubt the Muslims succeeded in building a great empire, but thereby they largely repaganized their political

ideals and lost sight of some of the most important potentialities of their faith. Islam certainly aims at absorption. This absorption, however, is to be achieved, not by territorial conquest, but by the simplicity of its teaching, its appeal to the common sense of mankind, and its aversion from abstruse metaphysical dogma. That Islam can succeed by its inherent force is sufficiently clear from the Muslim missionary work in China, where it has won millions of adherents without the help of any political power. I hope that more than twenty years' study of the world's thought has given me sufficient training to judge things impartially. The object of my Persian poems is not to make out a case for Islam; my aim is simply to discover a universal social reconstruction, and in this endeavour I find it philosophically impossible to ignore a social system which exists with the express object of doing away with all the distinctions of caste, rank and race, and which, while keeping a watchful eye on the affairs of this world, fosters a spirit of the unworldliness so absolutely essential to man in his relations with his neighbours. This is what Europe lacks, and this is what she can still learn from us.

One word more. In my notes which now form part of your introduction to *Asrār-i Khudī* I deliberately explained my position in reference to Western thinkers, as I thought this would facilitate the understanding of my views in England. I could have easily explained myself in the light of the Quran and Muslim Súfís and thinkers. As a matter of fact I did so explain myself in my Hindustani introduction to the 1st edition of the *Asrār*. I claim that the philosophy of the *Asrār* is a direct development out of the experience and speculation of old Muslim Súfís and thinkers. Even

Bergson's idea of time is not quite foreign to our Súfis. The Quran is certainly not a book of metaphysics, but it takes a definite view of the life and destiny of man, which must eventually rest on propositions of a metaphysical import. A statement by a modern Muslim student of philosophy of such propositions, especially when it is made in the light of the religious experience and philosophy invoked by that great book, is not putting new wine in old bottles. It is only a restatement of the old in the light of the new. It is unfortunate that the history of Muslim thought is so little known in the West. I wish I had time to write an extensive book on the subject to show to the Western student of philosophy how philosophic thinking makes the whole world kin.

Yours very sincerely,

MUHAMMED IQBÁL.

Lahore,  
26th January, 1921.

## SOME REMARKS ON FOURTH DIMENSIONALISM AND THE TIME-ENIGMA.

THE EDITOR.

THE label 'fourth dimension' has become very familiar of late owing to the great interest aroused by the discussion of the principles of the Theory of Relativity, which has been brought so prominently before the public by the experimental verification of two of the three famous predictions of Einstein based on that theory; the most striking of them being the bending of a ray of light by a gravitational field. This 'law' seems to have been recently exemplified in the laboratory by Rutherford's experiment, in which a light-beam is deflected by a magnet.

The fourth dimension of that which, when all is said and done, is for the observer the psychical continuum in which all sensible phenomena show, is required by this theory to be Time. To define the world-position of a physical particle or body, even when it is so called at rest for us, we must know its 'time' as well as its relative spatial localization. The fundamental problem before us thus concerns a more exact method of measurement of objects, their mensuration in space and time.

The term 'dimension' was first applied to measurable or spatial content of any kind, as length, breadth, thickness, area, volume. It meant simply measurement, measure, magnitude, size, and is solely

a quantitative material concept. According to the postulates that underlie the traditional Euclidean geometry, which enjoyed undivided sway in the mathematical world till the thirties of the nineteenth century, there are theoretically three, and only three, elements of spatial dimension or theoretical factors of measurement of magnitude or of extension in space. Thus a line is conceived as having one dimension; a plane surface two, length and breadth; and a solid three, length, breadth and thickness. Time gradually came to be conceived of (but mark by analogy only) as a quantity of one dimension; the analogy between time and conceptual 'space' of one dimension has been thought to be so close that the same terms have come to be applied to both. It is held moreover commonly that 'the eye sees' (if such an expression is tolerable) only length and breadth, but no third dimension. The 'seeing' of the latter is inferred from memories of the sense of movement. We cannot really see thickness, but only surfaces. Our sense of concrete three-dimensional space is due to the fact that we describe space by the movement of our limbs and eyes and feel it internally. It is demonstrable experimentally in physiological psychology why there are only three dimensions of space.

To ascertain the actual position in the world-order of a sensible object seemingly at rest for us on the earth, it is necessary not only to know its position according to the conceptual scheme by which we map or mesh out the earth's surface (our invented parallels of latitude and longitude which do not exist in nature) but also to know its motion—pace, velocity, time, relative to that order. This motion will be the common motion of the resting body of the observer, of

the resting object observed and of the surface on which they are both at rest—namely, the motion of the earth itself. The heretofore static becomes now transformed into a dynamic problem, a riddle of motion and therefore of time. Moreover we are here dealing with translational motion only; for every object, no matter how immobile in itself it may appear to our limited powers of vision, has also its own internal motion, hypothetically conceived as molecular, atomic, electronic, sub-electronic, etc.,—indefinitely extensible or intensible. This inner motion we may neglect, for our present purpose, though as a matter of fact it is a universe in itself. If, then, we take a purely external view of an object, though it is at rest relative to the surface of the earth, it is really moving with the translatory, the combined axial and orbital, motion of the planet,—i.e. relatively to the sun. And the sun again is moving through space in its turn relative to some far distant cosmic centre or more inclusive frame of reference; so that the earth-motion is further subsumed under the common motion of the solar system and all its contents in respect to that super-solar pattern, whatever it may be. And so on indefinitely, theoretically, for who is to call a halt to our imagination in this direction? It seems that we are here up against our old friend *regressus* (in this case rather *progressus*) *ad infinitum*, where the possibility of conceiving an absolute centre, an eternal *pou stō*, of the universe is past praying for.

Time and space seem boundless both as to their maximal and minimal directions, from sub-electronic infinitesimals to infinitudes of extensibility, from infinitely divisible instants to immeasurable æons of duration. All our measurements or determinations of time and space must then be relative; they are in last

resort dependent on the observer and his limitations. The earth-dweller's estimates will presumably differ from those of an inhabitant of the sun, even if the sense-apparatus and method of calculation be assumed to be the same for both. If, however, we admit the possibility, and I think we are bound to do so, of beings of higher grades of sensible consciousness and powers of interpretation than our own, our present realizable mensural grip on reality must be exceedingly slight, indeed immeasurably removed from full comprehension. Nevertheless, even as it is, the human factor—the observer—which had hitherto been banished to the realms of the unconscious by a science that for so long imagined it was dealing in its calculations with an absolute homogeneous time and space, has bobbed up again serenely above the threshold. Though every observer is theoretically at the centre of an infinite universe, for practical purposes he can determine the positional relation of his body to a limited field of observation only. Absolute measurement is out of the question. For such purposes he must be content with the immediate modes of time and space in which he finds himself, and which determine not only his apparatus, both his instrument and his body, but also what he is measuring. Practically he measures matter with similar matter, with scales, rigid rules, clocks; there is nothing absolute about it, aggregates of matter vary indefinitely in the infinite universe.

The critics of the theory, however, contend that the absolute in nature is not really abolished by the principles of relativity. It may be true that measurements of time and space cease to be absolute and depend upon the observer, but "things like energy and the velocity of light are independent of such motion

and remain as absolute as ever they were."<sup>1</sup> It may, however, be remarked that, fascinating as is the theory that the velocity of physical light is 'absolute,' it means simply that experimentally it is constant and that we cannot be normally sensible of a higher velocity; but this is only to say that our normal sensibility is limited. Abnormal sense—so-called clairvoyance—sees light which is commonly invisible. As for the 'command concept' of 'energy,' it is up-to-date camouflage masking the operations of our old friend 'matter'; we know no more really about the one than the other. Energy, yes—but energy of what? Energy is a purely material and mechanical concept and as such essentially relative. Here, however, we should bear in mind among others the protest (*ibid.*) of Sir Oliver Lodge, the most stalwart defender of the æther-hypothesis. This, we might add, seems to be thought by many to be unnecessary, if for no other reason, because the magnetic 'field' of every electron can be held to extend infinitely in all directions through space, and so covers the ground previously held by the hypothetical æther. But perhaps here 'I speak as a fool.'

Sir Oliver writes: "To make a philosophic scheme of existence complete, more than the expression of a static instant is required, there must be duration likewise: the universe is not merely a Being but truly a Becoming; Time has to be associated with Space. This can only be done by a velocity factor of some kind; but to arrive at an appropriate factor, relativists have not dived down into the æther, as someone must ultimately dive, and dissected out the intrinsic speed of its turbulence—which is really the fundamental velocity in existence—

<sup>1</sup> See the Editor's criticism at the end of his Introduction to the 'Relativity Number' of *Nature* (Feb. 17, 1921).



they have utilized the more obvious and conspicuous *consequence* of this fundamental speed, *viz.* the uniform velocity with which the æther can convey a great variety of signals."

For common sense, for the lay mind, time and space seem entirely different orders of experience, they apparently cannot be converted into one another; time cannot 'flow' into space or space into time. For time to have only one dimension and space three, moreover, seems rather derogatory to the former; the man in the street is here worried about the familiar triplicity of time—past, present and future. May not the present, he asks, be as a one-dimensional time, unobservable even as the line proper is unseeable; the past two-dimensional, observable (in memory) just as we see areas or surfaces; and the future inferred, and not seen, just as we infer thickness. Again we should remember that in the sensible world all is always concrete. A sensible surface is a minimal lamination of concrete space, a sensible line is the minimal reduction of such a surface. Continue the reduction line-wise and you reach the point, the zero of visibility. So with time; the sensible present is not an abstract conceptual instant, void of duration, ideally separating past from future. Sensible time is what is called the specious present; it is an appreciable length of duration. How long, whether a second or two or longer, is disputed. But modern psychologists have to reckon with it, just as the Buddhist thinkers two thousand years ago postulated so many instants in a unit of perception. The philosopher, moreover, will counsel the layman that in considering time he has to remember it is not simply succession; it is also duration and simultaneity. Here again simultaneity may be

compared to our sense of concrete space, duration to superficial continuity and succession to linear tracing.

Thus to the mind of the man in the street, though he may have no clear notions on the subject, there seems to be a certain incompatibility in speaking of only 'four-dimensional' reality. He might have been less confused if the new theory had generally spoken of four co-ordinates or independent variables—terms of which he knew nothing—rather than of dimensions of which he had a vague knowledge. He may not be cognizant of the enormously difficult problems for science and philosophy underlying space and time, the commonest factors of sensible experience, but he has an instinctual *flair* for them. It may then be of interest for other men in the street, if one of their number blunders round the outskirts of the subject; perhaps the spectacle of his ignorance may induce some benevolent sage subsequently to help our readers with a word of wisdom.

The matter is of special moment just now, not only for physicists, owing to the confirmation of two of Einstein's predictions, but also for philosophers, and we are all embryonic philosophers whether we are conscious of it or not. Quite recently in philosophical circles we have been asked<sup>1</sup> to regard Space-Time as the very stuff of reality from which all else proceeds or develops up to deity. Space-Time is conceived as unitary, a concrete indiscerptible reality; you cannot in reality abstract space from time or time from space. Either without the other is non-existent for experience. They are always found together in every point-instant or event in the universe of experience. And here the speculation that each instant of time

<sup>1</sup> By Professor Alexander in his much discussed Gifford Lectures.

embraces every point in space, and each point in space every instant in time has its fascination. This Space-Time is said to be Motion—the *fons et origo* of all things. It is true that this view purports to be descriptive only and not explanatory. But how motion alone can endow itself with the capacity of evolving the infinite gradations of ordered complexity in the universe of events, it is difficult to conceive. Motion is a material category, and is no more really originative of anything than is energy. Activity is a far less vulnerable term for a genuinely originating power, seeing that we can thus speak of creative and conservative activity, but hardly of creative motion. Again even in this Space-Time cosmogonic hypothesis the *deus ex machina* is surely not motion but the complicating process that imposes itself on motion. Motion is the material and not the formal, much less the final, 'cause.' You cannot 'derive' the creative genius of a Shakespeare from motion, no matter how rapid or complicated it may be assumed to be. Motion will never 'produce' the least sign of life, much less the smallest scintilla of thought. The philosopher, as distinct from the scientist, must seek for some sort of explanation; he cannot rest content with such a supposed history of modal evolution, even when it is claimed to be only descriptive. Motion will not account for the orderly sequence of its modes, even if one could agree that life is a mode of motion. Such products, if they are products, as life and thought are not derivable from motion, but from a reality transcending life and thought. Thought however will not 'explain' this reality, life will not explain it, much less motion. Nevertheless we need not despair, for there is no reason to suppose that

human thought exhausts the comprehensible powers of the creative activity of divine fecundity. Spiritual self-consciousness transcends discursive thought, and it is here only, one may believe, that human activity begins consciously to synergize with divine actuality.

But to return to Space and Time and the notion of a four-dimensional continuum or manifold, remembering that science is based on measurement (as Poincaré says, in his *Dernières Pensées*, "What is not measured cannot become an object of science") and that you cannot measure space without time or time without space. We have to keep clear in our minds the difference between logic and experience or experiment. The experimental science of measurement should be called mensuration and not geometry. There are now several systems of conceptual pure geometry besides the traditional one of Euclid. But all are on the same footing and part and parcel of pure logic. That is to say, if the postulates are true the propositions are true. It all depends on the postulates, the fundamental assumptions. Here it will be of service to note a suggestive paragraph in the joint paper by Miss Dorothy Winch and Dr. Harold Jeffreys (*Nature*, 'Relat. No.')

"All experimental science depends on some postulate or postulates that imply that empirical generalisation is justifiable: no amount of experiment will enable us to make any inference unless we have some principle that enables us to generalise results. Theories involving such a principle may be called *extensive*, while those not involving one may be called *intensive*. The latter include the whole of logic. Now no process of generalisation is used in pure geometry; every proposition is proved immediately and with com-

plete certainty for every instance of its terms. Thus all pure geometry, Euclidean or otherwise, is intensive, while all physical sciences, including mensuration, are extensive."

Seeing that the terms 'hyper-geometry' or 'meta-geometry' are frequent in four-dimensionalism, it may be of advantage for those ignorant of the history of mathematics also to quote an instructive paragraph or two from the clear account of 'Non-Euclidean Geometry' by Professor Whitehead (Art. 'Geometry,' *B.E.*<sup>11</sup>) than whom we have no higher authority.

"Non-Euclidean geometry arose from the discussion, extending from the Greek period to the present day, of the various assumptions which are implicit in the traditional Euclidean system of geometry. In the course of these investigations it became evident that metrical geometries, each internally consistent but inconsistent in many respects with each other and with the Euclidean system, could be developed. . . .

"Until the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries (Lobachevsky, 1826 and 1829; J. Bolyai, 1832; B. Riemann, 1854), geometry was universally considered as being exclusively the science of existent space. In respect to the science thus conceived, two controversies may be noticed.

"First there is the controversy respecting the absolute and relational theories of space. According to the absolute theory, which is the traditional view (held explicitly by Newton), space has an existence, in some sense whatever it may be, independent of the bodies which it contains. The bodies occupy space, and it is not intrinsically unmeaning to say that any definite body occupies *this* part of space, without reference to other bodies occupying space. According to the rela-

tional theory of space, of which the chief exponent was Leibnitz, space is nothing but an assemblage of the relations between the various bodies in space. The idea of space with no bodies in it is absurd. Accordingly there can be no meaning in saying that a body is *here* and not *there*, apart from a reference to the other bodies in the universe. Thus on this theory absolute motion is intrinsically unmeaning. It is admitted on all hands that in practice only relational motion is directly measurable. . . . This irrelevance of absolute motion (if there be any such thing) to science, has led to the general adoption of the relational theory by modern men of science. But no decisive argument for either view has at present been elaborated. Kant's view of space as being a form of perception at first sight seems to cut across the controversy. But he, saturated as he was with the spirit of the Newtonian physics, must (at least in both editions of the *Critique*) be classed with upholders of the absolute theory. The form of perception has a type of existence proper to itself independently to the particular bodies which it contains. For example he writes: 'Space does not represent any quality of objects by themselves, or objects in their relation to one another, *i.e.* space does not represent any determination which is inherent in the objects themselves, and would remain, even if all subjective conditions of intuition were removed.'

"The second controversy is that between the view that the axioms applicable to space are known only from experience, and the view that in some sense those axioms are given *a priori*."

The problem is presumably fundamentally a question of epistemology and psychology, of how we know and how we 'sense.' But to come down to

the consideration of some imaginative exercises in pursuit of a fourth-dimensionalism. Years ago some of us were fascinated by C. E. Hinton's suggestive works, *A New Era of Thought* and *The Fourth Dimension*. We even broke our heads over his 'cubes'; for he claimed that it was possible to get some idea of what we took to be the fourth dimension of *space* (not the time-coordinate) by trying to visualize a composite cube—formed of, say, 27 similar smaller cubes, each of which was coloured differently—from as many points of view as possible. By dint of long practice, it was possible, he said, that the cube as a whole from these points of view and the whole of the mutual relations of the contents, when each smaller cube had been visualized in its relations to the adjacent smaller cubes, could be called up together and synthesized in a single act of vision. If this were achieved, we should be on the way to win towards securing some notion of a four-dimensional body. What was aimed at was said to be the realization of the existence of a fourth 'perpendicular' or 'direction' to the three rectangular axes of traditional Euclidean metrical geometry. To some of us the above seemed at best an exercise in normal visual gymnastics, it was all in the familiar region of three-space. You slowly visualized a large number of points of view, of perspectives or positions of the cubes relative to one another and the composite whole, and then passed them very rapidly in review, so that they seemed to be synthesized in a unitary act of perception. But as a matter of fact one never reached the point of a genuine 'all-together-ness, which presumably should pertain to the seeing of a four-dimensional body. You might get some idea of the possibility of seeing all round a three-dimensional body at once and also of seeing

the equally three-dimensional contents of one, as the accounts of certain phases of abnormal sight or lucidity seemed to suggest. But surely the latter is in any case but an extension of three-dimensional sight? And even if there is a mode of seeing which can simultaneously embrace an object on all sides at once,—a looking from a periphery inward and not from a centre outward,—it is the same three-dimensional object which is seen and not one of another order. It was hard to imagine where the fourth ‘perpendicular’ came in. We amateurs may have misunderstood Hinton; but we were under the impression that we were in pursuit of a fourth dimension of space, and that too on Euclidean lines, and not in chase of the time-coordinate. .

It may then be of interest to see how Hinton’s notions have been to a certain extent re-thought by a Russian mathematician who regards the fourth dimension as time, not precisely as in the Space-Time theory, where time and space are always found together and are apparently inconvertible into one another, but from the point of view that: “Time is the fourth dimension of space imperfectly sensed—apprehended by consciousness successively, and thereby creating the temporal illusion.” He claims to have established, “not that the idea of time is deduced from the observation of motion, but that the idea of motion results from our ‘time-sense’—and that the idea of motion is quite definitely *the function of the ‘time-sense,’* which in itself is a limit or boundary of the space-sense belonging to a being of a given psyche.”

G. R. S. MEAD.

(A paper dealing with these speculations will follow in the October number.—ED.)



## THE SPIRIT OF PROMETHEUS.

MARGARET LEGGE.

AT this time, when life seems like a turbid sea on the day after a storm, people are seeking in many directions for something upon which they may get a fair hold, something which it is perhaps simplest to call religion. In this search I think there is a tendency too constantly to dwell on the intermediate stages instead of pushing the quest towards its actual goal. That goal is ultimately the greatest thing of all. The way to it cannot be discovered in the *séance*-room; it must be sought beyond manifestations of the soul, incarnate or discarnate, in a region which, though harder to find than the psychic world, is, I suspect, far nearer to us and, though neither material nor psychic, is essential to both these forms of existence.

The difficulty of talking about religion is that it is chiefly a question of experience, and experience cannot be directly handed from one to another; therefore I have taken Shelley's presentment of the spiritual superman, Prometheus, to illustrate my thoughts in the hope that these may find response in the thoughts of others.

The first question is, what do I mean by religion? By religion in the abstract I mean that which binds man to God; by practical religion I mean the standard according to which we live. About the second part of this definition I want to be quite clear: I do not mean the standard at which we aim, but the actual standard

of our lives. So far as we believe our faith we live it. Good resolutions only become part of our religion when we act upon them. When we fail in this it is because we love ourselves more than our ideals.

I do not think we can be too uncompromising on this point. I find it is so easy to get into a habit of talking vaguely about spiritual aspirations, opposing them to the material, developing morbid emotions which lead us to believe that an unsympathetic fate constrains us to exist down here while our souls ache for unencumbered bliss up there. We want to dispel this fog and replace it with a clear atmosphere of wholesome thought, striving to obtain some degree of light on such great ideas as Immortality and Eternity; ideas which will give us hard exercise in their pursuit, but which if we could perceive their power would become the chief factors in our everyday existence. I suppose we can never reach these by thinking about them, but can only approach them reverently, using every power for thought, feeling and action that we possess.

And it is the idea of Immortality which brings me to Prometheus. Probably everyone who loves Shelley's divine poem has preference for certain parts and would emphasize this or that moment in the drama according to individual taste. I want simply to use the main idea, and the points I wish to fix attention upon are these: Jupiter has received his power from Prometheus himself; all the universe bows in terror before his tyranny with the exception of Prometheus; Jupiter tries to break the Titan to his will by chaining him to the rock and torturing him with every refinement of agony. With the exception of one detail the story is thus far purely classical; but where I believe

Shelley has lifted the ancient legend altogether on to a higher plane, is in the persistent refusal of Prometheus to be liberated at the cost of his own and others' spiritual freedom. He endures all things till the hour of Fate arrives and Jupiter is hurled into the abyss. Then it is seen that the liberation of the Titan has also brought about the liberation of the universe. It is a drama in which the immortal spirit, born of Earth, through its unshakable faith keeps alive the soul of mankind until the day of triumph—no personal triumph, as we are shown in the last Act, which is a vision of the liberated world.

A paper by Dr. Reynold A. Nicholson was published in the July number of last year on a poem by the Mohammedan philosopher-poet Iqbál, in which an important point was made of the idea of tension. The poet seemed to postulate that we have to win immortality by developing the power of tension, and the idea was fascinating when compared with the key-idea of Prometheus. Dr. Nicholson quotes from a letter of the philosopher: "Personal immortality is an aspiration. You can have it if you make an effort to achieve it. It depends on our adopting in this life those modes of thought and activity which tend to maintain the state of tension and can continue only if that state is maintained." Let us compare with this Shelley's preface to his poem, where he tells us the reason for his divergence from Aeschylus' treatment of the story, in which the Titan's freedom was obtained through his eventual reconciliation with Jupiter. Shelley says: "But, in truth, I was averse from a catastrophe so feeble as that of reconciling the Champion with the Oppressor of mankind. The moral interest of the fable, which is so powerfully sustained by the

sufferings and endurance of Prometheus, would be annihilated if we could conceive of him unsaying his high language and quailing before his successful and perfidious adversary." This makes it perfectly clear that endurance, *i.e.* tension, is the motive of the drama.

"Scorn and despair,—these are mine empire :  
 More glorious far than that which thou surveyest  
 From thine unenvied throne, O Mighty God !—  
 Almighty, had I deigned to share the shame  
 Of thine ill tyranny, and hung not here  
 Nailed to this wall of eagle-baffling mountain."

Grip—that is the whole matter ; grip of this one thing, unwavering love, never flinching for an instant though the tortures inflicted were not only bodily pains, but mental, emotional, spiritual. What more terrible trial has ever been conceived by the mind of man than that of Prometheus when he was forced to watch the sufferings caused to innocent people through his own continued fight for right ! After the torture scene, when one Fury lingers on thinking that he must give way, the Titan says :

"Thy words are like a cloud of winged snakes ;  
 And yet I pity those they torture not."

The Fury defeated cries :

"Thou pitiest them ! I speak no more."

And thereon vanishes.

The moral ideal of this is stupendous.

As a question fundamentally personal it is interesting to note that the power which bound Prometheus was really his own. Originally he had given it to Jupiter, who then misused it against him ; and Shelley

immediately strikes the high note to which the whole is keyed by making the first act in the drama Prometheus' withdrawal of the curse he had hurled forth against the tyrant when he discovered this perfidy. He had in fact to unbind himself of his last weakness, the desire for revenge, ere he could be unbound. The curse itself is terrible; one phrase of it relentless in its demand for logical retribution :

“ Heap on thy soul by virtue of this Curse  
Ill deeds, then be thou damned, beholding Good.”

May we take it then that religion, or the spiritual life, is a question not only of remaining true to that which we know to be right, but of doing it with such strength of conviction that our confidence, our conception of right, remains unshaken even when it appears to be doing harm? This is not doing evil that good may come, but recognizing that we must not waver before the smaller loss in view of the greater gain. It is the power of cognizing the permanent, the perpetual vision of that which *is*, beyond the illusion of that which passes—again tension, the unrelaxing grip of the idea. To put it in a different way : it is the power to see reality within the relative.

But one difficulty causing us much confusion is that of determining what belongs to reality, what to the relative. Sometimes people try to sweep the difficulty aside by saying these are both aspects of the same thing; but if we accept this too easily, we shall be apt to increase confusion rather than help ourselves by a vagueness which sounds impressive and is all the worse for that. From our point of view, living as we do with this pageant of passing things forcing our attention, pressing itself upon our consciousness, we

have to take a good deal of trouble, if we are to go beyond it and hold ourselves to the real; and the question of how we may achieve this is therefore of first importance and one on which our minds can usefully dwell.

Turning aside for a moment to seek illustration from another form of art, we find that Wagner gives a clue to this perception of reality in his essay on Beethoven, where he claims that music is the most perfect of all arts because it is a direct utterance of Vision. He compares it to the sleeper who wakes with a cry which is a spontaneous utterance of the will, this cry being of sorrow or delight according to his experience in the world of dreams, an experience which receives expression directly in sound. Speaking of Beethoven's deafness, he points out that, being by this cut off from the outer world of sound, the master lived in direct consciousness of the real world of vision. He says: "The essential nature of things now again speaks to him and he sees things displayed in the calm light of beauty. Again he understands the forest, the brook, the meadow, the blue sky, the gay throng of men, the pair of lovers, the song of birds, the flight of clouds, the roar of streams, the beatitude of blissfully moving repose. All he perceives and constructs is permeated with that wondrous serenity which music has gained through him." And again: "Never has an art offered the world anything so serene as these symphonies in A and F major, and all the works intimately related to them which the master produced during his divine period of total deafness."

But we have to seek this power of direct perception and direct expression in other matters than art. One of the reasons for the necessity of religion is that we

want to find it in life. Two of the most ordinary ways in which people endeavour to seek for it collectively now-a-days are in the church and the *séance*-room. Now going to church is a most helpful practice to many people; but on the other hand there is a tendency for churches to become as it were power-stations where people try to generate enough holiness to last them through the day or the week. This has served to accentuate the artificial division between that which is spiritual and that which is worldly, the opposite of the error mentioned above, where these are confused to the prejudice of clear thinking. In the *séance*-room also we find the necessity for arranging 'conditions'—a perfectly natural demand about which a large amount of unscientific nonsense has been talked, but which reveals the limitations of the method as such. What we want is to find some way of living perpetually the real life, finding, as some of the old mystics believed, in each meal a sacrament, a baptism every time we wash; for anything which tends to separate the spiritual life from the physical is apt to focus the mind on the physical, so ending in some sort of moral materialism, a purely ethical system, or on the other hand leading to an unpractical mysticism which unfits its devotees for the plain tasks of life. Priests, whether of the orthodox ordained type or of the self-elected kind, very often seem to place a high value on spiritual substitutes. They think that the great thing is to get people to believe in something; and whether that something is the essential truth or not does not much matter so long as it leads people towards the truth. That is the idea. The point is: Can you lead people *towards* spiritual truth which is an immediate, ever-present fact? Will not our perception of reality be blunted

rather than sharpened by substitutes? Take for instance spiritism. Very likely the soul's survival after physical death will be proved by this means, and that would be a very interesting scientific occurrence. It is not, however, for its scientific value that spiritism is practised in a large majority of cases, but either to satisfy curiosity or to alleviate suffering. None of us will withhold our sympathy from those who in the agony of parting seek consolation and a kind of re-union in this way; only do not let us imagine that it is spiritual experience which is thus obtained. Survival is a psychic matter, an extension of our experience here. Spiritual experience is, surely, not an extension of anything; it is a different quality of consciousness. I firmly believe that, if we could possess this great experience to any appreciable degree, our sense of immortality would be so strong, so ever-present, that such a question as that of survival would lose much of its importance.

The fact is that a large amount of so-called religion is inspired by nothing else than fear. People cling to any kind of belief because unbelief is such a terrible thing. Completely to lose faith, to enter into the great silence, is an experience that is full of dread, and the person who will face it without flinching must unconsciously contradict his own denial by calling up the spiritual quality of courage in order to do so. Surely this is far better than being propped up with inferior supports, however comforting these may be. Let people hold on to their unbelief and suffer through it; then in time will come the knowledge that there is something in human nature which remains unsatisfied without spiritual food. People are too much afraid of being hurt; so they indulge in forms of psychic drug-



taking, running the danger of losing taste for and perception of more normal sustenance. It is better to reject these opiates and suffer without flinching. Why should we not? Do not let us cower before Zeus when by the high quality of tension we may hope eventually to possess the spirit of Prometheus.

“Ah me! alas, pain, pain ever, for ever,”  
cried the Titan, adding:

“No change, no pause, no hope! Yet I endure.”

There has been much talk lately about a play in which a woman after great personal suffering exclaims: “Can we forgive God?” One question I have not heard raised in this connection is whether God wants people to forgive him! Appalling suffering had gone on in the world for ages; then came the War and the agony of the world was brought home to nearly everyone personally, and because people found themselves personally receiving hurt they resented it. It was no new problem; only the weight of accumulated experience overwhelmed large numbers who had never thought or felt much before. The appalling repetition of bereavement stunned the world with pain, and inclined us to lose our sense of proportion with regard to personal loss. But surely the power to see beyond this smaller person of ours constitutes the best part of religion. The problem of why pain and evil exist in the universe will never be settled through such superficial questioning. Prometheus deliberately chose the path of personal suffering because it was the only way to freedom. I do not believe that strong characters ever flinch from it; consciously or unconsciously they are aware of it as the supreme test of their grip upon that which lies beyond, that reality of which some

people are granted peculiarly clear vision in times of trouble.

Does not this compel us to another hard conclusion : That if personal suffering seems to drive away faith it is because faith was never present? Often what is believed to be faith is not so, and perhaps one of the finest uses of suffering is to help in searching this out. I am told that just now the clergy are distressed because so many men have come out of the army denying God. The men say that, if there were a God, he could not have permitted to happen the things they have seen happen. To those whose task it is to teach religious opinion, this is doubtless a most irreligious state of mind ; and yet I cannot help feeling that the reality of the case is different from their view. These men went—in many cases voluntarily—to offer their lives for what they believed to be right. No one can go further for his faith than to offer his life for it ; what does it matter whether they call what they fought for God or not? It is the faith that counts and not the creed ; and it is by faith that we live, because faith is our discovery of the spiritual in the material, the real in the relative ; according to our power of holding this vision we receive the vital breath of our lives.

We do not want to retire to a cave in the mountains and become one with a secluded God. That has been done in the past ; there is no progress in it ; and whether there is progress in the Eternal Idea or not, certainly there should be progress in our approach thereto. It is here, at this moment, among all the suffering and evil of this world that we have to look for it, to find it, and above all to recognize it. This last is the most difficult because it is so much easier to

see the other thing. When the Spirit of the Hour was sent forth by Prometheus to herald the dawn of liberation in the world, he was disappointed at first not to see such mighty change as he had expected; but looking more carefully his sight began to clear and he saw that "men walked one with the other even as spirits do." Modern psychology offers a very illuminating theory with regard to this difficulty in recognizing good. In Dr. Maurice Nichol's *Dream-Psychology*, he says, speaking of the interpretation of symbols: "Differences in mental background must degrade or refine the interpretation. A man who is lacking in some typical human experience will never interpret in quite the same way as a man who is richer by it." There is a smack to our self-complacency! Generally when we fail to find good in others, we receive a certain amount of satisfaction from the fact; we tell ourselves that we do not like that person because of his faults, and assure ourselves that we are quite right to disapprove of him. But now comes in a most disturbing idea: It is not our neighbour's faults but the lack of a richer experience in our own mental background which prevents our perception of his more spiritual qualities.

Prometheus never wavered from his faith in Good even when God himself seemed to have failed. What finer model could we adopt than this glorious figure of the Titan, refusing everything but the triumph of Love everlasting, here and now; never giving up expectation of perfection in this imperfection; holding on with divine grip to the knowledge of immortal Truth, which is no more killed by the accidents of Time than it will be by Time itself?

Most of us are watching with angry impatience the push of those who have profited by the sufferings

of the world, men who have made large fortunes while other men were being maimed and dying; on the other hand we see people who try to correct wrong by wrong, threatening the wreck of ordered life by revolution. The men who have fought and survived come back to all this saying that their faith is gone. Is it possible that in this stress and strain we are watching the process of a great mystery?—watching, but without recognizing its significance? In one of the Gnostic traditions there is a vision of the Cross which is not like the usual picture of the Crucifixion; for instead of one Man being nailed to the tree it shows us thereon “a multitude not having one form . . . because not yet hath every limb of Him who came down been gathered together.” That sounds very like our experience of the last few years. As before so now again humanity upon the Cross is crying out bitterly that God has forsaken it; and in the old story this cry was a prelude to the Resurrection. But when Mary Magdalene first saw Jesus in the garden, she thought he was one of the gardeners; so also in the walk to Emmaus the disciples failed to recognize their risen Lord. Is not history repeating itself in this also? Are we not failing to recognize the new spiritual body of the world because it is not just what we expected that it would be? Is not the failure again in ourselves, and have we not lost our power of tension? We lack that Titanic vision which never loses sight of spiritual truth in spite of the Furies who come to torture, or the revilings of those whom the superman has suffered to help. But it is that Titanic vision which gives the liberating power, and we shall never unbind the world from evil by cursing it. Cannot those who believe that reconstruction is fundamentally a spiritual matter,

make an effort to hold on to the deep-lying significance of it all, and prepare the way of truth by courageous thought which refuses to believe in anything else? Shelley gives us a lead :

“ Hark ! The rushing snow !

The sun-awakened avalanche ! whose mass,  
Thrice sifted by the storm, had gathered there  
Flake after flake, in heaven-defying minds,  
As thought by thought is piled, till some great truth  
Is loosened, and the nations echo round,  
Shaken to their roots, as do the mountains now.”

The acceptance of evil is part of that so-called religion which is the result of fear ; it is worship of the Tyrant. The religion of Prometheus is the result of courage ; it is the fire that keeps alive the soul of man till the hour of liberation. I have heard people speak as though Prometheus typified the spirit of resistance against God, and this idea appeals to the sort of mind who considers it rather dashing to defy the Deity. It all depends upon what we mean by God. Prometheus resisted the unjust being who was bullying the universe, before whose image men grovelled in fear, and who has been too often mistaken for God. The resistance of Prometheus was in reality a great obedience, obedience at an almost inconceivable degree of grandeur given to Supreme Love, that Spirit which man can contact directly only through his own heart.

We have watched the moral and spiritual triumph of his suffering ; we have now to see what was Shelley's conception of the result of this triumph. The quality which perhaps above all others proves the spirituality of this story is its impersonality. Prometheus was the friend of man, and the height of his sacrifice is

affirmed by the fact that he refused liberation which would be for himself alone; the Titan held himself till his unbinding meant the freedom of the world. One is reminded of the legend of Amida Buddha refusing Nirvana and waiting till all the sentient universe be saved. It is a saviour-story, and the high conception of what such a victory must be is shown in the description of the day of triumph: "When Conquest is dragged captive through the deep."

Most poets would have failed when the dramatic agony of Prometheus ceased; but it is here, perhaps, that Shelley attains to his finest and subtlest effort of spiritual expression. The keynote is given in one short speech of Hercules, who unbinds the Titan, saying:

"Most glorious among spirits, thus doth strength  
To wisdom, courage and long-suffering love,  
And thee, who art the form they animate,  
Minister like a slave."

Then Prometheus sets forth his idea of the life of freedom. He, with Asia, his spouse, and their faithful companions, will live the life of immortals in perfect fellowship:

"And we will search, with looks and words of love,  
For hidden thoughts, each lovelier than the last,  
Our unexhausted spirits; and like lutes,  
Touched by the skill of the enamoured wind,  
Weave harmonies divine, yet ever new,  
From difference sweet where discord cannot be."

In the Cave where they dwell will meet the Winds from all points of heaven, and these will carry the echoes of the human world, telling the immortals of the life of love and freedom lived now by liberated men.

**Lovely apparitions which are the arts of men shall appear :**

“The wandering voices and the shadows these  
Of all that man becomes, the mediators  
Of that best worship—love, by him and us  
Given and returned; swift shapes and sounds which  
    grow  
More fair and soft as man grows wise and kind,  
And, veil by veil, evil and error fall.”

In the moment of his defeat, swaying on the edge of the abyss into which he is about to fall, the Tyrant cries :

**“ Mercy !’ Mercy !**

Oh  
That thou wouldst make mine enemy my judge!"

Such a cry betokens the high victory of Prometheus. We must remember that the writer of this drama has described elsewhere Napoleon as an 'unambitious slave.' Shelley's idea of a victor was not such. The Tyrannic ideal is victory to the man who conquers the world endeavouring to liberate himself; the Promethean conquers self in order that he may liberate the world.

“ To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite ;  
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night ;  
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent ;  
To love, and bear ; to hope till hope creates  
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates ;  
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent ;  
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be  
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free ;  
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory.”

**MARGARET LEGGE.**

## THOMAS VAUGHAN IN OXFORD.

MARY J. H. SKRINE.

### I. THE VALE OF USK.

AT the opening of Michaelmas Term, 1638, a pair of twin brothers came up to Oxford from their Welsh home to matriculate at Jesus. If we accept the birth-date given by 'the first-borne,' they were aged seventeen and a half.<sup>1</sup> Through their affectionate and careful father, a younger son of that ancient house, they took from the Vaughans of Tretower some of the bluest and oldest blood of a richly endowed country-side. Inter-marriage with an Aubrey made them cousins to the famous John, whose *Brief Lives* place him among the most bewitching gossips in history. George Herbert of Bemerton too was their distant kinsman.

The comfortable marriage of a gentleman of his standing brought Mr. Vaughan his wife's pleasant estate of Newton by Usk, in the parish of St. Bridget, Llansantffread, where they lived and reared their family. A modern farm-house, looking full on the river, now replaces the home where love and gentle breeding surrounded healthy, happy children. Years after, in the troubled sleep of an hour of desolation, the younger twin would return (as he records) to this beloved spot. "I dreamed that I lay, full of sores in my feet and clothed in certain rags, under the shelter

<sup>1</sup> Aubrey, *Brief Lives* (ed. A. Clark), i. 268.



of the great oak, which grows before the courtyard of my father's house, and it rained round about me; not being able to stand up I was laid all along. I dreamed that my father and my brother W., who were both dead, came to me." They so aided that "I was presently well and stood up with great joy."<sup>1</sup>

Henry and Thomas, 17th century children, made no long journeys, but grew up among gentle kin, cousins and neighbours. For these two vision-seers the Vale of Usk, 'meet nurse for a poetic child,' clad with greenwood and the lone glory of mountain and the river's 'supernatural still voice,' held all Life's earliest secrets. A second potent mystery brooded over them. What twinhood means not even the twin's self can tell; he only knows that none not a twin can know it. These were kindred yet dissimilar souls.

They went at eleven years to school to their kinsman, the learned Matthew Herbert, 'a noted schoolmaster,' Rector of Llangattock a few miles away.<sup>2</sup> Straight from his hands they went up to Jesus, the Welsh College.

At the University came soon the inevitable parting of the ways. In an autograph letter to Aubrey, Henry says: "I stayed not att Oxford to take my degree, but was sent to London, beinge designed by my father for the study of the law, which the sudden eruption of our late warres wholie frustrated. My brother continued there for 10 or 12 yeares and I thinke he could be no lesse than Master of Arts."<sup>3</sup> Here we too part company with the Silurist.

<sup>1</sup> *Works of Thomas Vaughan* (ed. A. E. Waite), Appendix I. Mem. Sac. vii.

<sup>2</sup> Wood on Henry Vaughan (*Athene Oxoniensis*, iii, 425).

<sup>3</sup> Henry Vaughan's Autograph Letter to Aubrey, in Wood MSS. F. 39, fol. 216.

## II. EUGENIUS PHILALETHES.

Thomas Vaughan, fighting Cavalier, poet, devout lover, Hermetic philosopher, the 'great chymist' and 'noted son of the fire,' though elusive as every man whose soul is shaped like his, does not yet wholly refuse himself to the student. He was no recluse, but a vehement preacher of his own faiths, worked out with labour and anguish, 'with struggle and with straining.' Despite sacred secrecies in innermost matters, he held that great Thing which he conceived himself, if in part only, to have attained, to be a talent which 'twas death to hide. He was a 'stormy-working soul.' Yet the fire within him burned with a clear flame of devout vision, and at any moment he would have died cheerfully for Truth. His mortal days brought him drama. He learned life from living—from hot and passionate experience, from conflict, from an exquisite and romantic love.

The two Welsh lads entered an Oxford whose history has found a curious parallel in our own day. Have not our streets too been emptied of their 'scholars and privileged men,' and filled instead with 'russet coates' and 'blewe coates'? We too have heard the bugle mingle with our bells. As our fathers could not, we can see the place whose air already stirred with rumblings of the imminent war-cloud, and read open-eyed the meticulous diary and notes of a certain small boy who, when the twins came up, was 'in his Bible and ready to go into his accedence.'<sup>1</sup>

Assuredly our Thomas drilled with the companies who trained in New College Quad. under the eyes of

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Anthony Wood* (ed. Bliss), p. iii.

Dr. Pink, pro-Vice-Chancellor; which "being a novel matter, there was no holding of the school-boys in their school in the cloyster from seeing and following them"—when, "entring in to the towne at St. Giles his Church, they came marching all the waye through the market place, and so over Carfax and downe the high street (that so bothe towne and country might take notice thereof)." To-day's urchins with the same joy have witnessed the same "delightsome prospect" in the same "Newe Parkes," as the new levies "skirmished together in a very decent manner."

Our scholar had been less than two years at College when an event befell, scandalous to the modern mind, not unheard-of then. From a kinsman, patron of the living of Llansantffread, prudent Mr. Vaughan, it would seem, received for his second son promise of the next presentation. In 1640 it fell vacant. The lad of 19 (if so much) was fetched from Oxford, ordained (was it 'by accumulation'?) probably in the Chapel of Christ's College, Brecon, and instituted to the cure. Next spring he was taking his Bachelor's degree at Oxford. In 1649 he was sequestered for 'bearing arms for the King.'

The storm broke, sweeping him and the rest into the field. We have no dates or details. While he may have served within or without Oxford during her siege, Henry's '10 or 12 yeares' would seem to make her his central home. College records here fail. But Wood, who knew Oxford facts, if less accurately events happening at a distance, calls him Fellow of Jesus. Wood, a decade their junior, seems to have known both twins, but without intimacy. His sketches of them in the *Athene Oxoniensis* (iii. 722) are scarcely the less interesting. He devotes the greater space

to Thomas, records the appointment to 'Llansomfreid' and proceeds:

"But the unsettledness of the times hindring him a quiet possession of, he left, it, and in a sedate repose prosecuted his medicinal geny (in a manner natural to him), and at length became eminent in the chymical part thereof at Oxon, and afterwards at London under the protection and patronage of that noted chymist Sir Rob. Murrey or Moray, Knight, Secretary of State for the Kingdom of Scotland. . . .

"He was a great chymist, a noted son of the fire, an experimental philosopher, a zealous brother of the Rosicrucian fraternity, an understander of some of the Oriental languages, and a tolerably good English and Latin poet. He was neither Papist nor Sectary, but a true resolute Protestant in the best sense of the Church of England."<sup>1</sup>

Here then we set forth with him on a new road of life.

There is something rather stirring to the imagination, well-nigh a Paladin touch, about the figure we follow. The young soldier turns from the roaring field to a spiritual battle-ground. Dreamer and fighter, the romance of his mountains and 'his medicinal geny' in his blood, he turns from the heart-break of a cause beloved and lost to 'my dear Mother, the most famous University of Oxford.'<sup>2</sup> Setting his face towards the wilderness and the immensities, he deliberately secludes himself, the knight seeking the cloister, in 'a sedate repose.'

Where he found it is not clear. Not in his own college, 'dismantled into part of a garrison'—fellows

<sup>1</sup> The last sentence is Vaughan's own quoted without acknowledgment from *Anthroposophia Theomagica*.

<sup>2</sup> Epistle Dedicatory to *Lumen de Lumine* (Works, p. 289).

and students dispersed, Dr. Mansell, the pious Royalist Principal, exiled in Wales. He must have had access to some laboratory and somewhere to live. One place only in Oxford he names when he speaks of "a young strange person, who appeared in a strange manner to me at Edmond Hall."<sup>1</sup> Edmond Hall (with an odd reputation to-day of being 'haunted,' which however seems to evaporate under tests) is a tiny and secluded green quadrangle, now entered and concealed by an old, scarce-noticed, iron-nailed and knockered door in the wall close to the ancient Churchyard and Church of St. Peter-in-the-East. Towards a Crypt, called familiarly 'the second oldest Church in England,' look the little Hall's square, projecting casements. Judge Jenkyns, Vaughan's cousin, was of its distinguished members, and had gathered round him there a little Welsh coterie of friends. One builds nothing on such facts; yet it is tempting to glimpse our student dwelling with the silence in some panelled, low-ceiled chamber of this 'haunt of ancient peace.' It was a strenuous time. His books, all save one, appeared in 1650-1-2. He adopted the pen name of Eugenius Philalethes. One only of his undoubted works, *Aula Lucis*, vouched for as his by Henry,<sup>2</sup> was published, for reasons which remain obscure, under the initials S. N. (the last letters of his two names).

To return to Anthony Wood and his note in the *Athene* (iii. 725). The study of 'occult' things in Oxford still awaits the expert historian; but the veriest learner may feel the stirring of discoveries to come. The age that saw the Royal Society born was franker and bolder of tongue than ours; but in such matters there is always a within and a without. The Oxford

<sup>1</sup> *Works*, Append. I. Mem. Sacr. xiii

<sup>2</sup> Wood's *Life* (ed. Bliss), p. lii.

that produced Vaughan and Elias Ashmole stood, in all realities, quite outside though never averse from dabbings in 'these curious arts.' An amusing passage shows Anthony himself and others thus occupied.

"An. Dom. 1663, . . . April 23. He began a course of chimistery under the noted chimist and rosicrucian, Peter Sthael of Strasburg in Royal Prussia, and concluded in the latter end of May following. The club consisted of 10 at least, whereof Franc. Turner of New Coll. was one (since Bishop of Ely), Benjamin Woodroff of Ch. Ch. another, and John Lock of the same house, afterwards a noted writer. The club wrot and took notes from the mouth of their master, who sate at the upper end of a table, but the said J. Lock scorn'd to work; so that while every man besides of the club were writing, he would be prating and troublesome. This P. Sthael, who was a Lutheran and a great hater of women, was a very useful man, had his lodging in University Coll. in a chamber at the west end of the old chappel. He was brought to Oxon by the Hon. Mr. Robt. Boyle an. 1659. . . . The Chimical club concluded and A. W. paid Mr. Sthael 30 shill. having, in the beginning of the class, given 30 shillings beforehand. A. W. got some knowledge and experience; but his mind still hung after antiquities and musick." (*Life*, p. lii.)

This picture of his 'knowledge and experience' is useful to the critic of 'A. W.' on Thomas Vaughan. Let us in justice note that, though he could not understand them, he at least tried to study Vaughan's writings: witness quotations, and a valuable bibliography carefully obtained from Henry. With matters of Eastern tongues and Latin verse he is at home; but when he describes Vaughan the man, he besprinkles

him with various large phrases wherewith he frequently overlays his work in dealing with persons mysterious but 'ingeniose.' Some will do. Vaughan was 'a great chymist' and an 'experimental philosopher.' What, however, Wood meant by 'a son of the fire' he probably did not know. Neither do we. When again he writes of 'Rosicrucians' (whether with a small or large R) we must beware. Knowledge worth having about a Society whose first law has always been utter secrecy, is not for him who runs and reads or writes. There are those indeed who would have us believe that the Rosicrucians "on the whole did not exist." Yet face to face with Wood's favourite phrase, "he was also a noted Rosicrucian," recurrent in the pages of the *Athene*, it would be hard to think there were not people in Wood's Oxford who were known and knew themselves by that mysterious name. But when he claims Thomas Vaughan as 'a zealous brother of the Rosicrucian fraternity,' he goes beyond his book; for he here joins issue with no less a person than the man himself, who went out of his way categorically and not once only to deny this statement, declaring roundly: "I have for my own part no relation to them, neither do I much desire their acquaintance."<sup>1</sup>

It would seem difficult to argue with such a disavowal in front of us. In spite of this, certain writers, says Mr. Waite, "usually connected with pseudo-Rosicrucian societies, have claimed Vaughan as a member of the Brotherhood and even as having filled the chief office of 'Imperator' therein," and one is often glibly told that denial was part of a member's practice.

Whether or no, after the lapse of three centuries, it is still possible to get to the bottom of so puzzling

<sup>1</sup> *Works*, Pref. to *Fama*, p. 347.

a matter, the study of Vaughan's personality may support an explanation, which rules out the accusation of deliberate falsehood against a gentleman ready on occasion to be needlessly and offensively truthful. The facts seem to suggest that Vaughan's own mental history may account both for Wood's mistake and Vaughan's denial. He prefaced his first book with a dedication: 'To the most Illustrious and Truly Regenerated Brethren R. C. Elders of Election and Peaceable Apostles of the Church in this Storm-Driven Age Salutation from the Centre of Peace'; and the 'Address' to them which follows is dated by himself 'Oxford 1648.' The tone of both, as of all his writings, is deeply respectful and sympathetic towards 'these famous and most Christian philosophers.' But nowhere is there evidence, internal or other, of membership. The denial of it quoted above (and three times repeated) is found in Vaughan's Preface to a new translation (not his) of the R. C. *Fama Fraternitatis*. This appeared in 1652. It was, he expressly states, written by request.<sup>1</sup> Vaughan, who never agreed altogether with anyone, must assuredly have been inly conscious of his own rapid growth during these four important years; he seems almost to embrace this occasion to define his position as a ripened thinker. If moreover the truth should be that the 'Peaceable Apostles' of the dedication represented some close circle known to him in Oxford, with whom he did not desire to be identified, this becomes yet more probable.

Having thus taken Vaughan's Rosicrucianism for granted, Wood shows a stronger interest in the sorry squabble, unworthy of both, but doubtless a matter of

<sup>1</sup> *Works*, p. 841.



scholarly Oxford gossip, between Vaughan and More the Cambridge Platonist. 'A. W.' is careful to inform us that More called Vaughan a Momus, a mime, an ape, and a jack-pudding, Vaughan bettering this in 'The Man-mouse taken in a Trap and tortured to Death for gnawing of the Margins of Eugenius Philalethes.' Controversy then was neither pretty nor dignified.

### III. THE BOOKS.

Thomas Vaughan's Works, which for the first time have been well and fully edited quite recently by Mr. A. E. Waite, are sometimes hard reading even for the expert. The unlearned have to wander in a jungle of turgid English, "a language the author was not born to," as he is careful to remind us. The subject-matter, as the titles show, is profoundly mysterious. For a classic and philosopher, Vaughan is a strangely confused thinker, rarely pursuing a matter calmly to its natural end, forgetting what he has said before, impatient of delay and argument. Words, even thoughts, get in his way and he stumbles over them. He can never refrain from belabourings of Aristotle, fathomless discourse on skyblue dogs, 'celestial slime,' Tubal Cain's relations to alchemy, or from violent scoldings of Heaven knows who; and the reader's pilgrimage is apt to end in a painful reminiscence of Gratiano's reasons.

But not to read is not to know Thomas Vaughan. Terminology, vision-seeing, puzzlement, all alike are his—his soul's, not another's. The whole teems with unconscious autobiography and is instinct with the deep crying, full of tender and soaring beauty, of

a fiery heart for Truth, that 'dove of the deluge,' which in that heart "hath a little bark to return to. Methinks I see her in the window all wet and weather-beaten."

At the root of matter and manner lies the man. He was a born free-lance. Within himself dwelt the thing he must say. In his own vessel, storm-tossed often and manned only by himself, he launched out into the deep. To watch him at work is to see that for him the books and thoughts of others, though often quoted, are purely secondary. For his reader, too, whether he will hear or whether he will forbear, the author quite lacks sympathy. Most men are fools. If the reader is not, then he is that treasure among friends who may hear unspeakable words; still, they are hard to utter.

With a writer who thus 'broods and sleeps on his own heart,' his later works are apt to be the easier reading. The stream runs clearer as it flows. In the earlier treatises poems touched with spiritual tenderness, reminding one of notes in his twin's voice, are interpolated. When, as often, he touches the Old Testament text or founds elaborate alchemical argument on isolated words of Christ, as "Salt is good," he shows an extreme of literalness that recalls some itinerant preacher of to-day out of his own Wales. *Lumen de Lumine*, *Aula Lucis*, *Euphrates*, contain his ripest and weightiest work. Mr. Waite, in an exhaustive and finely-studied Introduction, calls him "an ambitious student at work in the dark unaided, owing nothing to ordinary instruction and nothing to a school of initiation." He definitely claimed to have seen, handled, worked upon and even tasted 'the First Matter of all things,' though his most central

experiences are shrouded solemnly in mystery and silence.

Mr. Waite places him in a triad with Michael Sendivogius and the anonymous Eirenæus Philalethes; but these he classes as first great alchemists, Vaughan as chiefly a mystic. The touch of the man through his work convincingly supports his editor. A passion, deep-moving and resistless as the wind of his own mountains, for God, the 'Great Adventure,' without as within, is the breath of Thomas Vaughan's being. Yet when he cries: "Love is the medium who doth unite the lover to that which is beloved," he is nearer to Julian of Norwich than to his namesake Eirenæus; and not without a hint of sadness, for he counts not himself to have apprehended.

"Reader, be not deceived in me. I am not a man of any such faculties, neither do I expect this blessing in such a great measure in this life. . . . Hold me, I bid thee, as a finger-post, which, ever pointing forward, shows the way to others undertaking the journey."<sup>1</sup> And again: "Shew me but one good Christian capable of and fit to receive such a secret and I will show him the right infallible way to come by it. Yet this I must tell thee: it would sink thee to the ground to hear this mystery related, for it cannot ascend to the heart of the natural man how near God is to him and how he is to be found."

"He looks here into his own glass of vision," adds Mr. Waite, who, refusing to be wise above that which is written, goes on to question whether Vaughan attained the Unio Mystica in experience or only in 'intellectual conviction,' and inclines to the latter view. We should

<sup>1</sup> *Anima Magica Abscondita*, p. 118; the last sentence is quoted from Cornelius Agrippa.

remember, however, that the quotation is from a book published when Vaughan had before him fifteen years more of life and yet greater things in experience.

#### IV.—LOVE AND DEATH.

On the 28th of September, 1651, that year of *Lumen de Lumine* and *Aula Lucis*, which touches his high-water mark, Thomas Vaughan was joined in marriage with a lady whose Christian name was Rebecca. Few but significant are the further facts known about her. She was Vaughan's true mate, the half of his soul, the centre for him of all joy and sympathy. She was moreover his partner in work so that, after his marriage, his chemical recipes and records of experiment are signed no longer 'T. V.' but 'T. R. V.' On the 17th of April, 1658, she died, after an illness of scarce two days, as her husband tells us, adding: "God of his infinite and sure mercies in Christ Jesus, bring us together again in Heaven whither she is gone before me, and with her my heart and my faith not to be broken; and this Thou knowest, O my God! Amen!"

Such a love-match, in the case of a man of family, was then as much out of the common as such a sharing of deep intellectual interests between man and wife. The heart-broken husband, recording a dream of "such a love to her as I had to her very soul in my prayers," wherein he "was again newly married," and "brought her along to show to my friends," saying: "Here is a wife which I have not chosen of myself, but my father did choose her for me"—is constrained to add a proud foot-note: "This was not true of our temporal marriage nor of our natural parents, and therefore it signifies some greater mercy."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Works*, App. I. Mem. Sacr. vii.

They "lived together at the Pinner of Wakefield in those dear days." Miss L. I. Guiney, most devout of Vaughan students and kindest to a learner, tells me (alas from her death-bed) this home of theirs was in Gray's Inn Road, in the parish of St. Andrew, Holborn. Where Rebecca died we do not know.

The moving story has another interest. Out of this fair romance of two rare souls comes down to us, like the cry of a great desolation, a scrap of human autobiography, naïve and poignant beyond expression.

In the British Museum lies a little quarto MS.,<sup>1</sup> 'written before and behind' and at either end, with blank pages in the middle, and titled: 'Aqua Vitæ non Vitis: or the Radical Humiditie of Nature, mechanically and magically dissected by the Conduct of Fire and Ferment, as well in the particular Bodies of Metalls and Minerals as in its seminal universal Forme and Chaos. By Thomas Vaughan, Gent.' The chemical and other recipes that follow are headed (in Latin): 'The whole Art as discovered in the Days of my sweetest Wife.'

This little book of 'processes,' 'a collection of particular secrets appertaining *ad rem medicam*,' bears its history on its face; the MS. contains evidently notes for a future book on which the two were working. On the reverse of the leaves is matter of quite another kind.

For the back of its pages are covered with personal jottings by one only. Coming each morning to his lonely work, the desolate man out of the tragic drama of his own soul is constrained first to record that which has happened in the night: the comings to him in dreams of his beloved, her dear presence gone on

<sup>1</sup> Sloan MSS. 1741.

waking; his own assurances and inferences from these fair visions; her foretelling thus of his father's death, to which he adds: "And, since, it is really come to pass, for he is dead and gone to my merciful God, as I have been informed by letters come to my hand from the country."

No cumbrous English must be waded thro' now, only pregnant, unconscious words and simple, short phrases like sobs.

Among these sacred scraps of a sore soul's history, thirteen entries in all, one, the fourth, stands alone. It seems to record the central event of Vaughan's alchemical and philosophic life, mysteriously befalling at its most tragic moment.

"On the same day my dear wife sickened, being a Friday, and at the same time of the day, namely in the evening, my gracious God did put into my heart the secret of extracting the Oil of Halcali, which I had once accidentally found at the Pinner of Wakefield in the days of my most dear wife. But it was again taken from me by a most wonderful judgement of God, for I never could remember how I did it, but made a hundred attempts in vain. And now my glorious God (Whose name be praised for ever) has brought it again into my mind, and on the same day my dear wife sickened: and on the Saturday following, which was the day she died on, I extracted it by the former practice: so that on the same day, which proved the most sorrowful to me, whatever can be, God was pleased to confer on me the greatest joy I can ever have in this world after her death. The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away: blessed be the name of the Lord. Amen! T. R. V."

Mr. Waite comments with his usual caution:

"I tend to think that the Oil of Halcali may have been Vaughan's sacramental name for his First Matter."

With this event Thomas Vaughan passes into silence. 'Aqua Vitæ non Vitis' was never published, and after Rebecca's death no other work of his appeared. We know not what he did with the seven years yet left him. His last recorded words express a widowed yearning to pass on: "I am ready for death, and with all my heart shall I welcome it."<sup>1</sup>

In September, 1665, the King and Queen, with their Courts, "came to Oxon to avoid the plague raging throughout the nation."<sup>2</sup> With them came Sir Robert Murray and Thomas Vaughan.

On a day in the new year that followed, Vaughan rode out of Oxford over 'Eastbridge.' Turning from the London road above Wheatley, four miles short of Thame he left the road for the fields. Descending a steep slope, he came upon an old secluded house. From rising ground across the road an ancient Norman church looked down a green and silent place.

Why did Vaughan come here on that winter day nigh three hundred years ago? What was the true story of his sudden and untimely death? Here no record remains either of death, or of burial 'by the care and charge' of Sir Robert Murray. A vandal mid-19th century Rector razed church and house to the ground, incorporating scraps of the latter in his comfortable modern rectory. Grave, monument, registers, all are gone.

Henry in his autograph to Aubrey gives Feb. 27, 1666, as the date adding proudly: "My brother died upon an imployment for his Majestie." Wood,<sup>3</sup> who in a footnote cites as his informant a certain Mr. Harris

<sup>1</sup> Mem. Sacr. xiii.

<sup>2</sup> Wood's *Life*, p. lvi.

<sup>3</sup> *Ath. Oxon.* iii. 725.

of Jesus College, says Vaughan died at Albury, "as it were suddenly, when he was operating strong mercury." Another rather ambiguous sentence adds that seven years later "my friend" (whether or not Mr. Harris) "was informed" by Sir Robert Murray, who died a few hours later, "of the death and burial of Eugenius Philalethes." It is not clear whether Murray stated on this occasion that the cause of death was that given above.

The Rev. Samuel Kem, in whose house Vaughan died, was a notorious and noisy turn-coat, who stuck like a veritable Vicar of Bray to his living of Albury, where he spent little time during the wars.<sup>1</sup> Mystery enwraps the occasion of Vaughan's visit to so odd a friend for courtiers and students like Murray and himself. But early Restoration years teemed with every kind of intrigue, involving strange figures, and Vaughan was in the confidence of Murray, who was in the confidence of Charles II.

Of what nature was the 'employment for his Majestie'? If Henry knew, he kept it from gossiping Cousin Aubrey. For chemical research and 'inhaling the fumes of mercury' Albury Rectory seems a strange place. One might very well there undiscoverably meet with foul play; but of this no more is to be known.

One thing only signifies. From this fair and secret spot Thomas Vaughan passed beyond all earth-mists and, in his twin's immortal words, went 'into the world of light.'

Since then at times he has seemed to become a half-legendary figure. Strange stories have been told of his supposed 'Rosicrucian' experiences, and he has been confused with Eirenæus Philalethes. In all ages

<sup>1</sup>*Ath. Oxon.* iii. 907.



there have passed through our world those from whom has streamed as it were "the power of an endless life." When they are no more seen, some dream that they have never died, others that surely some day they must come again. Such fleeting light and shade plays over the memory of Thomas Vaughan. Yet clear to be seen and full of charm still remains that stalwart figure, strong, faulty, pathetic. His feet stood firm on solid English earth, however his head, as some detractors said with scorn that knew not it spoke truth, might be 'in the clouds.' The words of those who knew and loved him, and yet more his own, show him in his habit as he lived. If for us he is no more (as for our over-imaginative forbears) the Mage Merlin, he is still the born knight-errant. Fighting, working, dreaming, loving, always he 'followed the Gleam.'

MARY J. H. SKRINE.

## THE PILLOW OF WISDOM.

ROSEI, an idler of worldly love with no thought of life  
after death,

Is on a journey to Mount Yoi to meet there a priest  
of learning.

By his ears a faint sound of song is heard :

“Lost in a world pathless, in woe unseen,  
How canst thou know the waking time from dream ? ”  
He sees in the course of journey many a familiar scene  
Rolling away as if a scroll rolled into the clouds ;  
He sees many a hill and moor forsaken by the setting  
sun.

To Kantan he comes ; he stops at a wayside inn.

Here he has to spend an hour of burning noon

And wait for the passing shower.

The inn-mistress led Rosei into a room

And showed him a pillow, saying :

“This is gift of a guest skilled in magic art :

Who touches it will see a dream of future and past.

To him the secret of higher perception will open wide.”

She persuades him to try it while waiting for dinner,

And withdraws. Rosei thinks the thought happy.

He lays his tired head on the pillow.

\* \* \* \* \*

He hears someone calling him. Rising

He sees a large suite of courtiers with a beautifully  
decked palanquin.

One, the chief of them all, speaks to him, saying :

"The Emperor of the Land of Ibara gives up the throne

To thy person. We are sent to bear thee to the palace."

"Is it possible?" asks Rosei. "Why should I be raised to such dignity?"

"I know no reason," the courtier responds, "save that thou art reputed

To have the heavenly luck of ruling the world.

Stand not idle with thy foolish protest.

Deign to step in the palanquin!"

Rosei rides now in the palanquin decked with sparkling gems.

How exultant he feels as he is borne onward by the courtiers,

As if climbing up the high sky.

On his arrival he finds to his surprise many a tower lofty and large.

In the garden are strewn golden sand and silver pebbles.

The gates, east and west and south and north,

Are all inlaid with diamonds and with jade.

The people pass through them in garments of radiant hues.

The sight, thinks Rosei, can be compared only with the Capital of Holy Sphere

In the land of 'Castle Joyful to Behold.'

Before him countless treasures as tribute are brought.

Banners to greet his ascension to the imperial throne

Wave in the glad sky; the glad voices of the people,

Thunderous, echo in the glad heart of the earth.

In the east a silvery mountain rises,

And a golden sun hangs over it.

In the west a golden mountain kisses the sky,

And the silvery moon swims gently above.

Oh, what does this sight betoken ?  
Does it not sing : Nor spring nor autumn will mark  
the time ;  
The sun and moon will forget their wonted speed ?  
Does it not sing of the deathless world where Rosei  
sits enthroned ?  
Then the ministers and courtiers appear before him ;  
They reverently address him, saying : " Alas, fifty  
long years have passed  
Since thou didst deign to mount the august throne.  
But thy imperial life would be prolonged a thousand  
years  
If thou wouldst drink of this elixir.  
We have brought thee the nectar and cup."  
" What may this be ? " asks Rosei.  
" The divine drink of the divine immortals," say the  
courtiers.  
" What of the cup ? " asks Rosei again.  
" The cup of the heavenly spirit," say the courtiers  
again.  
They offer Rosei the nectar, wishing him the joy of  
a thousand autumns.  
Smiling, Rosei raises the cup and the young maidens  
whom the ministers have summoned,  
Begin to dance, wishing him the joy of ten thousand  
springs.  
Drinking the nectar Rosei feels  
That his body becomes free like a mist-clear mountain,  
His soul light, like soul of spring with laughing foot-  
steps.  
Here in this lovely land is no change of day and of  
night ;  
One same season only through the year reigns in its  
beauty.

The flowers that the spring-time brings forth,  
The red leaves that shine on autumn's bowers,  
The glad summer moon, the rich winter snows—  
All enchant and please to charm Rosei's fancy and  
sense.

\* \* \* \* \*

He has no word for his wonder, he thinks,  
When he feels someone touch him to wake him.  
It is the inn-mistress to tell him that dinner is ready.  
Alas! 'Twas all then a dream whose shadowy grace  
and whose beauty  
Had vanished in a flash into space. What remained  
Was only the pillow on which his head had been laid  
Amazed he sits up, with eye in quest of the vision out-  
faded.

He cries: "Oh, where are the maidens and queens in  
blushing array,

Where is the melody soft and slow singing?

What I hear now is but the breezes passing through  
the trees.

Where are the towers and the halls of wealth and of  
pride?

What I see now is but the wayside inn humble and  
old.

What, after all, is a reign of fifty years?

It is but an hour of dream, alas!

While in a pot a mess of millet steams."

Since, thinks Rosei, when death comes, a century of  
bliss

Will fade out like a dream, there is naught

On earth but dreams of dreams.

As he had the joy of fifty years on the throne, though  
but in dream,

He says to himself, his life is all well paid.

Reverently before the pillow he sits.

He bows and gives thanks

For the dream which has awakened him to salvation.

He goes not to Mount Yoi for the lesson of the holy  
man.

He turns back home, singing:

“What I hear now is but the breezes passing through  
the trees.

Oh, this life of dream, this world of emptiness!

Let us forget earthly love!”

YONÉ NOGUCHI.

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## DOSTOEVSKY.

I HAVE been to see the works of a painter who was inspired by Dostoevsky. But has he understood him rightly?

The great thing in Dostoevsky is that redeeming note which runs even through the most dismal depths. He dwells on the crooked, tortured side of life and never falls either into cynicism or tearful pity. He marches hesitatingly, groping his way here and there through the intricate labyrinths of consciences overshadowed by the gloom of fate; and, though the lantern he holds on his way is very small, still its light is innocent as is the light on an old woman's face. It is not a forced optimism, it is not even conscious, but—one might say—organic. He has gone deep enough in misery and sin, and therefore he is no longer so pessimistic as those who stand at the

entrance. He has gone so deep in fact that he has almost reached the other side where good begins again. It is not yet a realization, but a faint promise.

Profoundly sincere, profoundly loving, and with divine news trembling yet unformulated on his lips—such is Dostoevsky.

The painter has tried the same thing in his art and failed. He has found that pain brings deformity, and is really more interested in that outward deformity of pain than in pain itself. The result is something rather superficial, and certainly disagreeable to look at. We can stop at the outward appearance of joy and beauty; but in dealing with sorrow we must go to the very depth. Joy and beauty being positive may reflect on their surface a faithful image of their spiritual nature; but sorrow is never what it seems. The exterior aspect of sorrow is the distorted mask of something else.

Behind joy stands but joy; but behind sorrow stands the joy which is its opposite. As Blake says:

“Under every grief and pine  
Runs a joy with silken twine.”

I think that this two-fold appearance of sorrow should always be discriminated in art. It brings in those two attributes which are the inseparable foundations of great drama: the poignant and the serene—poignant by the contrast, serene because complete.

Joy on the other hand is simple, a gentle unity. I think of that exquisite little poem of Anacreon on the birth of Venus:

“She floats like a white sea-weed. Her hands  
of pale reflections break the water, uphold her  
body and push it forward. Above her rosy breasts,

underneath her delicate neck, the deep water comes beating against her, and, in the transparence of the sea, Cypris appears like a lily surrounded by violets."

This pleasurable little description is quite sufficient: the beauty of the Anadyomenē and that playing of transparent waters around her nakedness have given me entire satisfaction. I shall hardly derive any sense of a greater reality in hearing of the ecstasies of St. Teresa or of Spenser's 'Ode to Heavenly Beauty.' In that scene, whose elements are purely sensuous, beauty has nevertheless given us its true self entire. A single one of its aspects holds all the others.

But with the dark side of life it is not the same. The one-sided semblance of ugliness, which is just what strikes the eye, troubles me, makes me feel uneasy as before a truth half-concealed. The so-called realistic art, for instance, pants in quick short breaths; and because that jerky breathing makes a strong sound suggesting the strength of steam, many are taken in by it and say: "What power!"—whereas it is only weakness that prevents it from carrying each breath to the end.

Beyond the marred image of degradation, or rather—I should say—at its very depth, stands the spotless lamb bleating for its mother and its native field with grasses as young as itself.

No art is truly dramatic which does not reach to that ineradicable innocence which is latent in all life.

ISEULT GONNE.



## REVIEWS AND NOTICES

### THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM JAMES.

Edited by his Son Henry James. London (Longmans); 2 vols., pp. 348 + 382; 42s. net.

WILLIAM JAMES was a warm-hearted, graphic and humorous letter-writer. Though psychologists and philosophers will regret that letters of a wholly technical or polemical character have been omitted from this selection of his correspondence, there is much of an intimate and informal nature that throws great light on the versatile nature of his unconventional and lovable character and the development of his thought. His schooling and studies in France, Switzerland and Germany gave him a cosmopolitan outlook. He first gave himself to art, for which he had an undeniable talent, but speedily abandoned it; his keen faculty of observation and delight in nature, however, showed themselves throughout in his subsequent scientific work and the directness and graphic style of his writings. He next turned his attention to physical science, and acquired sufficient competence as a naturalist to become one of the assistants of Agassiz. This he abandoned for physiology and anatomy and later took his doctor's degree in medicine. But research was his chief interest and not the practice of medicine. Physiological-psychology, which was in its infancy, the relation of mind and body, now became his chief preoccupation and he set himself to work to inaugurate and organize the Harvard Laboratory. Ill-health dogged his efforts for the major part of his life and he found great difficulty in getting on to paper in a way that would satisfy his highly critical mind the ideas seething in his brain, especially those of a psychological order. He took no less than twelve years to produce his great work, *The Principles of Psychology*. Originally intended as a short handbook, chiefly of a historical nature, James expanded and rewrote the material until it finally appeared in two thick volumes as one of the most original and challenging contributions to the infant science we possess. Having completed this long labour,

he practically turned his back on psychology, to devote himself to the real love of his life, that for which his whole previous training and studies had been but a propædæutic, the great fundamental principles of life and being, philosophy proper. In one of his letters he humorously remarks that to be a philosopher it is necessary first of all to hate someone's system. We cannot believe of course that he really meant this to be taken *au pied de la lettre* ; nevertheless it is true in his own case that he did most strenuously abhor all that savoured of absolutism and abstractionism, of pure intellectualism or rationalism, and waged relentless war against the Hegelians and Monists of all schools.

But though a most lively controversialist, who knew well how to deal shrewd blows, he was never embittered and remained on the most affectionate terms with those whose standpoints differed most fundamentally from his own. His humour saved him from all bitterness. Thus in a letter to Schiller he repeats a story told by Höffding when lecturing at Harvard. An American child asked his mother if God made the world in six days. "Yes."—"The whole of it?"—"Yes." "Then it is finished, all done?"—"Yes." "Then in what business now is God?" James adds: If Höffding tells it in Oxford, you must say: 'Sitting for his portrait to Royce, Bradley and Taylor!'

The concrete, the 'rich,' the 'thick,' the human and vital, the warmth of emotion and love, our pragmatic pluralist must have at all costs if there was to be any real substance in philosophizing. Orthodoxies and formularies he detested and, while insisting on thoroughness and objectivity in all research, had warm sympathy for much that the schools refused to recognize, especially in the domain of abnormal phenomena and psychical and mystical experience.

Had James enjoyed a normal mystical experience of his own he would have perhaps modified some of his contentions, as may be seen from his description, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, of his experience of what he calls 'toxic ecstasy,' when under 'gas' he entered a state where for the time he understood what underlay the thought of Hegel, his *bête noire*. He had his 'dark night' also. The graphic passage of the 'sick soul,' disguised as the report of an anonymous French correspondent, is a piece of autobiography, written thirty years after the occurrence, in the *Varieties* (p. 160). The philosophy of experience was his chief interest, and towards the end mainly the philosophy of religious experience. Apart from the *Varieties*, which led the

way in the now busy research into the psychology of religious experience, his chief contributions to philosophy were *The Will to Believe*, *Pragmatism*, *A Pluralistic Universe* and *The Meaning of Truth*. All he wrote was eagerly read and strenuously combated. James never resented criticism; his only complaint is that his opponents did not really grasp his meaning,—his phraseology was attacked more frequently than the idea he was labouring to set forth. Thus it was not so much the *will-to-believe* for which he was contending, but the *right-to-believe*: again he agrees with Schiller that *humanism* is a better term than *pragmatism* as a label for his views. James was utterly honest with himself, he was also extraordinarily modest concerning his own achievements, and remained undogmatic to the end, even with regard to some of his chief contentions. Thus he writes to Pillon concerning Pluralism: "I fear that you will find my system too *bottomless* and romantic. I am sure that, be it in the end judged true or false, it is essential to the evolution of clearness in philosophic thought that *someone* should defend a pluralistic empiricism radically." 'Clearness' was for James of the greatest importance; he detested verbiage and was never tired of lamenting the lack of style in most of the work of his colleagues, especially American and German. It has been said of James that his chief fault is that he transfers the psychological conception of life to philosophy; this for some of us, however, is by no means to be lamented. We are glad that it was so, in so far as it enriches the content of his philosophizing. This brings us back to his humorous notion of practical philosophizing beginning with a strong reaction against a crystallized system. As he says, his bogey was desiccation.

#### THE SADHU.

A Study in Mysticism and Practical Religion. By B. H. Streeter, M.A. (Oxon.), Hon. D.D. (Edin.), and A. J. Appasamy, B.A. (Madras), M.A. (Harvard), B.D. (Hartford). London (Macmillan); pp. 264; 8s. 6d. net.

THIS is an interesting, instructive, and discriminating account of the life and teachings of Sundar Singh, a Sikh convert to Christianity, who visited this country last year and made a deep impression on many by his simplicity, sincerity and spiritual insight. It is a valuable sequel to Mrs. Arthur Parker's small biographical volume *Sadhu Sundar Singh, Called of God*, and tells

us much of what we desired to hear about the views of this pleasing character, elicited mainly from himself by the able and sympathetic questioning of the two writers. Sundar Singh is a mystic and at the same time a zealous propagandist of an essentially evangelical Christianity based on the New Testament and his own abundant and unintermittent personal spiritual experience. He belongs to no special Church, and does not himself baptize, but remits his numerous converts for reception to the clergy, no matter of what denomination, of the district in which he happens to be preaching. A Sikh by birth, and belonging to a wealthy and high-born family, as a boy he practised his ancestral faith with assiduity, and familiarized himself with its scriptures, the *Granth Sahib*, but early began to seek for peace and spiritual satisfaction by a study of the *Quran*, the *Upanishads* and the *Gītā*, the last of which he learned by heart. He also attempted yoga-exercises. But by none of these means did he find the inner peace he sought. As to Christianity, he was violently opposed to it, going so far as to tear up a copy of the New Testament. Suddenly, at the still early age of sixteen, he had a remarkable waking vision of the Christ, which wrought his conversion and gave him the inner peace and strength which have been his practically without break from that day to the present, a period of another sixteen years, in spite of much outer trial and suffering. Driven from his home by his family, he adopted the life of a wandering *Sādhu* or holy man, and travelling to Kashmir made his way into Tibet, where he began to preach. There he suffered much persecution and on several occasions came very nigh to a martyr's death of cruel torture, from which he escaped only by what has all the appearance of 'miraculous' intervention. Until 1917 he confined his activities to Northern India and Tibet. Thereafter he visited on his preaching tours Southern India, Ceylon, Burma, the Straits Settlements, China and Japan, and quite recently Europe, America, and Australia. Our interest in him is chiefly because of his mystical experience, which is so sympathetically set forth and prudently considered by the writers. Sundar Singh is typically what is called in India a *Bhākta*, the ecstatic devotee of a personal God, in his case of course of the Christ. He believes that religion is entirely a matter of the heart, and he has thus little or no sympathy with the intellectual difficulties which bulk so largely in the present unrest in the religious world of the West. They seem to have no meaning and no importance for him. He is a man of the ages of faith and even we might say of the first

two centuries of the faith. Since his conversion he never seems to have had any intellectual difficulties; and even in the most severe physical sufferings and dangers, when all seemed outwardly hopeless, he has been upheld spiritually and has never experienced any break in inner consciousness of the Presence. For him there has been no 'dark night of the soul,' which has tried to the depths the faith of so many of the great Western mystics, and (what is not sufficiently recognized) is the far more common lot of those myriads who have never enjoyed a mystical illumination. For him not only has there been the formless comfort of unbroken inner peace, but also a constant ability to enter into the ecstatic state, in which he is conscious of being in a heaven-world, where Christ and the saints of the faith appear in forms of spiritual glory, and where he can commune with them without earthly speech, and receive instruction. It is of interest in this connection to note that, though the Sādhū accepts so unquestioningly the full inspiration of the Books of the Bible, he nevertheless is not very greatly impressed by *Daniel* and *Revelation*, and can make little of the visions of *Ezekiel*. He naturally believes in revelation as a continuing fact and, when pressed on the subject, averred that as far as he was concerned he had no choice but to follow what was given to him, as the immediate truth. "With me," he declared, "a revelation in ecstasy counts for more than Church tradition." As we might expect, his theology is intuitive rather than formal and is interestingly sketched by Canon Streeter. It is essentially Christo-centric, and though he does not publicly preach salvation to all ultimately, he is really a universalist. The simplicity of his conceptions may be instanced by his view of the trinity, based on a vision, which he relates as follows: "The first time I entered Heaven I looked round about and asked, 'But where is God?' And they told me, 'God is not to be seen here any more than on earth, for God is Infinite. But there is Christ, He is God, He is the Image of the Invisible God, and it is only in Him that we can see God, in Heaven as on earth.' And streaming out from Christ I saw, as it were, waves shining and peace-giving and going through and among the Saints and Angels, and everywhere bringing refreshment, just as in hot weather water refreshes trees. And this I understood to be the Holy Spirit." It is evident that traditionalist theologians would make short shrift of him: but Swedenborg would have understood, and it is interesting to note how the *fond* of his experience agrees with the general notions of now wide-spread psychic 'communications,' from which

his editors would dissociate the Sādhū's visions and which apparently he himself would repudiate. His general preaching is replete with simple natural analogies and graphic illustrations; some are fair and fitting, others naïve and by no means so convincing as the preacher seems to believe. There is, however, a deep sense of ethically spiritual values in all he says, and an atmosphere about him which for many carries more conviction than his actual words. But for men of religion who have to grapple with the many grave historical and doctrinal difficulties of the present day the Sādhū does not seem sufficiently to appreciate that religion in its fullest sense should satisfy the whole nature of man, intellectual as well as affective. The presence of this interesting personality among us, has brought prominently forward, especially in Missionary circles, speculation as to the possibility of developing a new characteristic type of Christianity in the various great countries of the East. The idea is widespread that denominational forms of Christianity, developed in and suited to the West, are not appropriate to Oriental mentality. It is hard on the convert to ask him to choose between a variety of schisms and sects, and already in India a strong movement to union has begun in the native churches. The Sādhū has been urged to start an order, and no less than four hundred aspirants to Christian Sādhūism have volunteered to put themselves under his guidance. But Sundar Singh is averse from this. He knows that the genuine spirit must come from within and that 'imitation' is a poor substitute; and in this he is wise. We shall follow the career of this Indian Christian mystic with interest, for he is yet young and the temptations of his present great popularity are more subtle than the trials of his years of persecution.

#### IS CHRISTIANITY THE FINAL RELIGION ?

A Candid Enquiry with the Materials for an Opinion. By  
A. C. Bouquet, B.D. London (Macmillan); pp. x. + 350;  
10s. 6d. net.

THE quest of finality is a task which is beset with pitfalls. In no case is it so difficult as when it is applied to the work of estimating the final form of an evolutionary religion. Mr. Bouquet's task is not made easier by the extraordinary amount of static theology with which the Christian tradition is bound up. It is probably true to say that in ninety per cent. of the books dealing with Christianity the law of development finds no recognition. Mr.

Bouquet finds himself morally and intellectually bound "to hammer out as best he may the fundamental grounds for maintaining the finality and absoluteness of Christianity." It is to the basis of Christian belief that his attention is principally devoted.

He begins his essay with a consideration of the nature of religion and its continued existence. He takes his stand quite definitely with those who believe in the 'personality' of God. He finds it, moreover, to be in harmony with the facts of life that, in the development of the relations between God and man, there might arrive a point at which a body of Truth, supreme and absolute, should come into existence. He further contends that at the same point the Divine Personality, never inactive, might act in a unique way as far as man's spiritual life was concerned. Hitherto Mr. Bouquet's arguments are not particularly convincing, and there appears a number of *lacunæ* which need a certain ingenuity to overcome. He argues from the analogy of human achievements that it is at least possible that a unique human being might have appeared about two thousand years ago. That may be so, but where is the proof that such a being represented an impact of the Divine Personality upon the human sphere?

Having established to his own satisfaction the possibility of an absolute religion already existing, Mr. Bouquet passes to a consideration of the traditional valuation of Christianity and the Christian theology. A long chapter is devoted to those arguments which are commonly adduced in support of the absoluteness of Christianity. They are as follows (it will be noticed that they concern practice rather than belief, and are therefore, in a sense, incidental to Mr. Bouquet's thesis): (1) The Christian religion is racially wider and more successful in the extent of its appeal than any other; (2) it has satisfied more completely than any other religion certain fundamental needs of human nature; (3) it has achieved more beneficial results in the world. Mr. Bouquet is wise enough to notice the imperfections of such arguments, but believes that, at any rate with regard to (1) and (3), as much may be urged in support as against the claims which they assert.

The fifth chapter is a really masterly summary of the attempts of Prof. Ernst Troeltsch to reconstruct the Christian view of the world. Similar attempts by the Unitarians, by Prof. Harnack, by M. Loisy, by Prof. Eucken, are considered in another chapter. In the last chapter Mr. Bouquet sums up his position. He believes in the historical career of Christ as the religious climax of the planet, and as the definition of the character of God. Alongside

of this definition is also to be found the fixation of the ideal human character. Since the historical career of Christ, to be regarded as the focus of all life on this planet, the Divine Spirit has sought to bring mankind into conformity with the ideal. The sum and crown of Mr. Bouquet's philosophy is this: "I am convinced that the evidence taken as a whole shows it to be in the highest degree improbable that there can be any new or higher religion to supersede Christianity." The practical consequences of this belief are summarized in a final chapter. H. L. H.

#### KING'S COLLEGE LECTURES ON IMMORTALITY.

Edited by W. R. Matthews, M.A., B.D., Dean of King's College, London. London (Hodder & Stoughton); pp. viii. + 249; 6s. net.

THIS book is a collection of suggestions rather than a coherent exposition of the doctrine of immortality. The fact that five different lecturers have contributed to it makes it inevitable that each should write from a different angle. While this method of treatment makes for variety, it also makes for too great brevity. Readers will find, however, much food for reflection; they will be introduced to many lines of thought which should stimulate them to carry their studies further, for they will find five men of very different outlook all in agreement upon the reasonableness of the belief.

Prof. Bethune-Baker of Cambridge writes upon 'The Religious Value of the Idea of a Future Life.' His point of view is essentially modernist. He finds the orthodox Christian interpretation of the doctrine of immortality too narrow and cramping. At the same time he holds the doctrine itself to be absolutely essential. "Some beliefs which have been held about the future life no doubt we must discard . . . but the idea itself of a future life is for me at least so integral a part of Religion that if I had to discard it I could not feel that I could speak of Religion at all." Professor Caldecott has undertaken a difficult task. His paper is called 'The Argument from the Emotions.' His theory is that all emotional desire postulates a consummation. Hence the desire for a future life implies the existence of such a life. It may be so—we hope it is; but the argument is by no means conclusive. Dean Rashdall treats of 'The Moral Argument for Personal Immortality.' Unless the present world of unhappiness and pain be a preparation for a happier world it is impossible to



believe in a loving and a moral God. This position seems to beg the question. What is meant by 'loving' and 'moral' as epithets applied to God? Is either inconsistent with pain and suffering? Professor Brown ('Immortality in the Light of Modern Psychology') frankly admits that, so far, psychology has helped but little in the consideration of the problems of immortality. Its verdict is favourable, but beyond that it has done little. "The verdict of modern psychology is in favour of the possibility of a future life. Proofs of its certainty are yet to seek." Dr. Relton's paper ('The Christian Contribution to the Conception of Eternal Life') is one of the best in the book. He discredits Dean Rashdall's theories (albeit involuntarily) by defining the life of God as "a victorious spirit wrestling with sin and death." He shows the essential flaw of pantheism—that dualism of soul and body which admits only of an immortal soul, an incomplete personality.

We have criticised some of the writers but it is only right to say that the good entirely outweighs the weak points in this book. It is as a whole a noteworthy contribution to the solution of an exceedingly difficult problem.

H. L. H.

#### THE LIFE BEYOND THE VEIL.

Spirit Messages received and written down by the Rev. G. Vale Owen, Vicar of Orford, Lancashire. Edited by H. W. Engholm. Book I. The Lowlands of Heaven. Book II. The Highlands of Heaven. Book III. The Ministry of Heaven. London (Thornton Butterworth); pp. 191, 253, 250; (1) 6s. net, (2 and 3) 7s. 6d. net.

NEVER in the history of Spiritualism has such publicity been given to any automatic script as to that of the Rev. G. Vale Owen. For months one of the Sunday papers belonging to the most powerful Press combine in the country published a whole page of these communications week by week. The circulation of the *Weekly Dispatch* went up by leaps and bounds, and the interest aroused in all classes was testified to by the enormous correspondence which poured in from some thousands of people. Not the slightest shadow of doubt can be thrown on the good faith, sincere convictions and high character of the writer, and though large emoluments could legitimately have been his, he has steadily refused to take a halfpenny for the script. The volumes before us are three of the four which will present the whole

matter to an extended public in book-form. They are furnished with an appreciation by Lord Northcliffe and with an enthusiastic benediction by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who is the most fervent and energetic apostle of the better side of Spiritualism regarded as a religion and which he himself goes so far as to call the 'new revelation.' These Vale Owen messages have been circulated very widely in the United States and in the Colonies and are being translated into several languages.

It is not to be supposed that the Vicar of Orford is a recent convert who has hastily succumbed. As he tells us, it required ten years to convince him that communication with the departed could be a fact and fifteen more to assure him that such a fact could be legitimate and good. Even then it took long to overcome his reluctance to make trial on his own account. He was urged to this by automatic messages received by his wife and he was gradually impressed that the influence was good, and so at last but even then doubtfully he decided to sit in his cassock alone in the vestry after evensong. A start once made the writing came very regularly and consistently. As for the influences, he says, "they did not overrule or compel my will in any way—that would have settled the matter at once, so far as I was concerned."

The general purport of the matter contained in these volumes will be familiar to readers of Spiritualistic literature, for the main features of such rumours of the hither hereafter bear a strong family resemblance to one another. These things vary indefinitely but in the main the general ideas are similar. In contrast with our prosaic state of existence, it is a world of romance and phantasy. The nearest resemblance is to be sought in that freedom from the normal conditions of time and place that appear in some classes of vivid dreams. In the present case the whole is suffused with strong Christian influence and there are throughout ample signs of a sincere desire to help. Indeed the whole scheme of the conditions of progress, as is generally the case in the better class of this literature, is based on the law of benefiting and being benefited in turn. This interlinked economy of mutual service is the most attractive feature of Mr. Owen's script.

As is usual in these modern sketches of the more proximate conditions of the hereafter, all is depicted in natural imagery, and not in the terms of symbolic apocalypse; it is imaginally serial with our physical state of existence. There are ascending grades of refinement and tenuity of substance with a proportional intensity of vividness of sense; but the 'spheres' are materially continuous

with one another, and not discrete states of consciousness. As far as the picturing goes, up to the 'tenth sphere,' it is still a question of ascending mountains and descending into valleys and plains in passing from one zone to another. It is true there is passage by way of the air as well as by more pedestrian means, according to requirement, and that psychical and psycho-physical possibilities are much in evidence. But there is little said of deeper inward spiritual experiences of a genuinely mystical nature. With no desire to be hypercritical, it must be remarked that some of the instances given of extensions of psychical sense seem to be set forth naïvely, to say the least of it. Throughout, however, there is no claim to be dealing with ultimates, no pretence of infallible knowledge. It is all set forth as an attempt to depict things seen as far as the 'communicators' have got. The general impression left on us is that it is a view within a shut-off and, so to say, protected field of experience, and not a comprehensive or comparative after-life world-view. We have nothing to help us towards a notion of other religiously determined 'heavens': the only incident that indirectly bears on this problem, suggests that certain 'fire-worshippers' were converted to the Christian faith as they ascended the scale. The spiritual implications of Zoroastrianism and of the other high faiths of the world are not considered. The blending point where the various 'heaven'-modes flow into one another, lies presumably beyond the scope of all doctrinally conditioned formal eschatologies.

We are watching an attempt at depicting some of the after-life phases in terms of more immediate interest than those of the ancient mythological modes; it makes it all at any rate far more human. And as automatists of the same integrity as Mr. Vale Owen clearly do not sit down deliberately to invent it, many are persuaded, without going so far as to be out-and-out believers, that there must be some background of actuality in it all, and that it cannot be disposed of as being solely the will to believe fooled by the inventions of a lying subconscious.

#### BEAUTY AND THE BEAST.

An Essay in Evolutionary Aesthetic. By Steward A. McDowall, B.D. Cambridge (The University Press); pp. 93; 7s. 6d. net.

THIS essay will be welcomed by those who regret that Croce's philosophy of beauty stops where it does, and also by those who,

attracted by both the beautiful and the spiritual, long to establish common ground between them. The writer attempts to take up the argument where Croce leaves off; he endeavours "to reach a conception and definition that will carry us beyond Croce's into a region that shines with a light of its own." For him beauty is more than expression simply; it is the expression of relationship.

Our writer lays the foundation of his constructive work by noting the psychological effect of such a realization of beauty. The beauty we perceive is never satisfying. There is a yearning for something, and this yearning is compounded of lack, aspiration and self-ignorance. These three determine its salient character—that of an impulse. This impulse produces a desire to create, and thus the psychological effect of the beautiful is to produce a creative impulse.

Mr. McDowall goes on to consider the yearning which accompanies our realization of beauty. He finds an analogy in the yearning caused by intense love of a person when there is uncertainty as to this love being reciprocated. But this is more than an analogy. It is the same yearning that is caused by both. He reaches this conclusion chiefly by noting that in both cases the dissatisfaction is due to receiving without giving. We receive the beauty, grace, charm, interest of the loved one and can give nothing in return. Similarly with the beautiful. "We receive everything, we can give nothing at all (to the beautiful thing) and so dissatisfaction is at its highest. We love the thing in which we find beauty but our love is one-sided. The cases are identical. It is no mere phrase when we speak of the love of beauty and the beauty of love. Unwittingly we have expressed the truth of an absolute inter-dependence. Love is relationship, beauty the expression of relationship. In this sentence lies our thesis."

We find it difficult to follow him here. We cannot see how the cases should be identical simply because this yearning accompanies both. Yearning caused by love of a person surely has something in it which no other yearning possesses. We have an idea of a person, which is the sum of his qualities as they appear to us. Sometimes this idea is of such a nature that it gives rise to the feeling of love. Really we love our idea though we refer it to that person because we know that he possesses a self-conscious life in himself—his very ego, ever new, original and creative.

Our yearning is caused by our desire to bridge the gap between our idea and this ego, to include all within relationship.

and this can never come about until that ego is brought into action towards us by his becoming conscious of our love and returning it. We cannot see how in our love for a person, this sense of his ego can fail to give a special character to the yearning that is felt, differentiating it from the yearning caused by beauty.

Our author proceeds to develop the thought of the yearning caused by beauty and to re-assert the latter to be the expression of relationship. In realizing beauty we are receiving an intuition. He follows Croce in observing that when this beauty is that of a work of human art, we enter into the mind of the creator of the work of art, follow his intuition and create the expression afresh for ourselves; and so he uses the analogy of the picture or the poem, and goes on to say that when we see beauty in a natural object we are following out the idea of the creator of the natural object, that we are in touch with the Cosmic Idea, which is the Idea of a Personal God.

But is there an analogy here? We indeed follow the intuition of the creator (of a work of art), but this his intuition is that of the Reality behind, which he is painting or describing, and through him we have an intuition of the same Reality, as indeed it is possible for us to do when ourselves face to face with the natural scene.

In reading Mr. McDowall's essay we are stimulated to go beyond the position of Croce, but it does not convince us that there is any way of doing this short of postulating beauty as proceeding primarily from God. No consideration of the love of beauty or the beauty of love, no thought of human relationship or creative art appears able to bridge this gap. If the Reality behind is referred to God at all, it must exist in Him and proceed from Him. To refer love and beauty to God, uniting them to Him, appears preferable to uniting them before referring them to Him.

C. M. S.

#### MIRACLES WHICH HAPPEN.

By the Rev. Arthur Pannell, M.A., B.D. London (Nisbet); pp. xiii.  
+ 170; 6s. net.

JUST before the close of his professorial life Dr. Sanday wrote his considered opinion upon the controversial topic of the miraculous element in religion. His words were: "I will ask you to consider whether it is not possible to keep the idea of miracle but to eliminate from it the element of the 'abnormal.' I fully believe

that there were miracles in the age of the Gospels and Acts in the sense of 'wonderful works' or 'mighty works,' but I do not think they involve any real breach of the order of nature." In the book under consideration Mr. Pannell states the present position of research and knowledge upon two matters which bear directly upon the whole question of miracle: (i) the influence of mind upon mind and upon body; (ii) the possibility for the human mind of forming a belief which goes beyond the range of observed and verifiable facts. Two chapters deal with the powers and influence of suggestion and auto-suggestion. The author surveys the work of such authorities as Kraft-Ebbing, Braid, William James, Boris Sidis and others; and applies their conclusions to the miracles recorded in the New Testament and in the lives of the saints. A full account of these latter miracles is given and shows the author to be a student of the lesser known paths of ecclesiastical history. In addition to his theological learning, which is not inconsiderable, Mr. Pannell has a wide and deep knowledge of medical and psychological science. Consequently his approach to the problem of the miraculous is one which will command the attention of all students. It is becoming increasingly clear that the old interpretation of a miracle as an act of Divine interposition involving the temporary suspension or reversal of natural law, is untenable. There is dawning upon the world a range of new facts which reveal the presence of hitherto undiscovered laws. These laws are seen, as they emerge, to explain many occurrences which up till the present have been regarded as entirely inexplicable, and it is scarcely too much to assume that in the process of time everything which has hitherto been regarded as beyond or outside human understanding, will be capable of scientific explanation. To-day men are turning rapidly to a view of miracle which may be regarded as subjective rather than objective. They are beginning to look for the miraculous element not in the occurrence itself but in the impression made upon the minds of the witnesses. An ignorant or credulous man sees a miracle where the educated scientist sees the revelation of a hitherto undiscovered natural law. Mr. Pannell's book leads to a conclusion along these lines. The weakest chapter in the book is the last, which attempts a religious interpretation of some of the facts of science. It is at least arguable that religion and science are phenomena not so far distinct as to need an interpretation to one another. It would not be unfair to say that this chapter is marked as much by ingenuity as by scholarship.

We welcome this book as a valuable contribution to the study of the miraculous, and are glad to see that the University of Cambridge has accepted it as a dissertation for the degree of a Bachelor of Divinity. An excellent bibliography is included, but the value of the book would be increased by the addition of an index. Professor Caldecott contributes an introduction.

H. L. H.

#### NEITHER DEAD NOR SLEEPING.

By May Wright Sewall. With an Introduction by Booth Tarkington. London (Watkins); pp. 320; 7s. 6d. net.

THIS is a book of greater interest in some ways for the experimental student of psychical phenomena than the usual run of spiritistic literature. Mrs. Sewall was exceedingly well known in the United States and to a less extent in this country for her prominent work in the Women's movement, and in educational matters and international organizations for peace and arbitration. She has hitherto been known as a tireless worker and very capable organizer, as eminently objective and practical. Meantime, all unknown to the vast majority of her friends and colleagues, she had been engaged for twenty-five years or so in a private interest that gradually outweighed all others for her—the possibilities of communication with the world invisible. At long last she decided to break down her reserve and publish some parts of her varied and interesting psychical experiences, for the present volume by no means exhausts the very voluminous records to which she repeatedly refers. It took long to break down her scepticism, for she was by no means inclined to believe, and had indeed, at the beginning, a very strong aversion from anything savouring of spiritism. After fifteen years of happy married life her husband died. According to her story, it is he who first began to attract her attention by numerous communications through sensitives in different parts of the world, all of them totally unknown to her, who were impressed to forward to her what they had received. She thus gradually began to overcome her repugnance, and at last determined to experiment personally with some mediums. As she was also, without knowing it herself, of a mediumistic nature, which had, however, hitherto been severely repressed and well-nigh atrophied by her active intellectual life, she obtained some phenomena through them which were more striking than those they ordinarily produced. As time went on, she herself began to be put through a very strenuous course of training, subsequently to develop her sensitivity, but first of all to save her life, for

she was suffering not only from general ill-health but also from an insidious malady pronounced by her medical adviser to be incurable—Bright's disease. The major part of the present volume describes the extremely severe regime and practices she adopted, not only to expel the poison, but also to build up anew from within an organism the tissues of which had been broken down and atrophied by the malady. It is the nature of the means employed for this cure which constitutes the chief interest of the book. We have before us a record of most strenuous and constant fastings and instinctive rhythmic exercises, with such a minimum of sleep that it is almost incredible that anyone could have undergone the process even if they had nothing else to do. It is all the more amazing when we are told that meantime Mrs. Sewall's busy public work was never interrupted or diminished; indeed it increased.

All this, Mrs. Sewall avers, was owing to the sustaining and transforming vital 'magnetism' poured into her by her friends and helpers from within, from whom she received constant and voluminous detailed instructions and directions through her own rapidly developing equipment, automatic and otherwise. We should not ourselves be inclined to credit so much of her account of externals as we do, if it were not that we were previously acquainted with a somewhat similar case. As to what lies behind, the psychical *personæ* of the *drama*, that is a more difficult matter of belief. Even Mrs. Sewall herself was oft and again in greatest doubt as to whether it was not all to be ascribed to the dramatic power of personification of her own subconscious, before she finally gave in to the spiritistic hypothesis and the special instances of it consistently present to her rich experience. While an ever-increasing number of serious investigators now-a-days baulk little when it is a question of communications from relatives and friends, they become very restive when historical names are mentioned. In this case we are up against a Rubinstein and a Mesmer. The interested reader must study the record to find out the part they are said to have played; but whatever he may surmise on this point, he will, we venture to think, be persuaded of the *bona fides* of Mrs. Sewall and thank her for her courage in overcoming her natural reluctance, and in submitting to the very painful ordeal of making public so intimate a record of her inner life. Unfortunately for us since the appearance of this volume the gifted lady who wrote it has passed to a wider life, and the unfinished story of her psychical experiences in the body may perhaps not be completed.



## WHAT RELIGION IS.

By Bernard Bosanquet, F.B.A., etc. London (Macmillan); pp. xii. + 81; 3s. 6d. net.

DR. BOSANQUET has put students of philosophy the world over under so deep an obligation to him for his many fine and searching volumes that it is with a pang that we have to pronounce this small book unsatisfying and disappointing. In eight short chapters Professor Bosanquet essays to tell us what religion is, but he is so anxious to avoid specific reference to specific religions and to specific religious experience, that his analysis is really paralysed for want of concrete illustration. Does it carry us very far to say that religion means nothing more and nothing less than salvation, and salvation 'from isolation'? The Apostle James is much more definite in his statement: "*Religio munda et immaculata apud Deum et Patrem, hæc est: visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum, immaculatum se custodire ab hoc sæculo.*" The genus and species of the religious experience which speaks with a single voice (p. 12), are nowhere stated by Dr. Bosanquet. Yet the problem for every man (and all men, says our author, possess some sort of a religion) is to settle his account with some concrete religion and choose it to govern his way of thinking and his way of living. And why should 'interesting and valuable speculation' be denied to be part of religion? Is the theologian only religious when he is not a theologian? Are the 'interesting and valuable speculations' in *Hebrews*, *Romans*, the *Upanishads* all not part of religion? And although it is true that "in religion man acknowledges his finiteness" (p. 27), is it not also true that in religion he also claims his infiniteness? "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, Else, what's a heaven for?"

The book, indeed, needs expanding, for where it is not metaphorical it is often obscure. Consider the following final three sentences in the short chapter on sin: "In pure morality, not allowing for the social ethical observance which is half a religion, the individual must always count as bad. In religion also he is always bad, but yet he is really and truly good. This depends on the nature of faith, and a religion which gives you this gives you all you need to see what is meant by sin." One would like Dr. Muirhead's commentary on the first of these sentences and Calvin's or General Booth's on the second.

The chapter on suffering is less unsatisfactory ; that on prayer and worship unimportantly brief. Dr. Bosanquet does not say that prayer is of the essence of religion, but only that it ' *seems to be* ' of its essence. Further comment is needless.

A. A. C.

#### OCCULTISTS AND MYSTICS OF ALL AGES.

By the Hon. Ralph Shirley. With Four Illustrations. London (Rider) ; pp. 175 ; 4s. 6d. net.

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3. Franz Anton Mesmer : His Life and Teaching. By R. B. Ince.
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5. Joseph Glanvill and Psychical Research in the Seventeenth Century. By H. Stanley Redgrove and I. M. L. Redgrove. London (Rider) ; pp. 52, 63, 59, 63 and 94 ; 1-4, 1s. 6d. each net ; 5, 2s. 6d. net.

THE notabilities of whom the Hon. Ralph Shirley, the Editor of *The Occult Review*, treats under his somewhat too expansive title, are Apollonius of Tyana, Plotinus, Michael Scott, Theophrastus Paracelsus, Emanuel Swedenborg, Cagliostro, Anna Kingsford and Edward Maitland. Two of these are also subjects of the five booklets under notice. The whole supply the general reader with convenient summaries of the lives, doctrines or views of variously famous people, some of the greatest genius and distinction, others of a more medium ability, all of special interest to students of psychical matters. Mr. Shirley and Mr. Redgrove are both sympathetic and judicious biographers, and the latter is especially good in keeping scientific interests in the foreground. The majority of the themes are of the past and well-worn. The highly appreciative sketch of Anna Kingsford and Edward Maitland by Mr. Shirley, however, brings us down to contemporary memory ; we ourselves were compelled to be somewhat more critical in reviewing the 2 vols. of their autobiography when it first appeared. Perhaps the freshest piece of work is Mr. Redgrove's treatment of Glanvill. Most know of him only through his famous *Saducismus Triumphatus*, a painstaking and enlightened enquiry into so-called

witchcraft and some allied phenomena. Glanvill showed much common sense and impartiality in his method of approaching the subject; but his excellent example was not followed, and what might have been the beginning of a scientific investigation of psychical phenomena was delayed until the birth of the Psychological Research Society in our own day. Apart from this, Glanvill was one of the founders of the scientific method in this country and one of the earliest fellows of the Royal Society. He was a doughty champion of experimental philosophy and also in close touch with the Cambridge Platonists, and his works deserve an attention which few have hitherto bestowed upon them. But it is hard to procure copies of his writings and in the present days of costly printing it is little to be expected that any publisher would risk the venture.

#### THE SECRET ROSE GARDEN.

Of Sa'd ud Din Mahmūd Shabistari. Rendered from the Persian by Florence Lederer, author of 'Seventy Thousand Veils.' London (Murray); pp. 92; 3s. 6d. net.

WE are very glad to welcome the reappearance of 'The Wisdom of the East' series, under the skilful editorship of our old friend Capt. L. Cranmer-Byng. The War crippled its good work, but fortunately has not permanently incapacitated it. 'The Rose Garden' of Sādi is one of the most famous specimens of Persian mystical love-poesy. Mrs. Lederer has a natural gift of her own in this direction, and has for some years past been acquiring a knowledge of Persian so as to enjoy at first hand its rich poetical literature. Her renderings are set forth in fair phrasing and with a commendable restraint of diction. The Sūfis, few can doubt, were and are ascetics. It is because of this, presumably by a natural reaction, that they poured forth their souls in love of God in figurative language which revelled in the joys of wine and women. They sang of the Allowed in terms of the Forbidden. This exemplifies the strange contradictions of human nature, and illustrates the law of psychic ambivalence. Their imagery clearly fascinated them and fascinates most of their readers in the East and no few in the West. For ourselves we have always felt a reluctance to envisage the ways of God to man under the guise of a coquettish damsel, no matter how fair she be. Still we must remember the enormous vogue of 'The Song of Songs' among the mystics of our Western tradition. You may expel Nature with a fork, but she will return with the love-light in her eyes to vanquish her too rude assailants.

## THE RELEASE OF THE SOUL.

By Gilbert Cannan. London (Chapman and Hall) ; pp. 197 ; 5s. net.

'CREDO,' thus printed, is the last word in this vague book. Yet, after going through these lightly filled pages of this expert writer, the reader will find himself asking in whom, or in what, does Mr. Cannan believe? Perhaps the hidden key to the problem is to be sought in the author's egotism? We cannot at all agree with what is said on the cover—that it is 'synthetic and constructive.' It might better be called analytic and destructive. Indeed the writer himself seems to take that view. "It is impossible to argue over religion. It is futile to attempt to crystallize any mystical vision into a system." Yet this has been done, and well done, by the great saints and mystics of the past, who still live through their teaching in the present. But to these 'Credo' meant more than a tag.

As far as there is any skeleton of construction here it seems to be vaguely drawn upon the lines of Plotinus. It is assuredly not Christianity, nor is it any known doctrine of philosophy. We find the old words 'God,' 'love,' 'soul,' 'spirit,' used in new meanings or with no meaning. There is no explanation even of the taking title, unless it lies in this cryptic sentence: "Definition is a function of the intellect. That which is true and therefore beautiful cannot be defined, but it can be known at the price of the laying aside of the intellect," and yet his publishers say outside the book that it "offers an intellectual solace from the disturbances of the present time." We may then omit the 'intellectual,' on the author's own showing, and rely on the 'solace.' It is here perhaps that we get to the root of the matter. After the shattering of all things and thoughts by the Great War and the muddlement of Peace programmes many people are seeking solace somewhere and somehow. Readers of this work may find comfort in the smart sayings of this ready writer; they will think they are themselves thinking, and that is always a consolation to many who do not want to know why. Though he has achieved some bright bits and purple patches, the net result is that the Release of the Soul seems to mean rather the letting it loose over what are for the most part desert places than the arrival of the spirit at any goal of mysticism or philosophy.

## SEEN AND UNSEEN.

Or Monologues of a Homeless Snail. By Yoné Noguchi. Agents :  
New York (Orientalia) ; London (Elkin Mathews).

IT is not necessary to introduce Yoné Noguchi to our readers, for he has contributed to our pages a number of pleasant pieces, poems and No-plays, in which are revealed the delicate feeling, mystical atmosphere and quiet if at times somewhat remote conceits of his creative imagination. The early reveries, so tragi-comically described as 'Monologues of a Homeless Snail,' are here reprinted. They consist of fifty short pieces of poetical prose and free verse with the quality of lyrical songs, and are Yoné Noguchi's first youthful attempts at expression in English, when he lived, a recluse and dreamer, in the home of Joaquin Miller, high in the hills near Oakland, California. His English was, as might be expected, not always impeccable. It was, however, never stilted nor conventional ; pleasingly quaint turns of phrasing showed that true artistry was at work in an as yet imperfectly controlled medium. In spite of its immaturity the poet himself, who has since written many other books, still loves *Seen and Unseen* best, not only because it is his first-born, but also because, as he says, "under its wild fugitive words sounding almost like a child's babble, I succeeded in making myself more naked and true." We do not think that Yoné Noguchi need apologize for his firstling or excuse his love of it ; what youthful English poet under similar circumstances and conditions could have done better, or even as well, in Japanese ? The Monologues are delightful. The present publication is most tastefully produced in Japanese style, and is a credit to the printing and book-binding of Tokyo.

## THE DREAMLAND OF REALITY.

A Book of Mystical Verses. By H. L. Hubbard. With an  
Introductory Note by Evelyn Underhill, and a Frontispiece  
by E. Hesketh Hubbard, A.R.W.A. London (Dent) ; pp. 42 ;  
4s. 6d. net.

THIS score of short verse-pieces is pleasing reading and shows that Mr. Hubbard has the sense of mystical beauty in him when he sings of "the city of my strong desires" found by the "dreaming heart," and of "the dreamland no one knows save the wise all-seeing blind." The whole is suffused with a deep religious spirit, and Mr. Hubbard is alert to find God 'here' as well as 'there,' especially in his nature-piece where, under the superscription 'None Other,' he writes :

- "Do you hear the country laughing in the springtime of the year?  
Then be certain 'tis none other than the Laugh of God you hear.
- "Do you see the branches quiver of the slender forest tree?  
Then be certain 'tis none other than the Kiss of God you see.
- "Do you see the starry splendour of illimitable dark?  
Then be certain 'tis none other than the Robe of God you mark.
- "Do you feel the spirit lifted far above a world of sin?  
Then be certain 'tis none other than the Life of God within."

#### SPIRITUALISM: A POPULAR HISTORY FROM 1847.

By Joseph McCabe. London (T. Fisher Unwin); pp. 240; 15s. net.

THE author does not approach his subject with an open mind and his book is superficial and remarkably disingenuous. He has a *parti pris* throughout against Spiritualism, and an imperfect acquaintance with the results of many recent investigations. He dismisses, for instance, the experiments of Dr. W. J. Crawford in Belfast and the automatic writings edited by Mr. Bligh Bond in connection with the Glastonbury excavations without a word of comment beyond the remark that the books published by them on these subjects excited little notice at the time of their publication, which is not the fact.

Mr. McCabe's book might more properly have been called 'A History of Spiritualistic Fraud,' since he seems throughout to take it for granted that all phenomena produced by all mediums are the results of deliberate deception.

O. S.

#### PSYCHICAL RESEARCH FOR THE PLAIN MAN.

By G. M. KINGSFORD. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 271; 6s. net.

THE 'Plain Man' has reason to be grateful to Miss Kingsford for the simple, interesting way in which she has stated the nature of the experiments and the verified telepathic and mediumistic phenomena which are recorded in the *Journal* and *Proceedings* of the S.P.R. She refrains from argument, and comments but little on her own account, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions from the evidence. Even if we find parts of the book not wholly convincing, we have to admit that it does not contain a single dull page.

O. S.

#### THE HAPPY TREE.

And other Poems. By Gerald Gould. Oxford (Blackwell); pp. 51; 3s. 6d. net.

THE unattained, the truth not apparent, the unrecognized value,

seem to be the inspiration of Mr. Gerald Gould's Muse. This is evidenced by poems such as that entitled 'Frustration,' which beginning :

" My Muse stopped singing and I heard  
A sorrow crying to and fro ;  
It cried upon me for a word,  
It claimed the word I did not know "—

ends with the following beautiful verse :

" O song that songs of ours refuse,  
And pain speech was not fashioned for !  
Upon that hunger of my Muse  
Not death itself shall shut the door."

Such writing may supply a needed antidote to the rising clamour of 'the world and the flesh' for recognition, perhaps too carelessly admitted by the present age ; but it cannot be denied that with all its lofty idealism, it seems lacking in a certain wholesome virility. One of the best among many beautiful poems is that on 'November 11, 1918,' though here again we have the 'goal' that 'mocked' those who tried for it, and a suggestion of futility in the struggle. The last verse of the concluding piece expresses in striking symbolism the spirit that permeates most of the book :

" O silent voice of loudest choir !  
The love made dim with day  
Lifts in the blind face of desire  
Her sacramental 'Nay !' "

S. E. H.

#### THE DALES OF ARCADY.

By Dorothy Una Ratcliffe. London (Erskine Macdonald) : pp. 64 ;  
8s. 6d. net.

THIS little book of pleasant verse is like a breath of real moorland air. It is filled with the spirit of the Yorkshire moors, though dealing perhaps too exclusively with one aspect of them. It is not always spring ; and their sterner moods are scarcely represented. The poetess should guard herself against a dangerous tendency to the facile, and should avoid the temptation to fill up lines with the names of natural objects. But though they do not speak from the depths, these poems makes the Dales in springtime vivid for us, and introduce us to a bright and refreshing personality.

S. E. H.



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